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Abstract of the thesis 
 
This thesis is a qualitative study of ethics education as experienced by general practitioners in 
mainland Britain. It draws upon interviews and documents as well as observations and 
reflections from encounters in the field. Ethics is conceived of as a kind of knowledge and 
ethics education is seen as involving translational processes shaped by various social forces 
and tensions. The data analysis is organised according to three concepts outlined by Bernstein: 
curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation. These broadly map to academia, education and practice, 
and the purposive sample reflects participants with involvements in these three domains. 
Ethnographic, phenomenological, and grounded theories are key influences on the method for 
selecting and organising the empirical data. The findings chapters look at the determination 
and production of the broad curriculum (chapter 4); the ‘transmission’, or the delivery and 
reception of, the curriculum (chapter 5); the assessment of ethics education (chapter 6); the 
ways in which ethical issues are identified and negotiated in practice (chapter 7); and key 
substantive issues that arise in practice – confidentiality, abortion, payment for performance 
and resource allocation – which enables an exploration of the negotiation of ethical issues in 
practice (chapters 8 and 9). The concluding chapter pulls the threads together. Societal forces 
and tensions are present when curricula are conceived, when knowledge and skills are taught 
and when GPs attempt to integrate learning into their daily practice. Having understood these 
forces and tensions better we can conceive better of how to make improvements to ethics 
education and assessment. The overall aim is to improve the reflexivity of ethics education. 
Many of ethical shortcomings of doctors have historically been linked to hidden curricula, 
features of practice and the practice environment that have been unseen or ignored by 
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teachers or learners. Knowing more about these features and about the translational 
processes, that shape the experiences and enactments of GP ethics, provides the potential 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
 
This thesis is a qualitative study of ethics education as experienced by general practitioners 
(GPs) on the British mainland. It draws upon interviews, documents and, in places, my own 
observations and reflections on encounters in the field. The broad aim of the study is to 
understand, and support collective reflexivity about, the multiple forces that shape GP ethics 
education.  General practice is the largest medical speciality – there are more GPs than any 
other kind of fully qualified doctor in the UK. And yet bioethics scholarship (both theoretical 
and empirical) tends to focus more on hospital medicine and biomedical research. One reason 
for this is that it is in hospital and research medicine where the dramatic dilemmas and the 
new ethical questions are seen to arise. However, the study of ethics in general practice 
(Family medicine or equivalent internationally) is itself of profound importance. There is also 
no good reason why dramatic dilemmas might not occur in the general practice setting. For 
example many of the court cases which discuss ethical issues at the end of life (e.g. euthanasia 
and the doctrine of double effect) have involved GPs (Huxtable, 2007). Furthermore the setting 
itself may predispose clinical practice to certain types of ethical issue –for example, the fact 
that patients generally present with more minor complaints in community rather than hospital 
setting may give rise to more complicated negotiations of power between patient and GP 
(Brody, 1992).  And the prolonged exposure some GPs and patients have to one another over 
many consultations, sometimes over many years, can generate a more complicated kind of 
respect for patient autonomy than is seen in the acute setting (Doyal and Sokol, 2009, Doyal, 
1999). In addition, departments of general practice have fostered the teaching of ethics to 
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medical students in a number of universities. In the course of planning this study I became 
aware of accounts of such initiatives in London at St Thomas’s (Zander, 1989a, Zander, 1989b) 
and Edinburgh’s (Boyd, 1987) medical schools. 
So why study the phenomenon of ethics education in UK mainland general practice? Reasons 
why research questions are identified for conducting qualitative research in medical ethics 
include: 
 Personal or professional experiences 
 Review of the literature 
 A specific assignment or charge 
 Gaps identified in previous work 
 A perception that previous understanding is lacking (Chandros-Hull et al., 2001) 
 
All of these factors have relevance in this study. Personal and professional experiences, in 
particular, have played a large role in the shaping of this study – a factor that I discuss at length 
in the section on reflexivity in the methods chapter. As an initially amateur ethicist attempting 
to professionalise my own interests in the context of general practice, I noted the relative lack 
of literature and of perceived support both for educators and practitioners. The study asks 
how ethics translates between theory and practice for GPs in Britain. I have chosen to focus on 
ethics as knowledge, and therefore on education as the process of translation. There is 
relatively little literature on how ethical issues are recognised and negotiated in General 
Practice, as acknowledged by Bowman and Spicer:   
…research into or about the ethical terrain in primary healthcare would be of inestimable value 
for the future. The traditional model of ethics analysis is philosophical and reasoned. In applied 
ethics, the methods of, for example, sociological research have added to knowledge about how 
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moral theory is interpreted and used. We know little about how clinicians in primary care derive 
their moral professional behaviours and why, and perhaps we should (Bowman and Spicer, 
2007a). 
There are even fewer accounts of ethics teaching in the context of UK general practice, and 
these tend to be found more recently in medical education journals than medical ethics 
journals. 
This study was conducted during a period of change. During the period when I gathered data 
the newly-introduced curriculum for General Practice training was completely revised and 
restructured. A system of compulsory assessed continuing professional development was 
introduced for all doctors (revalidation). However that is not to say that change itself was a 
new phenomenon. Participants brought with them experience of how things had been 
different over the course of their own lives and professional careers. Some had been in 
practice for decades and others had begun their professional careers abroad. In addition, there 
were widely accepted societal changes, which meant that even a snapshot view of ethics 
education might yield data and insights that were not possible a decade previously.  The Royal 
College of General Practitioners’ (RCGP) manual for GP-trainers and GP-educators suggests 
that the following changes in society at large may be affecting the doctor-patient relationship 
(Deighan, 2008): 
 Rise of consumerism in medicine 
 Emphasis on patient autonomy 
 Changing status of women in society 
 The rise of a disabled culture of affirmative action and pride 
 Attacks on professional self regulation 




 Social concerns about assault and violence towards women 
 Holistic and alternative health movement 
 Change in the status of all professions in society 
 Decline of role of medicine and expansion in role of other professionals 
 Increased use of technology 
 Shift of care from hospital to community 
 European working time [regulations] 
 Increased hospital liability for doctor’s care 
 Administrative- containment of medical costs 
 Increased emphasis on informed consent 
 Increased attention to prevention and patient education 
 [Increased] social acceptance of physician-assisted suicide 
 Doctor’s role as trustee regarding disability benefits 
 
The above list is not exhaustive. It is reproduced in its entirety to demonstrate professional 
awareness that changes in society can affect the consultation as well as other GP roles outside 
the consultation. Many if not all of the above items also connect in some way with issues that 
could be easily classed as ethical. In this thesis I have set out to study what UK GPs see as 
ethics, what educators teach as ethics and what academics frame as ethical discussion, 
guidance or proposed policy. My definition of ethics is a loose one by necessity. My 
participants used words like ethical and moral interchangeably. I came across references to 
philosophical methods of ethical analysis, professional ethical guidelines and legal 
requirements as well as professional etiquette. I took my definition from the participants as 
those things that they considered to be ethical. As well being problematic for me as a 
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researcher this is also problematic for ethics education in general practice and medicine more 
broadly. It is discussed in greater depth in chapter 4 and the conclusion. 
Summary of Research Questions 
 
I began this study with the following research questions: 
1. What issues and questions do general practitioners consider are ethical and how are 
these recognised? 
2. How do GPs manage ethical issues in their professional lives? 
3. How is ethics-education produced for and delivered in General Practice? 
4. How do the recognition and management of ethical aspects of practice inter-relate 
with ethics education in general practice. 
I used Bernstein’s conceptions of curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation to sort my data in the 
context of education (Bernstein, 1971). Bernstein’s categorization of educational activity 
usefully mapped on to three areas that I sought to explore the connections between, namely 
academia, education and practice. The chapters are set out as curriculum (how is ethics 
produced for the education of GPs?), pedagogy (how is ethics learned by and taught to GPs?) 
and evaluation (How are GPs’ enactments of ethics ‘tested’, either in formal assessments or in 
practice?). 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
In the rest of this chapter I outline what each subsequent chapter will contribute to the thesis. 
Chapters 2 and 3 outline my theoretical starting points and my methodological approach to 
the empirical component of this thesis. In the empirical sections of this thesis, I draw upon the 
responses of three groups of actors who ‘do ethics’ in similar but non-identical ways and who 
interact with one another: GP–trainees in vocational training and ‘jobbing’ GPs who are 
neither involved in academia nor education, trainers and educators (one of whom was not a 
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GP), and a small group of GPs who frame and conceptualise ethics in ways that shape the 
experiences of the other two groups. 
 
Chapter 2: A theoretical approach to the study of ethics education in 
general practice 
 
In chapter 2 I describe the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis. For the purpose of the 
thesis ethics is treated as a form of knowledge rather than as the regulation of a professional 
group. However, the regulatory properties of ethics education cannot be dismissed, and 
contribute to the interest in the ethics education of clinicians by a variety of stakeholders. 
The interrelation of agency and structures rather than an emphasis on one or the other is 
implicit in this study – one that attempts to analyse both the production and the experience of 
ethics education. I have based this study on the assumption that both social structures and the 
personal agency of the participants are relevant, but that the ability to influence social forces 
rather than be influence by them is present in a minority of individuals and situations. 
Consequently, an initial way of understanding structures is useful: I use the analogy of 
developing an understanding of a sport by watching it played. 
The chapter considers curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation (Bernstein, 1971) as messaging 
systems for the translation of ethics education between classroom and clinic or between 
argument and action. I consider two other attempts to describe messaging systems (from the 
sociology of science and biopolitics). The messaging system is used in this thesis as a way to 
organise data analysis – as I observe, the categories of curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation 
broadly map on to three categories of participation in the qualitative empirical data, namely 
academia, education, and practice. 
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I discuss the social forces that participants from the ethics education of general practice might 
be influenced by and (less frequently) influence. ‘Boundary work’ - a concept from the 
sociology of (usually) scientific knowledge - is presented as a useful sensitising concept.  
The chapter concludes with the idea that the study of ethics education can be seen as a study 
of translational processes (Cribb, 2010). Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to identify 
which styles of argument, or which moral arguments, are ethically ‘more right’ or ‘more true’ – 
this study can shine some light on how ethics as an educational subject is subjected to social 
forces, and is potentially used by participants to influence similar forces.  
 
Chapter 3: Methods 
 
Chapter 3 describes my approach to the study of ethics education in general practice. The 
choice of a qualitative method flows from the theoretical ideas in the preceding chapter. ‘How’ 
and ‘what’ questions are best answered with a qualitative approach. Methodological 
influences on this thesis are discussed: ethnographic, phenomenological, and grounded 
theories are key influences on the method for selecting and organising the empirical data. 
Prior to and during the study I have lived amongst the participants. I have also sought to give 
them voice and to capture their ideas and definitions rather than to evaluate them against a 
pre-ordained standard. 
I do not seek statistical representativeness, being aware both of theoretical and empirical 
arguments about sample size and about how randomisation of participants can be self-
defeating. In particular I am conscious of the phenomenon of self-selection, given that there 
were no compelling incentives to participate. Recruitment of participants involved striking a 
balance between theoretical and convenience sample. For example, I focused on some GPs 
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involved in ethics education -who see themselves as a small select group; but I also included 
participants who might bring particular perspectives or experiences, such as participation in 
rural practice. 
The analysis of interviews is described as thematic analysis with a modified grounded theory 
influence. The analysis of initial interviews shaped subsequent selections of, as well as 
discussions with, participants. 
Reliability and validity – the ways in which the results may be considered to be authentic and 
relevant- are concerns that qualitative researchers must consider. Throughout the project I 
have remained in contact with the majority of participants, as well as showcasing 
methodological ideas and emerging themes in academic and educational fora. This has allowed 
me to informally ‘check’ emerging ideas, not only with participants but with a wider 
representative group of academics, educators and GPs. 
Research ethics, a mandatory feature of all research projects that involve human participants, 
are discussed.  The ethical concerns in this study, indeed in any qualitative study involving 
practitioners’ descriptions of practice are analogous to some of the issues that can shape 
ethics education – for example, in terms of patient consent and anxiety over possible censure 
of ‘substandard’ practitioners. 
Reflexivity is a recurring theme throughout the thesis. Being an active participant in the field 
that I was studying, carried with it strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats. I 
conclude the chapter with reflections on the researcher in relation to the field: this study 
raises key issues in terms of reflexivity and research ethics that are of relevance to similar 





Chapter 4: General Practice and the foundations of the ethics 
curriculum 
 
In chapter four I examine the curricular aspects of general practice ethics education. I take an 
expanded view of curriculum as the knowledge that is tested in assessments and may be 
enacted in practice. The ethical aspects of the curriculum are shaped by undergraduate 
teaching, and by the GMC code of practice, but also by academic and professional 
consensuses. All of these sources are peopled by clinicians and scholars who are subject to 
social forces. I begin the chapter largely considering literature and published accounts but in 
the latter parts of the chapter participant data is also used to illustrate my analysis. 
New undergraduate medical curricula emphasise attitudes, values and other aspects of 
professional life which have previously been considered to be part of the hidden curriculum. 
This mirrors the curriculum for general practitioner training. However the tension between 
what Bernstein calls strongly framed collections and more weakly framed integrated curricula 
is evident in both the literature concerning undergraduate and postgraduate ethics education. 
Taught separately ethics suffers from many of the shortcomings of other disciplines, but 
integrated it may vanish as a result of ‘dilution’ in the timetable. 
One of the forces shaping the ethics curriculum is how general practitioners define themselves 
as a profession. Many of the ethical dilemmas that form part of an undergraduate academic 
curriculum originate in hospital medicine. But generalism entails different and sometimes 
subtler issues and a broader set of possibilities which are harder to define. Moreover the ethic 
espoused in professional definitions of general practice arguably influences the ethics 
curriculum for GPs and generates its own set of ethical concerns.  
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The foundations of the syllabus have for some decades been a combination of ethical theory 
and predetermined ethical issues. The chapter includes a discussion of how certain ethical 
approaches are explicit (e.g. Beauchamp and Childress’ principles) and others are omnipresent 
and implicit (e.g. utilitarianism). I also consider whether postgraduates require a nuanced 
ethics curriculum founded on a better defined body of knowledge and community of scholars. 
 
Chapter 5: Ethics education in general practice – formative encounters 
 
If chapter 4 is about the determination of, and production of, appropriate ethical knowledge, 
skills, and attitudes for GPs, chapter 5 is about the ‘transmission’ of these things i.e. the ways 
in which ethics education is delivered and received. The phenomenon of ethics education, 
considered separately here from the content of the curriculum or the ways in which that 
knowledge is enacted outside the classroom, matches broadly to Bernstein’s concept of 
pedagogy.  Participants’ experiences of ethics education, whether as learners or teachers, are 
considered in terms of a variety of educational activities that are relevant to a career in general 
practice. A loose narrative approach is taken, based on the concept of medical education as a 
long apprenticeship. Undergraduate and postgraduate experiences are examined separately, 
and some attention is given to ethics education pre-medical school. The key dichotomy 
exposed here is between undergraduate and postgraduate experiences. Ethics education is 
clearly formally embedded in undergraduate UK education, but nowhere near as prominent in 




Chapter 6: Ethical encounters in Evaluation 
 
Chapters 6-8 are about how ethical knowledge is enacted by GPs. Chapter 6 is about formal 
assessments over the potential span of a GP’s medical career. These were particularly 
exemplified by the many educational assessments that lead to career advancement, whether 
this means getting into medical school or qualifying as a GP. Moreover, they do not end once a 
GP has qualified, but recur every time that a GP’s knowledge skills and education come under 
formal scrutiny by peers or by regulators.  
Formal educational evaluations (including those concerning ethics) often have high stakes for 
participants, whether as part of a qualification, an appraisal for continuing professional 
development, or a medico-legal inquiry. The stakes keep ethics on the conscious agenda in the 
absence of dilemmas. Whilst evaluation keeps ethics education from vanishing, it 
simultaneously tends to circumscribe it to dominant themes and methods. Evaluation 
understandably therefore shapes learning, even to the undesirable point that only a 
preconceived set of issues are considered ethical, and only certain forms of analysis are 
considered legitimate for the purposes of assessment. The four principles of biomedical ethics, 
for example, are sometimes offered as if they are the only tool for ethical analysis that will 
satisfy either undergraduate or postgraduate examiners. This naturally follows from the 
widespread adoption of the four principles in the broad curriculum experienced by GPs. The 
disagreement by examiners over what issues can be presented as coursework relevant to 
ethics risks disadvantaging both philosophically less literate candidates who are unsure what 
to discuss when asked to present a case about ethics, and candidates offering more 
sophisticated presentations that do not relate to a pre-labelled topic, or that do not use the 
four principles to analyse an issue. 
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The ways in which knowledge, skills and attitudes relating to ethics are tested rely on a need 
for praiseworthiness (sometimes in the form of accreditation) in the candidate or practitioner. 
This may limit or distort how candidates respond under scrutiny, or whether they are prepared 
to venture beyond theoretical concepts and relate ethical ideas to practice. 
 
Chapter 7: Ethics in practice 
 
In this chapter I discuss how ethical issues are recognised and outline some strategies used by 
GPs to deal with ethics as it arises in practice. Issues are recognized in two ways: In the first 
instance they are recognized as a type of issue that comes pre-labelled as ethical, such as a 
request for abortion or assisted suicide or as a type of problem that has clear ethical 
connotations such as a conflict or dilemma, The other way of recognising ethical issues as they 
arise is emotional discomfort. I discuss how this may lead to ethical issues being raised in 
discussions about inter-personal difficulties in practice and how mentors, trainers and Balint-
group facilitators (among others) may have a role in signposting ethics advice and support. 
I also outline the strategies adopted by GPs in response to the issues they experience as ethical 
ones. I have grouped these to reflect the ways in which participants described their own and 
their colleagues' practices. Some GPs chose, in some respects, to avoid or ignore the ethical 
dimension of problems. Others deferred to rules or senior colleagues, either to validate their 
own opinion or to obtain an opinion more authoritative than their own. Some used developed 
rules of thumb or had internalised ethical ideas. I discuss the pros and cons of these strategies 
but note that explicit engagement with ethical issues can sometimes be a way of protecting 
the GP from emotional burnout, and reintroducing rationality, impartiality and fairness when 
decisions could not or should not be avoided or deferred. 
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Chapters 8 and 9: Substantive issues 
 
In these two chapters, I will focus on four key ethical issues that participants discussed the 
most as being problematic for their daily practice. Confidentiality, abortion, financial incentives 
and rationing are all issues that have been discussed in academic and practice literature. In 
chapter 8, I will discuss how confidentiality and abortion illustrate GPs’ need to negotiate 
ethical complexity in an area that is heavily legally and professionally regulated, as well as the 
possibilities for avoiding ethically and emotionally challenging professional encounters. I will 
discuss the limits of conscientious objection and distinguish it from ethical avoidance and I will 
discuss the problematic aspects of declaring religious belief as a conflict of interest when 
counselling a patient. 
The theme of conscientious objection is revisited in chapter 9 and applied to beliefs about 
whether incentivising GPs’ performance is ethical, and whether GPs should offer treatments 
which they believe are useless or harmful if patients have a notional entitlement to them. 
I will use discussions about financial incentives and rationing to illustrate the tension between 
personalised holistic medicine as espoused by a traditional GP ethic and population-based 
medicine and the different ethical styles that may underlie them.  
The purpose of the chapter is, in addition to highlighting the key substantive issues, to extract 
from these issues a better indication of the challenges, successes and failures of ethics 
education. A linking theme is the display of ethics - the need by GPs and general practice as a 




Chapter 10: Conclusions 
 
In the conclusion I will reflect on the key insights from the preceding chapters. The data have 
been organised around the themes of curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation. As described 
above, these chapters have been informed by participant data covering the production, 
transmission and enactment of ethics as a kind of educational knowledge in general practice. 
This broadness of view covering the phenomenon of ethics education in the span of GP’s 
career is one of my claims to originality in this thesis. 
Societal forces and tensions are present when curricula are conceived, when knowledge and 
skills are taught and when GPs attempt to integrate learning into their daily practice. By 
attempting to understand these forces and tensions we can be a better position to conceive 
how to move forward. 
Ultimately this study aims to improve the reflexivity of ethics education. Many of the ethical 
shortcomings of doctors have historically been linked to hidden curricula; those features of 
practice and the practice environment that have been unseen or ignored by teachers or 
learners. Knowing more about hidden curricula provides some potential for being able to 
adjust for their influence. Accordingly this thesis seeks a social understanding of how ethics is 
produced, transmitted and enacted. It aims to offer insights that may generate further 
scholarly work and improve education in a way that allows GPs to better understand their 




Chapter 2: A theoretical approach to 
the study of ethics education in 
general practice 
Introduction: Why discuss social theory at all? 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis, or the 
fundamental ideas which allowed me to ask initial questions and organise the answers into a 
story about ethics education in general practice. Research questions, it may be argued 
(Silverman, 2008) are inevitably theoretically-influenced. Theory provides a framework for 
critically understanding phenomena, as well as a basis for considering how what is unknown 
might be organized. Organizing ideas before going ‘into the field’ allows the researcher to 
focus the inquiry. Acknowledging relevant theory recognizes the notion that no one is a blank 
slate entirely free from preconceptions. Those same preconceptions may be debunked or even 
be illustrated and refined, rather than re-invented as if they had never previously existed.  
From the outset, this thesis has sought to capture a sense of ethics translated between 
classroom and clinic. Unavoidably this must include a consideration of the interplay between 
structures and agency. The thesis takes, as its starting point, the idea that how ethical issues 
are framed and conceptualised for, learned by and engaged with in practice by general 
practitioners (GPs) will be influenced by factors internal and external to GPs. The importance 
of understanding ethics as enacted in (and modified by) the social world is the key justification 
for the contribution of the social sciences to the academic field of medical ethics. For example, 
Haimes suggests that research into an area of ethical distinctiveness that does not involve 
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social theory is missing something vital (Haimes, 2002) – she uses Shenck’s analogy of the rules 
of ball games (Shenck, 1986). 
Shenck: Going into discussion of medical ethics attending only to ethical theories, without 
attention to phenomenon of embodiment, would be like going into a discussion of the rules 
governing ball games without paying attention to the differences between football, baseball and 
basketball, focussing only on abstract discussions on the nature of “rules” and “games” as such.  
Too often ethicists of medicine seem lost in just this way; and that is because they tend to ignore 
that which distinguishes medical ethics from business ethics or legal ethics which is of course the 
centrality of the body for the practice of medicine and the texture of embodiment of human life 
itself. 
Ashcroft notes that the incorporation of empirical data into ethical argument often takes the 
form of a hypothetical imperative, where an argument of the form ‘if P then X’ is made, and 
then empirical data is used as evidence that P. However, he observes that most of the 
literature on empirical ethics and most contributions to this field concentrate on certain kinds 
of social inquiry. From a ‘Sociology of knowledge,’ perspective the question is not “Can this 
hypothetical imperative be completed by this body of factual statements?” but “What are the 
conditions of possibility for this statement?” Ashcroft illustrates the difficulties with this kind 
of inquiry by via the analogy of a language game (Ashcroft, 2003): 
We are asking something like “If this is a valid move in some language game, what can we infer 
about the rules of the language game of which this is a valid move?”  
The statement’s conditions of enunciation are under-determined by the information we have 
in front of us. Ashcroft offers some rules of reconstruction. He suggests that we can ask:  
1. Who are the social subjects addressed by this discourse? 
2. What sort of agency—if any—do they have? 
3. Whose utterances are authoritative and when? 
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4. What are the dynamics of participation in the discourse? 
 
Gewirtz and Cribb describe the relationship between structure and agency as one of the 
central theoretical challenges facing all of sociology. Whilst I do not propose to solve it here, 
this thesis does lean towards what Gewirtz and Cribb term a ‘soft’ or ontologically secondary 
appreciation of structure. This can be understood by examples such as financial currencies, 
which are clearly produced by humans and open to change, but nonetheless for most people 
(most of the time) provide limits for what it is possible for them to do. An even ‘softer’ 
example given by Gewirtz and Cribb that is in keeping with an analogy of games is the rules of 
playground chase, which constrain and give shape to the possibilities of play for the children 
participating and yet which might, in certain circumstances, be renegotiated and radically 
changed relatively easily and quickly (Gewirtz and Cribb, 2009b). A soft appreciation of 
structure allows the researcher to accept that some people can influence and others be 
influenced by social structures.  In terms of his analogy (above), Shenck was explicit in 
clarifying his position that he was not opposed to abstract discussion of ethical characteristics 
or of meta-ethical theories. He argued, however that these were insufficient to found medical 
ethics (Shenck, 1986). This thesis takes the starting position that, at the very least, an 
understanding of the social world that is influenced by some and influences others is an 
important, if not completely essential, consideration in the study of ethics education. This is in 
keeping with the idea that a better appreciation of the social world in which ethics as an 
educational topic is studied, taught and enacted could lead to improvements in the study of, 
teaching of and practice of the same. 
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Ethics as educational knowledge or as regulation? 
 
A theoretical awkwardness with the study of the ethics education of any professional group 
lies in nature of ethics as the indirect subject studied. According to Bernstein (Bernstein, 1971), 
educational knowledge is a major regulator of the structure of experience, an idea which 
informs my research. However, ethics is subject which can be perceived, intrinsically, to 
regulate behaviour –knowing that an action is right or wrong carries with it a potential 
obligation to act or refrain from acting in a particular way. For this very reason it is relatively 
easy to answer the question, ‘Who cares?’ when discussing whether there is reason to attempt 
understanding ethics education of general practitioners. General practitioners may care, even 
if for no other reason that the trust that their profession requires from patients is founded on 
a reputation for acting rightly. Governments may care, because in a healthcare system such as 
the UK’s NHS, they are accountable for the quality of healthcare provision. Patients may care, 
because trust in the GPs ability to act rightly may determine whether they choose to consult 
the GP, or to disclose their secrets during a consultation. The above examples are not intended 
to serve as a complete description of the ways that different stakeholders care about how GPs 
are educated about ethics, but they do serve to illustrate the idea that the subject of ethics can 
easily engage stakeholders. 
Thus, a key difficulty with describing ethics as ‘knowledge’ lies in that ethics may be conceived 
as both a type of knowledge and a form of regulation. This means that by contrast with other 
types of knowledge, civil society and the state may stake a more overt claim to the shaping of 
professional ethics and consequently its education and assessment. To a degree this is evident 
in the legislation surrounding medical practice and the deliberate inclusion of ‘lay-people’ in 
medical regulatory bodies such as the General Medical Council (GMC). The GMC is the arbiter 
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of whether undergraduate and postgraduate education is fit for purpose. In their guide to 
undergraduate ethics curricula, Dowie and Martin highlight the phenomenon as a relevant one 
(Dowie and Martin, 2011b) . The direction of influence is also far from unidirectional -Salter 
captures a sense of this in the political triangle of ‘intersecting forces between the profession, 
civil society and state’ (Salter, 2004): 
Dowie and Martin: All professions form a triangle of political partnerships in conjunction with the 
other two vertices represented by society and the state. However the exchange of benefits 
between these partners is contingent and can be endangered. In particular, according to Salter 
(2001), ‘Public trust in the medical profession is the key to the political arrangement between 
medicine, society and the state.’ Trust in the medical profession operates at two levels: in ethical 
practice as performed by individual doctors when treating their patients, and in the governance 
of doctors as performed by regulatory bodies (Dowie and Martin, 2011b, Salter, 2001). 
The phenomenon that I have chosen to examine is the ethics education of general 
practitioners and therefore this thesis treats ethics as educational knowledge, albeit 
knowledge with particular properties for those involved in its production, transmission and 
embodiment in practice.  
Messaging systems as applied to ethics education 
 
According to Bernstein, formal educational knowledge can be considered to be realized 
through three message systems: curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation. Curriculum defines 
what counts as valid knowledge, pedagogy defines what counts as the valid transmission of 
knowledge and evaluation defines what counts as a valid realization of this knowledge on the 
part of the taught (Pollard, 2002). In the context of medical ethics education, I have equated 
curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation, broadly to academia, education and practice. 
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Perhaps artificially this thesis treats ethics as the knowledge skills and attitudes which are 
influenced by education rather than a form of regulation. A loose categorization based on 
curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation is helpful in organizing both the data and conclusions. A 
‘messaging system’ approach has been applied within fields that intersect and border upon 
bioethics. For example, it is worth noting two broadly similar approaches to Bernstein’s trinity 
of message systems, which have originated independently in the fields of anthropology and 
biopolitics. 
In instances where ethics has been crystallised in the form of declaration, a regulation or 
policy, Hoeyer found inspiration in the field of anthropology of policy in terms of a framework 
to ‘‘study through’’ (Hoeyer, 2006a, Hoeyer, 2006b, Shore, 1997).  Hoeyer suggests that where 
ethics as an activity becomes a form of knowledge or of governance it may usefully be looked 
at in terms of the interaction between policy-maker, policy worker and policy-target. In his 
case-study of a Swedish genomics company, Hoeyer uses this model to direct research 
questions towards an understanding of the development of the policy as it evolves at three 
levels: 
(1) Policymakers: How the policy takes shape: Who names and frames the issues the policy will 
address? What becomes the object of regulation? This is broadly analogous to Bernstein’s 
curriculum. Academics equate in my thesis to an influential set of policy makers. Academics 
(from an academic or professional vantage) name and frame the issues of concern, contribute 
to, and gather the professional curriculum. 
(2) Policy workers: How the policy becomes entrenched in social practice. This corresponds to 
pedagogy – on of the ways that the policy becomes entrenched in any case will be through 
being taught by policy workers.  
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(3) Target group: What are the social implications of the policy for the target group? The target 
group for the purposes of my thesis are general practitioners. This is because I am studying 
ethics as an educational topic rather than ethics as a form of regulation.  
Hoeyer’s (Hoeyer, 2006a, Hoeyer, 2006b) methodological principle has been to move between 
these levels and mirror the different forms of framings of problems expressed at the three 
levels in each other. 
Salter’s framework (Salter, 2004) attempts to conceptualise the control of medical knowledge 
in terms of creation, transmission and practice. Salter attempts to simplify the idea using a grid 
(table 1). 
Table 1. Knowledge control and  the politics of regulation  (Salter 2004: 8) 
 
Arena of Knowledge activity Regulation  Functions 
 
 
Standard Setting Monitoring & Evaluation Intervention 
Creation (Research) 1 2 3 
Transmission (Education) 4 5 6 
Application (Performance) 7 8 9 
 
On the one axis, creation of knowledge is embodied in research, its transmission is embodied 
in education and its application is embodied in performance. On the other axis, Salter 
describes three kinds of regulation function: standard setting, monitoring and evaluation, and 
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intervention  (Salter, 2004). The regulation functions are in effect social forces that act upon 
the messaging systems. Whilst less formal kinds of regulation function might be included, the 
legitimacy of their inclusion in Salter’s framework is not obvious. The advantage of restricting 
the forces observed to formal regulatory processes is that they are (in theory) more easily 
defined and mapped. 
 
At first glance the artificial subdivision of any practice – education or regulation- into a trinity 
of messaging systems does not recognise that participants do not necessarily just have one out 
of the three roles or a fixed role over time.  For example, where academics also teach and 
practise clinical medicine there is scope to ask questions about how academics and educators 
apply their ethical expertise in clinical practice also.  
 
Boundaries in academia, education and practice 
 
Whilst Bernstein provides an appealing categorisation for the messaging systems of 
educational knowledge, each of those three categories contain individuals who both possess 
agency and are subject to external forces. Bernstein describes the underlying principles to his 
messaging systems in terms of boundaries, for example between different curricula and the 
educational subjects within them, or between the teacher and student in the pedagogical 
relationship (Bernstein, 1971). However his conception of boundaries seems limited to the 
educational setting and dwells in the main on curriculum and pedagogy. Gieryn’s concept of 
‘Boundary-work’ (Gieryn, 1983, Gieryn, 1999, Jasanoff, 2005) is a concept that I used as a 
concept that ‘sensitised’ me to some of the social forces influencing each of the three 
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messaging systems. Boundary work is a concept usually associated with the field of science and 
technology studies (ST&S)1 rather than with the sociology of education. It is concept which has 
been successfully applied in the study of translational medicine (Wainwright et al., 2006), and I 
lean towards its use because I conceive of a study of ethics education as  a form of 
translational ethics  in itself as well as the study of ethics  translated (Cribb, 2010). Sismondo 
summarizes the field  of ST & S below (Sismondo, 2010b). 
Sismondo: ST&S starts from an assumption that science and technology are thoroughly social 
activities. They are social in that scientists and engineers are always members of communities, 
trained into the practices those communities and necessarily working within them. These 
communities set standards for inquiry and evaluate knowledge claims… In addition science and 
technology are arenas in which rhetorical work is crucial, because scientists and engineers are 
always in the position of having to convince their peers and others of the value of their favourite 
ideas and plans –they are constantly engaged in struggles to gain resources and to promote their 
views. The actors in science and technology are also not mere logical operators, but instead have 
investments in skills, prestige, knowledge, and specific theories and practices.  
Sismondo gives a very good summary of boundary work as well. His description illustrates 
Ashcroft’s rules of reconstructing the conditions of ‘allowable statements’ above (Ashcroft, 
2003). 
Sismondo: When issues of epistemic authority, the authority to make respected claims, arise, 
people attempt to draw boundaries. To have authority on any contentious issue requires that at 
least some other people do not have it. The study of boundary work is a localised, historical, or 
anti-foundational approach to understanding authority. For example some people might argue 
that science gets its epistemic authority from its rationality, its connection to nature or its 
connection to technology or policy. We can see those connections, though, as products of 
boundary work. Science is rational because of successful efforts to define it in terms of 
                                                             
1
 Whilst STS might seem a more appropriate abbreviation for science and technology studies, the books I 
referred to used the abbreviation ST&S. I have consequently used ST&S rather than altering quotations.  
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rationality; science is connected to nature because it has acquired authority to determine what 
nature is; and scientists connect their work to the benefits of technology or the urgency of 
political action in particular situations when they are seeking authority that depends on those 
connections…  
However as a theory pertaining to the sociology of knowledge, there is no reason why it should 
not be discussed outside the context of experimental or basic sciences. The notion of 
boundary-work has since been generalized and extended to the study of other ‘boundary 
disputes’ beyond the demarcation between science and non-science. According to Jasanoff 
(2005 at p.26), boundaries are everywhere at play in the world and the task of boundary-work 
involves the creation and maintenance of essential social demarcations. She suggests that 
boundary-work in contemporary societies is done by legal institutions as they classify new 
instances under a finite set of categories, in parliamentary bodies, courts of law, expert 
advisory commissions, ethics review boards, and a variety of other contexts (Jasanoff 2005, at 
p.27). Moreover, boundary work can be routine, occurring where there are no immediate 
conflicts imminent. Examples, people, methods and qualifications are all used in the practical 
work of charting boundaries. Textbooks and course, for example, can establish maps of fields 
simply through the topics or examples that they represent (Sismondo, 2010a). 
Gieryn (1983) coined the term ‘boundary work’ by arguing that (in his historical case studies) 
scientists are subject to both ‘strains’ and ‘interests’ and demonstrate ideologies which 
accommodate both through the alteration of social demarcations. Gieryn associates strain 
theories with Parsons (1967) in arguing that ideologies provide evaluative integration in the 
face of conflicting demands, competing expectations and inevitable ambivalences of social life. 
Interest theories are associated with Marx. Marxist ideologies are social weapons, used by 
groups to further their political or economic interests in the struggle for power and advantage. 
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Gieryn follows Geetrz (1973) in arguing that ideologies can both smooth inconsistencies and 
advance interests. 
Gieryn uses three examples is his seminal paper(Gieryn, 1983): The first example comes from 
19th century arguments defending natural scientists (scientists whom we might now recognise 
as studying physics). On the one hand physics was held to be equal or superior to religion in 
that it could provide useful provable truths about the world, which religion could not. On the 
other physicists were superior to engineers because they provided an underlying 
understanding about the world and theoretical discipline which engineers lacked. Moreover it 
was argued that engineers, being driven by profit and self-interest, were less likely to 
communicate discoveries of mutual benefit. Academic science is thus defined as practical and 
profitable in one circumstance, and yet in another setting it is described as theoretical and 
towards the universal good. 
In his second example Gieryn described how 19th century Edinburgh anatomists called into 
question the scientific validity of phrenologists’ work. The phrenologists were seen as 
competing for resources and prestige, by making grand claims about the utility of their 
knowledge. By describing those claims as untrue and unsubstantiated, the anatomists moved 
the boundaries of science so as to place the phrenologists outside science. The example 
emphasizes that such demarcations may have high stakes involved for the participants, and 
carries with it the implication that such boundaries are flexible and socially constructed. 
Gieryn makes his third argument for combining ‘strains’ and ‘interests’ in describing US 
scientists’ response to a proposal that their publications should be restricted during the cold 
war, lest a useful application be developed from those publications by enemies of the US. The 
rationale from scientists was incongruous. On the one hand military and industrial applications 
could be developed from scientific discoveries. On the other, it was unlikely that enemies of 
the US would develop the same from reading US scientists’ publications. Moreover, to restrict 
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US scientists from communicating with their Russian counterparts would prevent them from 
learning about areas where the Russians were more advanced. 
Criticisms of Gieryn’s work by groups attempting to expand or test the concept of boundary 
work by empirical means fall into the following categories: 
1. Gieryn’s studies have focused on historical cases, rather than observing boundary work 
in the making (Albert et al., 2009). 
2. Gieryn devoted most of his efforts to the demarcation between science and non-
science, rather than among different types of scientists (Albert 2009), or different 
types of activity by scientists (Ehrich et al 2006, Wainwright et al 2006). 
 
There is an immediate potential relevance of boundary work to the ‘translational’ messaging 
systems of education.  I have suggested above that demarcation may be routinely 
accomplished in practical everyday settings (Gieryn, 1983, Gieryn, 1999, Jasanoff, 2005) which 
may just as easily apply to general practice academia as to physics: GPs might set up curricula 
that include philosophy but exclude theology as prescriptive of medical behaviour; Journal 
editors reject some manuscripts as ‘not rigorous’ or ‘not evidence-based.’ It is more than an 
academic issue to decide who teaches ethical decision-making (Sokol, 2008), what counts as 
relevant research, and even who should make or contribute to decisions which are classified as 
‘ethical’ in the general practice setting (Savulescu, 2006).  
These criticisms do not so much challenge the concept of boundary work as lend their authors 
the legitimacy to fill the gaps that they identify in Gieryn’s work. 
Those who have extended boundary-work have argued that it is equated with “ontological 
reordering”. Wainwright et al describe an instance of this in the way that ethical boundary-
work involves a process of social demarcation – where ethical talk is not only about 
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representing a contradictory set of ethical terrains but is also about ordering such terrains, by 
making social divisions which speakers identify with, or differentiate from (Wainwright et al., 
2006).  
In conclusion, I have chosen to use ‘Boundary work’ as the sensitising concept from which I 
begin to examine the structures which generally act upon and my less usually be influenced by 
the participants in this study.   
Boundary work and curriculum 
 
A key illustration of boundary work in academia is the argument, made by academics, that 
their own academic disciplines or fields have lives that need saving (Toulmin, 1982, 
Hoffmaster, 1992) – in other words, authority, resources and prestige can be both necessary 
for a discipline to flourish, and a sign that an academic discipline is flourishing. Relevance in 
the real world outside the classroom is one way in which academic fields and disciplines are 
justified, and this bears direct relevance to my thesis, because academia provides content for 
the curriculum and may influence who can legitimately teach that content. If academic 
disciplines are embodied in their advocates and disciples, ‘strains and interests’ (Gieryn 1983) 
can be a useful way of looking at this. For example there is an often quoted idea that a medical 
context has ‘saved’ the life of ethics and has given back a seriousness and human relevance to 
the subject of ethics (Toulmin, 1982). By contrast with the idea that ethics might be seen as a 
somewhat dry and unexciting subject that might not attract large amounts of funding or public 
attention, Toulmin describes the increasing prestige of bioethics in America.  
Toulmin: Before long moral philosophers (or as they barbarously began to be called, ‘ethicists’) 
found that they were as liable as the economists to be called on to write ‘op ed’ pieces for the 
New York Times, or to testify before congressional committees…(Toulmin, 1982) 
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According to Toulmin, the new medical ethics saved the life of ethics as an overlooked and 
under-resourced discipline by applying ethics outside the classroom. Toulmin argues that 
ethicists applied rationality to and therefore resolved arguments over matters of public policy 
i.e. they made themselves useful, and placed themselves in public view. They achieved this by 
colonising an area of interest, medical ethics. 
Barry Hoffmaster subsequently (Hoffmaster, 1992) wrote the again much quoted, “Can 
ethnography save the life of medical ethics?” In his paper he argues firstly that medical 
ethicists are not making enough explicit connection between theoretical foundations and 
practical application and secondly that clinicians are not engaged enough with medical ethics – 
to the point where they find academic medical ethics an irrelevance. On this occasion 
ethnography and other empirical methods are admitted into medical ethics, ostensibly as a 
way of maintaining the field’s ability to achieve relevance.  
Conclusion: Situating the thesis 
 
In this chapter I have suggested that in the particular context of medical education, ethics, if it 
is to be considered part of the medical curriculum, can be considered in a similar way to other 
kinds of knowledge that are categorised and shaped by academics. The study of ethics 
education in medicine is translational in a manner broadly analogous to translational medicine. 
Cribb suggests there is some merit in the idea that that much as translational research 
attempts to connect the laboratory scientist’s work to its implications for patient care, 
translational ethics focusses on bringing ethics scholarship into the sphere of personal and 
public action (Cribb, 2010). Like Cribb, I distinguish the term ‘translational ethics’ (the study of 
ethics being translated) from the two other key definitions in the bioethics literature. 
Translational ethics has been defined as a new way of doing medical ethics based on principles 
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derived from the ethics of human research. It has also been defined as the ethical issues 
implicit in translational medicine (such as the ethics of making claims about the potential 
applicability of a new biomedical discovery). These latter two understanding of translational 
ethics are not alluded to when I use the terms translational or translational ethics. 
Bernstein’s messaging systems are (I use the term loosely) translational, in that they are used 
to study how a type of knowledge or regulation is created, transmitted, and applied. This study 
seeks to be a kind of translational ethics. I propose that a similar, translational approach to the 
study of ethics education in General Practice can be both academically relevant and practically 
useful. There are evident multi-directional relationships between research (or curriculum), 
education (or pedagogue), and performance (or evaluation). The interrelation of agency and 
structures rather than emphasis on one or the other is implicit in a work that attempts to 
analyse the experience of ethics education in order to in some way improve it. Whilst what 
counts as relevant knowledge, how it is taught and how it is enacted might be shaped by the 
strains and interests implicit in boundary work, my initial position is that some individuals may 
be in a position to influence such processes. 
Understanding these relationships better might lead to improvements in what is taught, how it 
is taught, and the application of what is taught. The major reflexive point to be made here is 




Chapter 3: Methods 
Introduction 
 
The Oxford dictionary of sociology defines either the general approach or research techniques 
as ‘methodology’ (Marshall, 1998) Here both the general approach to the research and the 
techniques themselves are set against the research questions and aims of the study. The 
chapter thus describes the methodology for my qualitative study into the ethics education of 
UK general practitioners. This research looks at how UK GPs (and selected stakeholders who 
participate in the shaping of general practice ethics education) identify, categorise and 
attempt to reconcile ethical problems which arise in the context of general practice.  
 
In this chapter I discuss how my research questions and key theoretical ideas have influenced 
my methodological choices. This thesis sets out to examine ethics education as the active 
translation of knowledge between theory and practice. In the previous chapter I accordingly 
discussed concepts from the sociology of education and the sociology of scientific knowledge. 
These were the concepts that would allow me to be receptive to and to organize the ideas 
emerging from the data. By contrast, the theories and techniques that I discuss below relate to 
how I engaged with the field of study in order to obtain the data. 
 
As well as describing my chosen methods, I discuss practical and theoretical reasons why I 
have chosen interviews and one focus group for data collection. I go on to discuss my place in 
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the field and the approach to taken to sampling. Sampling for this study has been connected 
with analysis of the data. Though this study does not claim to be a grounded theory of general 
practice ethics, I have chosen to use modified grounded theory coding as a key influence on 
the thematic data analysis. Some participants were selected on the basis of gaps emerging in 
my data as I conducted interviews, and all participants were selected on the basis of their 
connection to the phenomenon of ethics education in and for general practice. 
 
The final part of the chapter is a discussion of ethical and research governance considerations. 
My position as both as a GP and as a perceived ethicist created a set of obligations that may 
have deterred some from participating. I reflect on whether this has a broader resonance 
within GP ethics education.  
 
Choosing a qualitative empirical methodology  
 
An empirical study of ethics-related phenomena in general practice arguably may be 
considered to be included in the body of literature that has been called empirical ethics. The 
study of empirical ethics encompasses the idea that the study of people’s actual moral beliefs, 
intuitions, behaviour and reasoning yields information that is meaningful for ethics (Borry et 
al., 2004). It may involve description and analysis of the actual conduct of a group with respect 
to a morally relevant issue (De Vries and Gordijin, 2009); for example: describing compliance 
with existing moral norms and determining whether policies or procedures designed to 
operationalize certain moral norms have been successful. Normative theories may depend 
upon assumptions that can be empirically tested (Sulmasy and Sugarman, 2001). Empirical 
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study may identify moral issues that have escaped the attention of ethicists, but which are 
relevant in specific contexts. It is important to describe and analyse the actual moral opinions 
and reasoning patterns of those involved in a certain practice.  
 
Its proponents claim that empirical ethics is important because ethics is enacted in the real 
world. To be able to guide action in a sphere of practice, ethical recommendations must be 
sufficiently accepted by the people involved in that practice. If it is to stand a good chance of 
adoption, it should therefore be formulated in a way that stresses continuity with those 
people’s already accepted moral beliefs. Some may view moral beliefs in practice as a source 
of morality per se. The making of ethical policy that is more context sensitive or realistic may 
follow on from this idea (Birnbacher, 1999).  Thus talking to GPs will allow a more grounded 
and detailed analysis of perspectives, processes and practices that are often erased or ‘skated 
over’ by purely philosophical analyses. A qualitative approach has been used to good effect in 
mapping ethical approaches to human embryonic stem cell research (Wainwright et al., 2006) 
and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (Williams et al., 2007). 
 
This study examines ‘general practice ethics’ as a field by examining the literature and by 
talking to three types of actor: academics, educators, and practitioners in relation to the same, 
whilst taking into account the influence of, and the influences on the researcher. 
This study seeks to map how ethics scholarship relates to moral decision-making in general 
practice. The notion that what is ethics and what is ethical is variously interpreted and far from 
universally agreed mitigates against use of a quantitative tool e.g. a survey. Qualitative 
research is often defined by reference to quantitative research (Pope and Mays, 2006a). This 
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study is concerned with meanings and participants’ interpretation of situations and decisions. 
A qualitative method is thus a positive choice. 
 
There has been a noted increase in the use of qualitative research methods in medicine and 
health care during the last decade (Walker Holloway and Wheeler 2005: 90). For many social 
scientists, the choice of a particular research method is linked to a particular theoretical 
perspective, or set of explanatory concepts, that provide a framework for thinking about the 
social world and inform their research. However, Some have suggested that the link between 
theory and methods is overstated and that the choice of method and how it is used as likely to 
be informed by the research question or pragmatic or technical considerations as by the 
researcher’s theoretical stance (Pope and Mays, 2006a). 
 
Influences of Phenomenology and Ethnography on this Study 
 
In conducting this study I sought to capture the lived experience of ethics education as 
Phenomenology has its roots in philosophy. As applied to qualitative research, it seeks the 
essence of lived experience. The goal of a phenomenological approach would be to produce a 
narrative that allows readers to share in the experience of the research participants. 
Consequently it would rely on methods such as in-depth interviews (Chandros-Hull et al., 
2001). This study relies on foreknowledge of the field as well as seeking to capture and distil 
the experience, knowledge, attitudes and beliefs of participants. A foreknowledge of both 
ethics and general practice was unavoidable for me as I had trained as a GP, and had also 




Ethnography is an approach with anthropological origins. Ethnographers aim to describe a 
culture by immersing themselves in it. This often involves at least several methods of data 
collection including interviews and document collection. Ethnographic approaches often 
incorporate a formal element of observation.  
 
There is a school of thought which views ethnography with participant observation as a 
superior way of seeing what participants actually do rather than (or in addition to) what they 
say they would, or justify what they did. Participant observation has been extolled as way to 
observe ethics in action (Hoffmaster, 1992, Parker, 2007). In seeking to find out how GPs ‘do 
ethics’ it would appear logical to do participant observation of GPs followed by interviews 
about the morally problematic cases. Slowther makes this case in her PhD Thesis (at p. 286): 
 
A limitation of most published empirical ethics studies in the clinical context of primary and 
secondary care is their reliance on the participants’ identification of ethical issues, or the 
researcher’s prior determination of the ethical issue or issues to be studied thus studies that 
combine observation of the clinician/patient consultation, together with interviews with 
clinicians and patients following the consultation, would provide useful data on ethical issues that 
were not identified by the researcher (Slowther, 2004). 
 
There are good intentions behind such a statement: the inclusion of patient as stakeholder, the 
avoidance of researcher-bias and the generation of scientific data which is triangulated in a 
way that is meaningful are worthy aspirations. However, the limitations cited do not detract 
value from the aim of this thesis. I want to know what GPs perceive as ethics and ethical issues 
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and to understand how this relates to their education. Therefore asking patients would only 
serve to highlight areas of similarity and difference and whilst worthwhile per se it would be 
answering a different question. There is a vast social science literature which seeks to capture 
patient experience, and relatively little that seeks to capture that of the clinician. My research 
aim was to understand how GPs encounter ethics in their education. Therefore the only 
participant in this study who was not a GP was included because she commissioned 
postgraduate academic education for GPs in ethics. 
 
This study also does not involve formal participant observation in combination with the 
interviews and focus groups. I chose not to conduct formal observation methods on theoretical 
and practical grounds. Whilst there is a position that the theoretically ideal approach should be 
taken ‘whatever it takes’ the reality is that there are many barriers to conducting certain types 
of research, both internal (funding and resources) and external (research governance) to the 
researcher.  My reasoning is as follows: 
  
1. Not all ethical problems arise in the consultation, or even in the physical surgery 
environment (Hoffmaster et al., 1982). The research strategy would also, considering the often 
unpredictable, unselected nature of the consultation, be extremely time-consuming with no 
guarantee of any relevant data. Similarly this study is examining the reasoning of GPs for issues 
which they classify as ethical. 
 
2. Observation, if it picks up anything, is more likely to pick up situations and procedures either 
which the observer classifies as ethical or which are awkward for a myriad of reasons for the 
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GP. Consequently the most ethically interesting consultations might be those which doctors 
and patients might prefer to keep unobserved. Researching sensitive topics, such as the 
rationing of treatments and denial of care, or the study of potential inconsistencies between 
general moral values and specific professional practice, raises a number of ethical and 
methodological problems. Direct observation may “damage the consultation” and therefore be 
unethical per se (Berney et al., 2005). Jefferys and Sachs observe that the “Main activity of 
general practice –whatever its setting- is not readily observable. The consultation between 
doctor and patient is a private privileged occasion…” and that the chief exception to this is 
medical education and training (Jefferys and Sachs, 1983). Patients in general do not expect to 
see two ‘doctors’ in a GP consultation and the constant need to check that patients consent 
would serve as a constant reminder of the presence of an outsider. Consent from every patient 
is an issue which I perceive from my training in general practice, which involved video-taping 
consultations as an educational tool. The idea that patients deserve to be proactively 
reassured they will not be observed while disrobing or that specific exams or procedures will 
not be observed without explicit permission has been discussed in the context of American 
family practice education  (Butler, 2002, Quillen, 2002). Furthermore, some patients may not 
feel empowered to refuse participation. Wilson, Draper and Ives suggest that, ”This may be a 
particular problem when patients have their own family doctor, whom they generally see, and 
the patient feels dependent on their practitioner’s good will for ongoing care” (Wilson et al., 
2008). This introduces further practical difficulties but also reinforces the presence of the 
observer and can change the nature of the consultation unless some kind of ‘en-bloc’ consent 
can be obtained.  
 
3. Observation carries duties to intervene if an observer sees unsafe or professionally 
unacceptable practice, more so if one has extra professional duties as a clinician  (Goodwin, 
47 
 
2006). Observers may be tempted to participate, especially if they have ethical or clinical 
training (Bosk, 2008). I consider that the notion that a fellow doctor in the same speciality is 
less threatening and less likely to change the consultation is idealistic.  On the one hand a GP 
might be more threatened, perceiving that someone with expert knowledge might be judging 
them, especially if on the lookout for ethical problems. The converse situation is that if one is 
perceived as having a) knowledge of general practice and b) knowledge of ethics then one 
might be invited to participate in consultation or other interaction of interest. Whilst ethically 
correct in the individual circumstance, this kind of intervention has some possible 
consequences: It may raise issues of informed consent and give participants a false sense of 
security or conversely may deter participation. Interference may also affect the data collected 
in ways which alter and may be perceived to compromise validity. 
 
4. Ethical approval for participant observation in NHS practices across the country could 
necessitate multiple applications to NHS Research and development offices, possibly ‘honorary 
contracts’ in more than one primary care trust and a criminal records bureau (CRB) check. 
Though I was CRB-checked by virtue of my clinical work, the process of sending or (less liable 
to loss of crucial paperwork) taking the relevant piece of paper to multiple human resources 
departments can create significant delay and a PhD is a time-limited degree. These all take 
time away from the limited time-span for a PhD. Though it is likely that there was theoretical 
justification for the choice of research location, others have tended to conduct their qualitative 
studies of rationing in primary care in one region, close to the academic centre linked to their 
research (Berney et al., 2005, Hussain and White, 2009). My participants are spread over a 
geographical area which included urban London and rural Scotland. I also note that neither 
study appears to seek patients’ views or conduct observation of the GP consultation –Berney 
et al certain attempt to justify this in theoretical terms (see above). Obtaining individual 
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consent from patients is a difficult undertaking in general practice when patients move rapidly 
in and out of the clinic (McKeganey, 1989). The difficulty with obtaining informed consent from 
all those observed, given the brevity of most interactions in the day to day general practice 
environment, is unlikely to secure Research Ethics Committee approval. 
 
Taking into account the constraints of research governance and the requirements for ethical 
approval, interviews and focus groups provide a balance of safety for the respondent against 
the generation of useful data for the researcher. General practitioners understand and are at 
ease with the interview as a method for collecting information. Although the semi-structured 
interview is unlike much of their own interviewing, the basic process of having a guided 
conversation with another individual is one with which they can identify  (Borkan, 1993). I 
would go further and add that focus groups have for a long time been a staple of General 
Practice education in the UK and indeed that discussion is a preferred method for teaching and 
learning medical ethics in this context (Gillies, 2009). In combining interviews with a focus 
group method Berney et al were able to examine points of fracture and agreement among GPs 
concerning different ethical principles before examining different ethical practices and their 
correspondence with the principles (Berney et al., 2005). They found that there were gaps 
between what prevalent ethical theories might suggest as an appropriate course of action and 
how GPs actually reasoned. They called this a ‘Theory-practice gap’. Where a sense of ‘theory-
practice gap’ emerged, they were able to question the reasons for this, the GP perceptions of it 
and the justifications given for the gap. They found that the multistage nature of research 
meant that they were able to develop greater levels of trust with the GPs than they might have 




The methodological approach to the gathering and analysis of data in this study does not 
completely adhere to the full requirements of either of the above traditions. However, 
elements of both of the above are present. I have endeavoured to learn all I can about the 
phenomenon of general practice ethics and use in-depth semi-structured interviews in the 
hope that the ensuing narratives will capture the essence of the phenomenon. I also immerse 
myself (see Reflexivity, below) as a participant in the relevant culture, and use multiple 
methods. Ethnographers are described as generally using multiple data sources and data 
collection techniques to obtain rich and overlapping data (Marshall and Koenig, 2001, Gordon 
and Levin, 2008). This is not enough, however, as the aim of the collection of data about the 
process of general practice ethics is to discover and develop a theory which accounts for and 





Sampling and recruitment of participants 
 
Whilst planning this study I repeatedly encountered the expectation from my non-medical 
peers that access to research participants would be straightforward. Britten writes:  
Sociologists conducting research in medical settings often have to negotiate access with great 
care, although this unlikely to be a problem for clinicians conducting research in their place of 
work.(Britten, 2006) 
Whilst access has been facilitated by my participation in the field, justifying my sampling 
strategy on the basis of more than convenience has been harder. Moreover there has been a 
need to steer between perceptions of inadequacy with a convenience sample, of researcher-
bias with a purposive sample, and incompatibility between convenience and theoretical 
sampling.2 
 
I made personal contact with key players in a field who supply different pieces of a theoretical 
picture. This thesis examines a phenomenon in the context of a particular speciality within 
medicine rather than the inside of one geographical location. There are elements of elite-
interviewing and insider research at play in this study. One may be ‘purposive’ about 
convenience and snow ball sampling (Smith-Doerr, 2009, Conti and O’Neill, 2007). Political 
scientists, for example, are accustomed to interviewing ‘political elites’ who are chosen 
because of a particularly influential role in the policy process (Delaney, 2007). Several authors 
                                                             
2
 This was cited as a reason for not funding the research by the Royal College of General Practice 
Scientific Foundation Board, personal correspondence dated November 2009. 
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who have employed the term ‘elite’ have attempted to re-define it to suit the specific 
purposes of their research (McDowell, 1998, Parry, 1998, Smith, 2006). Delaney describes 
‘organizational elites,’ meaning “…that the elite status of my interview subject is a direct 
consequence of holding a particular position in an organization, as opposed to, say, having a 
high net worth or having specific influence of one sort or another” (Delaney, 2007).  
 
These attempts at re-defining what ‘elite’ signifies suggests some researchers already 
acknowledge the subjectivity involved in identifying who is and who is not ‘elite’(Smith, 2006). 
Even the most junior of the ‘purposed’ participants in this study share some or many features 
with Delaney’s organisational elites, “Some are private and might not want to be interviewed 
and most, of course, are extremely busy. On the other hand, organizational elites are often 
intellectually interested in the projects we work on, they readily understand the idea of doing 
‘academic research’, they have reliable calendars and schedules (and even people who keep 
them), and they have places to meet (their offices).” (Delaney 2007: 212) 
 
Studies on elite interviewing advise researchers to draw attention to their institutional 
affiliation, use personal connections where possible, and seek to obtain an influential 
“sponsor” whose endorsement of the project will ensure the cooperation of the rest of the 
group  (Ostrander, 1993). In one sense I am my own gatekeeper, as an active participant in the 
field (see reflexivity) which I have chosen to study. In that my sample is non-random and there 
is an element of purpose in deciding who is invited to be interviewed or a focus group this 
sampling strategy is purposive. Participants must have the qualities of a good informant, i.e. be 
willing to participate in the study, have time to be interviewed, be knowledgeable about the 
research topic and be articulate  (Morse, 1986).  In many qualitative studies not all informants 
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are able to articulate their experiences.  Where I asked one participant to refer another, I 
asked to be referred to a purposed kind of participant. Purposiveness is expressed by Conti and 
O’Neill in their study of the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization 
(Conti and O’Neill, 2007), “Drawing on three contacts obtained through personal networks, I 
found the rest of the sample through purposive3 ‘snowball’ sampling and by directly contacting 
trade ministries.” 
 
The potential suitability of informants in this study was initially based on personal knowledge 
of ‘key players’ in the field.  Theoretical sampling is also used. Theoretical sampling is used 
here to mean something subtly different from purposive sampling.  As the aim of the research 
is to provide accurate and rich descriptions the sample is selected according to the informant’s 
knowledge of the research topic.  Theoretical sampling learns from the ongoing analysis 
(Covan, 2007, Morse, 2007). The methodological approach selected for this study contains a 
systematic exchange between data collection and analysis to generate and validate theory. 
Therefore, the theoretical results of the first circle of analysis are scrutinised on the basis of 
the next interviews and new categories will be developed to close the remaining theoretical 
gaps. The enrolment of participants is finished when new data do not enrich or refine the 
categories any more (theoretical saturation). 
 
This thesis does not seek statistical representativeness. To invite responses by, for example, a 
mailshot to every tenth GP in the College Directory seems a bureaucratically intensive and 
expensive way to ensure self-selection, whilst at the same time ignoring vital perspectives. One 
previous researcher using this method in among South Australian GPs found that two out of 18 
                                                             
3
 my emphasis 
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respondents came forward simply because they had known her at medical school (Braunack-
Mayer, 2005). Thus, in grounded theory the concern is with representiveness of concepts and 
this is achieved through theoretical sampling.  However, the level of theoretical sampling 
reached is dependent on the level of analysis reached.  In axial coding "data are put back 
together in new ways after open coding, by making connections between categories" (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990, Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
 
As I (see section on reflexivity) have a large number of personal contacts in academia, general 
practice education, and ‘ordinary practice’ it is possible to purposively select from an initial 
convenience sample it is then possible to invite existing participants to ‘refer’ colleagues who 
address emerging theoretical gaps (or indeed to select such individuals from the original ‘pool’ 
of potential participants). A similar approach has been used by Schildmann to recruit German 
palliative medicine physicians for a qualitative study (Schildmann and Vollmann, 2009). In her 
interview study of life-scientists’ reactions to ethical training requirements, Smith-Doerr also 
began a convenience/snowball approach to life-scientists. She used, “A diverse set of leads 
from my own networks (for example, from faculty at different institutions, graduate students 
from different disciplines, and friends and family members—in other words, people 
unconnected to each other in my own professional network), and also tried cold calls, based 
on public information about scientists on websites. The cold calls led to interviews rarely in the 
U.S. and U.K., and never in Italy” (Smith-Doerr, 2009). Smith-Doerr also asked participants to 
refer colleagues in the other countries she was interested in. In her exploration of the 
interaction of gender with the management of chronic illness during adolescence, Williams 
used networks established in her role as a Health Visitor to gain access to participants via 
seven GP surgeries in the same area (Williams, 1999, Williams, 2000). Provided that ethical 
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concerns are addressed (see section on ethical considerations below) personal networks can 
be a legitimate route of access to the field.  
 
Smith-Doerr was interested in typical life-scientists and so did not select for special knowledge 
of ethics (Smith-Doerr, 2009). Braunack-Mayer was interested in the ‘mythical average’ how 
Australian GP inter-related bioethics scholarship and moral deliberation (Braunack-Mayer, 
2001, Braunack-Mayer, 2005). This project needed a slightly different approach, one which 
required a kind of theoretical sampling. In seeking to capture a sense of how bioethics 
scholarship inter-relates with moral deliberation by UK GPs I was interested in academic and 
educational experts in the field. Access might be improved by a respondent’s interest in the 
subject, or one aspect of it. It would be naïve to think that people who theorize and research 
and who teach ethics to GPs are themselves value-free, especially those who espouse 
particular ethical frameworks. To exclude participants involved in academia on the basis that 
they are articulate and outspoken seems counter-intuitive if it is their writings and teaching 
which are (in theory at least) influencing practice. One may even discover how such individuals 
transmit their ideas, and whether such individuals embody theory in practice. Conversely it 
may be useful to seek out opinions which one might expect to have become main-stream but 
which in fact have not. 
 
Consequently the recruitment of participants began with a small number of GPs and academics 
who are involved in ‘Primary care ethics’ teaching and research, and then followed both the 
principles of “snowball sampling” as well as “theoretical sampling.” A small number of GP 
educators and academics were initially invited to participate. These participants then identified 
further GP trainers and GP trainees and contacted the researcher only if these colleagues were 
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interested in and willing to participate in the study. Participants who are interested in 
participating were approached by email or (if they preferred) by telephone in order to explain 
the purpose of the study and provide the information sheet and consent form at least 1 week 
in advance of the interview or discussion group. 
 
To reflect the anecdotal and empirical differences in issues raised by rural and inner-city GPs, 
interviews were held in both urban and rural settings. The relevance of different settings is a 
recurring theme in empirical research in General Practice ethics (Hoffmaster et al., 1991, 
Braunack-Mayer, 2005) 
  
The final number of the participants depends on the "theoretical saturation" of the concept 
generated with the help of the empirical data.  Guest et al (2006) suggest that saturation can 
be achieved after as few as 12 interviews with a participant group. A difficulty with using 
theoretical sampling lies in the uncertainty about final numbers. There are relatively rigid 
requirements from Research Ethics Committees and funding bodies to estimate numbers of 
participants and focus groups in advance. Another difficulty may lie in communicating the 
validity of the smaller numbers needed to achieve theoretical saturation than statistical 
significance, an altogether different concept which is a cornerstone of the evidence based 
medicine movement.  
 
The estimated number for this study was 20 GPs, 10 academic or regulatory stakeholders for 
interview and two or four focus groups to account for the diversity of experience and social 
background amongst UK GPs. I was prepared for the possibility that the numbers may increase 
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or decrease depending on theoretical saturation being reached. I conducted 19 interviews and 
one focus group. The lower numbers reflected the huge volume of data and the repetition of 
themes in discussion signaling the presence of saturation. 
 
The use of multiple complimentary methods: literature review, interviews and focus groups in 
this case has been regarded as a form of triangulation and to lend validity to the ensuing data 
(Chandros-Hull et al., 2001).  
 
Interviews and focus groups 
 
I conducted nineteen semi-structured interviews and one focus group of five participants.4 All 
participants were selected for their connection to ethics education, either as academics, 
educators or practitioners with a variety of experience. All but one participant were GPs at 
various stages of their careers from training to retired. The non-GP was an organizer of ethics 
education for GPs, working in an academic department of primary care, and thus contributed 
to the whole picture of the phenomenon being studied. The focus group was composed of GP-
trainees as this group was the most difficult to access for semi structured interviews.  
 
The consensus on semi-structured interviews, and the reason why I used them, is that they 
provide the opportunity to gain an account of the values and experiences of the respondent in 
terms meaningful to them (Stephens, 2007). The interviews included GPs from both urban and 
rural settings, this having previously identified as relevant to the way in which GPs make moral 
decisions (Braunack-Mayer, 2001). 
                                                             
4
 I have included the topic guides I used as Appendices F and G 
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The focus group of GP trainees took place as an adjunct to a half-day education session outside 
the clinical environment. It is believed that homogeneity in a group is less intimidating for 
participants. Moreover a group moderator (facilitator) which the group identifies with and is 
not intimidated by (through seniority for example) may work well  (Chandros-Hull et al., 2001). 
I acted as the group moderator. The focus group was conducted under Chatham House Rule 
for the participants. Chatham house rule is an often misunderstood concept, for example, 
“Discussions took place under 'Chatham House Rules' of confidentiality; this report therefore 
refers generally and without specific reference to individual commentators” (Medlin and 
Harper, 2003). The Chatham House Rule originated at Chatham House in 1927 with the aim of 
providing anonymity rather than confidentiality to speakers and to encourage openness and 
the sharing of information. It is used as an aid to free discussion. The Rule is not considered the 
same as 'off the record'. It allows people to speak as individuals, and to express views that may 
not be those of their organizations, and therefore it encourages free discussion. This is so 
participants do not have to worry about their reputation or the implications if they are publicly 
quoted.5 
                                                             
5
 More details of the Chatham House Rule may be obtained from the Chatham House Website 
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/about/chathamhouserule/ accessed at 1800 on 17/01/10 
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Dramatis Personae (Participants) 
 
The table below summarises the key characteristics of the participants. I have deliberately not 
included certain demographic information that might be used to identify them. I do, however, 
use a number of descriptive terms about the participants. I have called anyone who 
contributes to the body of knowledge called ethics or with involvement in research that relates 
to this field an academic. I have referred to anyone with a formal educational role (such as 
teaching students, supervising trainees or commissioning ethics education) as an educator. I 
use the term leader to denote a formal leadership role within a medical institution (e.g. within 
professional bodies, academic institutions or clinical commissioning consortia). In the table I 
have noted the gender of each participant. More men than women participated (14:11) in the 
study, and whilst I cannot make any statistically significant inferences, this particular 
demographic may change if this study is repeated in subsequent years. I have also included a 
general description of the participants’ location of practice but not named that location. 
Connected to location are questions about whether physical proximity to professional and 
academic institutions and degrees of geographical isolation might affect ethics education and 
support. Moreover, the possibility that issues might be experienced differently in different 
geographical settings (e.g. urban vs. rural) was one which I set out to accommodate from the 







Roles in academia, 
education, policy and 
practice 
Gender Location of practice 
Prof A Full-time academic/educator, IMG Female N/A (former GP overseas) 









Dr D GP Partner in First five years since 
qualification, IMG 
Female Urban 




Dr F GP trainee in final year of training, 
leader (medical politics), UK 
graduate 
Female Suburban 
Dr G Retired GP Partner 
/educator/leader, UK graduate 
Male Semi-Rural 
Dr L Non GP Clinician with PhD/ Full-
time academic/educator, UK 
graduate 
Female N/A 
Dr M Sessional/Locum GP 
educator/ethicist, UK graduate 
Female Urban 
Dr N Locum GP, No academic, education 
or leadership roles, IMG 
Female Urban/Suburban 
Dr O Salaried GP/Leader, UK graduate Male Rural 
Prof P Salaried GP/leader/academic, UK 
graduate 
Male Urban 
Dr Q Salaried GP, UK graduate Male Urban 




Dr S GP 
partner/educator/ethicist/leader 
UK graduate  
Male Urban 
Dr U Sessional/locum GP and Retired 
Educator/Leader. UK graduate 
Male Urban and Rural 
Dr W Locum GP/Leader/GP 
commissioner, UK Graduate 
Male Urban 
Prof Y GP Partner /academic/ethicist, UK 
Graduate 
Female Urban 
Prof Z Retired GP Partner 
/Academic/Ethicist, UK Graduate 
Male Urban 
Focus Group: Drs H.I.J.K. X. GP trainees (none with any teaching 
or academic role), All UK graduates 




Other sources of data 
 
In the section below on reflexivity I allude to the idea that I have very deliberately taken an 
expansive view of ‘data’. Given that I am immersed in the academic and practical contexts I 
was studying, I sought not to be too rigidly circumscribed by the notion that I was ‘data 
collecting’ only some of the time. My own voice as a GP who teaches ethics does appear in 
some of the chapters, as do some of the resources that I, as well as the participants, 
encountered with respect to ethics education. This expansive view of data also enables me, on 
occasion, to sketch in richer accounts of context than would be possible purely by relying on 
my fieldwork data understood in the narrow sense – this is the case, for example, in chapters 5 




Analysis: Coding derived from Modified Grounded Theory 
 
The interviews and focus group were recorded, transcribed, combined with field-notes and 
subjected to thematic analysis. The interviews and focus groups were transcribed and analysed 
using a approach influenced by grounded theory, and thematically coded using NUD*IST6 
(NVivo8) software. 
 
The method selected for the analysis of data in this study is derived from Grounded Theory as 
modified by Strauss and Corbin. Grounded theory contains a systematic exchange between 
data collection and analysis to generate and validate theory. The theoretical results of the first 
circle of analysis are scrutinized on the basis of the next interviews and new categories will be 
developed to close the remaining theoretical gaps. The enrolment of participants should 
conclude when new data do not enrich or refine the categories anymore (theoretical 
saturation). Interview and discussion group transcripts were analysed following the main 
principles of Grounded Theory. Sections of the first transcripts were selected and 
conceptualised. The concepts are compared and merged into categories if similar (open 
coding) (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
 
In the next step of the analysis these categories were improved and links between them will be 
established (axial coding). Due to this procedure, insights into complex and emotional issues 
can be extracted from samples that are much smaller than those required for quantitative 
                                                             
6
 “Non-numerical unstructured data indexing summarizing and theorizing,” is taken here as a generic term 
for this type of software. NVivo8 was chosen for its widespread availability and simple interface.  
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research methods. The results are not statistically representative for GPs in the UK but still 
provide insight into the process of UK general practice ethics. 
 
Theoretical sensitivity in analysis of the data derives from a grounded theory tradition 
(Chandros-Hull et al., 2001). Orthodox followers of grounded theory might disagree that this 
use of theoretical sensitivity is appropriate or should even be called grounded theory. I do not 
claim that this study used a grounded theory approach, only that it is influenced by it. 
Reliability and Validity 
 
Mays and Pope use the term ’reliability’ and claim that it is a significant criterion for assessing 
the value of a piece of qualitative research: ’the analysis of qualitative data can be enhanced 
by organizing an independent assessment of transcripts by additional skilled qualitative 
researchers and comparing agreement between the raters’ (Mays and Pope, 1995). A contrary 
position is taken by Morse who argues that the use of ’external raters’ is more suited to 
quantitative research; expecting another researcher to have the same ’insights’ from a limited 
data base is unrealistic: ’No-one takes a second reader to the library to check that indeed he or 
she is interpreting the original sources correctly, so why does anyone need a reliability checker 
for his or her data?’ (Morse, 1994). Armstrong et al  have wryly pointed out that the example 
used by Mays and Pope (1995) for inter-rater reliability was actually one of ascribing 
quantitative weights to pregiven ’variables’ which were then subjected to statistical analysis 
(Armstrong et al., 1997). They tested the degree of inter-rater reliability that might be 
expected by asking six researchers to identify themes in the same focus group transcript. The 
results showed close agreement on the basic themes but each analyst ’packaged’ the themes 
differently. They conclude that “Analysis is a form of interpretation and interpretation involves 
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a dialogue between researcher and data in which the researcher’s own views have important 
effects.” (1997: 601) Pope, Ziebland and Mays respond that “Armstrong et al. conducted a 
tough test of inter rater agreement and one which would be unusual in a typical research 
study” (Pope et al., 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, Pope et al maintain that that there may be merit in involving more than one 
analyst in situations where researcher bias is perceived to be a risk by others, citing examples 
of social scientists investigating the work of clinicians or evaluating government policy. In this 
study I discussed emerging themes and anonymised dialogue extracts with my supervisors. 
This did not represent a formal attempt at inter-rater reliability but ensured that I not only 
remained open the possibility of more than one possible interpretation but also that I did not 
ignore interesting data simply out of over-familiarity. 
 
Validity has been defined as the extent to which the account accurately represents the social 
phenomena to which it refers (Pope and Mays, 2006b). LeCompte and Goetz write about 
internal and external validity. Internal validity is how well researchers’ observations match the 
theoretical ideas which develop. This is a strength of qualitative research, especially where, 
participation in the social life of a group over a long period of time enables a high degree of 
congruence between concepts and observations. For the purposes of this study I argue that I 
participate in the social life of the spectrum of possible participants. External validity refers to 
how far findings may be generalised across social settings. This may be seen as problematic on 
account of the small sample sizes and case studies used in qualitative research  (LeCompte and 




Guba and Lincoln use the terms dependability, credibility, transferability and confirmability to 
describe the trustworthiness of qualitative research (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Dependability 
relates to the idea that the reader may audit the decision trail of the researcher.  Credibility 
refers to the presentation of such faithful descriptions and interpretations that people who 
have had such an experience can recognise it.  Credibility is also established if naïve readers 
can identify with the experience when reading about it in the report. Devices such as 
respondent validation (member checking) or triangulation (using multiple data collection 
methods) are presented as ways of enhancing this (Pope and Mays, 2006b, Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). Though I did not seek to provide every participant with a full transcript (this would 
certainly raise numerous problems in the focus group) the emerging ideas were presented at 
fora such as the RCGP annual primary care conference. Also, I discussed my interim findings 
with many of the participants, and all participants were given the option of further comment. 
Transferability refers to the ‘fit’ of the emergent theory to the data, and to its applicability in 
other contexts. A rich account provides others with a database for making judgments about 
the possible transferability of findings. Confirmability refers to the freedom from bias (such as 
from personal values or theoretical inclinations) in the research process and study findings. 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) also propose criteria of authenticity and raise issues concerning the 
political impact of research: 
1. ‘Fairness’ has also been referred to as fair dealing (Mays and Pope 2008: 90). Are 
different viewpoints in the setting fairly represented? This concept is arguably built 
into the need to seek out cases which do not fit when sampling for this study. 
2. Ontological authenticity refers to whether the research helps possible participants 
better understand their social world. 
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3. Educative authenticity refers to whether the research helps members better 
appreciate the perspectives of other members of their social setting. 
4. Catalytic authenticity asks if the research acts as a stimulus for members to act to 
change their circumstances. 
5. Tactical authenticity asks if the research empowers members to take steps necessary 
for engaging in action.  
GPs qua participants might not be perceived as the ‘underdogs struggling against a dominant 
views of powerful elites’ which is a preoccupation for much social science research (Mays and 
Pope 2008: 90). However, the above concepts of authenticity come across as thought 
provoking and laudable. 
Reflexivity 
 
The relationship between the researcher and the researched has been subject to debate and 
study in qualitative research (Coffey, 2002). Particularly perennial issues have been over-
familiarity and the effect of context on relationships which are formed in the field.  At the time 
when this thesis is being conceived and written I am a practising UK General Practitioner, who 
is involved (albeit at a junior level) with undergraduate and postgraduate professional 
education, and who contributes to academic literature with respect to medical and general 
practice ethics. Whether or not it helps to be one in order to know one, I chose to venture into 
the domains of academia, education, and practice with regard to clinical ethics and GP ethics. 
In a sense, I am both a native and a cartographer in the same metaphorical territory. In 
another sense I have been seeking social and intellectual capital in order to build the 
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Bordieusian habitus of a credible academic in the field of primary care (General practice) 
ethics, whilst at the same time studying the content and boundaries of that territory. 
 
Reflexivity has possibly become conceived as an advanced declaration of bias. Pope and Mays 
give declarations of bias normative force. Researchers “…can and should make their personal 
and intellectual biases plain at the outset of any research reports to enhance the credibility of 
their findings” (Pope and Mays, 2006b)  
Reflexivity is a term derived from ethnomethodology, where it is used to describe the self-
organizing character of all interaction so that any action provides for its own context (Seale, 
2004), and it has become perhaps over-used in reference to self questioning by a researcher. 
Pope and Mays use reflexivity to refer to the way in which the researcher and the research 
process shape the data collected, including the role of prior assumptions and experience (Pope 
and Mays, 2006b). The reflexive sociologist, according to Bourdieu, must engage in ‘sociology 
of sociology’ so as not to unwittingly attribute to the object of observation the characteristics 
of the subject (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). 
 
Haimes (Haimes, 2002)  describes bioethicists : “As individual practitioners of their discipline, 
however varied their approaches and interests, they are members of professional and other 
social groupings.” Pope and Mays use reflexivity as a benchmark of good qualitative research, 
“The effects of personal characteristics such as age, gender, social class and professional 
status… on the data collected and the ‘distance’ between researcher and those researched 
also needs to be discussed.” I consider myself in the context of professional and other social 
groupings and how I participate in my chosen field: 
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1. Participation in Practice 
I am a UK trained General Practitioner, having undergone training and assessment using the 
new MRCGP curriculum and examination. I am also subject to the same ethical duties and 
revalidation and recertification criteria as all other qualified GPs. Having worked as a salaried 
GP for a year, I am currently combining work as a locum (freelance) GP with work as an 
Accident and Emergency GP and as an ‘Out of hours’ (Evenings and weekends) doctor. Whilst 
this gives flexibility to do a full-time PhD, it may mean that perhaps I might embody the 
managerial and leadership aspects of General Practice less than someone who is a partner in a 
practice. However, I interact socially and professionally with ‘regular’ GPs. 
2. Participation in Professional Education 
I have written examination guides for medical students (Papanikitas et al 2006) and for GPs 
(Papanikitas at al 2008), and during this PhD have been engaged to rewrite a textbook of ethics 
and sociology, public health and clinical governance. I am also engaged to co-author e-learning 
in medical ethics and law for GPs and GP trainees (with Professor Brian Hurwitz) for the Royal 
College of General Practice. A further interaction is involvement with London-based RCGP 
ethics courses aimed both at trainees and older GPs (With Paquita De Zulueta and John Spicer). 
I also embody a broader appreciation of medical education through membership of the 
Academy of Medical Educators and active participation (on committees, running educational 
and academic meetings, chairing meetings and lecturing) at the Royal Society of Medicine. 
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3. Participation in Academia 
This is perhaps the least developed of the three domains. Whilst registered at King’s College 
London, I have published on ethical topics in peer-reviewed general (Papanikitas, 2009, 
Papanikitas and Toon, 2011, Papanikitas, 2011a) and specialist (Bahal et al., 2010, Papanikitas 
and Toon, 2010, Papanikitas et al., 2011) medical journals as well as in an academic specialist 
journal (Papanikitas 2009c). In the course of the above academic and educational activities I 
was introduced to a movement by academic GPs to formalize an academic sub-discipline of 
primary care ethics. Whilst I conducted this study, the group (with my involvement) ran 3 
annual conferences, developed a web-based forum, and contributed both to academic 
literature and other conferences. 
 
Though none of the above domains constitute formal observation for the purposes of the 
empirical study, they arguably contribute to a ‘Sociology of self’, possibly even with an element 
of ‘auto-ethnography’. They also arguably contribute to theoretical sensitivity. My junior status 
within each of the three domains is in one sense a disadvantage: My experience of teaching 
ethics is limited, and more senior participants have more extensive personal contacts such that 
snowball sampling may convincingly begin to resemble theoretical sampling. An advantage of 
my relatively junior status, however, is that I am far less likely to intimidate, or exert undue 
influence in the recruitment of (or data collection from) participants. 
Reflexivity: Academic influences on this study 
My exposure to STS theories and methodologies (see chapter 2), I have little doubt, comes 
from the use of STS methodologies in the analysis of bioethical issues that involve biomedical 
research and scientists. Whilst my chief interest has always been ethics and the education of 
doctors, I began this study based in the Centre for Bioethics and Society (CBAS). CBAS was 
interested in the ethical legal and social issues around human embryonic stem cell research. 
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My initial supervisors, Professors Steve Wainwright and Clare Williams had themselves made 
similar transitions from clinical practice into the social science of bioethics. Sadly CBAS moved 
from King’s College London to Brunel University, and half way through the PhD two new 
supervisors became involved in my project, Professors Alan Cribb and Sharon Gewirtz in the 
Department of Education and Professional Studies (DEPS). I perceived Professor Cribb to be 
primarily a philosopher and Professor Gewirtz a Social Scientist. They share an interest in the 
social understanding of education, and this made them highly appropriate influences. Whilst 
based in the Department of Education and Professional Studies at King’s College London I was 
exposed to an array of theoretical tools from the sociology of education. The division of 
education into three patterns of activity, namely: curriculum, pedagogy, and evaluation was 
one such tool, which I have used to organize the data. 
 
Professors Annette Braunack Mayer and Anne Slowther have been two major influences in 
thinking about general practice and primary care. Both wrote PhD theses, on General Practice 
and Primary Care Ethics respectively, which involved a major empirical component. Each has a 
distinctive approach. Braunack-Mayer asks how GPs do ethics, and what makes a problem 
ethical using qualitative methods (semi-structured interview) with 18 self-selected Australian 
GPs (Braunack-Mayer, 1998). Slowther’s doctoral thesis uses a combination of interview and 
vignette-based discussion groups to look at ethical decision-making around rationing 
(Slowther, 2004). Slowther’s study is a qualitative comparison of practice nurse decision-
making, GP decision-making and decision-making at the level of the Primary Care Trust. The 
publications of both Professor Braunack-Mayer and Professor Slowther have also shaped my 
ideas about what the notional field of ethics as applied to general practice might look like. 
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Reflexivity: Social Background 
I am a caucasian, public school educated, professional heterosexual male. I have been raised as 
a Roman Catholic, and have lived as a child in England (Oxford) and Greece (Athens). For most 
of the last ten years I have lived and studied in London, but training as a doctor has taken me 
to London, Brighton, Hastings, Eastbourne, and Aylesbury. I have no doubt that this experience 
colours my view of the world. I would also assume that it colours others’ views of me as a 
researcher, as insider or an outsider, with views which are contaminated or enriched by my 
academic and social background. 
Ethical considerations and research governance 
 
This study clearly fell under the definition of research (Jones and Newton, 2012) and therefore 
was subjected to scrutiny and approved by an ethics committee.7 In recent years there has 
been increasing recognition of the need for ethical regulation of forms of research such as in 
the social sciences and of activities that have not traditionally been labeled as research (such 
as medical audit). From an ethical perspective, it is the nature of the study undertaken, and 
the involvement of participants in the study, that generates the requirement to comply with 
the principles of ethical conduct, and not the label given to it. In weighing up the risk-benefit 
balance in research, the following should be taken into account (Slowther et al., 2006a):  
 The importance, originality and topicality of the research question  
 The scientific validity of the study  
 The likelihood of achieving meaningful results—for example, the capacity of the study 
to recruit adequate numbers  
                                                             
7
 See Appendices A and B 
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 The potential impact (on the participants, the local community, the disease group, the 
global community)  
 The potential risks to participants and researchers 
In the UK, it is no longer part of the remit of the research ethics committee to evaluate the 
science of a proposal, but they are required to obtain independent information on the risks 
and benefits of the proposed research. As this study proposed to obtain qualitative data form 
UK National Health Service (NHS) GPs ‘as doctors,’ approval was sought from an NHS research 
ethics committee (REC). However, because the study was not conducted in any research sites 
other than King’s College London separate site-specific approval was neither required nor 
sought. Two years into the study and after I had conducted the interviews and focus group, I 
was forced to change department and supervisors (my initial supervisors moved to another 
university). The REC maintained its approval and did not ask for any additional actions by me.8 
The main ethical issues which were considered were: 
1. Disclosure of identifiable data of individuals or institutions 
2. Disclosure of criminal practices 
3. Upsetting participants when discussing difficult ethical decisions 
4. Recognisable individuals and institutions in spite of anonymisation 
I addressed these issues in the following ways: 
1) All participants were informed that as part of the process of transcription any data which 
may identify individuals or persons would be anonymised. Tapes, files and any hard copies of 
the interview transcripts were stored in a secure locker at the work place of the researcher 
                                                             
8
 See Appendix B 
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who acted as custodian for the data. I used a digital voice recorder, so it was possible to store 
the recordings as encrypted audio files. Only anonymised electronic data were be stored on a 
password protected personal laptop and home computer as encrypted data. A copy of the 
data was stored on a password protected and encrypted USB storage device. All contact details 
were stored as password protected and encrypted data on a university computer. The opinion 
of the REC was that encryption was well as password-protection were to be regarded as 
standard data security. 
Key data, including: consent forms,9 a disc (or password protected data storage device) of 
transcripts, and the research protocol will be kept in the locked office of the main PhD 
Supervisor, in a locked filing cabinet, for 7 years, as per King’s College London policy. This may 
be for further analysis by the original researcher. It also allows for subsequent review of the 
primary data as may be necessary for validation in that there is an audit-trail, should the 
veracity of any of the data be questioned. Use of the primary interview and discussion group 
data by others would require further REC approval and consent from participants.10 
2) This study focused on ethical issues and education in General Practice and did not explore 
any specific criminal practices such as assisted-dying. Given the previous experience of other 
researchers in these areas it was considered unlikely that any information about criminal acts 
would be disclosed. However, the interviewees were informed that if this occurred during the 
interview, the interview would have stopped immediately and confidentiality would no longer  
have been guaranteed. Specific reference is made to this exception to confidentiality on the 
information sheet. Participants were reminded prior to the interview or focus group.11 
3) Thought was given to the very unlikely event that discussion of ethical conflict in practice 
caused emotional distress. Participants were informed that in the case of being upset by the 
                                                             
9
 See Appendices D and E 
10
 See Appendix C 
11
 See Appendices F and G 
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issues raised in the interview they could end the interview at any time. As the 
researcher/interviewer/facilitator and a GP I was aware of potential stress associated with 
discussing these issues. All participants received contact details allowing them to contact me in 
case of any queries or problems they had that arose from participation. Queries and 
complaints could also be addressed to the main academic supervisor. Participants experiencing 
significant emotional distress would have been be directed to an appropriate counselling 
service such as the BMA counselling service for participants who are BMA members. I had no 
complaints, and no one displayed distress in the interviews or focus group. 
4) Given the seniority of some of the participants, there was a possibility that participants 
might discuss their own involvement with particular problematic or controversial cases which 
have (for example) received media publicity. If this was the case, it was possible that even an 
anonymised description of the case (that is, with names and places removed) may still be 
recognisable by readers of the transcript. Moreover, the number of senior GPs who contribute 
to academic and educational activities regarding ethics (in the UK) is quite small – which may 
make them identifiable. I had heard a few of the stories which they told me before the 
interviews and I heard some of them afterwards. In these cases, care was taken to exclude 
sections of the transcripts which describe recognisable features of these cases from any 




In this chapter I have sought to enhance the validity of my study by describing what I do, how I 
intend to do it, and why I do it this way. I am conscious of the idea that no social setting is 
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frozen in time, and that few people will necessarily have the same involvement in the field that 
I have chosen to study. Nor will they necessarily have access to the same participants.  
Two key themes run through this chapter in informing the method. The first and larger theme 
is the researcher as participant in his chosen field. I have chosen to study academics, educators 
and practitioners. This is at least in part because these are roles I have to lesser and greater 
degrees adopted as a GP, a teacher and someone who has begun to contribute to academic 
literature. Interviews and focus groups are a positive choice of method, based on types of 
interaction with which my participants are familiar. Though this study does not contain formal 
observation, I bring my own experiences and my own familiarity with both the relevant 
professional communities and their bodies of knowledge. I have suggested that having lived as 
if a participant and speaking the language of my participants enhances my claims to 
authenticity (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). I have treated the symptoms of over-familiarity by 
frequently stepping outside the environment being studied and looking in, sometimes using 
analytical ideas as described in the previous chapter, and frequent discussions with academic 
supervisors and colleagues who are not GPs, as well as presentations to academic nut non-
medical colloquia.  
 
The second theme in this chapter is the relationship between theory and method. A cook-book 
approach has been criticized and may even represent a way in which quantitative traditions 
limit qualitative creativity. However, a recognizable methodological toolkit is needed for the 
mandatory research governance approvals. Deviation from methodological tradition is often at 
a significant cost when research-funding favours studies using established methods. 
I have sought to defend my use of personal contacts and networks in selecting from what has 
been criticized as a convenience sample subject to researcher bias. The use of coding becomes 
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useful in lending validity to this approach. I selected participants on the basis of theoretical 
gaps in the data, seeking out negatives (a process which feeds into a sense of fair dealing). An 





Chapter 4: The ethics curriculum in 




In chapter two, I discussed curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation as conceived by Bernstein. 
Curriculum concerns the knowledge and skills that are or that ought to be taught (Bernstein, 
1971). This chapter is about curriculum as an educational concept, rather than any one specific 
curriculum document. As this thesis is about ethics education in UK mainland general practice, 
I discuss what counts as valid knowledge for the purpose of ethics education in general 
practice, and how it comes to be counted as such. In chapter 2 I also referred to Gieryn’s 
concept of boundary work in the context of academic and professional boundaries (Gieryn, 
1983, Gieryn, 1999, Jasanoff, 2005). Gieryn described the construction of a boundary between 
science and varieties of non-science as useful for scientists’ pursuits of professional goals: 
acquisition of intellectual authority and career opportunities; denial of these resources to 
“pseudoscientists”; and protection of the autonomy of scientific research from political 
interference. I have used ‘boundary work’ as a ‘sensitising concept’ when thinking about ethics 
as something which is taught and tested but also is used to distinguish good from bad GPs. 
Boundary work is a relevant concept when considering what shapes a curriculum in the 




A nuanced understanding of how a curriculum develops as well as what it contains can 
potentially be useful for teachers and learners. For example, Riley et al describe the RCGP 
curriculum as being relevant to GP trainees, GP educators, public regulators of professional 
standards and GP academics concerned with understanding and improving GP education. They 
define a curriculum as something that encompasses all the complex factors that contribute to 
a comprehensive educational programme, and includes the rationale for learning a topic, the 
context where learning takes place and the ways in which learning can be achieved (Riley et 
al., 2007a). Riley et al’s description of a curriculum that encompasses rationale and context can 
thus be read as a kind of educational reflexivity. While Riley et al refer to the entirety of the 
RCGP curriculum, this chapter considers only the context and rationale of the ‘ethics elements’ 
in formal and informal curricula. I explore curriculum in terms of academic and professional 
ideas about valid knowledge, attitudes and skills concerning ethics. Therefore academic and 
professional scholarship is reviewed, as well as key institutional curricula. It is also discussed in 
terms of what the academics, educators and learners themselves might perceive to be relevant 
knowledge skills and attitudes, and why they might have such perceptions. Consequently this 
chapter increasingly introduces participant data as well in order to capture a sense of the 
social forces acting on those who shape curricular elements and those who have to teach and 
learn them. 
 
The broad concept of curriculum that I consider here will appear initially to mostly focus 
syllabus content. This is in part because of the categorization of data into chapters that relate 
to curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation as outlined by Bernstein. The participants described 
learning about ethics in various ways during their training. I consider the mode of learning, 
such as reading, classroom teaching or workplace-based learning as forms of pedagogy in the 
next chapter. The content of learning that the participants describe, such as the theories and 
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topics that may be taught or learned, should be considered alongside official curricula – this 
illuminates what I have called the curriculum in translation (see chapter 2).  
 
In this chapter I use the ‘What’ to begin to access the ‘How’ and the ‘Why’ of curriculum as 
regards ethics for GPs. Consequently, the chapter has multiple starting points, chief among 
them the reading list in the 2006 RCGP curriculum statement on clinical ethics and values 
based medicine, and readings suggested by participants in this study and by colleagues with an 
academic or educational interest in the ethics of general practice. The chapter is not a 
systematic literature review of general practice ethics or of ethics education in general 
practice. A simple literature search of ‘ethics’ in ‘general practice education’, is insufficient or 
possibly inappropriate. This is because much literature of relevance is either not explicitly 
labeled as ethics, or is published in books, documents internal to organizations, or privately 
produced materials, and therefore invisible to systematic reviews of literature databases. 
There is also the problem that such a search spans multiple bodies of literature – not least 
medical education, medical ethics and general practice. More fundamentally, there is an 
absence of consensus on what is ‘ethics’ for the purpose of general practice education. On 
several occasions where I proposed methodological ideas or interim data from the study I was 
asked how I defined ethics. Dowie and Martin outline the many meanings of the word ‘ethics’ 





Different domains called ‘ethics’(Dowie and Martin, 2011a) 
Metaethics Critical philosophical ethics 
Normative ethics Analysis of theoretical relevances in ethical situations 
Morals Personal, cultural, or faith-based behavioural codes 
‘Applied’ ethics Determinative reasoning correlated with normative ethics 
‘Practical’ ethics Similar to ‘applied’ ethics 
Bioethics Normative and ‘applied’ ethics in biological and life-sciences 
Biomedical ethics Similar to bioethics, with a focus in scientific medicine 
Research ethics ‘Applied’ ethics and governance in research 
Healthcare ethics ‘Applied’ ethics and governance in healthcare professions 
 
Many of the above meanings of ethics surfaced over the course of the study. However, 
multiple linked meanings surfaced even before I spoke with participants. Dictionary definitions 
are also unhelpful in finding a common definition that is meaningful. 
The 2009 Collins English dictionary contains the following definitions relating to ethics:  
Ethic n a moral principle or set of moral values held by an individual or group  
Ethical adj 1 of or based on system of moral beliefs about right and wrong 2 in accordance with 
the principles of professional conduct 3 of or relating to ethics  
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Ethics pl n 1 a code of behaviour, esp. or a particular group, profession or individual: business 
ethics 2 the moral fitness of a decision, course of action etc n 3 the study of the moral value of 
human conduct (Dictionary, 2009) 
 
The above definition contains reference to codes of behavior, groups and professions, and has 
some use but it simply replaces the term ‘ethical’ with ‘moral’. Moral is a word conflated with 
ethical, for example Orme-Smith and Spicer in their ethics handbook for GPs appear to use the 
words ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ interchangeably, stating that both refer to behaviour that is good or 
bad and right or wrong (Orme-Smith and Spicer, 2001). In this study I was interested in ethics 
in its broadest sense and more interested in how domains such as those outlined by Dowie and 
Martin (above) might connect and overlap.  
 
My definition of ‘Ethics’ was led by social meanings of ethics displayed in the field – for this 
reason I refer to curriculum statements that are explicitly about ethics as opposed to 
professionalism or governance. For the broad purpose of this study therefore, ethics broadly 
concerns the rightness and wrongness of decisions that concern GPs. Ethics education 
therefore concerns the understanding of personal, professional and societal norms. 
Curriculum Documents 
Whilst this chapter is about curriculum in a broad sense, curriculum documents are relevant. 
They are the academic blueprints from which teachers and learners plan to teach and learn 
and whilst they might not define ethics, they do identify relevant educational content. Current 
general practitioners (GPs) in the UK may have experienced ethics as a component of formal 
undergraduate and postgraduate medical curricula. Both undergraduate and postgraduate 
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curricula are discussed in this chapter, because both undergraduate and postgraduate 
education form part of GPs professional narratives.  In the section below I consider key 
documents that inform the ethical formation of general practitioners. Chief among these are 
the consensus statement for undergraduate teaching of medical ethics and the explicit 
curriculum statement of ethics for GPs. Curriculum statements have a role in signposting the 
relevant knowledge, skills and attitudes required of learners. 
 
This means the days are gone when a new GP spends week searching fruitlessly for an official 
opinion on ‘what a GP needs to know.’ GP trainees can focus their efforts instead on developing 
the identified core knowledge attitudes, and skills of general practice (Riley et al., 2012). 
 
The book from which the above quotation is taken also recommends itself to GP-trainers, GP-
educators, and established GPs undergoing appraisal. It illustrates the idea that curriculum 
statements can be read and acted upon by both teachers and learners 
The undergraduate curriculum and syllabus 
 
The UK’s undergraduate curricula are relevant to this thesis. The main reason is that many of 
the participants, and indeed many current GPs, will have been subject to undergraduate 
curricula in UK. As I discovered and discuss in the next chapter – the presence of an 
undergraduate curriculum is potentially appreciated not by UK graduates’ testimony but by 
those who have not been subject to it. The second reason is that many undergraduate medical 
teachers and architects of those curricula are also involved in postgraduate medical education 





In 1993, The General Medical Council (GMC) set out requirements for medical ethics and law 
teaching in the undergraduate medical curriculum. National consensus documents on the 
content and teaching of medical ethics to medical students claim to be in response to the GMC 
requirements set down in the document entitled, ‘Tomorrow’s Doctors’.   ‘Tomorrow’s 
Doctors’ is not necessarily a document that all doctors are intimately familiar with. It arguably 
influences professional and academic leaders, as well as all others who are charged with the 
task of delivering undergraduate curricula. In the quotation below Steve Field, chairman of the 
RCGP at the time, emphasizes the relevance of ‘Tomorrow’s Doctors’ to medical education.  
 
Field: Since 1993, Tomorrow’s Doctors has been a major influence on how we prepare future 
generations of general practitioners. As a foundation for the undergraduate curriculum, the 
report sets the standards for knowledge, skills, attitudes, and behaviour that medical students 
should learn at medical schools in the United Kingdom. We need to know what type of doctor the 
GMC expects medical schools to produce. This point should be stated right at the outset, as is the 
case in the GMC’s Good Medical Practice guide. That document says: “Patients need good 
doctors. Good doctors make the care of their patients their first concern; they are competent, 
keep their knowledge and skills up to date, establish and maintain good relationships with 
patients and colleagues, are honest and trustworthy, and act with integrity.” (Field, 2009) 
 
It is relevant to know that, at the time of the quotation, Field was a key figure in not only 
editing the RCGP curriculum, but also in producing learning materials for GP educators. Whilst 
the quotation above is a thin one (in terms of richness of data) it emphasizes the importance 
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of ‘Tomorrow’s Doctors’ in medical education. With respect to ethics education, the 2003 
version of ‘Tomorrow’s Doctors’ states that: 
 
[Medical] graduates must know about and understand the main ethical and legal issues they will 
come across. For example, how to: 
 make sure that patients’ rights are protected 
 maintain confidentiality 
 deal with issues such as withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging treatment 
 provide appropriate care for vulnerable patients 
 respond to patients’ complaints about their care 
 deal appropriately, effectively, and in patients’ interests, with problems in the performance, 
 conduct or health of colleagues 
 consider the practice of medicine within the context of limited financial resources. 
 
Graduates must understand the principles of good practice set out [the GMC] publication Seeking 
patients’ consent: the ethical considerations. These include: 
 providing enough information about conditions and possible treatments to allow patients 
 to make informed decisions about their care 
 responding to questions 
 knowing who is the most appropriate person to ask for consent 
 finding out about a patient’s ability to make their own decisions and to give their consent; and 




The earlier (1993) guidance had stated that medical students should have ‘a knowledge and 
understanding of ethical and legal issues relevant to the practice of medicine’ but did not 
expand on this except to give a list of expected attitudes. Although ‘Tomorrow’s Doctors,’ was 
last updated in 2009, participants in this study would have been subject to the 1993 and 2003 
versions of this document. The 2003 guidance suggests that all doctors must have sufficient 
understanding of ethics to deal with pre-defined ethical issues. It also emphasises 
understanding the GMC document, Good Medical Practice. Its relevance lies in that it places 
ethics into the undergraduate curriculum and thus creates a mandate for the teaching of ethics 
at medical school. As I will discuss below, this may have improved the availability and 
consistency of ethics teaching at medical school. 
 
The consensus statements on ethics and law in the undergraduate curriculum 
 
Some of the participants in this study will have had exposure to aspects of the undergraduate 
UK medical curriculum that concerned ethics, as well as a defined ethics syllabus. A landmark 
document in undergraduate medical ethics education in the UK was the 1998 consensus 
statement by a group of teachers of medical ethics and law (Hope, 1998). The aim of the 
document was to put ‘flesh on the bones’ on the requirement from the General Medical 
Council that ethics and law should be part of the undergraduate curriculum (Fenwick et al., 
2013). The consensus statement and the documents linked to it represent a core syllabus.  
Because the 1998 statement may well have shaped the undergraduate experience of 
participants, I list its main headings below: 
1. Informed consent and refusal of treatment 




4. Medical research 
5. Human reproduction 
6. The new genetics 
7. Children 
8. Mental disorders and disabilities 
9. Life and death, dying and killing 
10. Vulnerabilities created by the duties of doctors and students 
11. Resource allocation 
12. Rights 
 
The explicit inclusion of ethics as a relevant subject in the undergraduate curriculum from the 
1990s onwards may not have yet had full effect among the general practice workforce. As 
subsequent chapters will demonstrate, some GPs qualified as doctors prior to systematic 
ethics input into medical school curricula in the UK, others may have qualified abroad. Many of 
the participants in this study qualified prior to the introduction of the above syllabus or outside 
the UK.  
 
Those of us who graduated prior to implementation of such a syllabus may find ourselves to be 
relatively undereducated by comparison with our junior colleagues (Spicer 2005: 234). 
 
Spicer writes in reference to the core curriculum in ethics and law for medical students. The 
under-education he refers to above is rhetorical –he has an MA in medical law and ethics, 
teaches the subject to GPs and is involved in organizing local education for trainees and 
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medical students as well has having co-authored an number of books on medical ethics and 
law. He is making a point in solidarity with colleagues of his generation, however. Many ethics 
enthusiasts tell stories of minimal presence of ethics in their curricula – and note its emphasis 
on manners rather than morals. 
 
At one time people thought medical ethics consisted of medical etiquette, for example, not 
criticizing colleagues or working with unlicensed practitioners, taking the precautions needed to 
avoid falling foul of the General Medical Council (GMC), and not advertising, doing abortions or 
engaging in sexual liaisons with patients (Toon, 2007). 
 
Secondly, even if it has improved considerably, the thematic content of the consensus 
statements on undergraduate teaching in medical ethics is slightly biased towards secondary 
and tertiary care (specialized and subspecialized hospital medicine). In particular many of the 
issues around informed consent, medical research, reproduction, genetics and end of life 
decision-making may be slanted towards the hospital setting.  
 
Both original (Hope, 1998) and revised consensus statements (Stirrat et al., 2010) are 
published in the Journal of Medical Ethics (JME). Not only is the JME the main academic peer-
reviewed medical ethics journal in the UK but it is also part owned by the Institute of Medical 
Ethics. Publication of the curriculum statements in this journal represents a level of academic 




The Foundation Programme (Formerly the House Officer years) 
 
In the next chapter I have included participants’ descriptions of ethics teaching and learning 
during the time which they spent as junior doctors in hospital. Junior doctors’ training in the 
UK has changed dramatically during the professional lives of current GPs and GP trainees. I will 
not dwell on these changes except to mention the most obvious point. Previously UK 
graduates were obliged to do one year as a pre-registration house officer (PRHO) before 
committing to training as a GP. Since 2005, all doctors work for a two-year period as a junior 
doctor before commencing onto a specialist training programme such as a GP vocational 
training scheme (GPVTS). This two year period is referred to as the Foundation Programme, 
and the term PRHO has been replaced by Foundation Year 1 and 2 (FY1 and FY2). During this 
period trainees are closely supervised as part of team which is led by a consultant. They also 
have to demonstrate a number of competencies and record these in an electronic e-portfolio. 
 
Whilst the actual teaching of ethics during this period of training has been unmentioned or 
described by participants as virtually non-existent, it is now an explicit component of the UK 
Foundation Programme Curriculum (2012). This curriculum sets out the framework for 
educational progression that will support the first two years of progressions after graduation 
from medical school. This is included with the sections on undergraduate curricula, because 
foundation year doctors are ‘quasi-students’ who have yet to commit to a particular training 
pathway within medicine. In this curriculum, section four is entitled, ‘Ethical and legal issues.’ 
Explicit subheadings in this section are: Medical ethical principles and confidentiality, legal 
framework of medical practice, and comprehension of outside bodies to professional life. 
Other topics in the Foundation Curriculum integrate ethics and law, for example, ‘Relationships 
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and communication with patients’ includes issues of patient autonomy dignity and consent 
(Fenwick et al., 2013). 
 
 
Ethics in the RCGP curriculum 
 
Explicit references to ethics are to be found in the curriculum for GP training in the UK. The 
RCGP Curriculum was first launched in 2007. This coincided with the RCGP membership 
examination becoming the qualifying examination for new GPs. All new GPs were now 
required to pass the exam, including many of the participants in this study. The curriculum was 
made up of a number of statements. Each statement was coordinated by a GP with particular 
expertise in that field. Candidates for the Membership of the RCGP were encouraged to read 
the curriculum statements, and revision materials for the examination remind them of this 
encouragement (Naidoo, 2008b). The general curriculum administered by the RCGP for a time 




RCGP Curriculum statement number 3.3 (CS 3.3)  on clinical ethics and values-based practice 
(Slowther et al., 2006b) addressed clinical ethics and values-based medicine as a subset of 
‘Personal and Professional Responsibilities.’ Clinical ethics and values-based practice was 
considered under this main heading as Statement 3.3 in a series of statements which are 
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numbered 3.1 to 3.7. These statements also included: Clinical governance, patient safety, 
promoting equality and valuing diversity, evidence and practice, research and academic 
activity, and teaching, mentoring and clinical supervision (Slowther et al., 2006b). This was 
launched as part of the curriculum in 2007, and revised in 2009. It also appeared to privilege 
one particular style of ethical analysis (Values-based practice), a style that was associated with 
some of the same academics who had written the curriculum statement. I will discuss values-
based practice (also known as values-based medicine, and values in medicine) as a style of 
philosophical medical ethics later in this chapter.  
 
The RCGP curriculum contained a discrete statement on ethics and values-based practice for 
the entire time when I was collecting participant data. Whilst it gathered a list of suggested 
reading, The RCGP curriculum statement (CS 3.3) on ethics attempted to be part of an 
integrated curriculum (Slowther et al., 2006b):  
 
The knowledge and skills which trainees are expected to acquire are applicable across the whole 
curriculum, and should be incorporated into all aspects of clinical, managerial and research 
practice. 
 
The idea behind the broader RCGP curriculum is to define a set of learning outcomes for GP 
and consequent upon this, to suggest a content of learning. Standards for training are by 
implication standards common to all GPs. According to “CS 3.3”, every GP should be able to: 
 Recognise the ethical dimension of every healthcare encounter 
 Understand the nature of values and how they impact on healthcare 
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 Identify the values that patients, families and members of the healthcare team bring to 
a specific healthcare decision 
 Demonstrate moral reasoning skills in the process of choosing an appropriate course 
of action or resolving conflicting values 
 Demonstrate the knowledge skills and attitudes for effective communication in 
eliciting and understanding the values of patients, negotiating an acceptable course of 
action and justifying that course of action 
 Demonstrate knowledge of the professional ethical guidelines and legal framework 
within which healthcare decisions should be made 
 Recognise their personal values and how these influence their decision-making. 
Essential Feature 2.4 (Justifying and clarifying personal ethics) of the RCGP Curriculum for 
General Practice training takes in to account the idea that a person’s espoused values and their 
real-life behaviour can often differ. If a GP does not take time to reflect on actions when 
ethical issues arise in practice, s/he may not be aware if her/his behaviour starts to deviate 
from the values which s/he supports (Riley B et al 2007: 115). Case-based discussion is also 
used to explore skills knowledge and attitudes to professional issues. (Deighan 2008: 172) 
More recently the RCGP curriculum was simplified. Some curriculum statements (including 3.3) 
were removed. They were replaced by an overarching statement, “Being a GP’ which has links 
to statements about ‘Essential features’ (as before) and ‘Clinical Examples’. Ethics as a subject 
is more implicit than explicit in this new configuration. It receives explicit mention in the 
context of reconciling person-centred care with fairness to others and the broader community 
and with maintaining good doctor-patient relationships. The overarching statement lists 
examples of readings rather than a prescriptive syllabus. This includes recognizable sources of 
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ethical scholarship and guidance. The RCGP Occasional Paper, ‘What is good general practice?’ 
(Toon, 1994b) is listed as a resource for ‘Person-centered care’. The documents, ‘Good medical 
practice’ (General Medical Council, 2006) and ‘Good medical practice for general practitioners’ 
(Field and Buckman, 2008) are listed as a resource for ‘Community orientation’. Given that 
‘Good medical practice’ provides the foundation for all undergraduate and postgraduate 
medical education, it would be surprising had it not been mentioned. Perhaps the most 
surprising reading in the new curriculum statement comprises two books by Seedhouse, 
‘Ethics: the heart of healthcare’ (Seedhouse, 2009) and ‘Values-based decision making for 
caring professions’ (Seedhouse, 2005). The Seedhouse texts are offered as resources for the 
domain, ‘Attitudinal features,’ which, as with the previous RCGP curriculum covers personal 
and professional values and ethics. There is no mention of the work that forms the core of 
statement 3.3. (Petrova et al., 2006), and there is no mention of the four principles of 
biomedical ethics (Gillon, 1994, Beauchamp and Childress, 2009b). This is startling because 
values-based (after Fulford et al) and Principle-based approaches are considered to be 
(respectively) favoured by the RCGP and undergraduate leads for ethics.  
 
The changes to the RCGP curriculum illustrated a theoretical idea as outlined by Bernstein in 
his discussion of curriculum. A discrete curriculum statement, albeit one that advocated ethics 
as fundamental to all areas of practice, might be described as a collection. Bernstein describes 
collection type curricula as highly controlled sets of knowledge with highly defined content. 
Collections are best exemplified by uni-disciplinary subjects such as chemistry or physics.  The 
advantage of collections is that it is relatively easy for learners to identify what they need to 




The contribution of academic general practice and primary care 
 
One way in which academic general practice and primary care contribute to either 
undergraduate or postgraduate medical ethics education is by physically hosting it. The 
historical tendency for ethics to be situated in philosophy departments but medical ethics and 
bioethics to be housed in medical schools and law departments has been noted in the 
bioethics literature.   
A good example is the Unit for the Study of Health Care Ethics at Liverpool University. The 
unit is based in the Medical School and the courses are run from the Division of Primary Care.12 
The unit co-ordinates undergraduate and postgraduate ethics teaching within the Faculty of 
Medicine. The Unit also conducts research into health care ethics, with interests in the areas of 
reproductive technologies, midwifery ethics, psychiatry and ethics, general practice and 
community based care and research ethics and social science methodologies in health care 
ethics. The unit runs modular postgraduate certificate, diploma and MSc courses. The module 
“Ethics in primary and community health care,” illustrates the enlargement of general practice 
ethics into primary care ethics: 
Health care ethics has frequently neglected to explore the problems faced by those who work 
outside the hospital setting. These problems are often not dramatic and rarely hit the headlines. 
Not all the carers involved are professionals: some work for voluntary agencies or care for 
dependent family members. As far as possible, the course draws on the practical experience of 
these carers and the content therefore tends to vary from year to year. Typically, students can 
expect to explore some of the following: ethical issues that are found in general practice, dealing 
with child abuse, rape, and abuse of the dependent elderly, care in nursing homes, care of drug 
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users, psychiatric care in the community, prison health care, care in the domestic setting, and the 
shift to care in the community of those previously cared for institutionally and the impact of new 
government policy. 
 
The above passage illustrates the idea that ‘Ethical issues that are found in general practice’ 
can be situated within a wider set. The content of that set ‘tends to vary from year to year’ 
depending on the participants in the case of the above course module. It illustrates the idea 
that there are concerns which may have a different prominence depending on who 
participates in the discourse. Tailoring ethics discourse to its participants in practice rather 
than to those in the academy may implicitly endorse the notion that ethics need grounding in 
context. 
 
Departments require resources to fund staff to teach and undertake research. The following 
quotation illustrates the role of doing medical ethics (teaching and research) in the expansion 
of the department of General Practice at Liverpool University. 
 
The department began to expand in the late 1980’s with the benefit of… two externally funded 
lectureships in management (Wellcome) and medical ethics (Health Education Authority). The 
latter was consolidated into a university-funded post, in part to support our new Masters in 
medical ethics (McGuinness et al., 2011). 
 





Many departments of ‘General Practice’ in universities appear to be altering their boundaries 
to encompass primary care. King’s College London’s department of general practice has 
evolved into a division of ‘Primary Care’, part of the Department of Primary Care & Public 
Health Sciences. This ostensibly ‘promotes the discipline of general practice’ and 
thereby improves the ‘delivery of primary care.’13 General practice is situated within primary 
care –in the case of KCL, primary care means primary healthcare. If they are to be successful in 
terms of attracting students, postgraduate educators need to continue to ensure that their 
programmes reflect the changing landscape of primary care (Tsimtsiou et al., 2010). 
This might be seen at first glance as a failure of boundary work, rather like stem cell 
researchers surrendering some of their freedom to regulators (Wainwright et al 2007). The 
drive to break down professional boundaries in terms of education and professional ethics 
finds expression within the enlargement of General Practice, as an academic endeavour, to 
Primary Care. However, this could also be perceived as an enlargement of an intellectual space 
that creates a field with boundaries which are more socially and politically 'defensible' by 
university departments. 
 
In chapter 2 I talked about strains and interests – a broad division of the social forces that 
might influence the way in which social divisions are created. The idea that that academic and 
educational activity can be shaped by such forces is illustrated by Dr L in the quotations below. 
Hosting academic ethics research and teaching and ethicists themselves, whether as 
temporary or permanent staff within a department can require resources and/or the kudos 
generated by pre-existing expertise in that department. In the first instance Dr L sets the 
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interest in being affiliated with an academic department (in this case to teach ethics on an MSc 
in Primary Care) against the need to be sufficiently compensated for the work. 
  
Dr L: I think... people tend to be interested in the idea of it, kind of rhetoric of it and then when it 
comes down to the actual, ‘Well this is what you need to do and this is how many sessions,’ and, 
you know, maybe the whole sort of murky world of how much you’re getting paid and is this 
sufficient recompense, you know, then it suddenly starts getting sort of very complicated... 
 
Dr L also talked of the prestige that might be associated with being in the same department as 
particular experts. A number of eminent academic GPs had recently retired in Dr L’s region. 
One might imagine that fledge-ling academics might ‘take a gamble’ on a less well known or 
resourced department if there was someone they might be mentored by or publish with. 
 
Dr L: ...I kind of wondered also whether there’s a bit of a chicken and egg in the sense that if you, 
if we had the expertise already in the department, then I think we would be more, it would be 
easier to attract other people, because there would be some kudos in having kind of connection 
with the existing expert.  But once that kind of expertise goes, then the, those people maybe 
can’t really necessarily align themselves with, or kind of get the kudos from being associated with 
those experts, because they’re sort of no longer there in terms of that particular field, in terms of 
the ethics. 
 
In Dr L’s academic department of primary care, the ethics experts had either retired or moved 
on and been replaced by permanent staff with other interests. When looking for expertise to 
buy in on a freelance basis in order to run an MSc module in medical ethics and law, Dr L had 
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initially looked within the same university. There was some expertise within the university, 
arising from the medical school and the law department. However, Dr L had been unable to 
secure expertise from within the university.  Those experts that Dr L was able to contact were 
 
either unable to commit to the MSc timetable or their enthusiasm waned when recompense 
was discussed.  
 
The contributions of General Practice as a profession 
 
In a recent editorial in the British Journal of General Practice, David Misselbrook (GP and 
‘senior ethics advisor’ to the journal) articulates the perception by GPs that GPs ‘do ethics’. 
David Misselbrook: GPs are sometimes a bit smug about medical ethics. We are the ones trained 
in ethics, communication skills, and patient-centred medicine — we just are the good guys 
(MIsselbrook, 2012).  
 
However tongue in cheek Misselbook’s opening line may be, his claim (MIsselbrook, 2012), 
“General Practice has often led the way in medical ethics teaching,” is a serious one. In the 
quotation below, Dr B described the assumption that GPs should run the relevant course for 
medical students at his institution. 
 
Dr B: And in a meeting of tutors, who were mainly not GPs, a need was indentified for someone 
to teach ethics.  And somebody turned to me and said, ‘You’re a GP, you can teach ethics,’ which 
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I always thought was a very interesting assumption … I think there literally was an assumption, 
almost a sort of quite a nice, positive sort of stereotype from my hospital based colleague, that 
GPs did ethics. 
 
Dr B read the comment as an assumption that GPs ‘did ethics’. This does not necessarily mean 
that that there was an assumption that GPs had a special expertise or interest in ethics as a 
branch of philosophy. Dr B went on to describe this: 
 
Dr B: But I think, I mean this is my fantasy now, but I think, particularly at that point, there would 
have been a sort of common fantasy among secondary care colleagues, that general practice 
represented, if you like, the soft end of medicine.  The soft, by the soft end, I mean particularly 
the sort of person oriented bit of medicine. 
 
In the above quotation Dr B described the external perception of the British general 
practitioner as linked to the ‘soft’ end of medicine. The question of how best to educate 
general practitioners, it might be argued, is shaped by the knowledge skills and attitudes that a 
good GP should have. The Royal College of General Practice in the UK uses the motto ‘Scientia 
cum caritas’ (science with caring) to signal the idea that a good GP is sensitive to psycho-social 
as well as biomedical aspects of the consultation.  Moreover, he or she perceives and 
interprets complex aspects of the consultation in the context of parallel duties to community 




There is an extensive literature relating to the role of the general practitioner. According to 
Jeffreys and Sachs, this is an indication of ambiguities in the recent past concerning such a role 
(Jeffreys and Sachs, 1983). Much of this literature was based on the agreed premise that GPs 
already were or were in danger of becoming little more than the sorters of medical wheat 
from the non-medical chaff. The real problems requiring medical attention (the wheat), it was 
implied, was increasingly being passed to hospital-based specialists; the chaff consisted either 
of trivial problems that did not require medical input, or problems for which medical input was 
inappropriate. The low point of such professional perception is exemplified in Lord Moran’s 
(The president of the Royal College of Physicians) evidence to the 1958 Royal Commission on 
Doctors’ and Dentists’ pay. Asked if GPs were on a level with consultants, he responded (a 
statement which he tried subsequently to retract) that this would be absurd – implying that 
GPs were doctors who had ‘fallen off’ a professional ladder and should not be treated like 
those who had not (Neighbour, 2011). 
 
There was consensus that it was bad for professional morale for GPs to see themselves or be 
seen by others in this way.  Jeffreys and Sachs identify two proffered solutions that emerged: 
One solution was that GPs should deal with a comprehensive but restricted set of problems 
and treatments that excluded major surgery and rarer or more specialized investigations and 
treatments. This solution also excluded social and emotional aspects of practice. The other 
solution was the task of general practice was to treat every request for help as a legitimate 
deployment of their diagnostic and therapeutic skills.  GPs’ standing among their medical peers 
and among the population at large, as well as their professional gratification would derive from 
the acknowledgement that they too were specialists. They were possessors of a unique body 
of knowledge of people in a biological, psychological and social context. There were variations 
in, and combinations of both camps. Roger Neighbour, himself both an influential figure in 
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general practice academia and a former president of the RCGP, champions a combination. 
Writing in a recent career handbook for general practitioners, he describes three responses to 
the poor perception of general practice as a discipline: insistence on high clinical standards, 
the insistence on clinical generalism as a speciality in its own right, and a commitment to 
excellence in training (Neighbour, 2011). 
 
Texts and participants alike distinguished general practice by reference to hospital medicine. In 
this way the professional features of the job might shape the content of an ethics curriculum.  
 
Dr C: I think some of... the difference between primary and secondary care ethics... is that 
general practice and primary care generally is, I would agree with Ian McWhinney when he says 
it’s a disciplining of tasks in which the fundamental characteristic is the relationship with the 
patient, rather than with the disease or the organ.  Whereas most secondary care doctors now 
are, because the specialists are concerned with the cardiovascular system or the heart or the hips 
or whatever, the fundamental aspect is different in primary care  - is that the relationship is with 
the patient first and the condition that the patient has, after that.  And I think that does make 
primary care and primary care ethics different from secondary care ethics.  I think... the area of 
judgement becomes more important and much more complex actually, deciding the right thing 
to do.   So I would say that’s one fundamental area that would need explanation.  
 
What is striking is how this links with other participants’ description of what make General 
Practice ethically rich: a clinician’s gaze that transcends the biomedical and the primacy of 





In discussing moral decision-making by South Australian GPs, Braunack-Mayer suggests that 
such decision-making is shaped by professional ideology, a ‘GP’ paradigm. In the description of 
the RCGP curricula above I mentioned a section that is and has previously been at the core of 
the curriculum, ‘Being a general practitioner’. 
 
The identification of General Practice with a particularly interpersonal approach to medical 
practice is bound up with the ethic, as well as the ethics, of general practice. It is also identified 
as something which can be taught back to the rest of medicine by GPs. Dr J make this 
suggestion in the quotation below. 
 
Dr J: I think it’s something that the rest of clinical medicine is kind of catching up with in terms of 
recognising that actually addressing patients’ concerns and how it impacts their life is quite 
important. 
 
Dr R makes an implicit connection between ethical characteristics of GPs and  
 
Dr R: [Describing a conversation with the author of a book on medical ethics] ...What he keeps on 





To conclude there has been a perceived qualitative association between general practice and 
ethics. It may be linked to the professional features with which general practice has become 
identified. The possible consequence of this is that general practice may not only shape the 
curriculum for its own practitioners, but lay many of the foundations of ethics for doctors in 
general, either through involvement in pedagogy, or direct contribution towards the 
curriculum. 
The contributions of philosophical ethics – a broad curriculum and 
syllabus  
 
This section discusses some of the main styles and approaches in bioethics which are taught at 
postgraduate level to GPs in training and GPs seeking continuous professional development. 
These are identified as the main approaches by review of the relevant Curriculum Statement 
(2004, 2006) and its references as well as recent texts on General Practice Ethics  (Orme Smith 
and Spicer 2001, Rogers and Braunack-Mayer 2009)) and Primary Care Ethics (Bowman and 
Spicer 2007), and articles aimed directly at GP trainees by RCGP publications (Gillies, 2009) or 
independently published MRCGP preparation materials. I also refer to two descriptions of 
ethics teaching of GP trainees that have been published in the general practice education 




Styles of philosophical medical ethics 
 
Each of the following is intended (in the current document) more as a thumbnail sketch to 
identify the approach and briefly signify its relevance within ethics teaching, and not as a full 
discussion of the origins and intrinsic value of the approach. 
Principles: Beneficence, Non-Maleficence, Autonomy and Justice 
 
Perhaps the most popular framework that is taught for ethical analysis is the ‘Four Ethical 
Principles’ framework (Spicer, 2005). The four principles derive from the Beauchamp and 
Childress’ text Principles of Biomedical Ethics. In the UK this method of ethical analysis was 
championed by Raanan Gillon (notably a GP) in his series of BMJ articles themed ‘Philosophical 
Medical Ethics’ and book of the same name. The small book was aimed at practitioners. This in 
turn led to the publication of ‘Principles of Healthcare Ethics,’ a larger academic anthology 
which has the four principles as a linking theme.  
 
The “Four Principles” are acknowledged as important in teaching by leaders of GP education. 
Deighan describes them as ‘often used’(Deighan, 2008). They are cited in CS 3.3. They are also 
cited in both editions of the ‘Condensed curriculum guide’ that has been a bestselling 
handbook with GP trainers and trainees in the UK, even after the removal of CS 3.3 from the 
formal curriculum itself (Riley et al., 2007a, Riley et al., 2012). Spicer summarises the four 
principles as follows (2005: 234): 
 Autonomy: respect individuals’ own choices 
 Beneficence: do good 
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 Non-maleficence: do no harm  
 Justice: treat equitably 
 
The principles are intended to be prima facie, that is each should be seen as creating a duty 
unless it conflicts with one of the others. They create a framework and moral language for 
discussion. In their handbook for GP trainees and GP trainers, Riley et al considered them to be 
a good foundation for making ethical judgements (Riley et al., 2007a). The principles’ strength 
lies in their intended purpose, to express general norms of ‘common morality’ (Beauchamp 
and Childress, 2009a). Riley and colleagues illustrate this idea by reference to the concept of 
respect for autonomy. 
 
In Western society, patient autonomy has become the overriding ethical principle in most 
medical decisions although there are still some notable exceptions to this (e.g. in the  areas of 
child protection and euthanasia) (Riley et al., 2007a). 
 
Riley et al highlight the importance of respect for patient autonomy as a key element of 
‘Patient-centred care’ a core competence for GPs to demonstrate. Respecting autonomy 
involves eliciting and taking into account the patient’s ideas, concerns and expectations, and 
involving patients at all steps of their care, including over how uncertainty is managed. 
 
Riley et al also argue that GPs have a right to refuse to act in a way that they perceive to be 
against the best interests of their patient. Whilst they do not label this as non-maleficence this 




The principles are not necessarily easy or unproblematic to interpret or to apply. Slowther and 
Parker outline differences in the application of these principles between secondary and 
primary care, where, for example respect for autonomy involves something broader than a 
formal consent process. There is little point in continuing a doctor-patient relationship in 
secondary care if the patient declines treatment or medical advice, whereas the nature of 
primary care is an ongoing relationship regardless of any one individual treatment decision. 
Attendance may continue and respect for autonomy may include providing opportunities to 
revisit such a decision and allow for changing patient views and experiences over time. Two 
key features are identified by Slowther and Parker, which permit the broadened concept of 
autonomy: continuity of care and direct access to care. In this context GPs often have 
knowledge of the patient’s situation beyond the immediate clinical problem and may also be 
caring for other members of the patient’s family. They also may have multiple contacts with a 
patient for a wider range of reasons, not restricted to a single clinical condition. They may 
share domiciliary care of a housebound patient with members of that patient’s family. 
Decisions made by a patient may have implications for that patient’s relatives, to whom a GP 
may also owe a duty of care. Processes of interpretation are also influenced by cultural or 
system norms. Outside of the UK, for example, Rogers has highlighted that the concepts of 
beneficence and autonomy are enacted in different ways by different GPs (Rogers, 2002, 
Rogers, 1999). 
 
Knight, an MRCGP examiner comments on the widespread use of the 4 principles. It is not clear 
in her work whether this might be because MRCGP candidates had the 4 principles at medical 
school and nothing subsequently, or if ‘Principlism’ is the predominant model for ethical 




Knight: In a five-year period of examining, I recollect very few candidates who accessed any 
ethical theory other than Beauchamp and Childress’ four-principle approach in their exploration 
of ethical dilemmas. Frankly, I find this concerning. Does what has been re-labelled by many as 
‘The Georgetown mantra’ really tick the box of ‘ethical theory and the GP registrar’? The four-
principle approach is not without challenge, and is an approach which, on analysis, StRs do not 
perceive that they use in practice. 
 
In a small study submitted as part of an MSc in medical education, Knight found that GP-
trainees (StRs) did not use the four principles in everyday ethical decision-making. The 
implication is that ethical theory is a primarily a tool for passing examinations. I encountered 
the principles of biomedical ethics in all the learning materials on ethics I could find that were 
aimed directly at GP trainees (Gillies, 2009, Naidoo, 2008a, Riley et al., 2007b). I comment in 
the later chapter on ethics assessment (chapter 6) how GPs and GP trainees may see the four 
principles as synonymous with ethics and vice versa. 
 
Deontology 
This stresses the idea of ‘duty’. (Greek: deontos, duty; logos, discourse). Whether an act or 
policy is right or wrong is determined by the action itself rather than the consequences that 
flow from this action. The ‘intentions’ of the person in acting are seen as morally relevant. 
Duties and intentions are often codified into a set of rules. The ‘Duties of a doctor’ in the 
document ‘Good Medical Practice’, which lists what a good doctor should do, is an obvious 
example of a deontological approach to medical ethics (Gillies 2009: 185). 
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Good Medical Practice underlies not just the Curriculum Statement on ethics and values based 
medicine but the entire formal RCGP curriculum (Riley et al., 2007a). The fundamental 
relevance of Good Medical Practice in all professional aspects of general practice is highlighted 
in the document ‘Good Medical Practice for General Practitioners’ (Field and Buckman, 2008). 
Educators in general practice ethics are keen to dispel the idea of assessments in ethics being 
only a means to the end of passing the MRCGP examination or as something separate to the 
real world of general practice (Gillies, 2009). 
The provision of healthcare is guided by a framework of legal and ethical principles that are 
reflected in professional codes of practice. Ethical decision-making and behaviour in clinical 
practice requires the application and interpretation of ethical and legal principles within a 
specific context, taking into account the perspectives and values of all concerned (Slowther et 
al., 2006b). GMC Good Medical Practice (2006), Good Medical Practice for GPs (Field and 
Buckman, 2008), and BMA Medical Ethics Today (2004, 2012) are cited as examples of 
professional codes and evidence of moral norms within medicine and General Practice by 
Curriculum Statement 3.3. Gillies goes so far as to suggest that when preparing for a case-
based discussion with a GP-trainer, GP-trainee should think in terms relating to the sub 
headings in Good Medical Practice (Gillies, 2009). Cases which relate to areas such as good 
communication, maintaining relationships, consent, confidentiality, truth-telling and working 
in teams arguably provide particularly good material for reflection (Deighan, 2008). Gillies’ 
suggestion in this particular instance supports the idea of a ‘professional’ ethic which is duty-
based and therefore ‘quasi-legal’. 
 
Though values-based ethics was adopted in the RCGP curriculum, quasi-legal ethical regulation 
remains important and effective in preventing abuses of medical power. The quasi-legal 
107 
 
approach has been described by Fulford et al as one which focuses on patient autonomy and 
rights-based theories (Fulford et al., 2002). While not denying that protecting patients’ rights is 
important, Fulford et al see the need for a counterpoint to the “growing legalism” in many 
areas of bioethics. In a reading that is listed on the 2006 RCGP Statement, they question the 
applicability of quasi legal approaches on several bases. Whilst regulation has an important 
function in preventing the abuses of power, unrealistic standards present a real danger that 
well-motivated rule-breaking will permit those self-same abuses. They cite consent procedures 
in research being so unworkably elaborate that they are consequently ignored by researchers. 
Good practice can be frustrated by many factors external to the immediate context of good 
clinical care such as inadequate training and lack of resources, according to Fulford et al, codes 
should only require particular action when it is within the reasonable power of those 
concerned (Fulford et al., 2002).  
 
Toon identifies two significant problems linked to an overly deontological approach: public 
concern about standards of practice and the orientation and values of practitioners, and poor 
morale among doctors, evidenced by problems in recruitment and retention as well as 
dissatisfaction among established practitioners. The fall in morale may in part be a 
consequence of this concern. The fall in morale may also relate to deontological responses to 
such concern, which by subjecting doctors to an increasingly demanding set of rules and 
procedures to monitor performance against those rules, are seen as adding to already heavy 




Each day, physicians fight to express values in the face of reality… Learners need to be made 
aware of these struggles, to experience them for themselves and to reflect on them. They 
provide excellent material for case-based discussion (Deighan, 2008). 
 
Quasi-legal ethics also may lead to intrusive regulation on the basis that good practice is far 
less settled than is sometimes argued. Deighan (listed as a contributor to the RCGP curriculum 
statement on ethics and values based medicine) writes that “Good Medical Practice tells 
doctors what to do and why this is important, it does not explain how professionalism should 
be learned” (Deighan, 2008). Values-based approaches to healthcare ethics has been described 
as a response to this quasi-legal ethics, aiming for partnership rather than regulation, or 
facilitating good practice rather than preventing bad (Fulford, Dickenson and Murray 2002). 
 
Values-Based Practice  
The re-conceptualisation of General Practice ethics as ‘values-based’ practice is reflected in CS 
3.3, which documents that, “This will involve the development of a range of skills and 
competences that is broader than traditionally associated with medical ethics” (Slowther et al., 
2006b). Values-based practice means that consultations with patients should take into account 
the values of the patient, her family, community and culture. In health education, community 
engagement and public health programmes, these values as well as the wider values of society 
are important. GPs should be aware of their own values and how they affect their practice.  
 
Critiques of VBP are not numerous in the literature but they do exist (Brecher, 2011). Whilst 
some of the educational material available to GP-trainees made reference to VBP (Gillies, 
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2009), there are instances of it being ignored in both the official trainees’ curriculum handbook 
(Riley et al., 2007b) and independent learning materials for GP trainees (Naidoo, 2008a). 
 
Virtue Theory 
Virtue theory is based on the idea that it is the virtues of the good person that are of prime 
importance in determining what the appropriate course of action is in any situation. 
This is in contrast to the focus on duties, as in deontology, or consequences, as in 
consequentialism and utilitarianism. The emphasis of this approach is therefore on the concept 
of ‘the good doctor’. This of course raises the difficult and interesting problem of determining 
what a good doctor is (Gillies, 2009). This particular approach has found currency through the 
publication of two RCGP occasional papers by Peter Toon; What is good general practice? 
Occasional paper no. 65 (1994) and Towards a philosophy of general practice: a study of the 
virtuous practitioner, Occasional paper no. 78 (1999). These two papers set out the author’s 
conception of a philosophy of general practice based on virtue ethics. Virtuist approaches to 
the study of ethical primary care has a number of champions besides Toon. Iona Health and 
John Gillies are both well known GP academics and educators who advocate an approach to 
medical ethics founded on virtues (Gillies, 2005). They have the added cultural capital of 
having been the RCGP President and the Chair of the RCGP in Scotland. 
 
Utilitarianism/Consequentialism 
Consequentialist theories are based on the idea that the right action in any situation should be 
based on the consequences of that action. Most influential of these approaches is 
‘utilitarianism’: maximizing utility (the good) understood in various ways including happiness 
or preference satisfaction. The right action in any situation is, on this account, that which 
110 
 
produces the greatest good for the greatest number (Gillies, 2009). The content of 
consequentialist ethics for GP ethics education has been summarised by Knight as follows: 
This branch allows for the exploration of ethics using consequence as a method of evaluating and 
making ethical decisions. This would include utilitarianism and QALYs, and would relate to key 
figures like Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, John Harris and Peter Singer (Knight, 2007). 
The advantage of an explicit discussion of consequentialism is that the ethical component of 
influential policy ideas, including cost-benefit analysis such as quality adjusted life-years and 
cost effectiveness in general, can be explored. 
 
Academic ethics and ivory towers 
A previous qualitative interview study of how bioethics scholarship affects moral decision-
making by GPs has looked at how GPs related ethics to practice. It found that, though the 
cognitive structures used by GPs in relation to thinking about ethical problems bore 
resemblance to some of the dominant ways in bioethics of considering ethical problems, the 
general practitioners did not articulate their cognitive styles with the sophistication and 
intellectual rigour that bioethicists assert hold for their own work (Braunack-Mayer, 2005, 
Braunack-Mayer, 2001). Dr C in the quotation below suggests that educators and practitioners 
are unfamiliar with the jargon and modes of discourse used by academic ethicists. 
 
Dr C: The ethical theory approach to deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics and there 
are various other ones that you get as well.  But they seem to me to be importing a whole, a 
whole new system and language and use of words that most GPs and most teachers and trainers 




The philosophical style to which Dr C refers (above) has been perceived as a necessary 
condition of publishing in medical ethics journals. In the quotation below, Dr S, a participant 
involved in ethics academia, ethics education and general practice suggests that the JME is not 
orientated to ordinary practitioners. For Dr S academic journals are inaccessible to non-
academics. 
 
Dr S: Most of us [GPs] are not academics. Most ethical writing is essentially of an academic 
standard.  And it’s not accessible.  The JME, let’s face it... The Journal of Medical Ethics, you have 
to be in the trade really to follow.  It’s not orientated at your average medic… it’s got a 
philosophical style to it.  And you have to think your way through those articles quite carefully.  
Now your average busy GP just ain’t got time for that, or interest...  I remain to be convinced how 
many people, other than academics, read the BJGP. 
 
AP: And is, so what is it that, I mean is it like a self defeating prophecy?  Is it that you’re, to be 
sort of successful in publishing in academic circles is never to be read by your colleagues? 
 
Dr S: I think for most GPs, that’s probably true … And I’m conscious of the fact, when I’ve written 
stuff for magazines and journals... that I’m writing at a different level. It’s a general audience...  
But the way one writes for that sort of organ is clearly going to be different for the JME.  Or other 
journals like that.  
 
Publications for ordinary non-academic folk have to be written differently according to Dr S. 
Success in academic writing for ethics can mean alienation from a general readership. 
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Below, he describes the academic world as a lovely world to be in, but one which is 
disconnected from the practitioner. 
 
Dr S: You’re in a different world -the academic world. It’s a lovely world to be in.  But the 
intersection between academic GP (and not excluding ethical academic GP) and your average GP 
in the surgery, I think, is not connected … because if you’re in the academic world, particularly 
associated with an institution, you’re in a different world, and arguably shouldn’t be a different 
world, but it is, to a work-a-day healthcare professional.   
 
As chair of the RCGP Ethics committee, Marshall reflects that ethics as a subject is perceived as 
difficult or academic by ordinary GPs (Marshall, 2010). 
 
There is also a widespread perception that ethics is a difficult subject that is not considered in any 
formal way by most GPs (Marshall, 2010).  
 
In February 2011 I co-organized a workshop on research in primary healthcare ethics as part of 
a bigger meeting looking at the state of the field. Attendees at this workshop were asked what 
they thought of the ‘shape’ of research in this area. It was striking that ‘non-academic’ GPs had 
little idea – the consensus was that ‘research’ only reached a general audience via an 




Is there such a thing as General Practice or Primary Care ethics? 
 
In the sections above I have discussed the influences of academic general practice, the GP 
profession, and academic philosophical ethics on the ethics curriculum for UK GPs. A related 
question, however is whether there is a field of study, populated by one or more kind of 
academic (e.g. philosopher, social scientist or GP) that is concerned with the ethical issues that 
arise in the primary healthcare context, including the ways in which medical ethics might be 
nuanced by the context of primary healthcare. As with my discussion concerning academic 
primary care above, I have noted that both references in the literature and participants study 
referred to general practice and primary care interchangeably. Sometimes primary care 
referred to a field with wider professional scope that those issues solely concerning GPs. 
Sometimes primary care referred to issues solely concerning GPs and it was considered to be 
synonymous with general practice. When authors such as De Zulueta describe primary care 
ethics as having a definite place on the bioethics map (De Zulueta 2008) there is an implicit 
suggestion that primary care ethics is a subset of medical ethics – perhaps more concerned 
with issues such as confidentiality and local healthcare rationing than with deep brain 
stimulation or issues around organ transplants. 
 
It is difficult to disentangle the intellectual origins of the academic study of primary care ethics. 
Braunack-Mayer, for example, distinguishes two approaches: the ‘individual’ account is built 
on contributions from the general practice literature, and largely concerns issues around the 
consultation (Braunack-Mayer, 2007). The ‘community’ account draws mainly on writing 




A different kind of divide is whether the literature originates within the bioethics literature, or 
the medical (general practice) literature. Braunack-Mayer for example, provides a chapter on 
‘the ethics of primary healthcare’ (Braunack-Mayer, 2007) in ‘Principles of healthcare ethics,’ 
whereas Doyal offers a chapter on ‘Ethics in primary care,’ in ‘The Oxford textbook of primary 
medical care’ (Doyal, 2004). Neither is a practicing clinician –Braunack-Mayer has a medical 
degree but does not practice medicine, and at the time Doyal was an ‘Honorary consultant’ 
(but never a doctor) The writings of both permeate literature that might just as easily be 
accessed by lawyers and philosophers as by GPs.  
 
To some degree, there are explicit connections between the community of scholars and 
curricula. Academics associated with that body of literature may also be directly involved in 
writing the books, chapters, articles and formal curriculum statements. An example of a ‘GP 
with particular expertise in that field’ who acted as a coordinator for CS 3.3 is Professor Anne 
Slowther of Warwick University. Other GPs with connections to academia and education 
include Paquita De Zulueta and John Spicer, both of whom have combined undergraduate and 
postgraduate teaching with contributions to the literature. 
 
There have been calls aimed at gathering a more explicit body of knowledge and a community 
of scholars who are interested in the ethical dimensions of primary healthcare.  
The primary care ethics described by De Zulueta  is very obviously general practice ethics, and 
the vast majority of authors in ‘Primary care ethics’ edited by Bowman and Spicer are 




Most of my participants who did not address the question spontaneously were asked the 
following question, “If there were such a thing as a faculty of primary care ethics, what would 
you imagine that would do?” 
 
Participants identified three educational roles: the education of doctors, the education of the 
public, and the education of politicians. This is also echoed in participants' sentiments that the 
organised study of primary care ethics might raise the status of general practice.  
 
When asked what a hypothetical academic centre for primary healthcare ethics might do, 
participants suggested it might: conduct both theoretical and empirical research, provide 
consultancy services to academic bodies, regulators and the government, provide educational 
support to clinicians in primary care as well assistance with problematic cases. Formalised 
communities of scholarship might also raise the status of the field itself. Participants expressed 
the sentiment that the 'patient' should be at the centre of any such endeavour but discussions 
about stakeholder-involvement were left open. 
 
Dr M articulates this particularly well: 
 
Dr M: It would lead to a greater understanding of... empirical research, theoretical research, it 
would probably mainly be empirical research but it would lead to a greater understanding of the 
work that we do. I mean GPs... we’ve not just had difficulty explaining the ethical aspects of their 
work –of course I’m being unfair because some GPs have articulated very well but even just the 
nature of our work you know... they haven’t articulated it so well so you can see that this 
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government [New Labour pre 2010 election] have just not understood, you know, it’s a very 
simplistic idea of what we actually do. 
 
Dr M’s account implies that general practitioners need to understand the nature and 
boundaries of their professional role, and politicians and public also need to understand this. A 
recent survey of GPs, for example, found that an understanding of their own profession was a 
reason for undertaking an MSc in general practice or primary care (Tsimtsiou et al., 2010). 
Knowledge informing this understanding needs to come from somewhere. 
 
Others felt that there was no particular need for an academic sub-field, and one participant 
argued that an organised field represented self-serving by a self-selected group of experts, 
using expertise to disempower those who did not possess the appropriate technical language.  
 
Some participants raised the possibility that a specialized community of scholars, at least as 
manifest in a formal department or field of study might be irrelevant or counterproductive. Dr 
L, the only non-medical participant in the study wondered whether the presence of a 
department or a specialty might take away the inclination to consider ethical issues. 
 
Dr L: ...I don’t see myself as an ethics expert at all, and yet I’m claiming that it’s kind of 
fundamental to everything GPs and everything that we do.  And I think sometimes one of the 
problems of having a department, a specialism, and having a department, it then takes the 
responsibility off everybody else to think about it.  And so therefore if there is a problem... we’ll 
call in our ethics person and they’ll kind of deal with it.  And the kind of parallel, I haven’t really 
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thought this through... the whole thing about issues around kind of difference and race and 
gender etc., and the way around kind of addressing that has been the appointment of diversity 
officers.  And so suddenly having that person there, you know, allows you kind of tick the box and 
sort of say, ‘Look, that’s kind of now being, being covered.’  So I think if there was a department 
of primary healthcare ethics, I think it would be how they collaborate with all the other 
specialties because... there is that ethical element there.  And you know... the strength of an 
ethics department would be its, its ability to inform and support what is going on in everyone’s 
practice, rather than kind of become such a sort of speciality that it’s perceived as – it becomes 
an end in itself.  
 
Dr M’s particularly enthusiastic response to the idea of a faculty of primary care ethics, makes 
it easy to see how an ‘outsider’ might get the idea of enthusiasts creating a field for 
themselves as an end per se: 
 
Dr M: Well I think it would certainly raise the status of primary care ethics... It would generate 
more research more this kind of research that you’re doing... I think yeah having a centre of you 
like of Primary Care ethics would certainly raise its profile, raise the understanding would lead to 
more interesting research… perhaps becoming a discipline in its own right, more literature, more 
journals... hmmm... 
 
Criteria of success identified by Dr M are in keeping with general markers that an academic 
field is alive and flourishing. The idea of associating together in dedicated intellectual spaces, 
be they geographical such as a dedicated centre or department, or intellectual such as 






At the beginning of this chapter (and in chapter 2) I made reference to boundary work as a way 
of thinking about how knowledge is socially constructed (Gieryn, 1983, Gieryn, 1999). As part 
of a curriculum for general practice, ‘Ethics’ is shaped by the concerns of academics, of 
educators and of practitioners. These three points in the translation of ethics between the 
classroom and the clinic are all situated in a social context in addition to their relationship to 
one-another. All three points may influence the curriculum and (as with the rest of the thesis) I 
have used them as my points of access to the notional field of general practice ethics. 
 
Published documents and participant testimony suggest that the content of ethics in the 
education of GPs is shaped by academic interests. Intellectual boundaries are linked to 
education and research.  Different conceptions of what is ethical and what is not determine 
what is researched and taught under the banner of ‘ethics.’ There is more than one possible 
kind of academic who might claim the authority to determine what is included in a curriculum. 
The history of academic general practice has a particular association with the teaching of 
ethics both to medical students and to GP-trainees. In many medical schools (such as King’s 
College London) this aspect of medical education has been ceded by academic general practice 
to medical schools and academics from non-clinical disciplines such as law and philosophy. 
Academic centers for medical ethics have also sprung up in departments of General Practice. 
However these are in competition with those that have arisen in departments of law, 
philosophy and social science. Moreover the topics of interest in departments may be resource 
dependent –if funding for bioethics clusters around biomedical research and hospital 
dilemmas generated by new technology, there are fewer resources for what scholars have 
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called the ethics of the ordinary (Papanikitas et al., 2011). Loss of interest in medical ethics as a 
research topic by academic departments of General Practice or departments of Primary Care 
could be accompanied by difficulty in accessing teachers of medical ethics with an interest in 
or experience of general practice. 
 
One of the key observations to have arisen in this chapter is that conceptions of academic 
‘success’ may paradoxically alienate academics from GP. Academics may pursue forms of 
theoretical rigour and specialized jargon that renders their ideas relatively inaccessible to 
those without the same qualifications. For example, philosophical approaches to bioethics 
(and I include medical ethics here) have been accused of lacking a sense of context (Hoeyer, 
2006a) and failing to acknowledge the complexity of professional life. By contrast the four 
principles of biomedical ethics (Beauchamp and Childress, 2009b) have found favour because 
they represent a common bioethical language for academic and educational discourse. Though 
the principles are sometimes cited in materials to support medical and general practice 
curricula as though they were the only way to do ethics, in practice they appear as part of a 
mix within a professional ethic that is actually heavily influenced by deontological and virtues-
based approaches. 
 
The content of ethics education is also shaped by the ideals and identity of general practice as 
a profession with a professional body. Both academia and profession are subject to social 
forces that act on an individual level as well as on institutions and wider society. There are 
professional boundaries at stake here –having ‘bespoke’ ethical curricula are one way in which 
GPs maintain their distinctive identity.  
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Chapter 5: General Practice and 
Formative Encounters of Ethics 
Introduction: Ethical encounters in Education 
 
Chapter 4 looked at the determination and production of appropriate knowledge, skills and 
attitudes with respect to ethics for general practitioners. In this chapter I have used Bernstein’s 
concept of pedagogy to organise data that relate to the transmission of the relevant 
knowledge, skills and attitudes (Bernstein, 1971). In other words, I consider the ways in which 
ethics education is delivered to and ways in which it is received by GPs. Accordingly I have 
chosen to present the view of both educators and those who are educated in describing the 
phenomenon of pedagogy. Like Gewirtz and Cribb I define education broadly to include more 
than just formal processes such as classroom teaching (Gewirtz and Cribb, 2009a). Training in 
general practice includes recognised elements of workplace-based and self-directed learning, 
traditionally including an element of apprenticeship.   
As well as not restricting discussion to classroom teaching, I have not restricted it to the period 
during which participants purposefully learn to be GPs. Education in ethics begins well before 
GP-training commences, and arguably may continue to occur throughout a GP’s career. 
Moreover, many school leavers, medical students, and even newly qualified doctors have yet 
to consciously decide on a career in general practice. Regardless, their full history of ethics 
education is relevant in the sum of their knowledge and skill as GPs. This was reflected in the 
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participant data, and the chapter presents this following a broadly narrative course starting at, 
or even before, entry to medical school.  
GPs in training are supervised and to varying degrees supported in contrast to the relative 
independence of practice which comes after full qualification as a GP. Even here, however, 
there are descriptions of formal pedagogic processes such as courses and degrees, as well 
informal formative processes such as reading, reflection, discussion and mentoring. 
Preparation for medical school interviews 
 
None of the participants described preparation to apply for medical school as part of their 
formation or their medical school interview as a form of assessment. However, this is 
something which interviewers do discuss with prospective students, and have done in the past. 
As a 17-year old schoolboy in 1995 I attended one of several conferences in preparation for 
medical school interviews. Medical ethics was one of the topics covered. See for example this 
recent observation by Sokol: 
 
Daniel Sokol: I was once paid a neat little sum to give a lecture. It was no keynote address to a 
distinguished audience in the Caribbean but a talk to 200 or so school leavers who were 
preparing for medical school interviews. Why an ethicist? Because it is not unusual for 20% of an 
admissions interview to be about ethics. A good answer displays maturity and nimbleness of 
thought and lifts the candidate above the rest. A poor one can signal the end of the road or, at 
best, an uphill struggle for the rest of the interview (Sokol, 2010a). 
 
Medical ethics may be encountered both in books aiming to prepare candidates for medical 
school, and in courses and sixth form conferences aimed at the same. At the time I was doing 
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the fieldwork for this thesis I spoke at two sixth-form conferences on the subject of a career in 
general practice. At both of these there was a lecture and discussion on medical ethics led by 
Raanan Gillon. Gillon, associated with the introduction of the four principles approach to the 
UK also writes the ethics chapter in at least 2 editions of, ‘A career in medicine – do you have 
what it takes?’ (one of the aforementioned interview preparation books)(Gillon, 2000).  Like 
Sokol in the above quotation (indeed Gillon and Sokol are friends and collaborators) his 
approach is arguably to give prospective medical students a taste of medical ethics. It may be 
that none of the participants met engaging luminaries such as Gillon and Sokol or it may be 
that such preparation was crammed in pupils timetables with other activities such as studying 
for A-levels finding work experience and reading medical newspaper articles.   
Whilst preparation for medical school interviews went unmentioned by participants, two GPs 
spoke of upbringing by parents and being taught at school: 
Dr J: ...I think also if you have a faith in... [tails off] That... [pause] probably that does have an 
impact on you as well -and probably your upbringing as well.  So maybe what you’ve been taught 
at school or by your parents.  I think those are factors that all have a role to play.  
 
The comment above suggested some moral education derived from parental upbringing or 
childhood schooling rather than any formal education in philosophical ethics. By contrast Dr G 
in the quotation below described a charismatic teacher inspiring a life-long interest in 
philosophy: 
Dr G: I mean throughout my life I’ve been very much interested in ancient history and ancient 
philosophy, particularly Greek philosophy, partly for reasons to do with a charismatic teacher at 




It is difficult to come to conclusions about the comments of Dr J and Dr G set against the 
absence of comment regarding preparation for medical school.  A possible hypothesis might be 
that Dr J and Dr G have successfully reflected on experiences that mattered to them and 
somehow connect with what they see as ethics education. It may well be that none of the 
participants did any preparation for medical school interviews and I did not specifically enquire 
about this. However it may be also possible that such preparation was seen as more of a 
superficial exercise in answering interview questions than as part of ethics education.  
Ethics education in Medical School 
 
A number of participants made reference to medical school in the context of being taught 
ethics, generally either as a lecture, or a classroom-based, activity. This section examines 
participants’ reflections on their undergraduate (medical school) experiences of ethics 
education. The purpose of this is firstly to contrast undergraduate and postgraduate ethics 
education in the professional narrative of GPs. Secondly, it is to consider whether medical 
school is the right time for learning about ethics. Some participants wistfully looked back at 
medical school as the time for learning rather than doing with throwaway comments such as 
Dr U’s below: 
 
AP: Is there any way that you feel that ethics education or ethics support could be improved for 
your average GP? 
 
Dr U: Okay, yes, right. Well the average GP isn’t going to go to medical school any more. 
When Dr U (above) made the comment that the average GP is not going ‘to go to medical 
school any more’, he drew my attention to the absence of a formal learning environment for 
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practising GPs, where education (including ethics) might take priority over (or at least be seen 
as equal to) the everyday concerns of service delivery. 
 
The emphasis on learning and relative lack of service commitment whilst at medical 
school did not necessarily mean that participants had clear memories of ethics 
teaching or its contents. Drs Q and O would have been medical students at the roughly the 
same time though at different medical schools.   
Dr Q: I don’t remember having lectures on medical ethics, as a medical student. I didn’t graduate 
till... I went to medical school from [early 1990s], so things may have changed since then, but I 
don’t remember going to any lectures on medical ethics. 
Just because Dr Q did not recall attending them did not necessarily mean that they did not occur. 
Dr O: In terms of formal training, really I only remember a couple of lectures from medical school 
[...] I do remember a lecturer from [ethics lecturer we have both met]. I remember it being very 
vague, and I remember – as I say I remember not learning very much from it, rightly or wrongly. 
Dr F described medical ethics being an explicit component of a year spent doing an 
intercalated BSc degree, but could not recall any of the detail of what she learned. None of the 
participants volunteered any clear narrative memories of learning. Dr O’s description 
suggested that other features may be more memorable than the content of the ethics 
teaching– in his biographical account he referred both to a particular lecturer, and to the fact 
that one of the senior figures at the medical school was particularly interested in the subject. 
Others also describe particular events, activities and people leaving an impression. Dr O 
described the four principles as the content of his learning, just as Dr D described her UK 




Was pre-90’s medical ethics poorly taught? 
In the previous chapter I described the systematization of undergraduate medical ethics 
education since the 1990s (Hope, 1998). The participants who were more recent graduates did 
not appear to reflect this systematization of undergraduate ethics teaching in their accounts 
beyond halting references to the four principles. However I was able to discuss the idea with 
GPs who had graduated before the 1990s.  According to Spicer for example, prior to the late 
1990s, medical ethics was taught in medical schools, but in a varied and piecemeal fashion. 
 John Spicer: Those of us who graduated prior to the implementation of such a syllabus may find 
ourselves to be relatively undereducated by comparison with our junior colleagues (Spicer, 2005). 
Comments such as Spicer’s raised the question of whether those who qualified after 1998 
would be much more ethically articulate, and more confident in discussing the ethical aspects 
of medical decisions.  
Professor P: And yet that, I think ethics by and large, certainly for my generation was very poorly 
taught at medical school.   
Professor P’s generation and those directly preceding it would have been unlikely to have had 
any significant time devoted to medical ethics in their undergraduate curricula.  
At the UK Primary care ethics conference held at the Royal Society of Medicine in London on 
February 1st 2012, Professor Roger Higgs, a contemporary of Dr G, made reference to one 
lecture on ethics which amounted to a list of professionally prohibited activities. 
 
Roger Higgs: When I was at medical school at Westminster, we didn’t have medical ethics, well 
we did have one lecture and the geezer said, ‘There’s the rules of As, no abortion, no advertising,’ 




Dr G, one of the older participants changed medical school half way through his degree and 
was able to illustrate a difference in ethos between a London medical school and an Oxbridge 
college: 
I certainly don’t remember, at undergraduate level, going to any lectures or tutorials formally 
entitled ‘Ethics.’  The fact that I can’t remember them doesn’t mean that they didn’t happen.  But 
I suspect that these things just emerged during the course of clinical case discussion.  I suppose is 
that likely?  It probably wouldn’t have been at St [Name of Medical School], because that wasn’t 
the sort of hospital that discussed things like that.  I did my clinical at [Oxbridge medical school], 
you know I did my pre-clinical, I don’t know what your experience is, but the ethos of the 
[Oxbridge] undergraduate training is very intensive one to one tutorial discussions with regular 
supervisors. And I suspect that such ethical discussions as I had would have happened then.  
 
 
Is this a case of unconscious competence or enculturation?  
 
Two of the participants, Dr D and Dr N qualified as doctors abroad in Asia and Russia 
respectively. Both describe GP training as their first encounter with taught ethics. In the 
quotation below Dr D describes the differences that she perceived between herself and those 
who had studied medicine in the UK. 
 
AP:  Could you tell me a little bit about [the VTS Ethics Session]?  Do you remember much of it? 
 
Dr D: Well, I’m a foreign graduate, so in my undergraduate days, we didn’t talk about medical 
ethics, nothing, it wasn’t there at all.  So when I came for my registrar years, all the other 
registrars knew the four, the breakdown of how you go about ethics.  I wasn’t aware of that, so 
learnt about that at that point. And they seemed to know more than I did and they were more 
ethical than I was… 
127 
 
… But I think the difference between me and a local graduate, they are more aware of ethics and 
subconsciously they are applying that all the time. 
 
All the other registrars knew ‘the four’ principles of bioethics, according to Dr D. Given the 
relative amount of time allocated to the subject, it seems likely that this was as a result of 
what they learned at medical school than during their hospital attachments. Dr D refers to 
local graduates being ‘more aware’ and yet applying ethics subconsciously.  
 
Dr D and Dr N were both reflective individuals who were prepared to discuss their ethics 
education with a qualitative researcher. Perhaps paradoxically Dr D and Dr N were more aware 
of ethical issues because they perceived a difference between what they had learned (or not 
learned) at medical school and what was now expected of them. For example, whilst Dr D 
perceived herself as less ethical, or ‘consciously’ incompetent her reflections demonstrated 
more potential awareness of ethical issues than UK-trained colleagues – who, relatively 
speaking might, paradoxically, be ‘unconsciously’ less competent.  
 
Whilst UK graduates were vague about describing the content of their learning It is equally 
possible that UK graduates progressed to a kind of unconscious competence, as Dr G illustrates 
with an anatomical analogy: 
 
Dr G: ...as an undergraduate we must have spent at least three weeks, three weeks agonising 
over the detailed anatomy of the femoral triangle.   And having vivas about it, dissecting it and all 
the rest of it, and learning the anatomy of it, not many years on, all you need to know about the, 
about the femoral triangle is that you put your finger over the artery and stab medially if you 
want a vein.  That’s all you need to know.  And at that point, although you probably needed to 
have been primed to appreciate that, in actual daily practice, most, a huge amount of what you 
128 
 
learnt and agonised over as a student, is either redundant or has become so internalised that you 
can’t see the origins of it any more.  And I suspect that quite a lot of ethical thinking is around 
there as well. 
 
To conclude, I found that participants’ descriptions of ethics at medical school in the UK were 
generally vague or absent. If there was any conscious recall of learning content it either related 
to the four principles or simply the acknowledgement that such teaching existed. There was no 
consistency among accounts as to whether ethics was not taught or poorly taught. The 
existence of either a familiarity with ethical values endorsed by wider culture or the four 
principles and ethics teaching, was remarked upon by the two participants who had qualified 
outside Europe. Possibly as outsiders they were able to perceive themselves as making a 
transition from conscious incompetence to conscious competence.  
 
Hospital induction and postgraduate teaching 
 
Most UK GPs will have spent at least 3 years as a junior doctor in a hospital environment. 
Medical Ethics is generally taught only briefly, as Sokol illustrates in his British Medical Journal 
(BMJ) column ‘Ethics man.’ 
 
Daniel Sokol: Tomorrow I must give a talk to junior doctors about “Essential ethics and law for 
the junior doctor.” This may be the only hour they have on the subject in the entire year. What 
should be included? (Sokol, 2010b) 
 
Daniel Sokol, an ethicist writing for the BMJ, the weekly medical journal that participants 
considered to be most widely read, muses on how to impart moral perception. Sokol suggests 
that the ‘hour’ is best served by sharing and discussing illustrative and problematic stories. 
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Sokol’s approach is not the norm and perhaps represents the experience of a handful of 
cohorts of junior doctors over a few years in one particular teaching hospital.  
 
 
Dr O recalled no formal teaching on ethics and/or law as a junior doctor in hospital, but 
recalled being made aware of the importance of protection of patient data: 
 
Dr O: Well, I say that, I remember, I remember an induction session by the IT guy.  And teaching 
as if for the first time about the importance of confidentiality, which I felt was rather bizarre. 
 
Sokol illustrates the boredom generated by reference to the routine in the context of junior 
doctor teaching: 
 
Daniel Sokol:  Another “essential” issue is confidentiality. I shall not bore the junior doctors with 
old sayings about soundproof curtains and indiscreet discussions in the cafeteria (Sokol, 2010b). 
 
The guidance on confidentiality referred to by Dr O above is very much in the vein of ‘old 
sayings about soundproof curtains and indiscrete discussions’. He recognised this as ethical in 
the context of our discussion rather than just one of the many administrative burdens placed 
on junior doctors. Dr O described the session as bizarre, chiefly because the idea of protecting 
patient information seemed so obvious both in terms of the espoused values and the routines. 




General Practice Vocational Training 
 
According to an article on ethics that appeared in InnoVAIT, the RCGP journal aimed at 
trainees, trainees are encouraged to participate in well-facilitated small group learning such as 
often provided on half-day release sessions in the course of a vocational training scheme. They 
are also urged to consider using tutorials with a GP trainer or educational supervisor to look at 
specific ethical issues raised by consultations or within a ‘hot topic’ such as palliative care or 
the termination of pregnancy (Gillies, 2009). 
Certainly ‘Ethics and values based medicine’ has been a part of the GP curriculum since its 
inception (Slowther et al., 2006b). There is documentary evidence of formal events built into 
training schemes before this. In 2001 for example, Molyneux reported his attempts to 
introduce a formal component of medical ethics to GP-trainee education in the north of 
England (Molyneux, 2001). On the basis that this formal component had to be delivered within 
two half-day sessions, he allocated one half day to theory and subdivided this into 
consequentialism and prima facie ethics (see below). Prima facie (at first sight) ethics refers to 
the use of principles which are absolute on their own unless there is conflict between 
principles. 
However, participants whose training predated the MRCGP curriculum were more vague about 
this. The presence of a syllabus does not necessarily mean that it was used. Several 
participants involved in training were prepared to share their indifference or dislike for the 
curriculum statement on ethics. Even when adhered to it is one of many statements on the 
learning expected of a UK GP. Dr D’s comment below illustrated this: 
Dr D: It was in our syllabus thing, yes ... I think it was the MRCGP syllabus ... Or was it part of our 
training?  I think we just, they had to just touch on it... 
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Prof Z: But of course in the vocational training courses have lots of ethics in there, discuss things. 
But would a typical GPVTS have ‘lots of ethics’ in a sense of conscious formal encounters with 
protected time for learning and reflection? 
 
“Day-release” – Classroom-based ethics teaching on the GPVTS 
Most of the GPs and GP Trainees I spoke to had a session on medical ethics built into their 
training. For example they might have one or two full or half-days of teaching dedicated to the 
subject on their GP vocational training scheme (GPVTS). Professor Z had led GP-registrar 
teaching on a couple of occasions. Being associated with medical ethics, this was the subject 
on which he had taught. Many of the GPs involved in academia and education had contributed 
to formal ethics teaching for qualified doctors specialising in general practice. This was 
formalised in the GP vocational training schemes (GPVTS). Dr S had coached GP-trainers in this 
area, Drs B and L had organised a GPVTS. 
From the perspective of this study it is be interesting to question what impact the overt 
education of ethical knowledge, skills and attitudes has on moral decision making by younger 
GPs.Indeed this question might just as equally be applied to GPs that predate the RCGP 
curriculum. In this case however GPs have some catching up to do as the curriculum is also a 
benchmark for appraisal and revalidation of qualified as well as training GPs. 
Dr D provides the clearest description of such a formal event. 
Dr D: I was a GP registrar, and in a nice safe setting, you know ... One was an Egyptian, two of us 
were Indians, trained.  The rest were all English graduates.  And it went on pretty well, I think.  
Well, for me at least.  The rest looked a little bit bored, I guess they knew what it was all about, 




Dr D describes a ‘safe setting’. The formative environment is generally perceived as safe by 
participants. As Dr D comments elsewhere, those who had graduated in the UK looked a little 
bored. Dr D guessed that they knew what it was about, or as with Dr G’s anatomical analogy 
above, what was being discussed may simply have appeared self-evident. Dr D goes on to 
describe a fairly typical day release session on medical ethics. 
 
Dr D: They gave us some leaflets after that ... It was more like case-based discussion. They gave 
us this whole list of situations and broke us into groups and saw how we actually allocated the 
money or funding or something.  That was the exercise initially, and then it was, they asked us 
why we did that, and things like that, you know – pregnant women, HIV, blah, blah, blah. Those 
kind of things.  And then they used that as a training tool, I guess, and then asked us about the – I 
still for the life of me can’t remember it.  I know it’s four, and asked us how to break down the 
ethics whatever.  That’s how we did that. 
 
Dr D described her GPVTS organisers just having to ‘touch on’ ethics. Like a session for hospital 
trainees, a one-off session was easily missed. Dr F thought she had missed the ethics teaching 
provided on her training scheme, a definite drawback to providing training as a one-off event, 
such as the ‘hour’ provided for junior doctors that is alluded to by Sokol (2010). Furthermore 
the session on ‘Ethics’ is easily missed for a number of reasons. Dr F illustrates missing the 
relevant session whilst a senior house office (SHO) in hospital. 
 
AP: Okay, and in the GP training, is there any kind of sort of built in, ‘Today we’re going to talk 
about ethics’? 
 
Dr F: I think on my VTS, yes there’s been a session, when I was an SHO. But I didn’t go to it, 




Despite giving a relatively clear account of GPVTS training in ethics, Dr D found it difficult to 
recall specifics. Dr O could not recall any specifics from his or indeed if he had one. Dr Q 
identified ethics with preparation for examinations as did Dr O.  
AP: Okay, and then sort of getting on to general practice training day release, how did medical 
ethics come up there for you?  
 
Dr O: I don’t think I really will remember any specifics. Again, and probably this blurs in with sort 
of one of your next questions, again it probably comes more into the context of exam 
preparation, preparation for the MRCGP. 
Participants’ encounters with ethics in the GPVTS could be summarised as being both essential 
and yet negotiable. How much GP trainees get on ethics from their GPVTS appears contingent 
on their perceived needs. It is a part of the curriculum, and as with undergraduate teaching the 
four principles of bioethics are taught. 
 
Clinic-based medical ethics training in the GPVTS 
In the UK, there are two main aspects to the training of GPs. Trainees have some time 
allocated for ‘classroom’ activities such as formal courses, classes and group exercises. The 
other aspect to GP education is a form of apprenticeship, where GP-trainees take on increasing 
responsibility within a ‘training practice,’ supervised by a GP-trainer. Dr O (below) mentions 
the ‘day-release’ course but links ethics with conversations with peers and his trainer. 
Dr O: Less formal training – I guess really the GP training, the last year of GP training, the GP reg 
[registrar] year, in terms of the day release course and then in terms of, you know, conversations 
with my trainer, and since then conversations with peers, you know, I guess ethics came into 
many of those conversations. 
Dr U illustrates the trainer’s side of this discussion. 
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Dr U: ...obviously as a trainer, this was one of the subjects I used to discuss with my registrars, 
but only as a jobbing GP and my understanding of medical ethics.  I’ve taken no higher 
qualifications in it, and apart from reading one or two textbooks in order to be competent as a 
trainer, nothing special. 
 
Whilst there is no mandatory training in ethics that GP trainers are required to undergo, during 
the period that I was gathering data, I was invited to speak at two GP trainers’ groups. Dr S also 
provided me with an outline of his lesson plan for similar activities. 
 Until the end of the 20th century, professional ethics might have been seen as something that 
would be learned by subconsciously by modelling. Campbell and Higgs describe this, “To some 
‘ethics’ means little more than etiquette, the accepted conventions of a social role. ‘Medical 
ethics’ in this sense means correct professional behaviour which is passed from older to 
younger practitioners by precept and example. (Some have called this the mystical infusion 
view!)” (Campbell and Higgs, 1982c)  
Dr B: But for most trainees, I think you’ve got to go through the sort of thinking it out process, 
before it will become intuitive at a deeper level. Some people will always have to think it out. And 
some people will just act intuitively, which, if they’ve been taught well or even modelled well, will 
be okay.  But I think that’s mildly dangerous because the problem with just modelling obviously is 
that you’ll pick up the bad habits as well as the good of your mentor and you won’t go beyond 
your mentor.  So my aim, with any trainee would be to enable them, themselves, to come to a 
view as to what are my bad habits and my good habits, and to do better than me.  But I 
acknowledge that some trainees actually learn primarily by modelling. 
Hope et al suggest that, "The apprenticeship method of medical education can make doctors 
blind to these ethical components: the ethical and scientific components of the decisions are 
not separated or separately assessed but remain entwined within the notion of clinical 
decision-making” (Hope et al., 2008).  
135 
 
There may even be an intolerance of ethics teaching based on the notion that discussion of 
medical ethics may over-exaggerate or unnecessarily prolong moral deliberation. Campbell 
and Higgs quote a hospital consultant, “When people start talking about ethics I reach for the 
golf clubs,” to illustrate a view that professionals pick up ethics as they go along and that it is a 
matter of common sense and experience (Campbell and Higgs, 1982a). This may result in the 
idea that ethical issues are somehow un-contentious or that because there is no perceived 
dilemma that there is nothing to discuss or understand (Molyneux, 2001). The need that 
responsible decision-making  should consciously incorporate  the ethical dimension is echoed 
by Christie and Hoffmaster (Hoffmaster et al., 1982). 
Some of these issues may have been neglected because they are commonplace and 
uncontroversial, others because they have been masquerading for too long as “medical” or 
“clinical” decisions. A number of readers may have difficulty discerning any ethical questions in 
certain types of cases… seeing them strictly as medical problems. We want to remove these 
blinders, for responsible decisions can only be made if the personal and the social, as well as the 
medical dimensions of issues are recognised (Hoffmaster et al., 1982). 
Gillies suggest that trainees do see areas of ethical difficulty but only when they cause 
difficulty or when there is a difference of values that is evident, perhaps through disagreement 
over a decision.  
All trainees are continually exposed to areas of ethical difficulty throughout their training; the 
important thing is to be aware of them… [Trainees] tend to notice values only when they are 
diverse or in conflict (Gillies, 2009). 
This may well be why some trainees perceive that their education is inadequate. In the 
comment below Dr F voiced her fear that she will not be prepared for ethical issues that arise. 
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Dr F:   I’m actually worried, I’m scared, although I’ve still got six months to go, I’m worried that 
I’m going to end up being a GP come August and there will be ethical issues that will sort of – that 
will come my way, and I’m not going to know what to do. 
Awareness is a necessary first step in ethics education for practice. However, if trainees 
consider ethics only to be what has been identified as problematic by lists of hot topics, or by 
what they have encountered as a problem then there may be instances of new issue arising 
where they are unprepared, unless they have a way of dealing with new problems that arise.  
The conscious analysis of ethical features in practice is recognised in the Royal College of 
General Practitioners curriculum.  It is categorised as an ‘essential application feature’. The 
essential application features are described as important factors that are always present in the 
background of a consultation and exert a strong effect on how a GP’s knowledge and skills are 
applied in everyday practice. As an essential application feature, ethics comes under the 
heading of, ‘Attitudinal aspects of care,’ quoted below from page 111 of the RCGP Condensed 
Curriculum Guide (Riley et al., 2007a): 
Riley et al: This requires a GP to be aware of his or her own attitudes and capabilities; the ability 
to identify ethical aspects of clinical practice and to understand his or her own personal ethics 
and values; achieving a good balance between work and private life. 
In the ‘new curriculum’, the RCGP encourages active learning of professionalism using 
approaches such as: apprenticeship, theory, technique or skills based approaches and 
reflective practice. Apprenticeship is used to convey caring, commitment, altruism, tolerance, 
service, compassion and integrity. Theory can be used for codes of practice, the law and ethical 




Whilst Dr B was keen to remind me that the ability to work through an ethical issue 
consciously and methodically was not necessary to be a good or virtuous GP, it was desirable 
for a GP trainer. 
 
Dr B: As I say, you know, to sort of set up the sort of rather simplistic notion of one of my 
partners [in practice], I’m quite sure he wouldn’t describe the process of ethical reasoning that 
we’ve had in the last five minutes, in any way, shape or form,  in the manner that I have.  But I 
suspect that he would be more skilled at when to intervene rightly and when not to intervene in 
somebody with domestic violence problems, than I would be. 
... And certainly it would be true that my partner would be a very, very good role model, but 
would be a less good teacher for, for [the] majority of learners who do not rely wholly upon 
modelling in which to learn. 
 
One way awareness of this has been raised in GP-training is with random case analysis 
focussing on ethical issues, or by asking a GP trainee to keep an ‘ethics diary’ for a week –
noting down issues that made him/her stop and think (Deighan, 2008). Gillies comments that 
GP trainees are encouraged to enter their thoughts on a topic or case which raised interesting 
ethical issues in to their e-portfolio as comments on a clinical encounter, professional 
conversation, significant event analysis or other category of log entry (Gillies, 2009). 
 
Ethics education for ethics educators 
The expectation to professionalise medical ethics teaching is not new. The following quotation 
is Gillon’s commentary in the Journal of Medical Ethics on the Pond Report of 1987 (Gillon, 
1987). The Pond Report was commissioned by the Institute of Medical Ethics and followed on 
from a General Medical Council conference in 1984 on medical ethics teaching, and a call from 
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the British Medical Association for rigorous teaching of the subject and a curriculum for 
medical schools.   
 
Raanan Gillon: Interested medical teachers are encouraged to undertake further study of medical 
ethics through appropriate courses and/or to involve themselves in co-teaching with non-medical 
teachers from the ‘analytic disciplines’ of moral philosophy, moral theology and law, as well as 
nurses, social workers, chaplains and other medical-related professionals and also with 
‘representatives of the articulate and considered lay opinion’. 
 
Whilst the Pond Report mostly concerned the teaching of medical undergraduates, it also 
commented on the need for improved postgraduate education (Gillon, 1987).  
 
A number of participants in this study described taking formal courses and qualification in 
medical ethics and related subjects in relation to teaching medical ethics. Sometime this 
followed on from a pre-existing teaching commitment and a perceived educational need. 
Sometimes the opportunity to teach ethics sprang from a pre-existing intellectual interest. 
Formal qualifications in medical ethics and related subjects described by participants included 
university degrees as well as non-degree courses, provided by universities, professional 
organizations and learned societies.14 
 
For example, Dr B described qualifications in retrospect. Dr B is an experienced GP-educator, 
and was involved in the undergraduate teaching at a medical school.  However he did not 
initially have qualifications in the ethics per se. In the comment below he describes advanced 
qualification (verb) as a route to professional expertise. 
 
                                                             
14
 Learned societies are non-university institutions, examples include the Royal Society of Medicine and 
the Society of Apothecaries of London 
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Dr B: But, as time went by, I thought I ought to perhaps learn more about it. To be fair, 
I’ve always had an interest in Philosophy and the Philosophy of Medicine.  I did quite a 
bit of self directed study in that as an undergraduate, nothing to do with my formal 
medical course.  So there was a certain sort of match with that.  I always did a bit of self 
directed study in reading around ethics and eventually, about ten years ago, I did a 
course called the DPMSA, the Diploma in the Philosophy of Medicine of the Society of 
Apothecaries.  That led me to deepen my interest in ethics.  I then went off to do an MA 
in Philosophy at [London University]. 
 
The Worshipful Society of Apothecaries of London, is what one might term a ‘Learned society’. 
It is one of London’s old city livery companies, but has within its organisation faculties that 
deliver medically-related accredited courses, lectures and occasionally conferences. Its faculty 
of History and Philosophy is particularly active. I did the DPMSA course and examination 
myself in 2001 and have taught on it in 2013. 
 
Dr S illustrated a prospective approach. A qualification in medical law and ethics led to 
opportunities to lecture in the subject. Dr S already had accreditation in medical education. 
 
Dr S: I did a Masters Level qualification in medical law and ethics [at a specified university] about 
ten odd years ago, which was part of, that was my choice if you like, of professional 
development, when an opportunity arose to get time out of practice and funded education so I 
chose to do that, which I’d never done before ever, either as an undergraduate or postgraduate. 
But it seemed to be interesting at the time and I think it’s shown itself to be so -since doing this 
degree.  And that was my way into a world which, as I said, I really had no previous experience of 
before, which was absolutely fascinating, and I was lucky enough to get a lecturer position a 
couple of years after that, and I’ve carried it on ever since. 
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All of the ‘Ethics educators’ who I spoke with described a vocational aspect to the 
qualifications. For example, Professor Y ‘enjoyed’ (her word) the law in MA in medical law and 
ethics that she went on to do an LLM in the same subject.  She was clear about where she did 
both qualifications, as both institutions carried the prestige of being associated with particular 
leaders in academic field of medical ethics and law. 
 
Whilst structural concerns might shape a choice of course or degree, there was also an 
element of personal choice, or heterogeneity. Dr B was one of several participants who 
preferred to obtain a philosophical than a legal degree.  
Dr B: Well I mean there are a million and one Masters courses as you say.  My impression of 
those is that an awful lot of those are courses in medical ethics and the law.  And I personally 
don’t like those so much, because in a course like that, when push comes to shove, people tend 
to say, ‘Well what does the law say?’   
 
Many of the educators among my participants, including Prof Z, Prof Y, Dr B, Dr C, Dr S, and Dr 
M taught or had taught ethics to both undergraduates (medical students) and postgraduates 
(Junior hospital-doctors, GPs or GP trainees). Like Dr C below, they all made use of the content 
of their learning in teaching. The course which Dr C refers to is a 1-week intensive ethics 
course run by Professor Raanan Gillon at Imperial College. I attended this course myself in 
2009. At the time I observed that my co-participants and I from the UK were mainly either 
involved in education or resource-allocation activities. 
 
Dr C: I still do some undergrad teaching with [University Professor in Medical Ethics].  I rely quite 
heavily on material that I got during doing the Masters and the one week’s ethics course in 




Only Dr C described co-teaching of the kind referred to in Gillon’s commentary on the Pond 
Report above. However there are some published instances of a GP and a philosopher 
publishing books and articles together such as Roger Higgs (GP) and Alastair Campbell 
(philosopher) or Brian Hurwitz (GP) and Len Doyal (Philosopher) (Campbell and Higgs, 1982b, 
Doyal and Hurwitz, 1987). 
 
Informal formative encounters with ethics 
 
This section refers to the informal formative encounters with ethics described by the 
participants. It is immediately striking that participants appear to have less to say. Informal 
encounters such as conversations with colleagues over a coffee, the influence of mentors and 
personal reading are perceived as under threat unless in response to a doctors’ educational 
need. The key threat is the lack of time – an issue raised under other headings in this chapter. 
Professor Y cements the idea that an academic environment allows thinking time in a way that 
practice does not. 
 
Professor Y: But where is the time? This is what I say.  I was in academic general practice for 
many years, and you’ve got time to think then. 
 
By contrast there is less time for reflection in the ‘real’ world where service provision is the 
main focus of a GP’s activity, and this may itself be under pressure.  
Informal encounters with ethics education, that is, outside the confines of a timetabled course 
or a training programme fell into two categories in my discussions with participants – 




A group discussion within the confines of a GP Surgery or a GP learning set of some kind was 
another formative encounter with ethics.  Medical ethics, Gillies argues, is not a subject which 
can be taught and learned by dissemination of fact, but requires discussion and argument 
(Gillies, 2009). This may be contrasted with the traditional structure of UK General Practice, 
which involves most GPs working independently, making decisions about patient care without 
the monitoring and support structures provided by the hospital setting. This may result in a 
relative lack of awareness of ethical issues arising in practice, fewer opportunities for 
discussion with colleagues, and difficulties in providing ethics support. Slowther and Parker 
argue that the geographical dispersal of GPs and their places of work is a barrier to ethics 
referral (Slowther and Parker, 2007). Here I discuss discussion as a form of pedagogy. Dr Y 
illustrates the relative lack of formal educational presentations in practice.  
 
Prof Y: And occasionally we have a, not a significant event, but a topic. I can’t remember what the 
last one was actually, but that’s quite rare.  Usually it’s informal discussions. 
 
Dr B also commented on the increasing rarity of discussions around the patient rather than 
some aspect of the GP surgery as a business. 
Dr B: …we were reflecting as a practice the other day that 10 years ago when we met over coffee 
in a sort of haphazard way every day and in our weekly team meetings we spent most of our time 
–well certainly a very large chunk of our time discussing individual cases, whereas we now spend 
most of our time on practice administration and [quality and outcomes framework targets]... 
Dr M described significant event analysis as a forum where ethical issues might be recognized. 
In a sense there are two key reasons why ethical discussion might arise in a significant event.  
Significant-event analysis is generally done as a group learning exercise where something has 
either gone wrong, or had the potential to go wrong –a ‘near miss’. Conflict, tragedy and 
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wrong decisions are present. Consequently such cases might not only have a legal and clinical 
component but also an ethical one. Significant event meetings are encouraged in general 
practice as a way of avoiding future (potentially costly) adverse events, and are also 
encouraged as part of individual GPs’ commitments in terms of demonstrating quality 
assurance for annual appraisal. In theory at least the aim is to improve a service rather than 
blame one or more individuals. 
AP: Are you saying that ethical problems are usually raised under other banners? 
DR M: Yeah. Significant event analysis. For example there used to be weekly management 
meetings in the practice where I worked and quite often there would be one or two ethical, real 
you know ethical problems would be brought to be discussed in the group. 
Dr M used child protection concerns or concerns about domestic violence as an example of an 
ethical discussion that might be raised in a significant event meeting. Rogers and Braunack-
Mayer, use the same example to illustrate the overlap between clinical, legal and ethical 
decision-making (Rogers and Braunack-Mayer, 2010). In his call for ethics education and advice 
in primary care Peile suggests that significant event meetings are an excellent forum in which 
to host an ethical discussion (Peile, 2001). 
Dr S added that it is worthwhile for a discussion group to have someone with ethical expertise. 
Dr S: That’s a good one. The first step surely is to have a forum in which you can discuss it. So that 
could be a significant-event type discussion kind of meeting. So to actually gather all the doctors 
in the same place and the same time to discuss stuff, hot stuff that’s going on. And I think it’s 
easier to say than do and practices have to make an effort to make that happen. To then be able 
to make their discussion go beyond a rather superficial one let’s say may take somebody with 
expertise. I think that is one of the ways in which my practice uses me. 
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Doyal advocates regular fora where GPs can discuss problems, and where the responsibility 
for strategies for their optimal resolution can be shared (Doyal, 1999). He also describes 
some moral indeterminacy as irresolvable at the ‘level of general practice,’ and cautions 
against overestimating the importance of collective reason. Sharing a decision does not 
necessarily mean a better decision is made – for Doyal the best kind of decision involves the 
best kind of reasoning – this ties in with the idea that discussion might involve others with 
experience of the issues or expert facilitators. 
Some of the above groups might be perceived as adversarial in nature, for example 
significant event analysis may occur after an adverse event or near-miss. Moreover 
discussion of the medicine may eclipse the human and more arguably ethical aspects of 
such a discussion. It is not a surprise that ethical and legal aspects of practice may be raised 
in Balint groups. 
Dr R: I think one of the most influential things on my professional thinking was the fact that I 
found myself when I entered training, right in a nexus of Balint thinking and Balint creativity. My 
trainer was a member of a number of Balint research groups. There was a regular Balint group as 
part of my training every Wednesday afternoon for three years. I later worked with another 
course organiser who was [involved in] the Balint society and so forth. And so there was a sort of 
a network, a very strong subculture of that approach to the doctor-patient relationship. 
Though Dr R was keen to point about that discussing ethics was not the intended function 
of Balint groups, the unique quality of the Balint group method is that it provides a safe 
environment for doctors to examine the nature of their work from a de-medicalised 
perspective. The group members are encouraged to examine the process of the 
consultation. At present in the UK, Balint group work is almost completely confined to 




Reading about medical ethics 
I have considered ethical readings in the context of curriculum. Now I consider them as a 
pedagogic medium. The quotation below is from an article published in the journal, Education 
for Primary Care, by Rhona Knight, a GP who served both as an MRCGP examiner and a 
member of the RCGP ethics committee. She considers what speciality trainees (StRs) in general 
practice might read. 
Good resources are accessible for StRs to increase their understanding of medical ethics. As well 
as more generic texts, there are some specifically aimed at primary healthcare. These include: 
Peter Toon’s Occasional Paper on virtue ethics; John Spicer and Anne Orme-Smith’s book on 
Ethics in General Practice; Fulford, Dickenson and Murray’s book Healthcare Ethics and Human 
Values (Knight). 
The texts indentified by Knight are very different kinds of book. Toon’s Occasional Paper is an 
argument for Aristotelian Virtue Ethics as the underlying philosophy for General Practice. 
Spicer and Orme-Smith’s book is a work-book with simplified theory and case-studies – theirs 
is probably the most accessible to trainees. The text by Fulford et al is an edited academic 
anthology. Having sampled the above texts myself, it seems evident that they might be 
accessed in response to a need. 
Dr S: As ever, learning, or reading around happens in response to need and if you don’t have a 
need of ethical theory, or if you perceive yourself not to have a need, then you don’t do it very 
much ... 
Dr S described reading related to ethics in medicine as like a reaching into a “Quiver full of 
arrows”. As well as ethics texts, Dr S’s approach at times was to use literary references to 
address an overtly ethical learning need. Dr S for example makes reference to ‘The Spirit 
catches you and you fall down’ as one of the books he recommends. This novel is about the 
issues faced by an immigrant family in dealing with western medical services. I asked Dr S 
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following the interview if the quiver-full of arrows was conscious reference, either to one of 
the Psalms from the Bible or to a collection of short stories by Jeffrey Archer. It was neither, 
just a useful simile. Other ethics enthusiasts among my participants accessed a wide range of 
printed scholarship. Dr B and Dr M referred to a smorgasbord of scholarly works by a range of 
authors including Plato, Foucault and Holm. This informed their own work, but they were not 
averse to sharing insights which they had gleaned from reading.  
 The following entry on ethics in a revision-guide for GP-Trainees seems fairly dismissive of 
academic scholarship (Mead, 1995). 
Best learnt by example. The BMA publish The Handbook of Medical ethics which is worth reading 
Reading a book takes time, and whilst participants did not state that books physical availability 
was an issue – I found that, as an ethics teacher in a university that online resources were 
much more likely to be accessed and read. Books in the library had the potential to be 
unavailable and the same books were expensive to buy. 
Non academics described a lack of time for scholarly reading whilst at the same time 
advocating the use of and bemoaning the lack of scholarly work on ethics. In the quotation 
below Dr F described the idea that academics should write books on ethics, books that are 
(ironically) unlikely to read by her colleagues: 
Dr F: And I think that, I just imagine it would, you know, the doctors or the researchers within this 
fictional centre [studying primary care ethics] would write books on ethics and …  
AP: Do people read books on ethics? 
 Dr F: No, not people I know. 




Dr Q: There’s no book that says you can speak to a hostel care worker regarding this patient, I’m 
just sort of using my sort of clinical judgement or my common sense I suppose... 
And yet if there were such a book Dr Q would seek other sources of advice and support in 
preference. He had made use of the ‘five little books’ of GMC guidance for his professional 
assessment. In practice, however reference to written material was not a personal choice. 
Dr Q: I don’t refer to a book, if that’s what you mean, or a web site. No I never have. 
Dr S, a GP trainer, educator and academic contributor to scholarship was also cynical about 
any direct connection between ethical scholarship and practice. A disinterest in or frustration 
with ‘formal worked-out ethics’ was commented upon both by academics and educators. In 
chapter 4 I discussed how successful contributions to academia might be inaccessible to the 
everyday practitioner, either because they used specialist jargon or because the precise 
argumentation required time to read and understand. This was time which many of the 
participants did not believe they possessed. This might contribute to or be in addition to a lack 
of interest in ethics scholarship. This was echoed by references to a lack of interest by trainees 
and non-academics participating -who used word like ‘boring’ (Dr F) or ‘foreign language’ (Dr 
Q). 
Dr U, a senior freelance GP and former senior GP-educator reflected that principles of ethics 
and law are imparted by way of an instructional narrative. According to Dr U below there has 
to be an ‘interesting’ story of a ‘practice’ dilemma to engage the reader, followed by a solution 
which is provided by expert opinion. 
Dr U: So a busy GP, or someone who has a matter of three or four minutes to think about an 
issue quickly and maybe reflect on it if it’s relevant to their own practice, may absorb the 
interesting story of a practice dilemma, read what the medicolegal aspects are and what the 
expert patients say, reflect briefly on that and then store it away, unaware that they’ve absorbed 
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by osmosis some core ethical values. It’s unfortunate that ethics has to go in this guise but it’s the 
best way it will be communicated easily effectively and widely. 
Dr U suggests that ‘four minutes’ is the time which might be allocated to thinking about such 
an article, which might typically be a single or double page with a large dramatic picture. The 
idea of osmosis as a way that ‘good’ values somehow go from a high to a low concentration 
according to the respective gradient is an old idea linked to ideas of etiquette and the 
apprenticeship model. His use of the word guise implies the idea that ethics is somehow 
camouflaged as professional behaviour or even as an entertaining narrative in a popular 
magazine. An entertaining narrative will capture and hold the attention of the reader, whether 
because it discusses or dramatises a situation of conflict, or is more of a cautionary tale. Drama 
and human interest is the delivery vehicle for camouflaged ethics.  
Dr U also makes note of the medicolegal and professional aspects as essentially only non-
covert part of what he referred to as ‘sugar coated’ ethics. Dr U’s suggestion of an instructional 
narrative has echoes of Sokol’s ‘hour’ for junior doctors (see above) where discussion of key 
problematic cases is used to illustrate key ethico-legal principles such as consent and 
confidentiality. It serves a similar function to the ethical code of practice, conveying knowledge 
and basic understanding. The inclusion of brief learning points in such a piece of writing 
demonstrates utility for the reader. The idea of ‘sugar coating’ ethics with relevance and 
narrative serves two vital functions –illustrating principles in action but also connecting them 
with human interest and making them less dry. 
It appears that there are two kinds of reading described for the non-academic. Dr U described 
an overtly casuistic example of a case accompanied by a digest of the relevant points of law 
and etiquette – this might also be presented the other way round as an article highlighting the 
main principles of law or ethics illustrated with paradigm cases. This is akin to a simple and 
explicit parable, or a cautionary tale. Dr S, on the other hand, invites his trainees and students 
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to read a piece of literature and reflect on it. Dr S’ use of literature still makes use of human 
drama, but the trainee or trainer has time to read and reflect, and possibly have a 
conversation with Dr S to discuss the reflections. There is still a utility – the reading is offered 
in response to a situation or learning need. The ‘Quiver-full of arrows’ approach appeared to 
be one which participants associated with a more protected environment such as the GPVTS or 
Trainers’ Group, or a situation where the reader is willing to invest time to read and reflect. 
There may be a personal element of learning style here also, as Dr B illustrates below. 
Dr B: I think it’s hugely different for different GPs.  And, as I say, I couldn’t answer that question 
without again referring to sort of personal styles.  To some extent, learning styles, but also, I think 
there are practicing styles.  So my style is actually quite, I actually  have to literally work things 
through and so, to some extent, my partner, who doesn’t work things through and hasn’t read 
half as much as I have, hasn’t read – actually probably the honest truth is, he hasn’t read a tenth 
as much as I have. 
 
Discussions with participants about encountering ethics in printed literature illustrate a divide 
between enthusiast and non-enthusiasts. Utility and drama are the tools by which the latter 
group is engaged. The readings used for reflection by the ethical enthusiasts among the 
participants were of a different order. 
The attitudes to ethics readings illustrate a gap between the theoretical literature and practice, 
and a gap between ethics and practice more generally. In particular they echo some of the 
problems generated by the influence of structures on curriculum – specialised reading can be 
unpalatable unless translated or signposted by someone with specialist skills. A useful analogy 
may be that some readings in ethics are ‘available over the counter’ for common conditions 
such as how to notice common threats to confidentiality, and others require prescription 





Pedagogy in the ethics education of GPs contributes to the sum of lifelong learning. Education 
is frequently goal focussed, and this was the case among the participants. It is tasked with 
getting someone into the next phase of their professional narrative, or giving them skills for 
practice – I will discuss assessment of ethics in the next chapter. The ‘Four principles’ recur at 
every stage as a popular framework for understanding ethical issues, and they are possibly a 
marker to suggest that the more recently qualified UK graduates have received some sort of 
ethics education rather than picking up what society expects as they  go along. The 
heterogeneity of recall by practitioners and the heterogeneity of experience in terms of time in 
the job, and country of qualification, may mean that - for ethics education to be assured - 
refeshers are needed at regular intervals along a professional narrative. This is especially the 
case if, as Cribb and Bignold suggest, ethics education is an antidote to or immunisation 
against the more harmful aspects of hidden curricula (Cribb and Bignold, 1999). 
In chapter 4 I noted the relatively disproportionate concentration of activity on undergraduate 
in comparison to postgraduate ethics curricula. In this chapter I have noted the forces that 
limit the availability and the accessibility of ethics education.  The key difficulty for ethics 
education is clearly time – Campbell and Higgs described periodic necessity to refresh ethics as 
being like checking the tyre pressures on a car. Whilst it would be wrong to do this in heavy 
traffic, it is clearly something that needs doing to safeguard oneself against road traffic 
accidents (Campbell and Higgs, 1982a). Time needs to be set aside out of the busy day for 
ethics education, whether this is simply focussed on the starting concepts or reflection on 
more complex cases. Because there is limited space in curricula in for ethics in any distinct 
way, and integration may be synonymous with invisibility, multiple bites at this topic may be 
needed to counter the effect of ethics ‘missed’ because the classroom session occurs once a 
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training cycle, or is considered to be the most optional by students because it has the least 
marks attached to it in assessment. 
Time, however, is not the only factor affecting accessibility. Education needs to engage with its 
target population. Reading as a pedagogic medium illustrates this – an effective reading needs 
to be simple enough to fit into the free time of the reader and be in language that the reader 
can understand. But it seems that this is not enough – it must engage interest either through 
drama, relevance or both.  The reader must appreciate the importance of the ideas as well as 
their relevance if precious time, whether four minutes or an hour, are to be allocated to it. 
Reading and experience of drama is perhaps the safest way to learn about ethics in that 
‘someone else’ opens their practice and ideas up to scrutiny.  However there is a kind of safety 
that also comes with formal educational settings – students and trainees are expected to get 
things wrong in a way that fully qualified GPs are not. That safety is mirrored in the connection 
between Balint groups and ethical issues 
Living as an ethics educator and talking to those who teach and learn ethics in general practice 
brings home these key points: that ethics education is part of lifelong learning, that it may be 
easily missed, and that ethics education needs to engage with those who are educated on a 
practical and human level. 
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Chapter 6: Ethical encounters in 
evaluation 
Introduction: Ethics as evaluation 
 
In the previous two chapters I used the concepts of curriculum and pedagogy to organise ideas 
about ethics education in general practice (Bernstein, 1971). In this chapter and the next two I 
discuss the enactment of ethics education. This chapter is about the assessment of ethical 
knowledge, skills and attitudes – what Bernstein refers to as evaluation. In particular I explore 
those key evaluative encounters represented by formal assessment processes: selection for 
medical school, medical school examinations, and selection for general practice training, as 
well as qualifying as a GP and attaining Membership of the Royal College of General 
Practitioners (MRCGP).  
However, aspects of evaluation in the stories of encounters with ethics do not end at 
qualification. General Practitioners are also formally evaluated when their professionalism is 
questioned in the adversarial setting of courts and GMC hearings. A more recent historical 
development is the formalisation of appraisal and revalidation. As with all other types of 
doctor in the UK, GPs now face a periodic assessment of their knowledge, skills and attitudes. I 
will consider whether this latter development can represent a limiting factor on the 
educational value of appraisals. Specifically I will argue that assessment brings with it a 




Informal aspects of evaluation are not considered in this chapter as they relate more closely to 
the theme of formation: they have lower stakes, and play more of a role in learning than in 
quality assurance. For example in chapter 5 I talk about discussion groups as a form of 
pedagogy and in chapter 7 I discuss access to ethics support from colleagues or formal 
providers of such advice. Participants may have felt a certain ethical exposure when talking 
through difficult decisions with others, but the main purpose of such discussions appeared to 
be learning or support rather than formally verifying a GP’s suitability to progress or continue 
in their career. 
Evaluation of candidates for medical school 
 
In the previous chapter (which described formative encounters with ethics) I observed that 
none of the participants mentioned ethics education in terms of preparation for medical 
school entry. Whilst the inclusion of a question about contentious issues in the public arena is 
not a new aspect of medical school interviews, the explicit inclusion of medical ethics as a topic 
for discussion at interview is a relatively new phenomenon. As an interviewer for a large 
medical school in 2011 and 2012 I was given ethical scenarios with which to test candidates’ 
ability to recognise and discuss an ethical issue. In lieu of participant data I present quotations 
from two books which the younger participants (certainly the group of GP trainees) could have 
accessed to prepare for interviews. Richards and Stocktill (2001) outline in broad terms how 
the participants might have encountered ethics at a medical school interview.  
With contentious issues such as ethics or politics, candidates will neither be criticised nor 
penalised for holding particular views but will be expected to be capable of explaining their case. 
Specific questions on subjects such as abortion, religion, or party politics are discouraged, but if 
they are likely to cause personal professional dilemmas, it is reasonable to have thought about 
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them and to be able to discuss how you would approach resolving such issues (Richards and 
Stocktill, 2001). 
In another guide for prospective applicants published in the same period, Stein (2000) 
reiterates that the answers to an ethical question at interview are less important than the 
reasoning and evidence of prior reflection. 
Your interviewers will probably be interested in your views on current medical issues, such as the 
funding of the National Health Service... euthanasia, or the pros and cons of the new genetics. 
You need to have some knowledge on these issues and to have formed your own opinions on 
them. There are no correct answers, but your remarks will help the interviewers to judge how 
much you have bothered to think about the burning political and ethical issues in UK medicine 
(Stein, 2000). 
Stein lists resource allocation, euthanasia and issues around genetics as areas about which 
prospective students might expect to be quizzed at interview. All three areas were identified 
by participants as coming ‘pre-labelled’ as ethical. My own experience as an interviewer is that 
some medical schools now present candidates with scenarios that assess their appreciation of 
ethics in practice. Whether this will result in a pre-selected cohort of ethically-sensitive doctors 
and GPs remains to be seen. 
Undergraduate examinations 
 
When I co-authored a clinical finals preparation guide in 2006, I was aware (as a recent medical 
graduate) that medical ethics could be embedded within objective structured clinical 
examinations (OSCEs). Consequently that guide contained a chapter on ethics, albeit largely 
focussed on the hospital environment (Papanikitas et al., 2006). The King’s College London 
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core medical curriculum, for example, also discussed ethical and social aspects of all the illness 
categories that it specified for learning in 2003.  
Whilst participants did refer to undergraduate experiences in learning ethics, law and 
professionalism (including the relative lack of such experiences), none of them volunteered 
any stories about being tested on these topics as medical students. Ethics at medical school 
was more vividly recalled by participants in association with examination preparation. 
Examinations represent the non-negotiable aspects, perhaps a ‘dress rehearsal’ for the non-
negotiable aspects of ethics in professional examinations and problematic cases in later life. In 
the quotation below Dr O illustrates preparation for exams. 
Dr O: In terms of preparing for the exam, I can, you know, I can remember sort of ethical 
frameworks of what was expected to do answer anything within, see if I can remember it - so the 
principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, equity and then there was a fourth one... what was 
the fourth one?!... – oh, ha, ha!  There we go... 
 
Dr O illustrates the perceived requirement to analyse cases using the four principles. As I 
discussed in the previous two chapters – the four principles approach is potentially offered as 
the way to think through ethics cases in materials aimed at every examination in a GP’s 
professional career. As I will show later in this chapter – it may sometimes be presented as if it 
is the only way to think through ethics.  
Neither I nor the participants could recall any specific examples of multiple choice questions 
regarding ethics in final examinations. However many medical schools explicitly test medical 
ethics in combination with subjects like sociology and psychology. I was able to locate a page 
from the student handbook from Dr O’s medical school at approximately the time when he 
would have been there. 
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This course will be assessed in the [ethics, psychology and human sciences paper] as part of the 
case study, which will include questions that instruct students to discuss the moral issues that the 
case study raises. In particular students would be expected to show the ability to: 1. Distinguish 
between moral concepts and facts 2. Describe the moral dilemma(s) 3. Analyse the moral 
dilemma(s) 4. Provide a solution (or solutions) 5. Give argument and counter arguments for the 
solution(s) 
Notably this description does not appear to privilege any method of analysis, and does not 
mention either principalism or GMC duties. I know that some of my own generation of GPs will 
have been assessed on their appreciation of ethics in practice by way of objective structured 
clinical examinations (OSCEs). The presence of ethics as something practical that is assessed in 
use rather than just in theory (as a skill to be deployed in the context of OSCEs) may give 
legitimacy to the subject as one that medical students (and subsequently GPs) consider worthy 
of some study.  
Evaluation of candidates at entry into general practice training 
 
At my own interview prior to entering GP training I was asked how I might respond if a patient 
asked me to end their life. I suspect that this may have been because ethics featured quite 
heavily at a theme in my own curriculum vitae and qualifications. Ethics was not an area that 
participants described in terms of evaluation at this stage of their careers. However, the 
trainees that participated would have had to do a ‘professional dilemmas’ paper as part of 
their selection for general practice. This is a 2 hour examination designed to assess the 
candidates understanding of appropriate behaviour for a doctor in difficult situations, testing 
competencies such as ‘professional integrity’ and ‘empathy’. The examination format that my 
trainee participants would have experienced would have used multiple ranked answers 
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marked by computer with the answers set by a panel of expert GPs. Shortlisted candidates are 
then invited to a selection day, where they are observed in a patient simulation, complete a 
written prioritisation exercise and take part in a group discussion. (Papanikitas, 2011b). The 
computer-marked assessment evaluates candidate responses against correct answers, so 
successful candidates will have chosen answers corresponding closest to professional values. 
Situational judgement is a core component of selection for postgraduate training, and so there 
may be an invisible element of ethics assessment in both the professional dilemmas paper and 
prioritization exercise. 
Ethics in the qualification to be a GP 
 
The key difference between the older participants and the younger GPs (and GP trainees) lay in 
a fundamental difference in the way in which ethics are ‘tested’ in those examinations which 
defined them as a GP.  
 
This difference lay partly in the kind of professional examinations the participant had 
completed. Until autumn 2007, there was a choice of two quite different routes for a doctor 
wanting to become a qualified GP. The easiest route was ‘Summative Assessment’, which 
usually involved completing a MCQ exam, an audit, a video of consultations, and a trainer's 
report (Riley, 2008). The other route was the old MRCGP exam, which involved two exam 
papers, an oral exam, and a more stringently marked video. After 2007, MRCGP became a 






Just as Dr O recalled ethics in preparation for undergraduate examinations, Dr Q recalled a 
similar process in preparation for summative assessment. Ethics as he consciously 
encountered the subject was in the form of standards or rules as enshrined in the GMC’s 
‘Duties of a doctor,’ and how they might guide a response to a problematic issue. 
Consequently preparation for this assessment meant reading the GMCs guidance booklets on 
confidentiality and other issues.  
Dr Q:  And we all roughly knew the type of scenarios that they would give us, and apply the sort 
of ethical basis to that, you know like Dr Paul Parker (imaginary name) comes in drunk –that sort 
of thing- or you know he’s taking drugs, how do you deal with that sort of case scenario? And 
basically you sort of use the four principles in how to deal with it. 
For Dr Q, ‘ethics,’ as encountered in his qualification as a GP, involved choosing the right action 
in a constructed problematic scenario. The four principles approach was a tool to be applied in 
finding the right answer. The problems were predefined scenarios that had been labelled 
ethical. The answers could be model answers based on the duties of a doctor and discussed in 
terms of the four principles. It was unclear how the scenarios Dr Q mentioned might find their 
way into a multiple choice question unless there was a clear ‘right answer.’ This might be 
because the scenario was oriented towards a clear decision once all the principles and duties 
had been appropriately weighted or perhaps because the MCQ asked other factual questions, 
such as which principles or duties applied to particular parts of a case. Either way – scope for 
discussion and debate was very much limited. 
 
Videotaped consultations 
One of the ways in which the behaviour of a prospective GP at the end of their training was 
assessed was by submission of videotaped consultations. This is a feature of both summative 
assessment and the MRCGP, and it was identified by participants as possibly problematic. For 
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example, the candidate was in a position to edit the video so that it included only the 
consultations which showed his or her best light. 
 
Dr G: ...the trainees under the old regime would record lots and lots of consultations, and cherry 
pick the ‘best’ of them, to submit for examinations... 
 
In the use of video-recording of consultations, prospective GPs professionalism might be 
criticised if perceived to be inadequate. 
 
A separate problem with video-recording consultations did not lie with the GP but with the 
patient. The consent process for recording consultations meant that (if followed correctly) the 
patient also had a power of veto over whether the consultation could be examined by 
strangers in a remote location. Dr G commented on this aspect of assessment.  
 
Dr G: ...if you were to say to a patient, it’s initially between the doctor and his supervisor or 
trainee or educational staff, but if it’s sufficiently interesting or provocative, we might want to 
show it to somebody else.  And if it’s really juicy and somebody else sees it, we might go national.  
I mean they’re going to say ‘no’ immediately aren’t they?  They can’t be bothered with that.  But I 
think if you know right at the outset that the intention is, at the outset, to reserve the right to 
take that to, to a very remote forum, I think you have to declare it. 
 
Dr G picked up on the idea that a case that was problematic in some interesting or 
provocative way might be considered by the patient to be highly sensitive and 
confidential. As such there might be a problem with GPs’ ability to demonstrate 
their skills in dealing with difficult cases involving ethical decision-making. Dr G felt 
that one way of working around this issue was consent by stages – and patients 
160 
 
taking part in videotapes consultations would usually be asked to give consent both 
before and after the consultation. 
 
Dr G: But I think actually what usually happens in these studies, is that consent is sought in 
stages.  For instance, in the exam context, which I’m familiar with, for instance, because ... they 
wouldn’t know in advance that the one coming, about to be filmed, they wouldn’t have decided 
whether it was going to be one that would be seen by examiners, because they didn’t know 
whether it was good or not, in advance.  So what was normally done is a kind of serial consent, 
which would say, first of all, ‘Are you happy for it to be recorded for educational purposes?   We 
may, I may want to submit it for examination purposes, in which case I’ll contact you later to 
confirm that you’re still happy about that.’ And I think that works fine, because by that time, 
because obviously in advance the patient doesn’t know where it’s going to go. And people are 
perhaps a little bit cagey and uncertain.  But afterwards, of course, most people realise that 
actually well there was nothing particularly scary about that, and perfectly happy for others to 
see it ... With the patient’s right to say ‘No, I don’t mind you seeing it, but I don’t want strangers 
seeing it.’ Or actually what usually happens is, is that ‘I’m happy for strangers that I don’t know to 
see it, but I don’t want people that I do know, or other people I know, to see it.’  That usually 
happens. 
 
In the above quotation Dr G suggests that patients may realise that their problem is not as 
stigmatizing as they had initially perceived, and thus will be happier for the consultation to be 
seen. This does not solve the problem of those consultations that are characterised by major 
emotional content, extreme disagreement, or a perceived stigma that is not dissipated. 
 
Problems of positive bias and patient consent are less of an issue – video recording is now 
generally used for educational purposes only and for workplace-based assessment (WBA). 
Because WBA is arguably formative (candidates demonstrate improvement rather than 
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excellence from the outset) there is less incentive on the part of the GP trainee to hide difficult 
consultations. As the trainer is usually a GP in the same practice, there is less potential concern 
about confidential patient encounters being viewed by strangers in a remote location. 
However, problems of participant bias and patient consent may be lingering issues where 
recorded observational research is conducted into the ethical behaviour of GPs, especially if 
those aspects of practice which are problematic are being sought. Consent to use of recordings 
in this circumstance may be withheld by either GP or patient based on their perceived 
exposure. 
 
The ‘Old’ MRCGP 
 
Several of my participants encountered ethics in the context of the old MRCGP examination. 
This involved writing essays, submitting videotapes of consultations and an oral examination. 
The idea behind the old MRCGP was that it represented a higher standard than summative 
assessment which existed in parallel as an exit examination for GP training. As such it was 
legitimate to ask candidates to engage with theory in the context of professional practice. 
 
The subject of ethics was a perceived component of the old MRCGP. Dr G, a senior examiner 
for the MRCGP, described the ways that ethics was included in the examination. Many of the 
quotations from the examiners perspective come from Dr G as he was highly placed in the 
MRCGP for many years. 
  
Dr G: ...under the former configuration of the exam, there was a strong ethical component 
running through that, both in terms of thinking about written questions and particularly in asking 




Ethics in the old MRCGP was also perceived by participants who had been candidates. From 
the candidates’ perspective, ethics appeared to be an explicit or an implicit component. Dr O 
recalled that he had to answer ethics questions, but could not recall anything specific about 
them. He could not recall any specific examples from either his oral or his written 
examinations. He did, however, recall that he had to reconcile some theoretical ideas with 
professional context. 
 
Dr O: ...the trick was, answering the ethics questions was always as with any ethics question, to 
establish a framework to answer it in.  And I answered it in terms of the individual patient and 
the practice as a whole apart from anything else.  So the way you started thinking about 
indirectly principles of ethics in terms of equity and autonomy. 
Dr O used the four principles of bioethics and related academic ideas of equity and autonomy 
to the professional context of the competing duties to the practice as a whole and the 
individual patient. 
Dr E gave a slightly dissenting viewpoint to Dr O’s, in suggesting that ethics was an implicit 
rather than an explicit component of the MRCGP. 
Dr E: because if you’d have asked me, if when I took my membership, there was any emphasis on 
ethics at all – with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, I would have said, ‘No.’ And I don’t recall any.  But 
clearly there were in the… the sort of short answer questions… on a modified essay question or 
something, you saw something on one page and, you know, it would be that, you know, ‘Mrs 
Brown’s booked in to see you and when she comes in, they ask you whether her mother has 
been drinking,’ and I mean clearly what one is looking for there is not just an understanding of 
the ethical principle, that breach of confidentiality is a serious issues of medical malpractice, and 
you need to be aware that that’s the sort of scenario that you may do it.  But it’s more I think in, 
in – that is a key issue, but in addition in a membership exam, one is looking, not for someone to 
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make a cold brutal statement to the patient, but… seeking to understand their viewpoint and to 
be as helpful as they can.  So I think the membership exam is seeking to or was then seeking to 
do more than one thing, and it certainly – I do not remember any exploration of whether one was 
able in terms of – you know, that scenario would not be followed by a question, at least in those 
days, I don’t think, like, ‘What are the ethical implications of this request?’  I don’t remember 
anything like that. 
 
For Dr E the ethical components were implicit in the short essays. He gives the example of 
recognising confidentiality as the problematic concept and the desire for a nuanced view that 
can take into account conflicts and exceptions. Dr E was describing a written assessment as 
opposed to the oral examination, where an explicit discussion of ethical theory and principles 
might have taken place. 
 
The MRCGP oral Examination 
Participants who had done the old MRCGP had potentially faced a discussion of professional 
ethics in an oral examination. The notional advantage of an oral examination was that 
candidates could have their soundness of their knowledge and attitudes tested in a way that 
was somehow deeper than a written exercise.  
 
Dr G: the element of professional discourse, where you can actually test them in conversation, 
the soundness of people’s judgements and values, and whether they actually carry them through 
or not. 
 
In participant accounts, the ethics component either involved either: a discussion about ethics 
and its application to practice or presented the candidate with an ethically problematic case 




Dr G: …in the MRCGP exam… it was very common in all the situations to confront somebody – to 
have a 5 or 10 minute conversation about ethics – which would usually start in one of two ways, 
and different examiners had different styles of approach.  One would be, you know, moving from 
general to the particular, would begin with, ‘Do you have an ethical framework, could you tell me 
what it is?’ ...  And then, and then be confronted with something, with some situation that 
perhaps you know, they felt the principles were in conflict or it wasn’t immediately clear what 
was the right thing to do, think how they would apply. 
 
Dr G expanded on how the examiner might evaluate candidates in terms of ethical expertise. 
He distinguished between poor, satisfactory, and advanced answers in the old MRCGP 
examination. 
 
Dr G:  So, for instance, a poor candidate might say, ‘I don’t know, I think I’ve heard of altruism…’ 
A medium level of answer might be, ‘Well there are a number of principles, four, for example, 
which are,’ and describe them and think how they might apply them in this particular case. 
Somebody at, with what I think most examiners would regard as  a more sophisticated ethical 
awareness, would be able to say, ‘Those may be the principles, but they’re nothing, but in real 
life it’s much more complex than that, or they interrelate or they don’t deliver the answer, or it 
all depends on a number of other things.’   And so I think [that] the ethical dimension in practice 
is as multifaceted and as subtle and as hard to codify as all the other clinical things. 
 
A satisfactory answer, according to Dr G, at least attempted to relate theory to practice. A 
more sophisticated answer might go further and critique the theory’s application in practice.  
 
Dr G: I think the, the way most of my exam colleagues found or tried to differentiate somebody 
who was ethically sensitive or ethically developed from somebody who was not, was not to do 
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with whether they can articulate the four principles or any other number of principles, but 
whether they could actually see the inconsistencies that they implied.  
The other approach used in the oral examination was to present the candidate with a 
deliberately controversial scenario. Dr G recounted his dismay at the abstractness with which 
candidates attempted to apply the four principles in scenarios that they could encounter in 
real life. 
 
Dr G: And others, another style of approach, people would start with some particular clinical 
dilemma or consulting dilemma – ‘the patient says this, but you think that, how might you 
resolve it and can you infer any principles from that discussion?’  And there seemed to be such an 
awful lot of not-intentional humbug, but you listen to …full-grown adults in their mid-twenties, 
coming out with statements like sort of, question, ‘A mother wants you go prescribe antibiotics 
for her child, but you don’t think it’s necessary, is there an ethical dimension to this?’ Answer – 
‘Well there are four principles, blah, blah, blah and blah,’ and that’s not the way people think in 
real life, because people do not think in real life, this is an abstraction.  And is not the actual 
means by which you resolve that moment’s uncertainty which confronts you in the consultation. 
 
Not all the participants saw the complex cases in the manner experienced by Dr G. Dr E, for 
example, suggested the emphasis was on more on demonstrating how one might handle the 
scenario rather than a discussion of the ethical issues and content. 
 
Dr E: Twelve year old Miranda coming in without her mother or even with her mother, for the 
pill, you know, all those kind of case scenarios, much beloved of the membership examination 
really … it was more from the point of view of testing the candidate’s ability to handle a 
controversial consultation, rather than …its ethical content, and identifying the ethical issues… 
166 
 
Dr E’s different perception may reflect the lack of time in an oral examination, such that the 
discussion may include ethics or it might not. Not every oral examination was the same and 
not every examiner might have the same expertise. 
 
Using the four principles appeared to be the preferred strategy for using a theoretical 
approach in oral examinations. I infer this for several reasons: The four principles approach 
was the only ethical framework to which participants referred in the context of any 
examination. Dr G repeatedly referred to candidates using the four principles. Moreover, an 
overdependence upon the framework is alluded to in the educational literature. Rhona Knight, 
a RCGP examiner, GP educator and member of the RCGP ethics committee published just such 
a comment (quoted below). 
 
Evidence of this can be found in the oral exam of the MRCGP, which looks in part at ethical 
decision making. In a five-year period of examining, I recollect very few candidates who accessed 
any ethical theory other than Beauchamp and Childress’ four-principle approach in their 
exploration of ethical dilemmas. Frankly, I find this concerning. Does what has been re-labelled 
by many as ‘The Georgetown mantra’ really tick the box of ‘ethical theory and the GP registrar’? 
(Knight, 2007) 
 
Knight raises two concerns. Firstly candidates appeared in her experience to only favour one 
ethical framework. Secondly, implicit in the description of the framework as a ‘mantra’ is the 
idea that the concepts and or jargon are used uncritically and without depth by MRCGP 
candidates. Dr G illustrated this idea: 
 
Dr G: And everybody would trot out the four principles and kind of look smug and wait for the 




In response to the question, “Do you have an ethical framework?” the four principles 
represent an ostensibly easy answer. It is an answer which has appeal to candidates who are 
desperate to give the right answer. However, it was not enough to simply articulate the 
principles, which begs the question of why candidates might respond to the question in this 
way. The principles generally loom large in the couple of pages devoted to ethics in MRCGP 
preparation materials (Stacey, 2008). Candidates preparing for the oral might rely on such 
revision texts or even on their notes from medical school. Examiners such as Dr G and Rhona 
Knight had the ability to appreciate and recognise an excellent answer from candidates, 
including the ability to recognise an excellent answer that might completely omit the four 




Prior to 2007, successfully completing the MRCGP examination was considered to be a badge 
of excellence (with a failure rate of about 25%). Older GPs who had done the ‘easier’ 
summative assessment are now able to obtain MRCGP by undergoing a process called 
membership by assessment of portfolio (iMAP). iMAP comprises two distinct assessment 
stages, the production of a satisfactory portfolio followed by an oral assessment, and grants 
full RCGP membership which is equivalent to that gained by the exam route. One of the 
participants, Dr Q, was in the process of completing the iMAP portfolio. Another participant, Dr 
M, was a GP appraiser and examiner –she had recently mentored colleagues through the iMAP 




Dr Q: In those days the MRCGP was just an extra qualification if you wanted it. It wasn’t 
compulsory whereas now it is compulsory. I am training to do my MRCGP by the iMAP route. I’m 
in the process of doing that as we speak. 
Dr Q was commenting on the fact that MRCGP is now a mandatory qualification for all new 
GPs. The relevance of iMAP lies in the fact it confers a desirable credential. Whilst GPs who 
qualified by the summative assessment route are not obliged to take the MRCGP, it is also 
legitimate for employers to require MRCGP as a requirement in GPs. Whilst failure does not 
prevent a GP from remaining in practice, IMAP is an expensive and time consuming 
examination, and success allows a GP to use the post-nominal MRCGP, something all new GPs 
in the UK have by virtue of qualifying. The iMAP portfolio is essentially a proforma document 
that is completed by the candidate.  
Ethics, law and professionalism are explored as an explicit component of the evaluation 
process. 
Dr Q: One of the components is… “Discuss an ethical dilemma that you came across. And how did 
you deal with it?” In my day to day practice I’ve been trying to find a scenario that would be 
appropriate, or that they would accept. It is part of the iMAP process.  
Official tips on how to fill the ethical principles section are as follows: 
 
Criterion 14: Ethical Principles (RCGP, 2012) 
 Needs to be an ethical discussion applied to a clinical problem 
 The clinical problem should be clear (though the final outcome may not be) 
 The discussion needs to show how all sides of the problem were considered within 
an ethical framework 
 Read about and refer to an ethical framework 




Whilst the 5th point refers to GMC advice, there is strong emphasis on use of an ethical 
framework. The overriding perception I obtained, by looking at the guidance materials 
which Dr Q would have had access to, was that (if he read them) he was strongly 
encouraged to refer to GMC guidance and use 4 principles as the ethical framework for 
analysis. 
The candidate is also expected to state what guidance has been used to reflect on the 
situation. The handbook guidance favours the four principles of bioethics as the ethical 
framework used, as illustrated by this quotation from the 2012 iMAP handbook: 
 
Guidance: You will need to show familiarity with the four medical ethical principles. You may 
find it useful to use the four ethical principles of Autonomy (‘self-rule’), Beneficence (to do 
good), Non-maleficence (to do no harm) and Justice (to act fairly) to structure your submission. 
You can use an equivalent framework but this should be a recognised one and needs to be 
referenced (RCGP, 2012). 
 
I have deliberately highlighted two sections of the above quotation as at first glance the 
guidance in the handbook demands familiarity with the four principles. The below sample 
entry from the RCGP website illustrates this. The third highlighted part of the quotation 
attributes validity to an ethical framework based on its recognition by academia – a 
minimum criterion being publication. Implicit is the idea of the publication being from a 




The RCGP website contains a sample iMAP portfolio entry for ethical principles (RCGP, 
2010). Perhaps a satisfactory answer has to be one which may be found in a peer reviewed 
journal such as the example below. 
 
Sample entry: The ethical framework I used was based on the ‘four principles plus scope’ 
approach described by J Gillon15 in the BMJ [referenced]. The four principles are respect for 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. The scope is how these four principles are 
applied… (RCGP, 2010)  
 
The sample uses the four principles, and links them to a reference in the British Medical 
Journal. This does not give any idea of scope to candidates, but arguably confirms that they 
should stick with the four principles, because they are what the medical profession uses as 
an ethical framework. 
The RCGP example uses a sample case involving an elderly residential home occupant 
whose health has deteriorated rapidly and is refusing to be admitted to hospital. The 
proforma asks the candidate to give a brief description of the clinical situation. In the 
quotation below the sample candidate also includes the dilemma within that description. 
Sample entry: My dilemma was that I was not sure that he was at the end stage of life, and 
therefore if he had intravenous antibiotics and fluids his condition might improve. Also, my 
concern was that in commencing a syringe driver I would be hastening his demise … (RCGP, 2010) 
 
                                                             
15
 It is R Gillon – the typographical error is in the guidance 
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The candidate is also expected to discuss how the ethical framework was used to reach 
a decision. As an example I include a quotation of how justice might apply to the case 
from the RCGP sample entry. 
 
Sample entry: Justice – is the moral obligation to act on the basis of fair adjudication between 
competing claims. Gillon divides justice into three categories, distributive justice (fair distribution 
of scarce resources); rights based justice (respect for people’s rights) and legal justice (respect for 
morally acceptable laws).  
 
I think this principle was not as important in this case, as the balance between beneficence and 
non-maleficence and the respect for the patient’s autonomy. However, sending the patient to 
hospital would have involved much more cost to the health service. It could be argued from a 
distributive justice point of view that this scarce resource would be better spent on a patient who 
is more likely to recover and be able to lead a better quality of life and therefore possibly 
contribute more to society. Having said that, had the patient expressed a wish for more intensive 
treatment then I would have respected his decision (RCGP, 2010).  
 
The proforma also invites the candidate to state the outcome of the case and to write a 
final reflection on how the case was handled.  
Having had previous conversations with Dr M about iMAP, I asked her about the RCGP 
guidance (see above). She suggested that there might be some intrinsic limitations to iMAP 
guidance, that some limitations might be expressed by the candidate, but also that also that 




Dr M: Yeah well I certainly would not rigidly just apply that. It would seem a rather narrow way of 
doing it … There are some moral issues, there may for example be the moral issues of power 
imbalance, power -for example- does not necessarily come into the four principles. It may do in 
coerced autonomy or something but again it could be quite subtle, quite difficult to identify if 
you’re not thinking about it.   
Dr M raised two issues with use of the four principles in the iMAP assessment. In a way that 
was reminiscent of Dr G’s comments regarding the old MRCGP oral examination, she describes 
candidates ‘trotting out’ the four principles, but not really knowing how to apply them. 
Dr M: …before you even begin is there’s got to be awareness. You’ve got to be able to identify 
that ‘a’ there is an ethical issue which for some people, they don’t see it. So if they don’t even see 
it you don’t even, you can’t even begin. Then they’ve got to identify what are the moral issues, 
which again may escape them… I would first have to know did they identify the problem, did they 
identify the issues, and then how did they start, you know, working out a way through, because 
you know you can get people to trot out the four principles and then, and then they look at the 
problem and it hasn’t. -how do they weight, how should one thing, why would one think be more 
important than another. 
In a subsequent (unrecorded) discussion about my findings16, Dr M suggested that the 
simplicity and prescriptiveness of the manner in which the four principles had been adopted 
might relate to the examiners not being ‘well versed’ (her phrase) in ethics. She cited the 
example of an iMAP candidate whom she had being mentoring who was told that the 
submitted portfolio entry did not relate sufficiently to ethics. Dr M described the case as 
presenting a very challenging ethical dilemma that in her opinion was worthy of inclusion as an 
iMAP entry. An alternative explanation for her mentee’s scenario being labelled, ‘Not ethical 
enough,’ might have been that the examiner did not perceive an ethical issue because the 
answer appeared (rightly or wrongly) clear. Dr M was not able to share the details of the 
                                                             
16
 Unrecorded discussion 16/7/12 
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scenario with me, 
iMAP is particularly interesting because it requires that a candidate uses a referenced 
ethical framework to reflect on a real clinical case  from their recent practice. This is 
something that neither old nor new MRCGP examinations have strictly insisted upon. Dr Q 
was the only participant in the study who was undertaking iMAP at the time of interview. 
He shared two potential examples of cases which he might reflect on. Both cases concerned 
issues of who should be able to access parts of a patient’s healthcare record. Whilst I have 
written elsewhere in this thesis the idea that confidentiality is a perennial concern for 
clinicians (Papanikitas, 2011a), I have also suggested that confidentiality is easier to discuss 
as a real issue involving cases. This is perhaps at least in part because deliberately hastening 
someone’s death (see the RCGP sample entry above) is a more serious issue to reveal to a 
stranger than whether to discuss breaching confidentiality.  
The new MRCGP 
 
The Royal College of General Practice Examination which is now a compulsory examination for 
all new GPs can test ethical knowledge skills and attitudes through: a Workplace-based 
assessment (WBA), a clinical skills assessment (CSA), applied knowledge test (AKT), and the 
requirement to submit a complete electronic portfolio of learning at the end of the training 
years. 
Applied theory and practical skills are evaluated by a trainer in the workplace, and 
independently quality assured in the two examinations: the AKT and the CSA. The AKT is a 
computer-marked timed examination aimed at assessment of relevant knowledge and 
reasoning. The CSA is a simulated general practice surgery where role players are used to 
assess candidates’ knowledge and consultation skills. The qualification – a combination of 
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workplace-based assessment and examinations remains a statement of competence, of 
being ‘finished.’  
 
Workplace-based assessment of ethics in general practice and the eportfolio 
Newer GPs have the task of incorporating ethics and professional behaviour that is assessed in 
the workplace into reflective portfolios. The web-based log in which they are required to 
record their reflection and learning (Dr F referred to this) is called the e-portfolio. It also 
contains the results of examinations and workplace-based assessments. It is submitted at 
completion of training in order to obtain the MRCGP qualification which is now the 
requirement for entry on the general practice register. The diary entries contribute as evidence 
of learning towards the above learning outcomes. Gillies argues that, by analyzing issues using 
an ethical framework, trainees demonstrate learning outcomes from the RCGP curriculum. 
Until 2012, this would have been linked to Statement 3.3. 
 
Dr F was aware of the RCGP statement on ethics and values-based medicine, in so far that this 
curriculum statement was embedded in a tool used for workplace-based assessment, the e-
portfolio. However, she could not recall any specific examples in her own e-portfolio. 
  
AP: Okay. How would you go about sort of tackling that part of your portfolio? 
 
DR F: Well when I, the way I sort of include it is, when I see patients where there’s an ethical 
dilemma, then I write them up as clinical encounters and I’ll tick the ethics box.  So that’s 
probably to date that’s what I’ve done.  I’m trying to think of any other examples.  If I read 
something about ethics, that was relevant to general practice, then I would mention – I’m not 
sure if I have done.  You know, I’m not particular great with my e-portfolio.  I find it a bit 
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frustrating.  I don’t, you know, I think I do a lot of learning and I don’t document every single 
piece of it... 
 
The idea of ethics as a “box to be ticked”, which Dr F described, implies that the goal of 
incorporating ethics for the trainee was primarily to submit a complete portfolio and thereby 
to qualify as a GP. It coincided with comments about training sessions on ethics such as Dr D 
recalling that the VTS course organisers, ‘Just had to touch on [ethics]’. Even though for all the 
participants who were undertaking the new MRCGP there was an ethics box of sorts to be 
ticked in the e-portfolio, this was one of many items they needed to demonstrate that they 
had ‘covered’ in some way. This is potentially the same kind of negotiation for time and 
attention that ethics is subjected to in the undergraduate setting. The key difference is that the 
amount of time for learning and reflection is vastly reduced by comparison  
The ability to select consultations upon which to reflect in the e-portfolio requires ethical 
awareness. Otherwise the trainee may rely solely on pre-identified types of case such as 
requests for abortion or for assisted suicide or only cases that fit with a paradigm such as a 
consultation with the driver who has uncontrolled seizures. There is a vast variety of cases that 
may be written up in the e-portfolio.. Riley et al acknowledge this in the RCGP curriculum 
guide: 
Less obvious issues crop up all the time in day-to-day practice. For example, considering to what 
extent to twist someone’s arm when attempting to persuade them to stop engaging in what you 
believe to be a harmful activity, such as smoking, involves a judgement based on the conflicting 
principles of autonomy and beneficence (Riley et al., 2007b). 
An alternative to reflecting on consultations is reflecting on readings. The following quotation 
from InnovAIT, the RCGP journal for GP trainees, outlines this approach and echoes the point 




It can be difficult to get around to writing e-Portfolio entries on ethical issues, and usually entries 
are triggered by ‘headline’ issues such as assisted wills or treatment rationing. Andrew 
Papanikitas and Peter Toon wrote a brief article in the November edition of the British Journal of 
General Practice that focussed on mundane events in everyday general practice. The e-portfolio 
entries do not need to be long. If you read this and wrote down some thoughts about its 
relevance to your own practice, you would have a high-quality e-Portfolio entry that might help 
fill one of your curriculum gaps (Papanikitas and Toon, 2010, Etherington and Van Hecke, 2011). 
 
GP trainees are formally appraised by workplace based assessment using two assessment 
tools: case-based discussion –CBD- (where a trainee presents a clinical case and discusses 
aspects of it with the educational supervisor) and the consultation observation tool –COT- (a 
formal method of assessing an observed consultation or video of a consultation between a 
trainee and patient). Knowledge and understanding of ethics as well as the trainee’s own 
values and attitudes in practice may be assessed in CBDs under the heading, ‘maintaining an 
ethical approach to practice’. Trainees are guided to complete a minimum number of CBDs 
(and COTs), including some which demonstrate ethical issues, ethical reasoning and ethico-
legal knowledge (Gillies, 2009).  
 
GP trainees in primary care usually undertake the case-based discussion with their own GP-
trainer, who enters the record of the discussion, along with learning outcomes demonstrated 
and further learning goals into the trainee’s e-portfolio. Critically the trainer may identify 
issues which the trainee may have overlooked or challenge the reasoning and reproduce the 
necessary discussion and argument. Whilst none of the participants discussed undergoing a 




AP: ...when you’re sort of encouraging sort of reflection, how might you go about that, how 
might you draw out the, the sort of the ethical content of that? 
 
Dr B: In different ways. I think one main task, non obvious questions.  So, for example, if a mother 
is there with a child with a rash, fine, I may well ask about the rash or I might decide the rash is 
boring.  I’m talking now say about looking at a video, because obviously if it was a joint surgery, 
you’d just have to attend to the patient.  But if it was a joint surgery after the patient had gone, 
but in my own practice, more likely looking at videos, I might ask the registrar - if I believed the 
registrar was basically competent about that rash, I might think that was a very boring thing to 
talk about, and ask the registrar to describe to me the way the mother interacted with the child.  
If the registrar wasn’t sure about that, then I’d suggest we’d look at the video for a second time, 
with the sound off, which is often a very good way of getting registrars to latch in to 
communication issues, if you can, if you can cross out the content of what is said.   Or I might ask 
the registrar what he’d learnt.  Say if the registrar had seen that patient on a number of times, or 
another family member a few times, I might ask what they knew about the family, what other 
issues were going on, why the mother brought the child, etc. etc..  So those sort of issues.  So at 
the moment we’re dealing mainly with sort of family, psychosocial issues, and all of that to me, 
you could either say borders on the ethical or has an ethical component to it. 
 
An example such as that which Dr B outlines above might well be included by the trainee as a 
CBD in the e-portfolio. Whilst is contributes to the in-course it is also a case of assessment 
being combined with learning. However it relies on the trainer having the expertise and the 
willingness to take the discussion in the direction of ethics. 
 
None of the participants discussed ethics in connection with the COT. Though ethics is not 
formally considered in the COT, it is expected that ethical practice should apply across all GP 
work (Slowther et al., 2006b, Riley et al., 2007b). Some COTs will provide opportunities to 
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demonstrate ethical insights during reflection and feedback on the case being assessed (Gillies, 
2009). However the kinds of ethical issues that might arise in a COT were discussed in 
connection with the new clinical examination, which is designed to simulate consultations, and 
I discuss this below.   
 
Multi-source feedback (MSF) and patient satisfaction questionnaires are also used to expose 
professional ‘blind spots’ both for trainees pre-qualification and fully qualified appraisees. The 
feedback itself may provide a learning opportunity (Deighan, 2008). None of the participants 
discussed the MSF, in any context. 
 
The MRCGP workplace based assessment presents an opportunity for trainers to explore 
ethical knowledge, skills and attitudes and trainees in a manner that is mandated by the fact 
that it ‘counts’ towards qualification. As with any administrative process, there is a risk that 
the task becomes an ends rather than a means. Rather than having an opportunity to reflect 
on the ethical content of ordinary and extraordinary practice, WPA may come to represent a 
laborious box-ticking exercise. This may possibly come with an undesirable side effect that 
ethical issues are conceived as somehow separate from social and clinical issues, and trainees 
seek a set number of prescribed dilemmas rather than document their better understanding of 
ethics in daily practice. 
 
Ethics and the Applied Knowledge Test 
Trainers among the participants also remarked on the preoccupation with anything that might 
be tested in an exam. Dr R, a GP Trainer refers to this in the comment below. 
 
AP: I was just going to ask, just tangential to that, what kinds of issues over the years would 




Dr R: To be honest, on the whole, they flag up the ones that come up in the exams.  So they 
usually flag up the sort of the, the medico-legal ones, because those are the easiest ones – I 
mean certainly now, because those are the easiest ones that, to put, to do, to put in the AKT 
[Applied knowledge test].  So they want to know about confidentiality.  They tend to see it in 
rather a black and white sort of, you know, “We need to know what the laws are.”  And that’s all 
right, because after all, the point about the law is to be the bottom line. 
 
Whilst I did not have access to the RCGP question bank for the AKT Dr R’s comment is reflected 
in revision preparation materials. The RSM Press ‘New MRCGP in a box’ (Punukollu, 2007) set 
of revision cards includes a card on the Data Protection Act 1998, and 2 cards on key elements 
of public health law, one on mental health legislation, but nothing on professional or 
philosophical ethics. If computer marked multiple matching questions require a prescribed set 
of answers to a prescribed set of questions, it seems natural to seek out those questions, and 
having found them to seek those answers. 
 
The Clinical Skills Assessment (CSA) 
Whilst the examination might delegate a peer-to-peer discussion of ethics and values to course 
work, the enactment of professional values is tested in the CSA. In the new qualifying 
examination for UK GPs, the oral examination has been removed and a structured clinical 
examination -the CSA- added. The CSA assesses, amongst other things, professional attitudes, 
defined as, ‘Practicing ethically with respect to equality and diversity in line with accepted 
codes of professional conduct.’ Riley et al give the following examples of ethical issues which 
may occur in the CSA: abortion, chaperones, confidentiality, euthanasia, rationing of 
healthcare and whistle-blowing (Riley et al., 2007b).  It also assesses the ‘domain’ of 
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interpersonal skills, which covers communication skills and developing a shared approach to 
managing problems. The CSA assesses ethical and legal knowledge and professional attitudes 
in context, integrated with consultation skills and clinical knowledge. Unlike the process by 
which candidates went looking for ethical cases for iMAP and the MRCGP coursework the CSA 
requires the candidate to recognise the ethical aspects and act appropriately. Being ‘ethical’ is 
demonstrated through appropriate practice. 
 
Dr F, a trainee about to undergo the CSA, gave examples of the types of scenario which might 
test the ethics of an MRCGP candidate. She had been on at least one preparation course run by 
the RCGP. I asked her how she imagined that ideas of good, bad, right, wrong, professional, 
unprofessional, legal or illegal would be tested in the CSA examination. 
 
Dr F: Yes, so another example would be a patient who wants a particular tablet and it’s just 
completely unwarranted.  Or wants referral and there’s no need.  A patient who – a telephone 
consultation and the patient over the phone wants you to do something and actually you need to 
see them and they don’t want to come down, or they phone from far away.  A patient who’s on 
methadone, or a patient who’s taking lots of benzodiazepines17 and they want a prescription and 
there’s some dodgy story like they’ve lost them or they’ve lost their piece of prescription.   
 
What is immediately striking about the scenarios described above by Dr F is that they do not 
involve discussions about abortion, euthanasia or confidentiality. Resource allocation is 
possibly the only big pre-labelled ethical issue here. All Dr F’s examples involve some sort of 
doctor-patient conflict – the patient wants something which the doctor should not provide. 
Implicit in refusing to give an unwarranted treatment, or making an unnecessary referral there 
is often a question about resource allocation and opportunity costs. Implicit in discussions of 
                                                             
17
 An anxiolytic medication which is also used for sedation and a common drug of abuse 
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telephone management and prescribing controlled drugs are considerations of doing good and 
avoiding harm set against patient convenience. 
Dr F went on to describe a situation in more detail in which a fellow trainee failed (in a 
simulated setting) to demonstrate a recognition of a conflict of rules and principles which 
required resolution. In the example below, a trainee did not attempt to resolve a problem 
because he had not recognised the existence of the problem in the first place. 
 
Dr F: …some people I think, basic things need to be explained.  Like when I went on the CSA 
[clinical skills assessment] original course, and there was a guy on the course – the scenario was, 
it was hilarious, the scenario was that there’s a methadone user and she says that her 
prescription got stolen from her, and it’s a really flaky story.  And he gave it to her.  So either he 
was really nervous, people do whacky things when they’re nervous, or he just didn’t understand 
that, you know, you can’t just give away methadone especially when there’s a slightly dodgy 
story, he just didn’t realise that. 
The scenario in question was being used to test the ability of a candidate to balance a patient’s 
wishes against the requirement to follow practice regulations, or to balance them against the 
risk of harm to the patient or others in the context of general practice.  It is a simulation of a 
plausibly common scenario encountered, particularly in urban general practice. The candidate 
must recognise that there is a conflict in a scenario which has been deliberately constructed to 
be problematic and resolve it in an appropriate manner. 
I asked Dr F what a model approach might be to that particular case. 
Dr F: You need to try and ascertain the correct information.  You need to explain to the patient 
that you can’t, just like that, you know, give them a prescription, because – and you explain to 
them why, and negotiate a more appropriate way of dealing with it.  You know, for example, that 
okay from now on you need to maybe – the solution may be to go to the local, a particular 
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pharmacy and get the methadone from them and you would get it on a weekly basis or daily 
basis.  And alter things to make them sort of, to try and avoid that situation from happening 
again.  And manage things, bearing in mind that this patient has come to see you because you’re 
not going to take it at face value, they do want to – they don’t want to be starting using heroin 
again.  
 
Dr F identified this scenario with ethics in hindsight. Her model answer approach embeds 
ethical concepts in practice. Without asking Dr F to describe her thinking, however, it would be 
difficult to know if she understood why she might do things in a particular way. The 
disadvantage of the CSA is that it assesses actions rather than thoughts. Dr G reflected on the 
loss of the ability to examine the reasoning of MRCGP candidates.  
 
Dr G: in the present configuration of the [MRCGP] exam, which is a huge advance in some ways, 
but what has been lost is the element of professional discourse, where you can actually test them 
in conversation, the soundness of people’s judgements and values, and whether they actually 
carry them through or not.  That’s missing. 
 
The CSA also assesses the domain of interpersonal skills, which covers communication skills 
and developing a shared approach to managing problems. Some candidates therefore might 
share their thinking with their assessors by thinking aloud and sharing their decision-making 
with the patient.  An important point here is that all ethics, communication skills and medical 
knowledge are integrated; it is not possible to practise ethically without having both a high 
standard of clinical knowledge and the communication skills to understand the patient’s 




Evaluation in Practice 
 
Appraisal and Revalidation 
 
A relatively recent development in medicine has the been the explicit linkage of appraisal to 
assessment – as well as being a confidential assessment of strengths and weaknesses 
conducted with the purpose of identifying patients’ unmet needs and doctors’ education 
needs (PUNS and DENS), the appraisal is now a component of the 5 yearly reaccreditation of 
doctors in the UK. The two issues that this generated in terms of ethics in appraisal were the 
recurring issues of time and safety. Participants did not discuss any changes to appraisals as a 
result of revalidation with any clarity.  
Dr U: I’m not aware of anything massively new, apart from the colleges pushing forward with re-
accreditation and that’s about the toolkits, I guess and revalidation. 
 
Dr N argued that ethics as a theme should be a compulsory part of examinations and also that 
it should be a compulsory element of appraisal. As far as she was concerned unless it was a 
specified element of such evaluations some GPs would not even be aware of it, much less 
engage with the topic. This was a view which was echoed by other participants. Professor Y 
articulated the idea that busy doctors will make time for the things which are compulsory. 
 
Prof Y: When you’re actually in practice, you know, working from 7 until 8 or 8 until 7 or 
whatever, you don’t have time to do it.  Not to reflect meaningfully, unless you’re going to do it 




Many of the educational activities which are accredited to count as continuing professional 
development time towards appraisal for GPs include courses in medical ethics and meetings on 
topics in medical ethics. These must obtain approval from one of the royal colleges, 
universities or learned societies to count in this way. Dr E added that some of the resources 
are accordingly geared for busy GPs 
Dr E: …even at my busiest times, as part of appraisal and eventually revalidation, I mean there 
are numerous training modules online and so on.  
 
Ethics can be revisited in annual appraisal and revalidation which have specific entries for 
probity, professionalism, and ethics. Roger Neighbour, a former RCGP President, reflects on 
the counter-intuitive nature of an appraisal process that invites a kind of confession which 
general practitioners might fear making for the sake of their professional status. 
Roger Neighbour: Cynic that I am, I’m usually more alert to the muddle and palm-greasing that 
spawn the latest good idea than I am to the lofty ideals its advocates claim for it... But with 
appraisal it’s been different... I am, after all passionately convinced that guided introspection is 
the best driver of adult learning... But here’s an interesting question, slipped unobtrusively into 
Form 3, page 6: ‘What safeguards are in place to ensure propriety in your... use of your 
professional position?’ In other words, are you Harold Shipman? No I’m bloody not. And if I were, 
what would I put?’ Curses, you’ve got me bang to rights, I’m a murdering psychopath’? 
(Neighbour, 2005b)  
Neighbour’s comment ties in with professional anxiety over exposing ethical inadequacy. I 
have written elsewhere that such professional fear might paradoxically inhibit people from 
seeking ethical advice (Papanikitas, 2011a). Opening up behaviour to ethical scrutiny can raise 
the fear that behaviour will be deemed by peers to be deficient. This has two key adverse 
outcomes: firstly discussion will only involve what the narrator thinks he should do (rather 
than what he does), or secondly that discussion will fail to take place at all for fear of reprisals 
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rather than remediation. For one’s decisions to be deemed unethical is similar to them being 
deemed un-professional – both place the practitioner out in the cold if the decisions are 
deemed unworthy. The phenomenon of ethicality refers to the interest a profession has in 
policing itself so as to maintain control over its work (Freidson, 1988).The fear is that one will 
fall foul of ethicality. In a profession’s desire to hit certain standards to maintain status, poorly 
performing doctors will be sacrificed rather than helped to achieve the same standards. Or in 
being seen to receive assistance a GP loses individual status. This set of concerns can be 
summarised in the following way: 
1. The rules are unclear 
2. If I ask about the rules, I will be seen to be deficient in my knowledge by my peers 
3. If I am seen to break the rules, my peers and society will judge me harshly 
4. If I think I am breaking the rules, I reveal this at risk to my professional status 
  
Fitness to practice 
 
Investigation by a professional standards organisation (such as the General Medical Council) is 
another example of such concern over a high stakes evaluation. Another example might be 
being sued for negligence. The stakes are high because censure by the GMC or successful 
prosecution might result in loss of employment or prevention from further employment. 
Disciplinary or legal proceedings in the event of alleged misconduct are final assessment of 
right or wrong-doing. GPs are subject to the same laws as anyone else and the same legal and 
professional duties as all other doctors. 
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None of the participants in this study admitted to being or having ever been subject to either a 
lawsuit or investigation by the GMC.18 A surrogate experience described by participants was 
the occasion to seek advice from a medical indemnity organisation. Like any other type of 
doctor, GPs contact an indemnity organisation to avoid litigation or anticipating or following a 
complaint. The particular circumstance where the two would overlap is where someone goes 
to their indemnifier as a result of being investigated by the GMC or sued for negligence.  
Participants displayed a certain embarrassment at needing to seek medicolegal advice. Dr N 
described feeling initially embarrassed the first time she used her provider of medical 
indemnity. Dr O jokingly suggested that his confession that he made a lot of use of his medical 
indemnifier made him sound like ‘a shocking doctor’. 
By contrast, other participants were keen to tell me if they rarely needed to talk to an 
indemnifier, as with this quotation from Dr G. 
Dr G: No I don’t think I’ve actually, touch wood, too late to touch wood after my career is 
finished, but I managed to get through it with nothing terribly serious in the way of either ethical 
issues or complaints. 
 
This was echoed by Dr B, who proudly stated that he had only telephoned his indemnifier four 
or five times in thirty-one years of practice, He went one to give me an example where he had 
been sure of the right thing to do and sure that it was also legal defensible. In another example 
Dr Q was at pains to state that on the one occasion that he telephoned his indemnity 
organisation it was over a ‘salary issue’ rather an ‘ethical issue’.  
Dr E raised a concern that unethical doctors might still satisfy a professional body that they 
had followed guidelines. He cited the example of refusing to disclose details to a patients 
                                                             
18
 One potential participant who had been briefly suspended by the GMC over an ethical issue, 
subsequently declined to participate. 
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relative or carer in circumstances where disclosure might be the morally correct course of 
action or a compromise might be better. He was concerned that the GMC and MPS might be 
approving of such a doctor on the basis that they had kept confidentiality.  
In Chapter 3, I commented that two GPs after expressing an initial interest chose not to 
participate and one of them was good enough to volunteer a reason why. He handed me a 
printout from the GP magazine Pulse (Iaccobucci, 2010). The article concerned twenty four GPs 
who were facing censure out of two hundred and forty-five volunteering for pilot trials of a 
new type of professional appraisal. The article also commented that over 3,000 doctors were 
invited to take part in the pilots - taking place across 10 different locations - and around 650 
doctors had volunteered. The headline warned of a witch-hunt (using those words). The article 
mainly concerned GPs with other interests who were deemed not to have spent enough time 
in general practice to be considered fit to practice and had little to do with discussion of ethics 
specifically. More generally, it reflects the anxiety that external scrutiny may have adverse 
professional outcomes for the doctor being evaluated.  The article has additional relevance in 
that it was associated with my study in the mind of a potential participant. 
Professor A, an educator and commissioner of general practice education at a national level 
expressed a similar disquiet: 
Prof A: The big difference is, I’m concerned that the more you regulate and legislate and 
bureaucratise, you create a climate of fear, you create a climate of uncertainty, a climate of 
insecurity, it, the regulation, which is supposed to protect, really, I think leads to a cover-up kind 
of activity.  People do less outside what’s in the box is defined, because they’re afraid to do so. 
And that’s more about the young...  I mean they should have fundamental principles, but we’re 
not going to be able to define everything for them if they are afraid of going out of the box… then 
we’re going to have a defensive kind of culture. 
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Professor A’s comments link back to the students’ and trainees’ preoccupation with knowing 
the right thing to say in an examination, and preference for definite rather than indeterminate 
answers as evidenced by the desire to discuss law and professional guideline rather than ethics 
of a more analytical nature. 
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Conclusion: Evaluation is a game with increasing stakes   
 
Time and safety recur as themes in this chapter. The pressure on time in a crowded curriculum 
means that the presence of ethics in formal assessments is what makes it visible and explicit 
rather than part of an invisible subculture. The presence of ethics in assessments mandates 
reading, discussion and reflection for GPs in the various stages of their careers. In this study I 
have not talked to sixth formers, medical students or prospective candidates for GP training. 
Instead, the inferences I make are taken from the professional narratives of GPs, GP-educators 
and GP-academics, which are in turn offered from personal narratives and observations. Those 
narratives and observations tell a story of increasingly high professional and personal stakes at 
each stage of a doctor’s career as he or she comes under external ethical scrutiny. However 
this is partly coloured by hindsight – one can imagine that for a sixth-former, demonstrating 
aptitude for medical school is a most important evaluation, as for a medical student, is 
demonstrating the competence to be a safe and effective junior doctor. Nevertheless, the 
narratives of evaluative encounters with ethics illustrate increasing stakes and decreasing 
safety for the professional in the discussion of ethical issues as education gives way to practice.  
 
Assessed coursework for GP trainees represents an opportunity to evolve beyond narrow 
approaches to ethics that might be favoured by a higher stakes oral examination – such as the 
four principles and a need to give the “right answer” as perceived by both candidates and 
examiners of the old MRCGP. The focus on pre-labelled issues and favoured answers is still 
present, however, and this may be exacerbated by the delegation of case-based discussion to 
trainers, many of whom may not have advanced skills in terms of ethics, law and 
professionalism that RCGP oral examiners might. The danger of focussing on set approaches to 
ethics too rigidly is that legitimate approaches and issues presented by GPs for academic 
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evaluation may be unfairly discriminated against. The stakes involved may act simultaneously 
as a driver for learning and, could paradoxically constrain deeper understanding. This is 
because those who are assessed may be more eager to give their examiners the answer that 
they think the examiners want to hear than to critique or debate it.  
 
The non-negotiable nature of making ethics an implicit or explicit feature of assessments and 
external scrutiny put ethical sensitivity and basic skills in moral reasoning on the GP’s 
educational agenda. However, the other forces acting on GPs in their professional narratives 
need to be accounted for. The fear of criticism and censure arguably may prevent GPs from 
sharing the learning which they have gained from failures, and possibly even admitting to them 
in the first place. It may also create a reluctance to open up their ideas about good and bad, 
right and wrong, professional and un-professional, because such ideas define the boundaries 
of practice. Ultimately discussions about practice that is ethically uncertain may determine 
who remains in and who is ejected from the profession. 
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In the preceding three chapters I have considered curricular aspects of ethics education, 
pedagogic aspects of ethics education and evaluation aspects of educational assessments. I 
have examined (Bernstein, 1971). The emphasis on ethics education as a classroom rather than 
a clinical activity was a phenomenon that participants either identified with (themselves) or 
identified in others.  
Both undergraduate and postgraduate curricula are crowded, and therefore the identification 
of any subject as being optional risks its omission by learners. Consequently, the presence of 
ethics as a subject for assessment in undergraduate and postgraduate examinations flags the 
subject to learners as one requiring some study. However those assessments either limited 
learning to a core curriculum by emphasising particular sub-topics and approaches, or de-
prioritised the topic by awarding it fewer marks in the sum needed achieve whatever 
qualification it might be linked with.  Whilst lip service is paid to the notion that an 
understanding of relevant ethical theory is core and fundamental, for non- enthusiasts there 
seemed to be a kind of negotiation over what amount of engagement with scholarship was 
necessary to pass exams and avoid being criticised in practice. This all leads to the question of 
whether what is learned and examined in educational settings adequately reflects the 
knowledge skills and attitudes that are required for practice.  Therefore, in this chapter and 
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the next  I consider a particular aspect of evaluation (Bernstein, 1971) that differs from the 
formal academic examination setting, namely ethics education as enacted in ethical practice.  
The non-negotiable necessity of practicing in a way which is consciously ethical is widely 
reflected in professional literature, such as the quotation below from a professional 
development handbook aimed at fully-qualified general practitioners. 
Being a good GP is an odd compound of broad knowledge, multiple skills, deep stickability and a 
touch of showbiz: but even just to get by we need some understanding of how to make moral 
judgements (While and Attwood, 2000). 
In this chapter I describe the identification of ethics in practice and the general approaches to 
ethical issues. I have looked at situations outside of the protected educational environments 
that are represented by the reading room, lecture, classroom, or directly supervised 
consultation. This chapter contains ideas mainly from fully qualified GPs. However, I have not 
excluded GP-trainees’ accounts of clinical practice. Neither would I claim that education was 
not on-going in the qualified participants’ biographies. Continuous professional development is 
an increasingly stringent (and unavoidable) condition of professional regulation (I have 
discussed ethical components of general practice appraisal and revalidation separately in the 
preceding chapter). Therefore I have regarded all accounts of practice as legitimate sources of 
data for this chapter. 
In this chapter I examine ethical encounters in general practice in terms of the encounter 
rather than the substantive issue (some of which I will consider in the ensuing chapter). In the 
first part of the chapter I discuss recognition of an issue as ethical. This is tied in with 
participants’ responses to the questions on a theme of ‘what is’ and ‘what makes’ an ethical 
problem. Participants described two broad ways of recognising ethical content in their 
professional lives: There was a conscious identification of specific issues which had been pre-
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labelled as having an ethical aspect and types of problem that might be consciously identifiable 
as ethical, such as ‘ethical dilemmas’ where there is a clear conflict of two or more ethical 
principles. However, there is also a recurrent emotional or subconscious element to the 
recognition of ethical issues in participant narratives.  In the second part of the chapter I 
describe the strategies used by (or observed by) participants in the management of ethical 
issues as they arise.  
I conclude by considering how the ability to recognise the ethical content of general practice 
and strategies for managing that content is connected to ethical competence. Ethical 
competence has previously been described as something that is progressive and linear. For 
example, Hamric and Delgado describe phases of ethical competence – and whilst their 
framework has been developed with American independent nurse practitioners (and not 
British GPs), it offers a logical structure that can be applied to the education of any clinician 
with some autonomy of practice. 
 Phase1 (knowledge development): learning ethical principles and topics as well as 
identifying appropriate forums for discussion. 
 Phase 2 (knowledge application):  involves application of ethics to individual cases 
 Phase 3 (creating an ethical environment): with a paradigm of preventative ethics, 
practitioners take on a leadership role as they advise colleagues and develop local 
policies. Preventative ethics involves engagement with codes and guidelines, principles 
and issues enhanced by ongoing rather than episodic enquiry – aimed at the avoidance 
of moral distress. 
 Phase 4 (promoting social justice within the healthcare system): where practitioners 
contribute to wider debates, e.g. whether assisted suicide should be permitted. 
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The successful implementation of such a linear progression is not evident in my participant 
data. Understanding the basic approaches that GPs have to the recognition and management 
of ethics will assist the development of better ethics education and support in general practice. 
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Much of medical ethics teaching at both undergraduate and postgraduate level focuses on 
particular issues which society and the relevant professions have identified as being 
problematic. Examples of these can be found in any textbook aimed at medical students and 
they include issues such as euthanasia, or contraception for children. These may be identified 
as problematic because either they have been identified as theoretically problematic, such as 
where principles predictably conflict, or because practitioners have found them to be ethically 
problematic in the past. While and Atwood (below) refer to these as identified dilemmas. 
Most obviously we need such a skill with identified dilemmas: [authors’ emphasis] requests for 
termination of pregnancy or euthanasia, the temptation to lie to a dying patient, an encounter 
with an uncontrolled epileptic patient who insists on driving (While and Attwood, 2000). 
The GPs participating readily discussed specific ethical issues, as well as cases where those 
issues arose. Issues are considered here as a means of recognising ethical content (In the next 
chapter I will consider the four dominant themes in terms of those issues). In the quotation 
below, for example, Dr W lists contraception as an area of practice that he identified as 
requiring him to apply his ethics education. He was also prepared to suggest that he had been 
socialised to think of related scenarios as ethical. 
Dr W: I suppose the other things in terms of when I talk about dilemmas is probably what I’m 
thinking about so when people have contraception, that’s the kind of typical scenarios that 
you’re reminded of when you apply the four principles. 
 




Dr W: They are dilemmas I suppose partly because we’re ... I suppose part of the way we’ve been 
socialised to think of those scenarios as dilemmas. 
 
It is problematic for ethics education to restrict itself to certain issues that are labelled as 
somehow ethical. Issues and cases may not always been seen by learners as paradigmatic of 
principles that might be applied in different cases. There may be a mismatch between the 
issues that are taught and the issues that are encountered. The mismatch may because the 
scenarios discussed in educational settings are rarely encountered. Some issues may be rarely 
encountered, and some might be rarely encountered by GPs. For example, Dr W suggested 
that the scenarios favoured in educational settings might not be so common in general 
practice. 
Dr W: I  suppose when we think  about ethics and when I think about ethics, the thing that 
springs to mind are end of life – end of life isn’t a traditional GP issue in terms of, it’s not day to 
day practice... 
Certain extra ordinary types of issue in medicine might be more obviously pre-labelled as 
ethical, or as ethically problematic. Dr S, for example suggests that extra ordinary issues are 
easier to discuss.   
 
Dr S: For example one does get cases like this in primary care such as assisted conception, let’s 
say, or a saviour baby, or a decision to treat at the end of life. I think that, if you like there’s an 
easier jump into an ethical problem from one of those kinds of things than from other more 
ordinary. 
 
There was consensus among participants that ethically problematic aspects of practice might 
be more easily identifiable in secondary care. The extraordinary examples cited by above Dr S, 
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assisted conception and the ‘saviour baby,’ are arguably more likely to be encountered in 
specialist medicine than primary care. Dr L, a course organiser for a MSc degree in Primary 
Healthcare suggested the life and death issues of acute hospital medicine might be more easily 
recognised as ethical in nature. 
Dr L: …maybe the, you know, the hospital is very obviously acute care, life and death decision 
making, whereas maybe in primary care, the, the sort of complexities and ambiguities are more 
subtle, and therefore aren’t seen as ethical dilemmas rather than, you know, this is, this is the 
sort of practice. 
 
The implication arising in comparisons that participants made between ethics in general 
practice and hospital medicine was that much of the ethical content in hospital medicine might 
come (to an extent) refined by speciality, e.g. beginning of life issues in obstetrics, childhood 
consent issues in paediatrics and when the general good might override individual rights in 
public health medicine, to name but a few. By contrast general practice was described as a 
coalface (Dr O was one of five GPs using the analogy of the coalface).  
 
Dr O: …probably the ethical dilemmas are much sharper in secondary care, but nevertheless you 
sort of feel that one is right there at the coalface... 
 
Professor A expanded on the idea that ethical issues in primary care might be more uncertain 
and undefined, because primary care itself and general practice are fields or spheres of 
practice which are themselves more vague or uncertain and certainly less predictable.  
Prof A: The clearer the problem, the much more [easy] it is to define the ethical dimensions 
because... by the time it comes through a consultant, it’s gone through a lot of those refining, so 
the consultant really only has to deal with the very narrow band of activity, the rest they leave to 
somebody else.  So the ethical considerations are much more easily defined within, as the sectors 
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move up the primary, secondary, tertiary sectors, the problems get more, not that they’re easier 
to resolve, and not that they’re not any less significant, but they’re more easy to define.  So the 
difference between primary care ethics and ethics in other places is that the definitions are 
pretty hard and they are very interactional and they relate to a whole lot of values and other 
constraints.  So that’s, that’s one of the big differences between situations, is the amorphous 
nature of primary care -and the unpredictable nature of it. 
 
The ethical content of general practice was not only seen as harder to define but more 
unpredictable in terms of the issues that individual practitioners might face. An ethical issue or 
challenge may be unexpected, as Dr O illustrates here.  
Dr O: … sometimes one’s patients will say the most surprising things to you, to make you 
question their values and what’s important for, for that population. 
 
Dr O talked of questioning the patients’ values but a GP might just as easily find themselves 
questioning their own. This unexpectedness is difficult to remedy with education or guidance 
that is aimed at specific circumstances, or even forethought about what one might do.  
 
Dilemmas and other identifiably ethical types of problem 
 
One way in which ethics education caters to this problem of not being able to foresee and 
solve specific problems is by the inculcation of general principles and the ability to recognise 
ethical types of problem, such as conflicts of interests and principles, or dilemmas. To compare 
this with the above section the method of recognising ethics is not, “This issue is likely to be 
ethically complex”, but “The presence of conflict, or uncertainty as to what to do, has an 
‘ethical’ character to it.” 
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Dr W: I suppose more as a – actually when I have a dilemma, that’s when I tend to think about 
[Ethics] more explicitly. 
A dilemma might be perceived by the participant where a solution was not evident to them, 
even if might perhaps be evident to others. The word dilemma was generally applied to any 
ethical issue which provoked anxiety, distress (there was a solution which was emotionally 
challenging) or comment on the part of the moral agent. It was also applied to certain issues 
which had been identified in advance as being ethically contentious. True philosophical 
dilemmas are much rarer than the ethical conflicts that arise in medical practice. Conflict is 
possibly a better term than dilemma to describe the kinds of situations identified with ethical 
content, as While and Atwood illustrate below, even if the word dilemma is used frequently 
and loosely.  
Most dramatically, we need [the ability to make moral judgements] when there are conflicts 
[authors’ emphasis]: a patient makes a difficult demand, partners [in practice] fall out, or a 
[Primary Care Group] board faces a choice between two vital services (While and Attwood, 2000). 
Dr B provided what he considered to be a dilemma in abstract form. The quotation below very 
much identifies a key problematic aspect of general practice being the conflicts of personal 
interests that arise in the context of family medicine. 
Dr B: One would be very much the interest of patient A versus the interests of patient B, typically 
where you have a number of members of a family on your list.  And you may be advising the 
different members of that family, quite separately, or you may be advising them together. And 
there may be times when something you maybe feel is in patient A’s interest, is not in patient B’s 
interest.  And so that would present a dilemma.  And that would be the dilemma obviously that 
the GP is not in a position to resolve. The GP’s role almost certainly would be to facilitate the 
different patients’ thinking in a way that is, is both enabling each family member to flourish as 
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best they may, and is also, is also intervening in a way that is, is just, with respect to their 
different interests. 
Whilst Dr B’s abstract example above may be a representation of the kind of ‘dilemma’ 
routinely faced by general practitioners, it some not appear as immediate and as dramatic as 
some of the life-and-death issues discussed in hospital medicine. If anything it is a ‘life’ 
dilemma rather than a ‘life and death’ one.  
Dr O referred to the conflict between principles rather than between people. Whilst a conflict 
between the principle of equity (treating people fairly) and of respect for patient autonomy  
Dr O: I find that equity is absolutely fundamental through all my work as a GP [...] and I find it of 
paramount importance.  And I fear that many of my patients might object that I consider it too 
much in relation to their needs for patient autonomy. I don’t find the two mutually exclusive. 
Again I don’t know if I’m blurring the boundaries, but for me being a general practitioner is about, 
you know, fundamentally about managing resources, being a gatekeeper of resources and 
directing resources parsimoniously to those who need it.  So equity is of fundamental 
importance, I consider, in my work. 
 
Participants described a variety of types of encounter with ethics in practice, only some of 
which might be considered to be a dilemma as defined in philosophical theory.  Dr M 
expressed frustration that ethics should be perceived by the public solely as dilemmas. In the 
comment below she distinguishes between problems, challenges, and dilemmas in primary 
care. 
Dr M: So I had a conversation with [broadcast media producer], and she was saying, ‘Can you give 
me some examples of problems in primary care.’ Now I gave her some examples which thought 
were quite problematic and quite difficult but immediately it was, ‘Where is the dilemma?’ And 
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you see if you only focus on dilemmas you leave out a whole raft of ethical challenges and 
problems.... 
Educational approaches to ethics in medicine tend to cluster around a specified set of issues, 
or a particular type of problem. Even if, as the above data suggest, the issues can be more 
tailored to practice context, and an exclusive focus on dilemmas excludes more subtle ethical 
content, there more to discuss about such approaches. Firstly such education that there is may 
have relatively poor uptake. Also it may be seen as a classroom exercise. Professor P illustrates 
the idea with his comment below.  
Prof P: Most people don’t really know very much about ethics or engage with it as a structured 
intellectual exercise or they engage with its practical realities  
The engagement with the practical to which Professor P refers might not involve any conscious 
reference to ethics education, and there may be no formal knowledge. 
Prof P: I suspect that the majority of GPs very rarely have any kind of structured approach or 
framework or underlying theories to help them to deal with these challenges.  So that’s just seen 
as the challenging, demanding parts of doing the job, rather than, you know, a core element of 
what it means to be a GP. 
 
Professor P’s comment is in keeping with the idea that much of the ethical content of general 
practice is scarcely noticed (MIsselbrook, 2012). Thus, the other way that the ethical content of 
practice might be recognised by a practitioner, is by the presence of difficulty in making a 
decision, or emotional discomfort. This is discussed in the next subsection.  
Emotional and visceral dimensions of ethical awareness 
 
Three participants described the recognition of ethics in practice as an altogether more 
instinctive process than the recognition of pre-labelled issues or types of dilemma. Encounters 
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with ethical content in practice were described as (for example) a sinking feeling, feeling 
suddenly depressed, or a pricking of the conscience or a sixth sense. In the quotation below Dr 
R describes a fairly visceral recognition of an impending ethical issue. 
 
Dr R: [Eminent GP] once said to me, ‘You know there’s an ethical dilemma coming your way when 
you’re sitting in a consultation and you get a sort of sinking feeling in the pit of your stomach.’ 
 
All three GPs, Drs R, U and S are experienced GPs and all have at some point been involved in 
the direct supervision of GP-trainees. It is possible therefore that they are well placed to 
observe the phenomenon, in themselves and others.  In the quotations below Dr U and Dr S do 
this. 
 
Dr U: I start grabbing for my ethical safety net, when I start finding that I’m getting distressed 
about how a patient’s coping or not coping with a problem. 
 
Dr S: ...The learner may have a sort of sixth sense that something is pricking away at their 
conscience or not quite right... 
 
 
The idea of discomfort as a signal that there is an unexamined ethical problem is one which 
has found mention in general practice professional literature. 
 
Most commonly we have feelings of discomfort [author’s emphasis], which alert us to something 
which is not right in what we are hearing or doing (While and Attwood, 2000) 
 
Emotional discomfort, as well as being a way in which participants identified ethical 
encounters by themselves, also sometimes prompted them to elicit others’ assistance in 
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identifying the ethical component of an uncomfortable consultation.  One of the ways that this 
might happen is in a Balint group. The raison d’être of a Balint group is that participants bring 
cases (where they have felt uncomfortable or perceived something amiss) to discuss in the 
group. In the context of this study this would be a group of GPs or GP trainees led by a person 
with training in the Balint method.19 The unique quality of the Balint group method is that it 
provides an opportunity for doctors to examine the nature of their work from a de-medicalised 
perspective. The Balint group is not primarily intended as an ethics forum. 
Dr R: I think the Balint group is not designed to do that. It’s designed to look at something quite 
different which is to look at things where there are unconscious issues that are clouding the 
matter, and to try and understand them better... And that sinking feeling in the pit of the 
stomach is sometimes due to an ethical dilemma is one of the reasons why people might bring a 
case to a Balint group, but I don’t think in my experience, which I don’t think is that enormous –I 
haven’t been in that many Balint groups regularly for a very many years- you don’t get stonkingly 
obvious ethical dilemmas in Balint groups. Though there may be an element of ethical discomfort 
that may emerge in the analysis, but there is usually more to it than just ethical discomfort. 
The first point worth extracting from this quotation is the idea that the discomfort generated 
by an ethical dilemma potentially leads to the issue being raised in the Balint group. This may 
be a reason why the exposure of ethical issues is sometimes associated with Balint groups 
(Kjeldmand and Holmstrom, 2010). Ethical issues can cause emotional discomfort, and a GP 
might lack the language to express an uncomfortable problem as an ethical problem. 
Dr M: Especially if you’re not well versed in the whole, you know, language and understanding of 
it, and a lot of emotions come into it. People feel uncomfortable about certain –they may even 
say ‘I don’t feel comfortable. I feel angry. I feel upset, I feel distressed by this situation’ 
                                                             
19
 Michael Balint was trained as a psychoanalyst and the method is heavily influenced by psychoanalysis. 
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Dr R suggested that those who brought an ethical case to a Balint group might not be aware of 
its content, only the emotional discomfort. By contrast, if they knew that the issue was an 
ethical one, they might instead discuss it with an appropriate colleague.  
Dr R: A recognised dilemma, I would have thought that probably the most common thing people 
do, certainly the most common thing that  I do and that people that I’ve worked with, I’ve come 
across people that I’ve worked with that have come to me about it – just find somebody and go 
and talk to them about it. 
 
The second point is that the ethical issues Dr R associated with the Balint group are not 
obvious ethical dilemmas. Dr M described them as being framed in terms of clinical decision-
making.  
Dr M: Even Balint groups you see. They often raise ethical issues... Boundary issues. How much, 
what should I do? How far should I go? -that sort of thing... 
AP: Would [issues identified in a Balint group] be labelled as ethical at any point? 
Dr M: It depends, sometimes yes sometimes no but it’s more ‘I have a problem what should I 
do?’ Yeah. It wouldn’t necessarily be ‘I’ve got an ethical problem’. Sometimes it might be [that] 
they would define it that way but not necessarily 
The point illustrated by the above quotations is that emotional discomfort may be associated 
with situations in practice that have ethical content. Some participants above such as Drs R, U, 
and S used the discomfort as a trigger to think about ethics. Drs M, S and R suggested that GPs 
in training or with less experience in thinking about the ethical content of practice, might not 
have the language to express ethical causes of their discomfort, or might not recognise the 
discomfort as ethical in its origin. Balint groups are overtly connected to the idea of analysing 
unconscious sources of discomfort in the company of others.  A possible confounder when 
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talking about Balint groups is that some people might consciously miss-use the Balint group 
setting as a safe place to discuss ethical or legal problems arising out of consultations 
(Kjeldmand and Holmstrom, 2010). As Dr R suggests the Balint group is not necessarily 
designed for that purpose. The Balint group is a safe setting, similar to that experienced in 
education. 
 
Educational materials for GPs acknowledge the emotional nature of ethical issues and the 
recognition of ethical content (Gillies, 2009). Much of what is regarded as ethical is recognised 
unconsciously via emotional discomfort, and there is a need for a safe forum to discuss 
sensitive ethical issues. So if we buy into to the idea that ethics in general practice is about 
patient centredness rather than protecting doctors’ professional autonomy it is arguably 
appropriate to use a tool like the Balint group to expose ethical issues that may have been sub 
conscious. A number of participants, unsurprisingly among those who I had selected for their 
involvement with ethics as an educational or academic concern, describe such a conscious 
recognition of ethics ‘as it comes through the door’. Dr S illustrates this. 
 
Dr S: I would say that [the MA in medical law and ethics] made me much more aware of legal and 
ethical material as it comes through the door, and arguably of how to practice with more 
awareness of the law, with more awareness of moral thinking or moral decision making by 
clinicians. More awareness of things like trust relationships between doctors and patients... 
Someone such as Dr S with awareness of what issues could be classified as ethical or 
analysed using ethical tools. There has been research supporting the idea that doctors with 
ethics education are more confident in seeking assistance with ethical issues. It is slightly 
disturbing to think that those without such education are less likely to seek assistance or to 
know how to – a principle analogous to Tudor-Hart’s inverse care law. The inverse care law 
encapsulates a phenomenon where those most in need of healthcare are less likely to 
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access it, because of problems with access, whether services are simply unavailable, or 
inaccessible because of social or educational factors (Papanikitas, 2011a).  
Too much emotion- a caveat 
 
As I discussed above, emotional discomfort is a manner in which both participants and the 
professional literature recognised issues that could be ethical in nature. The acknowledgement 
of emotion and the subconscious in the consultation is (in theory at least) an established core 
feature of British general practice. During my general practice training for example, I attended 
a training session which used film, poetry, art and music to enhance the training group’s 
sensitivity of bereavement and loss. However, for some participants, such sympathy or 
empathy risked compromising rational ethical decision-making. Dr U illustrates the idea that 
too much empathy may have a paralysing effect on the trainee’s ability to think through a 
patient’s issues.   
 
Dr U: Okay, well, this is something we all face, because we’ve all got grandparents who die.  And 
it can be a very profound and distressing thing.  And again if the registrar is identifying too closely 
with the emotions of the patient at risk, they can get themselves in a muddle and stuck. 
 
Dr D suggested a danger of relying solely on her own empathic distress as a moral compass, 
namely that her response might be disproportionate. 
  
Dr D: I’m quite emotional about human beings and people and how they feel. I think I sometimes 
second guess how they might feel.  And feeling more pain for them than they actually feel… 
 




Dr U and Dr D saw an appreciation of ethical theory, even at its most basic level, as offering a 
way of tempering a purely emotional response.  
 
If ethical issues were recognised by discomfort, anxiety or even depression (all words used by 
participants), then it reasonably followed the ability to negotiate these encounters might be a 
source of relief.  
 
Dr D: I think it makes it a bit, it helps clarify things in general practice … medical ethics clarifies 
things for me. And keeps me sane. 
Dr U also quite clearly described ethical frameworks introducing dispassionate rationality into 
decision-making. In the comment below he described ethics as preventing GPs from becoming 
compromised by the emotion of an emotionally troubling case whilst at same time reminding 
clinicians of their expectations. 
Dr U:  And then, one way of helping them is to go, because you can use the ethical framework as 
a way of pulling back from the problems and emotions of the issue, and say, ‘Look let’s look at 
the values behind all this, emotions, if you put them in a box, now look at this coldly.’ And this 
helps, helps them manage the problem. 
 
The role of emotion in the identification of an engagement with ethical issues was referred to 
by Gillies in an educational article for GP trainees. He reiterates both the idea that emotion can 
identify an ethical issue and that reasoning skills are needed to guide GPs to the best decisions. 
Ethical discussions, especially in medicine, often bring out strong emotions. It is arguable that the 
nature of ethical debate has developed to enable us to discuss emotive issues without resorting 
to emotional manipulation and blackmail or even physical violence. However, this does not mean 
that emotional responses are not ethically relevant. These responses, often felt as intuitions, will 
often point us towards areas of ethical difficulty, which we ignore at our peril ... If we deny them, 
208 
 
we are effectively denying part of our humanity. We are unlikely to communicate effectively with 
our patients in general practice if we are suppressing our emotions completely, or if we are, our 
patients are certainly likely to be aware of it. At the same time, we need to be aware that these 
responses may not automatically guide us to the best decisions; they need to be subject to 
argument and discussion (Gillies, 2009). 
 
The key insight from discussions around the identification of ethics content is that the 
identification of any aspect of practice as being ethical in nature allows the use of analytical 
tools, and ethical support and resources to be used. The identification of ethical issues as more 
broadly problematic or emotionally distressing can prompt their identification as ethical only if 
the person experiencing them seeks help and those issues are then identified. Accordingly, GP 
trainers and Balint group leaders ought to be able to recognise when an issue is ethical in 
nature and at the very least, to signpost the person experiencing ethical difficulty to 
appropriate support. Identification is not enough to allow GPs to fully function as moral 
agents. To see a problem, or even to be able to frame and classify it, and not know what to do 
about it is itself a source of distress. GPs need some ethical tools to make decisions with and 





Having recognised aspects of practise as a GP to be ethical, the participants in this study 
identified a number of ways that they and their colleagues might approach such aspects. In the 
ensuing section I examine and classify those strategies. I have concentrated on the broad 
approaches to any ethical encounter – by encounter I mean any issue or aspect of practice – 
rather than participants’ responses to specific issues. For example, some participants hinted 
that a potential strategy is to avoid ethical encounters, whilst others talked of deferring to 
guidelines or consulting colleagues to whom they attributed wisdom or seniority in the 
workplace hierarchy. Some participants deferred to a set of rules. The law and the GMC’s good 
medical practice represent such a set. Others deferred to wise counsel or hierarchy. I have 
classified the ethical strategies in terms of level of engagement: avoidance, deferral and 
validation, and ethical engagement. Where evidence has emerged from participants’ 
narratives I have also considered what aspects of the workplace environment shape the 
adoption of particular ethical strategies.  
 
‘Go for closure and walk away’ (Avoiding the issue) 
 
One way of avoiding dealing with an ethical problem, dilemma, or issue is simply to not engage 
with it. None of the participants suggested that, having recognised an ethical issue, it was good 
practice ignore or avoid it. However, some did hint such a strategy was a potential option. 
Dr U: So if, you know, you’re feeling in a fairly benign mood yourself and then suddenly you start 
getting worried about what you’re hearing, then, you know, you’ve got one of two choices, you 
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can either just ignore it, you know, and go for closure and walk away, or, the more responsible 
thing to do is to actually look at it objectively and from that you then go back to your ethical 
principles. 
For Dr U the more responsible choice was to examine what was problematic.  However, Dr D, a 
much younger and less experienced GP, was reluctant to be drawn in to matters which she 
considered to be ethical. 
 
Dr D: I don’t think I consciously use ethics as my decision making, because rarely do I, am I drawn 
into such situations. 
 
Dr D describes the reluctance a GP might have in exploring whether or not a person is entitled 
to care or to state benefits. One way of avoiding a discussion of whether someone is entitled 
to benefits is simply to sign relevant ‘sick-note’. 
 
Dr D: I’m turning a blind eye where benefits and people are working and they’re coming to see 
me and asking for sick notes … That’s one, but I don’t know how to get out of it, because I speak 
to my partner and my partner says, ‘Your job isn’t to be a politician and try to save money, yours 
is your patient, therefore if they come and see you and they are sick, even if they pretend they 
can’t walk in front of you, you have to do it to keep the harmony between you and your patient, 
because it’s the bigger picture.’  It doesn’t sit right with me.  
 
Dr D’s senior partner may be avoiding certain types of ethically complex discussion. It is 
unclear whether the ‘bigger picture’ represents the smooth running of the clinic and more 
satisfied patients or an ideological commitment to one’s own patients in preference to others 
using the NHS. 
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None of the examples given above are intended to suggest that just because a GP wishes to 
avoid moral agency on one issue, they wish to avoid moral agency in every circumstance. Dr B 
felt that it was not the role of the GP to ‘Run people’s lives’ and he used this idea to distinguish 
his personal conception of right and wrong from that of professional ethics. When pushed on 
whether he might intervene in a case of repeated domestic violence he maintained that whilst 
he would facilitate engagement with social services and police, he would not do so without 
patient consent unless he felt autonomy was compromised, and went on to give a number of 
factors which might compromise that person’s autonomy. 
Where a GP uncritically takes a particular position is this an ethical preference or a reluctance 
to take a more critical look at the issue? Dr D's senior partner appeared at first glance to 
prioritise the patient in providing evidence for benefits on the basis that 'GPs are not 
politicians' and therefore not in a position to make resource allocation decisions. 
Dr D’s senior partner was, however, inclined to 'give them what they want', something which 
did not 'sit right' with Dr D. Several participants saw part of their role as GPs as not being 
wasteful with public resources. Dr D recognised that they might not have a right to the 
benefits and she might not be in a position to decide whether the patient was entitled or not. 
Dr D gave several accounts of resources being finite. Professor Z's partners in practice 
prioritised giving patients what they perceived to be the best option. Was this because they 
were committed to paternalist beneficence? Or was it because this allowed them to run their 
clinics to time, and offering options in an autonomy-enhancing way too burdensome? 
So does the simple prioritisation of (for the sake of argument) patient autonomy (giving the 
patient what they want), or medical beneficence (telling the patient what to do) represent 
1. Ignorance on the part of the moral agent? 
2. The moral agent's ethical preference? 
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3. The moral agent avoiding the issues because of personal or structural issues? 
It is not possible to answer this question with empirical certainty, as it is not possible to 
literally read the minds and ‘see’ the motivations of participants. However the data does hint 
at the possibility that one potential approach to an ethical issue is to avoid it. Another is to 
defer moral agency to others, and this will be considered in the next section. 
Time was raised many times as reason why an ethical issue might not be explored.  A lack of 
time may make ethical awareness or engagement complicated, difficult and inconvenient, and 
even ethically problematic. Time involved in thinking and reflection was mentioned many 
times by participants. 
Avoiding difficult consultations or dismissing complicated problems could also result in an 
increased burden on others.   Professor Z discussed the idea that practising in a more ethically 
sensitive manner might be inconvenient for others. Professor Z espoused a practical 
commitment to patient autonomy – he spent more time with patients giving them a sense of 
their options and empowering them to choose. He was prepared to reflect on why his more 
rigorous approach to autonomy might itself be morally problematic. 
 
Prof Z: Well insofar as we discussed it, it tended to be more discussed in sort of jocular terms 
than in, you know, a substantial medical ethical analysis terms. But insofar as I could pick out, the 
two objections – one was a perfectly reasonable one, that I took too long to do all this, and that 
was a distributive justice issue, as I saw it.  I was a long consulter rather than a short consulter 
and people would have to queue and the others who stuck with the ten minutes, felt a bit pissed 
off I suppose that I was causing people to wait and the dissatisfaction and so on.   And the other 
was that in any case, you know, people came to doctors really for being told what they needed 




The difficulty of attending properly to ethical issues because of time pressures was something 
that one participant was able to avoid. Dr U was the exception, and only by practising in the 
different context of military general practice could he luxuriate in the time available explore to 
possible issues: 
 
AP: Is there, do you ever feel sort of, do you ever feel hesitant to, as it were, open a can of 
worms? 
 
Dr U: Happily no. The reason I don’t is the timeframe.  I mean the other thing I forgot to mention 
about the military is, it’s luxury, the pace, the pace of work is 15 minute consultations and you 
don’t always fill – so whereas I can guarantee in three hours to see 20 patients in the NHS land, 
sometimes in the military, I can be there for four hours and see six people.  So if one came in and 
was obviously in trouble, it would not be difficult to give them three quarters of an hour.  And 
that is a long time. 
 
AP: Okay, so there’s a disparity of resource potentially between the two environments. 
 
Dr U: Yes. 
 
Whilst in the military context Dr U also had fewer complex problems competing with his 
time, as well as more available time at the outset, he did see conflicts of interest and had 




‘Just Tell me what to  do and I’ll do it’ (Deferred Ethics) 
 
The participants were generally happy to defer moral agency in a number of situations with 
ethical content. Deferral might involve following a set of guidelines or rules or it might involve 
following the advice or instructions of an expert or senior colleague.  Just as medical educators 
were prepared to talk to me about trainees and students, clinicians were prepared to share 
observations about colleagues’ comments and behaviours. Professor P, a senior (salaried) GP 
and medical leader described a moral deference which he felt was a new phenomenon. For 
Professor P this phenomenon of deference to management and guidelines went beyond 
general practice and applied to the medical profession as a whole. 
Prof P: Now, surprisingly, I think, I think professionalism, there’s a different model of 
professionalism emerging in which, rather than wanting and seizing a degree of autonomy that 
our forefathers would have wanted, people want to be told what to do. There’s a kind of 
passivity, I think.  So people want to, maybe passivity is wrong, people want to be told what to do 
by managers, they want a strict framework within which to operate because they don’t have time 
or energy or inclination to have discussions about issues.  They want to be told what to do in 
clinical practice, so evidence based medicine is easy medicine to practice.  So I think, I think yes, I 
think it doesn’t surprise me at all if people feel the same about ethical issues, ‘just tell me what 
to do and I’ll do it,’ is a common response from, not just from general practice, but from doctors 
and health professionals of all sorts, which I think is distinctly unhealthy. 
 
Dr F: Some GPs just want to get on with it. Some GPs just want to work two days a week and just 
be a GP, aren’t that bothered about the decisions. 
 
This observation appears to challenge the entire raison d’être of ethics education, if education 
is to be more than learning the rules. Professor P suggests that doctors (and GPs) are less 
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prepared to engage with and discuss ethical issues than they once were, and that this is 
because they do not have the time or energy to do so. The strong implication is that they are 
thereby deferring some if not all of their moral agency to a set of rules or a person with 
seniority in the workplace hierarchy. As such there is less interest in learning and 
understanding the vocabulary of ethical analysis. The self-imposed ethical illiteracy of GPs 
which Marshall hints at may be akin to political illiteracy which Marshall has also commented 
upon (Marshall, 2009).  
The following subsections will examine the types of deference described by the participants. 
The discussion of deferral falls into two parts: deferral to instructions such as codes, rules and 
guidelines and deferral to people such as workplace seniors and experts. 
Deferral to instructions 
 
The majority of participants made extensive reference to rules and codes in terms of the 
manner in which they signpost ethical boundaries in practice. Miller distinguishes between 
three types of ethical code that are commonly used in medical education (Miller, 2000): 
 
1. Statements of core values [which] are simply lists of moral values. They may or may not 
include some minimal explanation of what is meant by each of the values listed. 
2. Oaths [which] also concentrate on values. Although they usually do include some 
behavioural advice, this advice tends to be very limited in its detail. 
3. Deontological codes of ethics [which] are detailed expositions of what constitutes good 
behaviour. The GMC guidance for UK doctors, Good Medical Practice is a good example: it 




In discussions with participants and in my own experience as a GP I found very little if any 
reference to types one and two of Miller’s categorization having impact on day-to-day ethical 
decision-making. By contrast there was much reference to codes of practice, particularly to 
‘Good Medical Practice’ In this section I begin by considering statements of core values 
alongside oaths which concentrate on values. These were hardly mentioned except where 
participants dismissed them as superficial nods to a medical tradition. The second type of code 
is the professional code of conduct outlined in the document, ‘Good medical practice’. The 
latter document has a quasi-legal status in that doctors who do not conform may be ordered 
to correct their behavior or do additional training and/or be prevented from working (or 
‘struck off’) if they do not comply. I consider following rules and guidelines as a form of 
deference here.  I will argue very simply that that it is much harder to defer to values or to 
ancient oaths than to modern deontological codes of ethics.  Moreover guidelines for 
situations of ethical complexity and medico-legal risk are a highly attractive – they ostensibly 
offer a safe path through the moral maze.  
 
The Hippocratic Oath and deferring to values  
 
Despite references to the Hippocratic Oath in educational materials, references to the 
Hippocratic Oath were strikingly few. However, the Hippocratic oath is mentioned here 
because whilst they might not have sworn the Hippocratic Oath some of the GP population will 
have made declarations based on watered down versions of it, and new graduates in the UK 
do generally make a public declaration affirming the principles set down in the GMC’s 
document good medical practice (Richards et al., 2006).  
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The quotation below, taken from an article in ‘The Practitioner’, a journal for GPs, by a GP who 
has been a practitioner, educator and academic, suggests that healthcare professions 
espoused values via rules and codes. 
Roger Higgs: Traditionally the health care professions have fallen back on to rules or codes 
derived from oaths like the Hippocratic, changing little over the centuries and backed up by the 
gradually evolving traditions of practice ... The benefit of the patient was a major consideration 
but it was the physician who decided what that should be. The picture was of the profession 
looking out of its shop, and making sure the window was tidy (Higgs, 1985). 
Higgs uses the metaphor of the shop window to illustrate how a profession might put its ethics 
on display. Participants referred to values in the Oath still having currency in general practice, 
such as Prof A’s comment. 
Yes, what kinds of situations do you think of when you hear the phrase, ‘ethical issues’ in 
general practice? 
 
Prof A: Well I think, I think people relate to do no harm, the first one.  I think the bottom line of 
what most GPs would think was Hippocrates, because that’s supposed to be the oath they take 
and that’s the place where they last and do remember. And then maybe Asclepius and then after 
that, it’s, it’s about doing no harm. I think that’s what GPs have related to.  
 
Only one participant, Dr N, a general practitioner who had initially trained in a formerly 
communist country, reminisced that though she and her classmates had all sworn the 
Hippocratic Oath at their graduation. For Dr N and her colleagues this was a quaint tradition 
associated with a very superficial engagement with ethics, and with no sanction in the face of 
transgression. It is possible, however for some who swear versions of the Oath to be morally 
invested in its key principles. 
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Dr G reflected that whilst British doctors do not generally swear the Hippocratic oath, there is 
a public perception that they do. 
Dr G: And I mean, in the context of ethics, and if you go back to the, to the Hippocratic Oath, 
which obviously, to this day, many lay-people still think that doctors swear to, which of course 
they don’t any more.   
 
Dr G went on to reflect on why the public might like the idea of doctors swearing an oath of 
commitment to honesty, professional integrity and beneficence. 
 
Dr G: But the content of that, I think, is remarkably interesting, in that, that’s a wonderful mix of, 
of, of deontological principles, you know, to do with, ‘this is right because the gods will it.’  You 
know, and some of it enormously pragmatic, like, ‘don’t rape the servants because you’ll get into 
trouble,’ which features in the oath, as you know, ‘on house calls’.  And so, so somewhere in that 
whole background, there seems to be a very interesting mishmash of origins, I mean based on 
the idea that somebody in the professional role, almost by definition, is expected to have some 
kind of code of values which people can see in advance and have trust in, with all the thrust of 
professionalism, which is something I’ve done some work on, is to do with trust and how you 
remain trustworthy.  What it takes to remain trustworthy.  But the origins of what it takes to 
remain trustworthy are a curious basket of things, most of which I suspect are fairly obvious, like 
if you’re in a helping profession, it’s probably better to help than to harm.  And that doesn’t have 
to come down on tablets of stone.  But a lot of the detail, I think, is very pragmatic.  
 
If GPs do not defer to Hippocratic ideals when deciding on a course of action, this may be 
down to a lack of perceived relevance to current practice. The Hippocratic Oath has been 




Deferring to rules 
 
Ethical rules, guidelines and policies are all examples of preventative ethics. Based on the 
premise that some people with authority and or expertise have considered problematic issues 
and produced rules to navigate the issues – GPs could defer to rules of conduct rather than 
agonise over each and every case. Dr B provided one such example. 
 
Dr B: But I don’t think there are a lot of huge ethical dilemmas in general practice terminal care, 
because most of those have been well discussed and are ‘resolved’, in inverted commas, through 
the appropriate use of guidelines. 
 
The guidelines to which Dr B generally referred were those produced by the GMC. These are, 
as Dr B sees it, quite nuanced with a lot of ethical scholarship and professional opinion 
incorporated. GPs might defer to guidelines either to take comfort in knowing that they have 
made a decision that is morally right, or in the knowledge that if they follow the guideline they 
may be less likely to be criticised. Suggesting that ethical guidelines are based on ethical 
principles, Dr W illustrated both of these ideas:  
 
Dr W: So, you know, through training it’s like, you go through the whole thing about greater 
confidence and being brought up with the concept that you actually need to apply the guidelines, 
because it applies an ethical framework... 
 
AP [later in the interview]: Is it that you’re, you feel you’re making sort of better argued 
decisions or you’re making decisions that are in keeping with a responsible body of medical 
opinion? 
 






Dr W: However, I mean, in your day to day practice, I suppose it’s not – I’d like to think I’m not 
doing it as a defensive practice.  What I’m doing is, is a facilitative way of reaching a decision. 
 
However, a proliferation of guidelines could also be counter-productive if not accompanied by 
the means to prioritise guideline in the case of conflict between them. Dr G suggested that 
conflicts may be generated by a proliferation of guidelines in general 
Dr G: For instance, I do genuinely believe that the effect of [the quality and outcomes framework] 
has been to put a lot of doctors under quite serious ethical dilemmas, as to their priorities with 
patients in the consultation. I think that’s a very real issue.  And probably things like organisations 
like NICE and Healthcare Commission and so forth, which are intended to resolve some of these 
dilemmas, they actually I think intensify them, because they heighten the tension between 
individual prescribing decisions and the way you might want to advocate what you perceive to be 
an individual patient’s best interest, which is conflict or at tension with the whole public health 
perspective.  
 
For Dr G it appeared ironic that guidelines which were intended to resolve dilemmas might 
actually intensify them. 
Professor Z, a retired GP and eminent academic, argued that doctors in general require 
guidelines, and that these guidelines should incorporate ethics. For Prof Z, knowing and 
following the guidelines is important, perhaps more important than being able to understand 
or critique them. 
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Prof Z: ...I think the GMC has done a really good job in integrating medical ethics into practice in 
its guidelines.  And the only problem is, of course, that how many people actually read the 
guidelines, let alone how many people actually follow the guidelines in their practice. 
So, according to Prof Z much of the moral work has been done for the GP, and some of their 
agency has been deferred to the General Medical Council.  
Professor Z and Dr B were particularly emphatic that in the case of the GMC guidelines the 
rules themselves were worth buying into. 
Prof Z: …I’m very impressed with the amount of ethics that is now in the GMC guidelines of 
various sorts.  And indeed increasingly think that if doctors actually carried out the GMC 
guidelines as their basis for their practice, medical ethics would have, in reality got incorporated 
much more into medical practice than was ever the case before [...] and if you really read them 
and incorporate them into your practice, you’d be a darned sight better doctor. 
Professor Z talked of ethics being integrated ‘in’ the guidelines and ethics being ‘incorporated’ 
in practice. In terms of outcomes (i.e. avoiding complaints and litigation) doing as the 
guidelines suggest seems perhaps more important than being able to critique them. Dr B, a 
Senior Urban GP Partner, trainer and educator echoed the sentiment that all good doctors 
should know the rules. 
Dr B: Yes, I mean codes of practice are very important for a number of reasons.  They’re mainly 
important, I guess, because they set out a boundary, beyond which thou shalt not transgress.  
But certainly when they’re as highly worked up as GMC’s say, Good Medical Practice, then it’s 
more than just a boundary, it’s talking about some of the stuff that lies within that boundary.  So 
I would view that as a very helpful document.  And I encourage my trainees to read it.  
It thus seems unsurprising that, when revising for their general practice exams, Dr Q and his 
colleagues reached first for the GMC booklets that stated the duties of a doctor. 
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Dr Q: No really we know just from word of mouth that the oral component of the summative 
assessment, a lot of if involved ethical issues, so we got hold of the appropriate type of books 
that we got from ahh... um... that we got the GMC, do you remember those little books that they 
did there were four or five of them: Confidentiality, data collection, and all that sort of thing and 
just sort of read through them.  
Echoing Professor Z, Dr B expressed a preference for using the GMC guidance rather than the 
relevant RCGP curriculum statement: 
Dr B: For what it’s worth though, I view Good Medical Practice as a more interesting and relevant 
document than the RCGP curriculum.  But, sorry that’s a mildly personal and heretical statement. 
At the time when Dr Q and his colleagues sat their professional examinations, they used 
General Medical Council booklets that identified key ‘duties of a doctor’ and provided 
supplementary guidance on issues such as confidentiality. According to Dr B, juniors need 
to learn the rules and seniors need to revise them from time to time: 
Dr B: So if you like, to my mind, codes of practice would be a fairly sort of primary  school thing, a  
setting boundaries thing, an initial colouring in some of the spaces thing, that, that juniors need 
to do and seniors need to remain aware of and, you know, revise from time to time. 
The key point here is that ethical rules and guidelines are wont to change. For deferral to 
guidelines to avoid criticism GPs need to keep up to date with those guidelines. Learning them 
once and then internalising them will not be sufficient. 
 
Qualified deferral 
Participants talked of following rules but they also described a need to know when to 
deviate from them. Situations may be more complex than the rules have accounted for, and 
it may not be right to follow a rule or guideline. 
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Dr B:  However, what you can’t get in a code of practice, is any sense of what the experienced 
practitioner will actually be thinking and processing in complex situations.  Or at least, to the 
extent you can, it’s a fairly initial, initial broad brush approach at that...   But I don’t think it is in 
any sense a substitute for mature ethical reflection, which I think all doctors need to be 
encouraged to be able to develop. 
Even whilst suggesting that the code of practice is more immediately useful than a curriculum 
statement, Dr B discussed mature ethical reflection. Is necessary to be able to be able to 
understand the basis of a code of conduct? If so should this be such that one can critique it, or 
explain its rationale to patients? A problem with ethical guidance is that if someone agrees 
with the guidance on the basis that they believe it is right, and then the guidance changes 
what does this mean for the GP? 
 
Dr F, a GP trainee who was about to sit her clinical skills assessment, argued that GPs should be 
able exercise clinical judgement, and this included the ability to decide whether or not to 
follow a guideline. She used the analogy of guidelines from the National Institute of Clinical 
Excellence to do this.  
Dr F: That’s a bit like the NICE guidelines, isn’t it?  The NICE guidelines are clinical.  You know, 
someone who’s gone up there and come up with these guidelines and we should stick them, 
when actually not everybody, you know, a lot of doctors don’t agree with the NICE guidelines and 
don’t stick to them.   So it could be helpful. But it might not.  It’s difficult to say...  I’m not afraid 
to disagree.  So if someone presented me with this formulaic, ‘this is how you should be,’ would 
depend on what it said.” 
Dr F felt that she was possibly atypical in wanting to take more of a leadership role. However 
she was not unlike Dr O in terms of her institutional connections. She also indicated that 
(ethical guidelines being similar to clinical guidelines) she might have difficulty following them 
if they were inappropriate or poorly thought-through. Here ethical competence seems more a 
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feature of moral leadership than an anxiety over a lack of supervision or a lack of clarity. Dr F 
did not make any explicit connection between ethical competence and the ability to critique 
rules. 
 
Having every more specific and complex guidelines, does not make them easier for the 
practitioner to interpret.  When I pointed out that a patient was probably entitled to 
correspondence that related to their care, Dr Q suggested that practical guidance for such 
situation could be clearer. 
 
Dr Q: OK that’s a good example. If that information was much clearer rather than using foreign 
language sometimes. What can we give the patient, what can’t we give the patient... 
Whilst there was a potential learning need on Dr Q’s part, his description of ethical guidance as 
being a foreign language is suggestive of a way in which moral agency can be removed from 
the clinician. Technical language is by definition employed by technical experts. 
Dr Q highlighted the idea that being able to analyse an ethical issue so as to make sense of it 
was not just about understanding the rules so as to ‘buy in’ to them as Dr F had outlined, but 
about being able to justify decisions to the public.  
AP: So the message I seem to be getting from you, is that there’s a lot of advice, and perhaps 
those guidelines exist, but they’re not filtering through to the people who actually have to use 
these ideas and this knowledge. 
Dr Q: Well they are not as clear cut or as simple as they potentially could be. It would be nice to 
be told that you can give this information to a patient or you can’t, and give reasons why.  
Clearly, ethical competence involves more than simple rule following. 
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Advice from others 
This section (below) concerns another form of deferred agency, seeking advice. This was 
described as taking two forms. Some participants wanted to be given a clear direction to 
follow, whether this was in the form of leadership from their ‘line manager’, a guideline or an 
authoritative interpretation of their duties. Others wanted a prospective, inter-current, or 
retrospective validation of their thoughts or actions. Advice was sought from a variety of 
sources ranging from family members (medical and non-medical), trusted colleagues, and 
people employed to keep doctors out of trouble (medical indemnity advisors).  
What should I do? 
At the beginning of this chapter I quoted Dr F’s anxious comment that she might be in a 
position of not knowing what to do when she qualified as a GP. She expressed an added 
anxiety about there not being someone to ask, “What should I do?” 
 
Dr F: I’m actually worried, I’m scared, although I’ve still got six months to go, I’m worried that I’m 
going to end up being a GP come August and there will be ethical issues that will sort of – that 
will come my way, and I’m not going to know what to do.  And sometimes you don’t have the 
luxury of afterwards being able to make a phone call or being able to do something.  You have to 
really think on your feet and think, ‘Okay, you know, I need to address this with the patient 
now...’  
 
...I think that GP training needs more, there needs to be more emphasis on the ethics, because I 
think as a, I think as a GP it’s quite, it can be quite lonely and you’re dealing with quite difficult 
situations often. And I don’t know, I don’t know if the support is there. 
 
... in a hospital you have less control, you’ve got managers over you.  In a GP, as a GP in terms of 
sort of the financial side of things, at the moment you have a pot and you can decide what might 
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be good and what might be bad.  In a hospital a lot of consultants, they are limited by other 
people deciding things for them.  
 
Prof A: Well the thing that I did like that never really took off in a big way is the notion of the 
primary care ethicist who provides a service for ethical dilemmas that occur in practice.  That 
would be the service role.  Just a bit like … a counselling service for patients. 
 
Some of my participants had developed unofficial reputations as ethics experts. Professor Y 
and S described being used as a source of ethical and legal advice. Dr R had a formal role in the 
practice as ‘Caldicott guardian’ – the person in an organisation who is responsible for checking 
that the confidentiality of personal data is maintained. Dr S also was sought for advise on 
account of being known for his ethical expertise. 
Dr S: And my partners know that I’ve got ‘allegedly’ skills in this area, and quite often will ask me 
in discussion, you know, “What do I do with this incapacitous patient that I can’t cope with?” -
that sort of thing. So its value, I think, for the practice as a whole. 
The idea of deferring to the senior partner was very much a response of the more junior 
participants. Trainees deferred to their trainer in a similar manner. 
Dr D: … I most probably follow whatever my senior partner tells me.  The nice thing about my 
senior partner, is he tries to involve you with the top process, but him having almost 20 odd years 
of experience, I think, will actually give me an idea of what to do. 
 
Ethical validation, or, ‘Am I doing the right thing?’ 
The GPs in this study described a kind of deferral that was less advice seeking as it was ethical 
validation. They presented a decision which they had made or proposed to make and sought 
comment from experts or peers. This was described either as a formal process, often in order 
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to check that a decision would be defensible in the event of a complaint, or as an informal 
discussion in a familiar setting. 
 
When seeking ethical or legal validation formally, participants valued a source of advice that 
was ‘on their side’.  It seems intuitive that the medical indemnity organisation would be such a 
source of validation.  A handful of participants were prepared to discuss advice from medical 
indemnity organisations (MIOs).  Dr D echoes the sentiment in the quotation below. 
 
Dr D: Well I think I’d just call the [MIO] just to make sure legally I’m safe, whatever decision I 
make... 
 
In his quotation below Dr B illustrates how he contacted his provider of medico-legal 
indemnity in order to verify that his legal and professional obligations were as he thought they 
were. 
Dr B: ...quite a few years ago, the police came to see me and plonked down some photographs on 
my desk and said, ‘Dr, do you recognise this patient?’  And the photographs were from a security 
camera in the local bank. The patient I knew very well...  The patient holding a shotgun to the 
bank clerk, and threatening to blow their head off!  So that would be an example where  - I was 
pretty sure that I knew the answer to that.  This is quite a few years ago. So I said, ‘Just give me 
five minutes, I’ll phone my defence organisation.’ 
 
...Well, you know the [MIO], they’re very good. I’ve always been very happy with their advice.  
They reflected it back to me, and said, ‘Well doctor. What do you think?’ And I said, ‘Well it 
seems to me that there’s a fairly, because the police had given a narrative of a gradually 
escalating level of violence and threat.  This person had held up a number of local-ish banks and 
building societies, and there was an increasing concern that they were going to shoot someone.  
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So it seemed to me fairly apparent that there was a very real danger to the health or even life of 
another party.  And therefore that was a very good case where it would be both ethically and 
legally justified, and regulations wise, justified, GMC wise, to breach confidentiality.  And that’s 
what I said to the person on the end of the [MIO] like.  And they said, ‘Yes I agree with you 
doctor. If you do end up in court being sued by your patient, we’ll be with you.’ Which is in a 
sense, all I wanted to know. 
 
Dr B wanted to know that he would be supported if his patient sued him. The support from the 
MIO is twofold – they will defend a doctor in court, and if the doctor is found guilty they will 
pay the appropriate financial damages on the doctor’s behalf. Consequently any doctor who 
acts in the absence of unequivocal support from the MIO is being morally brave.  I was 
fortunate to have a very similar case for direct comparison. Dr O also described telephoning 
such an organisation for advice regarding a similar case where he was also sure of his ethical 
obligations. Unlike Dr B, however, he did not get the validation he sought immediately. 
 
Dr O: ...I did have a case in which I was asked for, asked by the police for information within 
records of a patient who had seen me... And I rang the [MIO] and the lawyer I spoke to [this 
would have been a medicolegal advisor, not necessarily a solicitor] gave me, I have to say, gave 
me very confusing advice.  I really thought it was really straightforward, you know, okay this is a 
serious crime, no question of argument, just open up the file and let them see what they want.  It 
really seemed very straightforward to me.  But the solicitor from the [MIO], I don’t know, seemed 
to be playing devil’s advocate or something and made me very confused, so much so that I 
refused to open the file for the police. I said they could have it, but with all the bits you’re 
interested in redacted.  Anyhow, they came round again because this was a very serious crime.  
And someone said to me that legal proceedings were going slowly and painfully and I thought, 
“Well you know, I’m going to revisit this.”  So I rang [MIO] again and I got much clearer advice, 
much more in line with my original felt position. And the advice was that... if the police were 




The participants had varied views on the role of medical indemnity organizations as a source of 
ethics support. Dr E suggested that defensive medicine might be advocated by indemnity 
organizations, actions that might be less likely to result in legal actions or professional criticism 
but at the same time might not be morally courageous. Possibly deferring to an opinion that 
he disagreed with or passing the decision to someone else could fall into such a category. Dr B 
and Dr G both described contacting an medical organization as something one might be 
expected to do if one expected a patient complaint and an was more about ensuring indemnity 
cover than ethico-legal discussion – and not a common occurrence: Dr B stated he had 
telephoned his indemnity body four or five times in thirty years of practicing as a doctor. Dr Q 
had approached his indemnifier about a ‘salary’ issue but never about an ‘ethical’ issue. 
Support for professional dilemmas has largely been provided by medical defence 
organizations, themselves motivated by a desire to avoid costly disciplinary proceedings 
against doctors. Newly qualified and trainee GPs are encouraged to obtain legal and 
professional advice from their indemnifier for any case which they feel ethical or legal 
uncertainty over (Abrams 2005). This appears motivated more by a desire to avoid being sued 
in the courts or censured by the GMC than a sense of ‘doing the right thing’. 
 
 
A much less formal way of checking that one’s ethics are sound that emerged was banter, or 
informal conversation. Dr Q mentions ‘banter’ with the senior partner in the practice or with 
colleagues as a way of resolving or discussing issues.   It is unclear if the same ‘banter’ would 





AP: How would you approach in general terms an ethical problem, having identified it as 
ethical or moral? 
 
Dr S: I think about it... and I talk to somebody else about it, and I read around it ... I might talk to a 
colleague –the coffee conversation... and I’ve got a lot of time for that… 
 
Dr S may have had more time because he was not in full-time practice, but he made a space 
within his working life to seek advice and (as someone with ethics skills) to give it. 
 
An interesting and perhaps obvious source of moral support was family. I describe this a moral 
support rather than ethical support, because there was no indication from participants that 
the spouse, friend or parent described had any theoretical knowledge, or was anything other 
than a theoretic ‘sounding board.’ This is perhaps obvious and expected because moral 
concepts such as (for example) justice, promise-keeping, and honesty are not restricted to the 
healthcare. Participants did admit that that they discussed work issues with medically and non-
medically qualified family members. Off-duty discussion carried some hazard in terms of 
safeguarding the confidentiality of patients, but had the potential advantage of not being 
prevented by time-pressures. 
 
What type of person might provide such advice? 
Deciding who to ask for ethical advice is itself a problematic issue. At the second Royal Society 
of Medicine conference on primary care ethics, Suzanne Shale, reflecting on her interviews 
with medical directors, put the question to a gathering of mostly GPs. 
Suzanne Shale: “…that the difficulty is, if you are a person who is seeking moral advice, that 
presupposes that you don’t know yourself what to do. It also poses the problem then of how do 
you know the right person to go to and ask for moral advice, how do you know that you’re 
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getting good moral advice, how do you judge the credentials of the person who is giving you that 
moral advice.” 
 
The answer to Shale’s question, as it emerged in this study, was manifold. Many factors shaped 
the decision of whom to ask for ethical advice, and these were conditional on situation 
requiring advice, as well as the natures of the advisor and the advisee. Dr R, a much more 
senior GP with some expertise in philosophy and ethics describes this: 
Dr R: There are some people you talk to about things like that and some that you don’t. It might 
depend on the patient and the situation. If you know – It might be you might come to some 
person because you know that they’re politically, they’ve politically got a good sense of moral 
nous. It might be because they know the situation and you may be looking for an insight, an 
understanding, a different understanding based on their knowledge of particular facts… 
 
Medicine arguably has a culture of deferral to speciality when a case becomes extraordinary or 
complex. Professor P reflected on what was perceived as a possible widespread contentment 
that ‘clever people’ might do ethics on behalf of the average GP. 
Prof P: And probably most people think [ethics is] something that intellectuals do or pointy 
headed people do and think about, it’s something that someone else is doing for them. 
One of the trainees in the focus group made the suggestion that hospital specialists in a 
particular field might also have some ethical expertise with respect to any difficult case that 
touched on their speciality.  
 
Dr I: I think you, if somebody urgently – if it was an end of life issue or something like that, you 
would always have clinicians in a tertiary centre, so there would always be a palliative care 
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physician you could speak to. Or if the patient was under some sort of specialist I guess you could 
speak to them. 
So Dr I (above) might consider speaking to a palliative care consultant about an end of life 
issue, the rationale being that the consultant may have encountered the issue before in theory 
or practice or might be aware of facts that might alter the nature of the issue.  
One such issue I have encountered is the issue doctors (including GPs) face when prescribing 
opiates or sedatives in an end-of-life context. It is used as a teaching example in the RCGP 
trainees’ journal article on ethics. The question is whether a doctor may give a patient 
medication to ease pain or distress that might also shorten their life. The advice from many 
palliative care specialists is that, in most cases the judicious use of such medications is not life-
shortening – and the ‘dilemma’ evaporates. 
The idea that a consultant in a clinical speciality may also assist with ethical decision-making 
regarding that speciality may reinforce or contradict the perception that ethical issues are 
easier to define in specialist medicine (see above section on ethical issues. 
 
The obvious source of advice might be someone who is paid to give doctors advice and keep 
them out of professional and legal difficulties, such as a medico-legal advisor for a medical 
indemnity body. Medical indemnity bodies were not necessarily preferable as sources of 
advice and support. 
 
Dr G: in terms of right or wrong, I’m not sure that I would set the [medical indemnity] people or 
the local ethical people on any higher pedestal than many other people in my experience, in my 
circle.  But what I do know is that, at least I think I know, is that for me to get to clarify my own 
uncertainty would be more effectively done in discussion with people that I know and respect 
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and trust and can feel safe with, which is not some anonymous expert at the end of a letter or 
phone call.  
 
Dr G talks about trusting and feeling safe with the person who he talked to. The implication is 
that one does might not trust and feel safe with an organisation that might tell the GP that his 
actions were indefensible in court. There is also a stigma around complaints. This compares to 
anxieties around evaluation. 
 
Some participants had also described seeking guidance from knowledgeable or senior 
colleagues. The deferral to the advice of a more experienced colleague or boss is referred to by 
Dr Q in the comment below 
AP: If you had ethical issues that you wanted to discuss who would you normally approach? 
Dr Q: Normally? Senior partner, colleagues, friends, who’ve had more experience. It a bit more of 
a banter really than anything else.  
However there might also be reasons why someone might not wish to approach such 
colleagues for fear of criticism. Dr D, in the comment below, describes a colleague whom she 
would not go to for advice on ethics. 
Dr D: You see, I feel, I feel very isolated because I’m new to the area, I’ve been here for almost 
two years, but I really, and it’s only my partner and me – and I know another GP in another 
surgery, but she’s very harsh.  She would know all the ins and outs legally what to do, but I don’t 
want her, I don’t think I can approach her type.  I feel very isolated, I wish I had good contacts 
with my old registrars and see how they feel.  But I think the Royal College has just had their first 
five year programme, and I’m seriously thinking of joining, because I really don’t know what I’m 
doing half the time, and there’s no one to ask.  Well there’s my partner, my senior partner, but 




Dr D’s description of her colleague from the other surgery as ‘harsh’ and unapproachable is 
likely to reflect a. Dr D went on to describe the qualities of the particular person who she felt 
that she could approach to discuss difficult issues. 
Dr D: Because he knows – I just feel comfortable with him and I know that he usually knows the 
ins and outs of everything.  He’s this slightly pedantic guy who would read every page and know 
everything there is to know, how to give the best care, and he is always very patient centred, and 
he will know how to signpost me to get help.  He’s always done that before.  And he’s also very 
kind, a kind person, non-judgemental, that’s what I like a lot about [name removed].  
 
Dr D also expressed anxiety about what she might feel if her senior partner advocated a 
decision she entirely disagreed with. Whilst junior participants somewhat predictably 
suggested they might talk to a senior colleague, senior participants were more forthcoming on 
the qualities of someone whom they might discuss an ethical issue with. 
Dr G: I would need to know that their experience would sufficiently chime with my own for them 
to empathise with my dilemma.   And I think I would probably want to have seen a track record in 
them of, of either being comfortable with that dilemma or similar dilemmas or having the 
approach to medicine from which a resolution was likely to emerge, and I think, for instance, my 
own trainer for whom I have the highest regard [name given] who’s not necessarily been there, 
done it all, seen it and seen it all chap.  His experience is vast. But I do know that his priorities are, 
are genuinely patient centred, genuinely thoughtful, genuinely intelligent, and that from the 
mouth of such a person is likely to come stuff that I would find quite helpful. 
Later in the same interview he clarified what he meant by moral nous: 
Dr R: Someone with moral sense that I find it easy to talk to … A mixture of having an impression 
that they have a high standard or moral integrity themselves, and sensitivity to the nuances. I 
mean there would be no point in discussing it with someone who has a woolly either ‘you obey 
235 
 
the rules’ view or ‘it’s not a problem’ and can’t see the difficulty… So yes you want someone with 
a good dose of phronesis [practical wisdom] don’t you? 
 
 
Embedded Ethics and Unconscious Competence 
 
Some participants described a category of strategy that is neither deferred ethics nor a fresh 
ethical engagement with the issues at hand. It is a form of practical casuistry, in the sense that 
one learns the right course of action from previous experiences as much as stories about the 
correct action, and then one applies similar actions in similar circumstances. This might be a 
conscious intuition, but might also represent the phenomenon of ‘unconscious competence.’ 
In Chapter 5, I referred to Dr G’s description of learning the detailed anatomy of the groin and 
then only consciously using the information to know where to feel for the femoral pulse. I 
repeat it below. 
Dr G: ...as an undergraduate we must have spent at least three weeks... agonising over the 
detailed anatomy of the femoral triangle.   And having vivas about it, dissecting it and all the rest 
of it, and learning the anatomy of it, not many years on, all you need to know about the, about 
the femoral triangle is that you put your finger over the artery and stab medially if you want a 
vein.  That’s all you need to know.  And at that point, although you probably needed to have 
been primed to appreciate that, in actual daily practice, most, a huge amount of what you learnt 
and agonised over as a student, is either redundant or has become so internalised that you can’t 
see the origins of it any more.  And I suspect... that quite a lot of ethical thinking is around there 
as well. 
 
Dr B suggested that embedding ethical guidance and learning in this way might be necessary. 
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Dr B: ...I think real life is incredibly complicated, but one needs to understand at least bits of it 
and then build that into a fairly intuitive style.  
 
An example of developing internalized rules as a combination of cumulative experience and 
reflection was described by Dr R. 
Dr R: I remember one doctor when I was quite new in practice, she was some years, she was 
quite near retirement, she was probably about fifty, she was in mid-career, she was about fifty 
then, I think.  And I said, ‘How often do you think you come across an ethical dilemma in practice, 
[name removed],’ and she said, ‘Not very often because I’ve decided what, what I believe about 
most situations I come across.’ And I thought that was interesting, that actually some of them 
are, are problems that once you’ve, once you’ve sort of sorted, you’ve unpacked them for 
yourself, and you’ve reached a position, you know what to do and they become less problematic. 
Dr R also referred to V-rules, in deference to virtue-ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse. A V-rule is a 
rule for good conduct that derives from an understanding of virtues and vices.  Dr B, a senior 
GP-trainer and course organiser, suggested that a virtuous style of practice might be 
developed with experience.  
Dr B: ...to some extent, my [GP] partner, who doesn’t work things through and hasn’t read half as 
much as I have, hasn’t read – actually probably the honest truth is, he hasn’t read a tenth as 
much as I have. In many ways he is a better and more humane and certainly just as ethical a 
practitioner as I am, because his style relates very much to himself as a person, he is indeed a 
virtuous person, with the word ‘virtue’ in inverted commas to mean one who has developed 
excellence and steadiness of character and habit. 
Toon argues that it is vital for the practice of medicine that impressionable students (I would 
add trainees in this category) are exposed to not just to practitioners with excellent skills in 
clinical practice but also to those from whom they are most likely to ‘catch’ the virtues of good 
practice (Toon, 1999a).  
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Whilst the acquisition and internalisation of practical wisdom was described as a virtue, it was 
also described as a way in which ethical competence might, or might become, unconscious. Dr 
R wondered if the practical wisdom demonstrated by the average ‘good’ GP represented this, 
and made specific reference to Johari’s window, a term from educational theory. 
Dr R: I think it’s part of expert practice isn’t it… – phronesis is part of expert practice.  There is an 
interesting question about whether, which, which bit of Johari’s window this sits in.   I would 
suggest that there are a lot of extra doctors for whom this sits in the unconscious competence 
corner. And I think that’s okay.  And perhaps being consciously competent is a minority sport. 
The Johari window is a two by two grid where the four windows comprise: unconscious 
incompetence, conscious incompetence, conscious competence and unconscious competence. 
These states refer to potential learners. The unconscious competence described here by Dr R is 
not necessarily a bad thing. It might refer to learned principles that have become internalised 
and instinctive. It might equally refer to competent behaviours that have arisen without any 
formal educational input. Dr B illustrated a successfully intuitive ethical reflection by his 
colleague, emphasising that this would be unlikely to involve philosophical jargon. 
Dr B: So, so my partner, with his very intuitive style – I think if you said to him, ‘Tell me about 
your ethical reflection on X,’ he would burst out laughing and kick you out of the room. However, 
there most clearly is an ethical reflection on X.  One can tell that because of the answers he 
comes out with, the way he deals with people.  But his ethical reflection on X is quite intuitive. 
Among the general practitioners involved in teaching medical ethics there was a conscious 
awareness of how ethical considerations might become ‘hidden’.  
Dr M: [Soren Holm] very much emphasises that thing of awareness of issues and also how people 
can get into automaticity -they can routinise certain procedures, which then makes them 
unaware that there are ethical issues involved. 
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This ‘routinization’, coupled with a loss of conscious awareness of the ethical issues implicit in 
a transaction or procedure may represent a form of unconscious competence. In informal 
conversations off recorder, some of the participants mused about whether the initial panic 
that some GPs perceived in response to an ethical issue was equivalent to the transition from 
unconscious incompetence, to conscious incompetence. This might be represented by the 
ability to recognise an ethical issue but not necessarily be confident in understanding and 
dealing with it. 
 
Embedded ethics and unconscious incompetence 
The authors of the RCGP curriculum guide also offer cautionary advice about the failure to 
reflect (page 115, quoted below) under the subheading of ‘justifying and clarifying personal 
ethics.’ 
Riley et al: A person’s espoused values and their real-life behaviour can often differ... If you don’t 
take time to reflect on your actions when ethical issues arise in practice, you may not be aware if 
your behaviour starts to deviate from the values you support. 
This view of the normative value in firstly learning to reflect on values and ethics and secondly 
re-analysing issues as they occur throughout professional life was reflected in my data. 
Professor A, an Australian GP involved in commissioning educational products for GPs, 
described unconscious incompetence in older practitioners, using the analogy of a (morally) 
good boiled egg: 
 
Professor A: If you think about, so we’ve had an egg that’s raw, one that’s a bit cooked, and 
we’ve had a boiled egg.  Now we’ve got a hardboiled egg that’s been in the fridge too long. And 
when you cut it in half, you see there’s black rings which tell you the egg’s old.  And that’s the 
thing that happens to practitioners who don’t think about this.  They get black rings.  And they 
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are fixed on those rings, and they demarcate any possibility of change.  So, you can get 
practitioners who are then, say they’ve got like Jesus, the way of the truth and the light, and stick 
by it.  And so they become, where they might have been unconsciously competent, they become 
unconsciously incompetent again, because they don’t know what things have changed and how 
the world and society has changed. And they are reflecting back on something that was hardened 
and worked for quite some time, which doesn’t work now.  
 
Professor A’s comment is different from Riley et al’s views. Whilst Riley et al caution that an 
unexamined set of moral beliefs may be too flexible, and risk a loss of moral integrity, 
Professor A highlights problems with moral beliefs that are too rigid and inflexible.  On the one 
hand a ‘hard boiled’ GP may embody the values that he espouses. On the other he may have 
attitudes which do not sufficiently adapt to new ideas or societal change during his career. 
 
Consciously engaging with ethics in practice 
 
Above, Dr R suggested that being consciously competent in the application of ethical 
knowledge to practice was a kind of minority sport. Participants described the phenomena of 
deferring to rules and guidelines as well as to more expert or senior colleagues, but they also 
described thinking through ethical problems. Dr B suggested that it might be that ethical 
reflection using academic tools and vocabulary was the minority sport. 
  
Dr B: I’m not sure that I see ethical reflection as a minority sport.  I see particular academic forms 




Some participants did profess the use of their academic expertise in practice. Dr S (for 
example) suggested that his consultations were better as a result of having ethics skills. He had 
achieved some expertise in the subject and his colleagues accordingly used him as a resource. 
In effect he became someone whom others deferred to. 
 
Other participants also discussed the benefits of being able to think through an issue or 
understand the ethical basis of rules and guidelines. According to Dr L, the right role for ethics 
education is to give professionals the education to understand their own ethical boundaries 
and theoretical tools with which to critique their own decisions. She illustrated this by 
reference to a module on a Masters degree aimed primarily at GPs. 
 
Dr L: ... I believe the objective of the module is how, is not to produce experts at the end of it, but 
to get those people taking the module to have a better understanding of how, you know, to kind 
of think about how an understanding of ethics and kind of professionalism can all kind of maybe 
clarify how they think and how they view things and how they can resolve them.  
 
The ability to consciously think through a problem rather than defer it conveyed a benefit in 
terms of emotional well-being. Dr D described her relief in understanding that being 
beneficent to her patients regardless of conflicting duties and opportunity-costs is unrealistic. 
 
Dr D: whereas after that one and a half hours’ lecture, realised, you know, if you’re an alcoholic, I 
can’t give you a liver, no matter how much I like you as a person, if you’re not going to stop 
drinking, why should I give you that liver when someone else needs it?   It kind of clarified things 




For Dr D in the particular instance above, the application of Beauchamp and Childress’ four 
principles of Bioethics unburdened her.  Rather than pursuing simultaneously trying to follow 
conflicting duties, she was able to see that these might be weighed in the balance. 
There were benefits to possessing ethical expertise and possessing sufficient competence to 
cope with complex and uncomfortable situations that arise in practice. However, there was 
also a sense that how far a GP used theoretical tools to understand the ethics of ordinary, 
everyday practice was down to individual learning and practicing style:  
Dr B: I think it’s hugely different for different GPs.  And, as I say, I couldn’t answer that question 
without again referring to sort of personal styles.  To some extent, learning styles, but also, I think 
there are practicing styles.  So my style is actually quite, I actually need to literally work things 
through... 
Dr B said that trainees also needed to go through a phase of working things through before 
developing a more intuitive style. The ability to use ethical theory to analyse practice in a 
conscious and deliberate way was not always seen as necessary. However it is arguably a 
useful skill for the purpose of ensuring that trainees are sufficiently competent. 
 
If a GP is aware of ethical complexity and conflicting duties then this can make the daily work 
of practice more laborious. Participants with some experience of both practice and education 
were keen to point out that this did not mean that an ethical approach should be avoided. 
 
Dr S: And in a sense it’s made consultations more complicated, being aware of [ethical issues]. 
Professor Z illustrated the idea that an ethical commitment to respecting patient autonomy 
took place in the face of a lack of support from colleagues, particularly because it takes time to 




Prof Z: I’m a great one for respect for patients’ autonomy, though always pointing out that such 
respect has to be compatible with equal respect for the autonomy of all potentially affected and 
so on.  But nonetheless I was pretty reluctant to be paternalistic in the sense of knowing what’s 
better for the patient.  So I used to, you know, discuss these issues quite a bit with patients.  And 
I think my partners thought I was a bit of a nutter in this respect ... They just felt that I, you know, 
that I could just get on with saying, you know, what they ought to have in the way of treatment  
in the same way that other doctors did, rather than discuss the alternatives and pros and cons. 
 
According to Prof Z, his colleagues objected on the basis that fully respecting patient’s 
autonomy took time, and this was time that could be better spent seeing more patients and 
doing more work. The lack of time for ethics in both education and practice was raised as an 
issue by many participants. It is one of many systemic barriers to reflective practice. 
Conclusion 
 
The manner in which ethical issues are identified, and the strategies for engaging with ethical 
issues appear to be enacted in a more complex manner than the phases of ethical competence 
to which I referred in the introduction to this chapter (Hamric and Delgado, 2009). 
Participants’ accounts echo some of the educational materials for GP-trainees and medical 
students (Gillies, 2009, Hope et al., 2008) in that they suggest that both intellectual tools and 
more intuitive or emotional approaches are used and indeed useful for identifying and 
managing the ethical content of general practice. However, it is difficult to make an 
authoritative statement of where the emphasis should lie, for example whether emotions 
should be guided by reason or reason tempered by emotion. Professional etiquette, academic 
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ethics, emotion, intuition and other ways of approaching ethics are all potentially inadequate 
in isolation from one another.  
Participants displayed and described not just an array of ethical strategies but also personal 
styles. Such styles might be shaped by personality or social background as well as educational 
experiences in medicine and general practice. Postgraduate education materials for GPs 
acknowledge the idea that individuals may have individual learning styles. However 
participants associated ethics education predominantly with undergraduate education (see 
chapter 5) so it is possible that ethics education does not benefit as much from this flexibility 
of attitude to learning. 
The idea of competence described in terms of unconscious incompetence, conscious 
incompetence, conscious competence and unconscious competence applies to ethics as any 
other skill. Using these four ways of describing competence is present in multiple learning 
materials for GPs (Riley et al., 2007b, Naidoo and Davy, 2005). Forums that look at difficulties 
in the doctor-patient relationship, and mentoring relationships such as that seen between GP 
trainer and GP-trainee may assist with the identification of unconscious incompetence. This is 
because they are educational settings and may be perceived to be safer settings in which to 
display ethical ignorance. Unconscious competence can look like unreflective practice and all 
too easily may become unconscious incompetence in the face of new cultural or technological 
developments. 
The participant data also suggest that as well as strategies and styles, other factors may shape 
the manifestation of ethical competence. However competent GPs may appear in managing 
situations that have ethical content, there are external factors that limit how well they are able 
to engage with an issue or seek some form of support. The availability of time to pause and 
consider, or time to reflect, may influence whether a GP avoids an ethically complex 
encounter, defers to others’ guidance or engages more fully with the issues at hand. A fear of 
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criticism represents the flipside of the drive towards excellence, and this is also relevant to life-
long learners and educators. It seems that the lack of time for ethical reflection due to more 
pressing priorities is compounded by the idea that any kind of explicit engagement with ethics 
might carry sufficient salience as to be considered professionally risky. 
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Chapter 8: Substantive ethical issues 




In previous chapters I have discussed how GPs identify and engage with ethical content in what 
I treated as the distinct contexts of formation, evaluation and practice. By contrast this chapter 
and the next one are about what it was that the participants identified, what was visible as an 
ethical issue requiring awareness and consideration. These chapters do not aim to establish a 
verdict on the rightness or wrongness of any one position on any one substantive issue. 
Neither do I seek to establish an exhaustive list of issues identified by participants. I do, 
however seek to demonstrate the messy complexity that distinguishes the clinic from the 
classroom and the academic assessment room, and extract insights of relevance to the ethics 
education of GPs.  I do this by selecting four key issues that were discussed more frequently 
amongst or more extensively by participants and by considering them in light of the 
approaches to ethics which I identified in the preceding chapter. This chapter focuses upon 
two issues in professional ethics closely related to the personal relationships between GPs an 
their patients – confidentiality and abortion. The following chapter considers two issues that 
highlight both the financial and the socially embedded and governed nature of GPs work – 
financial incentives and rationing. In addition to reviewing the ‘content’ of ethics, and the 
246 
 
multi-faceted nature of the issues GPs need to manage, I conclude the chapters with some 
brief reflections on the implications of each theme for ethics education. These implications 
then feed into Chapter 10, the conclusion, in which I further develop my reflections on the 
implications of my findings. 
 
Confidentiality 
The problem of respecting confidentiality was a frequently occurring ethical topic in my 
discussions with participants at all levels of experience. It represented the strongest 
substantive issue emerging from my data. This may be because it is a visible topic for ethics 
education and often a visible issue in practice. Confidentiality may also be a safer topic to 
discuss in relation to practice. Other topics such as assisted suicide and euthanasia may carry 
more of a perceived risk of being reported to the professional regulator or the police if 
discussed in the same way. Regardless of whether GPs find other issues more problematic but 
are afraid to discuss them, there is evidence that doctors find confidentiality problematic 
enough to contact their trade union for ethical advice (BMA, 2010). In the section on 
confidentiality I discuss how confidentiality issues were recognised, and use the participants’ 
encounters with confidentiality to illustrate key issues of relevance to ethics education. 
 
Recognising confidentiality as an ethical issue 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed the idea that certain issues are pre-labelled as ethical, for 
example in professional literature and educational materials. Confidentiality is prominent 
amongst the General Medical Council’s ‘Duties of a doctor’, and confidentiality has been 
identified in the general practice literature as a core feature of general practice (Slowther, 
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2010, Pereira-Gray, 2010). It was also perceived as one of the ‘big ethical issues’ in general 
practice by more experienced GPs such as Dr M and Dr R. Confidentiality represented a clear 
example of an ethical issue of particular concern to younger and less experienced GPs, as Dr Q 
and Dr H illustrate below. 
AP: What would make you think, “I need to think about this problem in an ethical way?” What 
kind of problem would make you think like that? 
Dr Q: Usually it’s something that involves ... some principle like confidentiality rather than a 
medical problem like, “This gentleman had a rash, we treated it with this...”  
 
AP (addressing a group of GP-trainees): What kinds of situations prior to today would you have 
thought about when you heard the phrase, ‘ethical issues in general practice’? 
 
Dr H: Confidentiality - Whether or not to disclose. 
 
It is not surprising that the GPs whom I spoke to identified confidentiality as the key ethical 
issue in practice. For UK GPs, a duty to respect confidentiality is very prominently displayed in 
the metaphorical shop window. The UK General Medical Council asserts that ‘Patients have a 
right to expect that information about them will be held in confidence by their doctors,’ and 
‘Confidentiality is central to trust between doctors and patients.’(Slowther, 2010, GMC, 2009). 
The legal basis has been described as a public interest duty, and is protected by both the Data 
Protection Act 1998 and (via the Human Rights Act) article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights which confers the right to privacy.  
A key reason that confidentiality is recognised as an ethical issue, therefore, is because it has 
been identified as such by the profession and those who set the curriculum for it. 
Circumstances where respecting confidentiality may be problematic are included in learning 




The commonest difficulties in general practice concern driving e.g. newly diagnosed epileptic. 
(Mead, 1995). 
This often-used example represents a clear conflict with clear duties. At face-value it has 
limited educational value because it has a clear answer. The GP has a duty to record and (if the 
patient will not) disclose the patient’s health status to appropriate authority, but only if he or 
she thinks that the patient will drive if this is not considered medically safe. However there is a 
more profound point to be made, which Slowther touches on in an article on confidentiality 
aimed at GP-trainees. 
 
GPs...  are more likely to be aware of the social dimension of their patients’ lives, for example, to 
know if their patient with epilepsy is driving... (Slowther, 2010) 
 
GPs are generally based in a community setting, with access to a complete healthcare record, 
often look after entire families, and have the potential to see the same patient many times 
over many years. There is consequently more scope for GPs to encounter situations where 
confidentiality becomes problematic than in many specialist settings. 
 
Confidentiality as an invisible issue 
 
Despite confidentiality being such a visible topic, I was told that it could be overlooked in 
practice. For example, the issue of confidentiality between family members is not an 
immediately obvious one for all trainees. Dr R (for example) observed a lack of sensitivity to 
confidentiality in GP-trainees. 
249 
 
Dr R: They really don’t see a problem about certain things, particularly issues about 
confidentiality in relation to the relatives, for example, sometimes ... And I’ve had some quite – 
quite worrying cases ...  I remember one trainee that was actually fairly near his, his – the end of 
his training. And I was supervising him and I was looking through his notes, and I thought, ‘Gosh 
there’s an issue, a confidentiality issue here and he hasn’t seen it. 
 
In theory, confidentiality may not arise as an issue because of a presumption about fact, for 
example that relatives are already privy to a patient’s health information or that the patient 
consents to the information being shared. The invisibility of confidentiality may also however 
result from an assumption that relatives ought to know the information. In the subsections 
below, I give three examples of confidentiality issues that can become hidden.  
 
Confidentiality and family 
 
The idea that family members legitimately might need to know a patient’s information was 
seen as relatively uncontroversial. Such a view was possibly hinted at by Dr Q in the scenario 
below. 
Dr Q: ...let me give you an example that we have, and I sort of have an issue about. On a regular 
basis we have a hostel that we provide a medical service for which is mainly a sort of stop house 
for rehabilitating alcoholics, and the managers, who are two very nice people, who are not 
medically trained, sort of run the shop and I seem to convey a lot of medical information to them, 
about medication, whether they [the patients] should be having medication, and why I think I’ll 
reduce this dose or increase this dose. And they’re not family, they’re not relatives, they’re just 
‘like’ the hostel care workers, and it’s a question of –they’re very responsible people and very 
good and I’ve met them on a number of occasions- but the question is, should I be divulging that 
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much information about these people? And do they [the patients] always know that I’m talking 
to them [the care workers] about them?  
Dr Q was uneasy about whether he should be divulging confidential information to people he 
perceived as informal carers. He percieved no professional (not medically trained), or familial 
(not relatives) entitlement by the carers to access confidential data. An immediate question 
that arises is whether some GPs might presume that relatives and medically qualified carers 
should have automatic access to confidential information. 
The expectation by relatives that they should be entitled to access a patient’s healthcare 
record is an ever-present issue in general practice. A common example of this is where 
children have an interest in keeping details confidential from their parents. However in other 
cultures there may be a broader expectation by relatives of access to healthcare records. Dr N 
referred to the widespread practice in Russia of telling the nearest relative but not the patient 
of a diagnosis of cancer (field notes).  She reflected that it might possibly be an issue among 
some immigrant families to the UK in dealing with UK trained GPs (field notes). GPs who 
encounter an expectation of access by relatives may inappropriately acquiesce or 
inappropriately withhold information. 
 
Confidentiality and healthcare colleagues 
 
The idea that medical colleagues and enclosed medical groups are automatically confidential is 
also problematic. Implicit in Dr Q’s account (above) was that medically trained individuals 
might have some entitlement to view confidential patient information. Perhaps some doctors 
might expect collegues to automatically keep confidences – for example, Dr O wistfully 
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recalled that he could discuss patients with collegues in the protected environment of hospital 
medicine: 
Dr O: ...if I was in the hospital I could, you know, in the junior doctors’ digs or in the Mess or 
whatever, I could speak freely.  That’s not possible [now in general practice]. 
For Dr O there was a presumption that doctors would keep the details of a case being 
discussed to themselves. Confidentiality was contained within the walls of the doctors’ mess. 
Dr O felt that educational and moral support might still be more safely obtained from 
collegues. 
Dr O: And also there’s a group of local GPs that meet sort of semi socially that I would be free to 
bring such matters to if it could wait.  Again, issues of confidentially although one has to be less 
careful about that because they’re all GPs, but nevertheless it’s an issue because they’re all local. 
Dr O’s perception of GP colleagues as safe discussion partners reflects educational materials 
that suggest that confidentiality is maintained provided that information is kept among those 
who understand confidentiality.  
You can of course discuss matters with your [GP] partners and other members of the health care 
team but anyone to whom confidential information is given must also appreciate the ethics of 
confidentiality (Mead, 1995). 
Mead’s advice above is in line with the idea that the immediate healthcare team are likely to 
require information in order to contribute to the ongoing care of a patient. 
Where a GP or a member of practice staff was a member of the community in which the GP 
surgery is situated, issues of confidentiality surfaced. The possibility of disclosure to someone 
unauthorised and its consequences was more important than any principle in discussions with 




Dr O: ... at the [annual RCGP] conference, I met some guy… who’s setting up an Internet site … 
that’s all about if you’ve got a query you post it on his website and anyone who logs into the 
website will give you an answer.  And that seemed like a good idea when he sold it to me at 
conference.  I was going to support him. But actually, every time I’ve sort of thought putting 
anything on there, actually I realise immediately there was a, there could be problems of 
confidentiality.  You know, I’ve just had a clinical dilemma, someone’s just come to me, and I’ve 
posted it on his website.  What happens if that same patient goes on to the Internet, not an 
unlikely scenario, searches – Googles the problem that he’s got and up pops my question on Med 
Crowd.  I mean I can imagine that that might make the patient not feel very comfortable and feel 
very cross with me. 
Dr O’s description of the patient’s anger and discomfort that their secrets are being discussed 
echoes the view (Pereira-Gray, 2010) that patients are happy when doctors espouse a strict 
respect for confidentiality.  
 
Sharing potentially confidential details with colleagues was described by participants in the 
following ways: direct assistance in making a decision (most participants), the GP seeking to be 
educated or educate others (most participants), emotional support (Dr O) and ‘banter’ (Dr Q). 
The only controversial aspect of all of these that participants raised in discussion was the 
possibility of the patient finding out, or harm resulting to the patient from the disclosure of 
confidential information. This perceived possibility of discovery or harm was very much linked 
to the social closeness between health-care professional and patient, whether it was 
geographical or via the internet. Without appreciation that such proximity might generate an 
adverse outcome, there is the possibility that sharing inappropriately with colleagues may be 




Keeping information from patients  
 
One issue that is potentially hidden is when a GP is given information about a patient and 
asked not to share it with the patient.  None of the participants talked about the situation 
where a friend or relative gives information about a patient but does not want to be identified 
and/or does not want the patient to know that this information has been disclosed. However 
Dr Q questioned whether a patient should be entitled to a copy of a consultant letter if it is not 
copied to the patient.  
 
Dr Q: Even silly things like I had a patient who came in to me, and this is another good example, 
and I wasn’t sure of the answer to that. A consultant had written to me and it was addressed to 
me regarding this patient. It said ‘Dear Dr Q thanks for referring this patient blah blah blah...’ and 
the patient said, “Can I have a copy of that letter?” And I wasn’t sure what to do. And I said –my 
answer was, “Listen it was actually addressed to me I shouldn’t really be giving this to you.” Now 
it is about her and wasn’t really sure about whether I give her that letter or not give her that 
letter. Because it’s addressed to me. Again I’m not quite sure where we stand with that. Can we? 
can’t we? Is that information strictly between the two clinicians or is the patient allowed to see 
that? Was what I did ethically right or wrong? Was I wrong? Is that an ethical problem or is it just 
a management problem? 
 
It is difficult to justify correspondence between clinicians that the patient may not access. The 
usual justification is ‘therapeutic privilege’, where it is claimed that the information will harm 
the patient in some significant way (Johnston and Holt, 2006). Whilst it is unlikely that the 
letter contained information which would be significantly detrimental to the patient’s physical 





Whilst this might represent a simple ethical learning need on Dr Q’s part, the scenario 
illustrated a potential weakness in what has been called preventative ethics. In this case the 
way of preventing the ethical question of whether details should be shared with the patient is 
to ensure patients have access to their correspondence at the outset. Thus it is common 
practice for patients to be copied into correspondence between doctors (and some would 
argue that consultants’ letters should be addressed to the patient and copied in to the GP). If 
the letter is copied to the patient, then there is little doubt that the patient is entitled to its 
contents. However, a widespread policy of copying in patients not only solves the problem but 
removes it from view. So when a patient is not copied-in (deliberately or as an oversight) this 
could in some circumstances result in worse confusion on the part of the GP.  
 
Confidentiality and guidelines 
 
Respect for confidentiality is enshrined in both law and professional guidance. Consequently 
the strategies for dealing with confidentiality largely revolved around professional duties and 
their codification in ethical guidelines. For example, Dr Q described a set of guidance booklets 
provided by the General Medical Council which doctors receive on qualification. 
Confidentiality, notably, is foremost among them. 
Dr Q: ...those little books that they did there were four or five of them: Confidentiality, data 
collection, and all that sort of thing... 
General guidance on confidentiality is made available to all doctors. However, participants 
complained that they were unfamiliar with guidance, and that the guidance was not clear or 
specific enough. Nuanced approaches to ethical guidelines on confidentiality encompassed 
wider ethical skills than rule-following. Moreover, even when there was a reason for 
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confidential details that guidelines envisaged, there was ethical discomfort based on genuine 
ethical concerns.  
  
Is ethical guidance unfamiliar or not specific enough? 
 
I encountered anxiety among participants that they did not have specific guidance for the 
circumstances when they found confidentiality problematic. 
Dr D: ... I don’t have this experience, I haven’t been trained in it, nothing ... I don’t even know the 
rules and regulations. 
 
Knowledge about ethics law and professional guidelines appeared to be a perceived need. 
Dr Q: The ethics... I think it’s almost assumed that you know all of this... You know the ethics and 
confidentiality... which is not necessarily true. 
 
Dr Q, for example, was unaware of specific guidance that authorised him to talk to people 
who were not related to patients nor part of the practice healthcare team but who 
nonetheless assisted with the care of patients. This made him wonder if he might be 
practicing unprofessionally or even ilegally. 
Dr Q: ...am I breaking the law of confidentiality or am I doing something that I shouldn’t be doing, 
inadvertently? So like, as I said, talking to this, talking to the care workers, am I breaking 
confidentiality or am I, is it OK because I’m looking out for the welfare of the person? Where is 
that line drawn? What is right and what is wrong there? Because at the end of the day I am 
technically looking after the welfare of the patient, but am I going about it in the right way? Am I? 





Dr Q felt that what he was doing was right because it aimed at improving the welfare of his 
patients, but was not confident that he was following the rules in an acceptable manner. 
Dr Q’s desire to follow guidelines manifested in the desire to know the correct procedures to 
follow to ensure that legal and professional duties were met. He suggested a number of 
procedural aspects to safeguarding patient information. 
Dr Q: Do we need to make sure it’s them –get some ID from them? Sometimes we may have seen 
the patient for the very first time –I don’t know who they are … We do a lot of telephone 
consultations: Am I speaking to the right person? Am I giving them too much information? Am I 
giving them not enough information? You know ... .if you did have to give information to a 
patient, what you needed to do so you did correctly provide that information. Was there any 
forms you needed to fill in blah blah blah etc etc. Like when we do an operation we sign the 
consent form. We’d need to do that.  
Ethics education potentially concentrates on principle rather than procedure. Consequently, 
GPs may have difficulties in knowing when procedures should be followed and when they are 
inappropriate. This requires an understanding of what principles underlie those procedures 
and guidelines, rather than learning an ever fatter book of rules. 
 
Nuanced approaches to confidentiality 
 
Some educational advice can appear extreme. The quotation below, from a GP study-guide 
(Mead, 1995) emphasised the strict adherence to confidentiality and the procedural step of 
written consent. 
Consultations between GP and patient should be strictly confidential. Disclosure of confidential 
information by the GP is a serious breach of ethics... Only rarely will disclosure be judged to be in 
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the public interest – consult your defence society before any disclosure to a third party without 
written consent from the patient. 
Dr Q was unsure about whether it was necessary to obtain written consent from patients in 
order to share their details with carers. 
Dr Q: Should I go through a formal process of getting them to get the patients to sign a consent 
form to say that they can divulge this information to these people, or you know, the system’s OK 
and everything’s running fine and no one’s complaining and the information is getting through to 
people and err... everything’s ok. 
Above, I mentioned that the exact setting for Dr Q’s comment was where the managers of a 
hostel for recovering substance misusers were requesting information pertinent to his 
patients’ care. Nothing had yet gone wrong and no one had complained. Sharing the 
information allowed the managers to help his patients get to their appointments and take 
their medications appropriately. 
The idea of adhering to prima facie rules sometimes being easier than making a rational 
exception was illustrated by Dr C, talking about people telephoning to discuss elderly relatives. 
Dr C: And I guess, I mean the easiest thing to say is, ‘I’m sorry, I can’t discuss anything about your 
mother because she hasn’t given me consent to discuss her health with you.’  And sometimes 
you’ve got to do that if you’re uncertain of the situation. 
 
Participants’ accounts of dealing with information requests by family members and carers 
illustrate the ability of GP s to be ethically nuanced, rather than simplistic, in the interpretation 
of guidelines. This kind of issue is a recognised source of ethical tension and finds its way into 
both educational and evaluation context. Dr E used confidentiality as a way of distinguishing a 




Dr E: I think that you can be a doctor who is so concerned about ethical sort of dotting the ‘I’s 
and ‘T’s that they do not behave in a professional manner.  And the example that I come back to 
is [where medical students] form a confrontative position with the patient and say, ‘I can’t tell 
you anything, medical confidentiality.’  And the rest of the consultation is, is stonewalling and 
not, not really engaging with the patient at all.  And I think that’s utterly unprofessional, though 
ethically the GMC and MDU may be very pleased with that candidate and I’m not. 
A potential danger of the desire for a definitive guideline is that students, trainees and doctors 
will adhere to a prima facie duty even when this not the right thing to do. In the quotation 
below, Dr E illustrates how this arose in the older version of the RCGP membership 
examination (However, this could just as easily find its way into the newer MRCGP 
examination). 
 
Dr E: ...it would be that, you know, ‘Mrs Brown’s booked in to see you and when she comes in, 
they ask you whether her mother has been drinking,’ and I mean clearly what one is looking for 
there is not just an understanding of the ethical principle, that breach of confidentiality is a 
serious issues of medical malpractice, and you need to be aware that that’s the sort of scenario 
that you may do it.  But it’s more I think in, in – that is a key issue, but in addition in a 
membership exam, one is looking, not for someone to make a cold brutal statement to the 
patient, but ‘I’m sorry, that’s totally inappropriate, we can’t do that because medical 
confidentiality means I can’t tell you anything,’ one would look to see whether the candidate was 
engaging the person being polite to them seeking to understand their viewpoint and to be as 
helpful as they can. 
 
The notion of ‘total confidentiality’ is an erroneous one which I encounter when I hear medical 
students reassure simulated patients that anything they say will remain solely between them 
and the patient before they have heard what the patient has to say. This may represent either 




In the quotation below Dr C illustrated a nuanced approach to confidentiality between 
relatives. 
 
Dr C: Quite a common one is a son or a daughter ringing up and asking to speak to me or another 
GP about an elderly parent, for example.  And often – we’ve quite an elderly population, and 
people move away because of, they move away to find work.  ...a son or a daughter, whom I’ve 
never met, might ring up about say, her mother who’s failing.  And needs some support.  And ask, 
‘What’s wrong with my mother?’ And she might, ‘Why can’t you get her more support?’  Or, 
‘How is she?’ or whatever.  So that’s often really the issue of confidentiality.  And these are quite 
difficult sometimes, because I guess the way I would respond there is – I find it’s often based on 
my judgement of, my knowledge of the elderly person, what he or she would like, and what I can 
pick up from the relative who’s ringing … Sometimes you can make a judgement based on their 
understanding of the nature of the person you’re talking about, which is sometimes a bit risky. 
But that can sometimes be helpful, that can sometimes be in the best interests of the patient as 
well, particularly if an elderly person is in failing mental health and not quite sure about her 
mental capacity. 
 
The risk to which Dr C refers could be professional risk (of a complaint that confidentiality was 
breached) or risk of causing harm to the patient in some way (also wrong). Dr C exercised 
judgement of what the patient might be likely to want (in the absence of valid consent) but 
also made a judgement about patient benefit. An understanding of concepts such as 
confidentiality and best interests was a prerequisite for such a conscious nuanced judgement. 
Dr C did not report checking each and every such decision with an indemnifier, or seeking 
written consent. In the case of a patient with dementia or a mental health problem it may not 




Dr O, a much younger GP looking after a semi-rural population, was also prepared to exercise 
some judgement but only where he was confident about what a person would want. 
 
Dr O: I usually go out and seek their explicit consent, unless I have good reason to think 
that they would, you know, or that they wouldn’t be agreeable to sharing the 
information. 
 
Discomfort about justified breaches of confidentiality 
 
If sticking to a prima facie set of rules is easy, then breaking or bending them can be hard, 
especially if a judgement has to be made in practice, and even more so if the GP can expect 
their decisions to be scrutinised and questioned at a later date. An understanding of the 
circumstances when there could be an exception to confidentiality was a key concern for Dr F. 
 
Dr F: ...it’s the whole confidentiality sort of thing.  And when it’s to be broken, which I think is 
quite hard actually.  
 
Professional guidance is clear that doctors are permitted and may even have a duty to share 
confidential healthcare records:  
1. When the patient consents to the information being shared 
2. When others may be at risk of serious harm 
3. When it is required by law 
 
When others are at risk of serious harm or when a doctor has a legal duty to disclose 
confidential information, doctors are encouraged to disclose where possible with the patient’s 
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assent but assent is not essential. Ethical discomfort may arise even when each of the 
conditions of disclosure above (including with consent) is clearly satisfied. Participants in the 
study offered examples of all three types of justified disclosure that were difficult. 
 
When the patient consents 
 
When a patient consents to a GP sharing confidential details with someone else, the GP may 
perceive ethical discomfort. This can flow from the nature of the information and the potential 
for it to cause harm. Dr H, a GP-trainee, presented the following case. 
 
Dr H: I had a 15 year old girl, just come over from Somalia the week before, living with her dad 
who had been here for about a year or so, and in a very overcrowded house … -Came with 
abdominal pain and nausea, vomiting, a bit of pyrexia.  -Couldn’t speak English so I had to get an 
interpreter on the phone.  And dad came spoke a little bit more English than her. I got a bit of 
history, told dad to go to the waiting room, asked if the girl could answer some more questions 
and he said, ‘Yes,’ and I asked her about her periods.  I had a chat and found out that she was 
pregnant, and she was married to somebody without anyone knowing, when in Somalia ... And I 
was getting a bit worried about her safety, because if her dad knew – if she was pregnant and she 
was married without anyone knowing.  And now confidentiality [was an issue] because she had 
presented here. Her dad was waiting in the waiting room and he would come to ask me what had 
happened to her. I didn’t know what to do that time, if I could tell dad ... And she said, ‘Can you 
please tell my dad that I’m pregnant and this is what happened?’ 
 
Implicit in these details is the idea that the daughter had a right to privacy. Dr H described a 
professional approach to respecting the patient’s confidentiality via use of an interpreter on 
the telephone, and inviting the father in for some but not all of the consultation. The patient 
absolved Dr H of her duty to keep her secret pregnancy, by asking that she tell the father. 
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However there was still a residual discomfort and uncertainty as to the right thing to do.  Dr H 
explains why below. 
 
Dr H: ... I was worried why she asked me to tell her dad, what the implications when she went 
home, whether she would be cast out or not, or whether she would have – if there would be 
some kind of repercussions at home. That’s why I was worried why she was asking me to tell dad. 
 
It seemed clear at the time that I spoke to Dr H that she was chiefly concerned about harm 
resulting from the information disclosed. If anything the request (as a doctor) to facilitate the 
disclosure made her worried that she was being asked as an authority figure, and to protect 
the daughter from repercussions.  
A far more common way in which people routinely ask GPs to divulge confidential information 
on their behalf is where the information is required for insurance or occupational health. Dr R, 
an experienced GP with expertise in ethics and professional guidance regarding healthcare 
records, illustrates this in the quotation below.  
 
Dr R: … I had one this week.  One of these occupational fitness things.  And she’d ticked ‘no’ to 
mental health, the mental health section, which was fairly broad, the questions, you know, 
psychosis, mental illness, psychological problems, distress.  And in fact she’d been seen, on a 
couple of occasions, with stress related insomnia.  And she’d had a course of hypnotics and it had 
all settled down quite quickly.  So it wasn’t serious and it wasn’t relevant to her fitness, but 
nevertheless  I was concerned that I couldn’t say she hadn’t had anything.  And she ticked the 
‘no’ box.  So I just used my algorithm, as you say, my view, and I got her in and talked about it, 
and said ‘This is how they, this is how I think you have to interpret what they’ve said,’ and it was 
as I thought.  Not that she was lying,… or particularly consciously concealing, but she thought, ‘Oh 
well I don’t think that really counts.’  There was a certain amount of hoping that it doesn’t count, 
‘because they might not like me if I disclose it.’ 
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This case involved the benefits and harms of including and excluding certain pieces of 
information in documentation, set against a professional duty of complete disclosure. Dr R had 
sufficient knowledge and experience to recognise that his duty of truthful disclosure was 
unlikely to cause significant harm and so this was not a source of discomfort. He did, however 
recognise that the patient might have an interest in withholding information, even though she 
had given consent to his providing a full and honest report. 
 
When others may be at risk of serious harm 
 
Dr N discussed a case where professional duty permitted and moral duty required disclosure of 
sensitive information [field notes]. A man, who had contracted a treatable sexually transmitted 
illness (STI), wanted his pregnant partner tested for it without her knowing. Testing for STIs can 
be a routine part of pregnancy screening. However, the pregnant woman can refuse to be 
tested, and Dr N reflected that the partner is not automatically entitled to the results (which 
he had also requested). If the pregnant woman required treatment she would need to know 
why she was being treated. This was likely to involve breaching the man’s confidentiality.  
 
Dr N’s case was potentially clear-cut because there is a risk of harm (untreated STI) to both the 
woman and her pregnancy, and in this case deception in terms of testing and treatment is 
practically difficult and professionally forbidden. Talking to Dr N it was clear that she felt that 
disclosure to the pregnant woman was the right thing to do. Her perception of difficulty was 
less moral and more professional – that the man might complain about her if she violated his 




Dr D presented a less clear case. The case she presents below arises out of the familiarity and 
trust that can be established in the relative intimacy of the GP consultation, where, for 
example there is a closed door, and the patient may have seen the doctor more than once. 
 
Dr D: A patient [presenting with a history of minor illness] suddenly just said, ‘Doctor I feel 
comfortable with you, can I say something?’  And I said, ‘Yes, what is it?’  And he went, ‘I have 
urges.’  And I was like, ‘Oh okay, what urges?’  ‘I like little children.’  I had a total blank look 
straightaway, you know, I was just, ‘Oh God. I don’t want to be here.’   ...And I said, ‘Girls, boys?’  
And he said, ‘Both.’  And I [checked his record], and I saw he has little children. And I said, ‘How 
would you like me to help you?’  And he said, ‘Oh forget it. Now I’m fine... Oh... cough... Yes fine.’  
And just said ‘Okay, ‘bye,’ and walked off … And I was just sitting there thinking, ‘Now what do I 
do?’ I mean who do I refer him [to]? And if I do refer him, will they, do I have to tell the 
authorities what’s going on here?’ ... Do I inform some authority and find out what he works as 
and all that, if he’s working with school children, do I, you know, if he’s a teacher or something, is 
it my job? 
 
The key factors Dr D considered important in deciding whether to preserve her patient’s 
confidentiality were in effect two sets of risk factors: risk of harm from disclosure (harm to her 
patient), and risk of harm from non-disclosure (to children).  
 
Dr D: ...this man, I don’t know whether he’s acted upon his urges or not...  And when someone 
asks you for help, I don’t want the person to feel, ‘Well I asked you for help and you penalised me 
for that.’  ... This is much deeper, because society really hates paedophiles.  Okay, and for that, 
and then I was thinking, if he’s acted upon his urges, am I going to act differently? And if he 
hasn’t... I knew what I would do, I would give him all the support and keep it quiet, to help him 
improve or whatever. ... Is there any counsellor who will counsel him, without telling the 
authorities?  ...But then I’m also concerned about the children.  So when you put the ethical thing 
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in, straightaway you will inform social services and everyone.  But then am I doing more harm if 
he’s not harming his children...   
 
For Dr D, her primary duty was to ‘help’ her patient and the duties to unknown people were 
the source of conflict. Dr D went so far as to refrain from immediately including the 
conversation in the notes. 
 
Dr D: If I write that in his notes, and it was all nothing, and if my partner decides not to do 
anything about it ... everyone can see it.  You know, someone, the receptionist printing his 
repeats or something like that ... if he says, ‘Oh I want to see the doctor,’ they put his name in 
and just say they do go into his notes, they will see that, and I don’t want them to know about 
this ... And some of them do live where he lives … And like this man, if it just comes out like that 
...  also I’m just wondering how much of it, because it’s in the news about paedophiles, children, 
blah, blah, blah ...  Okay, maybe he is a paedophile in the making or something. I don’t want to 
destroy someone. 
 
Dr D began her reply to my question by avoiding the issue. The patient had presented with a 
cough and therefore that was what belonged in the notes. She asked aloud if following up on 
this disclosure was her job. However she had the moral courage to explore why she felt 
uncomfortable, and why she might not include a record of the confession in the patient’s 
notes. Her key reason was not a desire to avoid criticism down the line but a concern about 
the security of the information that she might enter in the patient’s healthcare record. The 
possible repercussion was that someone with less of a professional commitment to 
confidentiality, or with a greater interest in making the information known might see the 
information. This concern about who can see the notes on the computer screen is reflected in 




When the law required that confidentiality be breached 
 
Another way in which confidentiality illustrates the differences in levels of ethical experience is 
where confidential records are disclosed to the police. I have already discussed two 
contrasting examples of this phenomenon in the previous chapter. In both cases (Dr B and Dr 
O) there was no real doubt in the GP’s mind. A duty to protect the public from harm (Dr B) and 
to detect serious crime (Dr O) overrode the duty to keep healthcare information confidential. 
Despite being sure about the right thing to do in this case, both doctors called their respective 
medical indemnity organisations. In both cases it appears evident that this was for legal and 
professional validation (see previous chapter). Dr O illustrates how, in the absence of support 
from the indemnity organisation, he temporarily lost confidence in the rightness of his 
decision. 
 
Dr O: ... And I rang the MPS and the lawyer I spoke to gave me... very confusing advice.  I really 
thought it was really straightforward, you know, okay this is a serious crime, no question of 
argument, just open up the file and let them see what they want...  But the solicitor from the 
MPS [this would have been a medicolegal advisor not a solicitor], I don’t know, seemed to be 
playing devil’s advocate or something and made me very confused, so much so that I refused to 
open the file for the police. I said they could have it, but with all the bits you’re interested in 
redacted.  Anyhow, they came round again because this was a very serious crime.  And someone 
said to me that legal proceedings were going slowly and painfully and I thought, well you know, 
I’m going to revisit this.  So I rang MPS again and I got much clearer advice, much more in line 
with my original felt position. And the advice was that: if the police were there then show them 




By contrast, Dr B gave the impression that he would have been surprised had the medicolegal 
opinion differed with his view, because he was confident that his ethical, professional and legal 
duties were in alignment. 
  
Dr B: And therefore that was a very good case where it would be both ethically and legally 
justified, and regulations wise, justified, GMC wise, to breach confidentiality... So that was an 
example where I broke confidentiality, being actually very confident that it was ethically the right 







The recognition of abortion as an ethical issue 
 
Abortion pre-recognised as ethical 
There is a vast academic and educational literature on the ethics of abortion. While and 
Attwood list requests for termination of pregnancy among the identified ethically problematic 
issues with which GPs may have to contend (While and Attwood, 2000).  Issues around 
abortion are evident in educational and professional literature, chiefly concerning the ethics of 
conscientious objection to involvement (Savulescu, 2006). 
One of the reasons for abortion being a visibly ethical issue may lie in the history of abortion in 
the UK. During some of the participants’ professional lives, there had been a strong legal and 
professional prohibition on providing or facilitating treatment with the intention to cause an 
abortion. Armstrong, a GP and medical sociologist mentions this as one of the historical 
prohibitions enforced by the GMC in his sociology textbook for medical students (a book that I 
used as a student).  
 
…the GMC … has tended to concentrate on the five ‘A’s of alcoholism, advertising, addiction, 





Roger Higgs (addressing a conference on primary care ethics) echoes this in recalling the single 
lecture that he receiving at medical school on medical ethics. 
 
Roger Higgs: …the geezer said, ‘There’s the rules of As, no abortion, no advertising,’ ...a whole 
load of things beginning with A... 
  
In ‘In That Case’ (a book referred to by both Dr M and Dr U), Higgs also ascribes (p.10) the 
prohibition on abortion to a set of values derived from the Hippocratic Oath and subsequent 
declarations of the World Medical Association (Campbell and Higgs, 1982b). As such, until the 
law changed, firstly with the case of R v Bourne and then the Abortion Act of 1967, a 
prohibition on involvement in abortions would have been something GPs were expected to 
abide by. Furthermore the very term ‘ethics’ meant avoiding involvement in certain unethical 
practices such as abortions.  
Prior to 1967 the law and professional guidelines offered a simple solution to most dilemmas 
concerning abortion – it was not allowed unless to save the life of the mother. This may well 
have reduced the requests for abortions as well as made it much easier to practice with a 
conscientious objection to the procedure. This did however mean that doctors who believed 
that an abortion was necessary either refrained with a guilty conscience, or risked professional 
and legal ramifications. 
 
Following the 1967 Abortion Act the decision to refer for and carry out terminations of 
pregnancy was placed at the discretion of doctors, with the caveat that there was some scope 
for doctors to opt out. This opt-out was provided on the basis of sincere conscientious 
objection and the absence of risk to the life or severe risk to the health of the woman 
requesting the procedure.  
270 
 
Abortion as an uncomfortable issue 
Despite the legal permissibility of abortion, it can be an emotive topic in a consultation. 
Emotional discomfort was the other key way in which it was raised as an issue. 
 
Dr M: Abortion can sometimes raise issues that either way it’s not great, that one or other choice 
is not one that you feel happy about... 
 
The discomfort may arise in practice because, as a result of the discretion afforded to doctors 
by the Abortion Act, the GP can be placed in a position where they have to make a decision.  
 
Dr R: I suppose a fairly common one is the question about abortion ... in the sense that, you 
know, people come in and say, ‘I’m pregnant, I don’t want a baby,’ you’ve got to do something 
about it, and you have to make a decision  
 
The key decision that the GP needs to make in this circumstance is whether the criteria of the 
Abortion Act are met and whether in good conscience the GP agrees that the benefits of the 
procedure essentially outweigh the harms for the woman requesting it or whether it is being 
requested under any kind of duress. Some GPs may also need to decide whether to opt out on 
the basis of conscientious objection to abortions per se, and whether to outline the basis of 
that objection to the patient.  
 
Dr R: It’s actually a bit more complicated... Well, because you have to decide how much of that 
you’re going to let, you’re going to reveal to the patient, and how much you’re going to get 
involved. 
 
For Dr R the balance of values is made more complicated by the decision of how much to tell 
the patient of the values underlying the GPs recommendations or reluctance to assist by way 
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of conscientious involvement or conscientious objection.  
 
Discussions around areas such abortion, where disagreements are shaped by epistemological 
differences of opinion as well as moral ones serve as stark examples of the potential push and 
pull of values in the consultation. On the basis that such decisions are not generally taken 
lightly, it is no surprise that how to respond to requests for termination of pregnancy was 
described by Dr B (a GP-Trainer) as a live issue for trainees currently. 
 
Dr B: I mean obviously trainees are going to come in with a very sort of obvious commonly 
recurring problems, like termination [of pregnancy] requests. 
 
Termination of pregnancy, or abortion, has in the second half of the 20th century become an 
issue for the ethics of practice. The discretion given to GPs and other doctors has been 
identified in texts and education. This discretion given to GPs to be involved or opt out 
generates ethical discomfort in some circumstances, and that discomfort identifies it as an 
ethical issue in practice. The emotional and cultural aspects of ending pregnancy as a medical 
treatment also generate ethical discomfort. A potential source of that emotional discomfort 
may stem from the differing values and belief held by the GP and the patient. Dr G illustrates 
this in the quotation below.  
 
Dr G: I mean, I think in general, doctors function better and patients get a better service from 
their doctors, if that doctor has as few boundaries between his personal self and his professional 
self as possible …the non-medically trained part of oneself can contribute to clinical practice in 




It is perhaps unsurprising that some GPs might choose to avoid involvement in abortion 
irrespective of whether they consider it to be right or wrong.  
 
Abortion as an issue avoided 
 
Abortion can be seen as issue that is sometimes invisible, and subject to both ethical 
avoidance and ethical deferral. Dr E reflected that abortion would have been much more 
prominent as an ethical issue in the past. 
Dr E: Well I think ten years ago, the old chestnut issues of the morality of abortion ... would have 
been much nearer the top of the agenda, I think. 
 
A possible reason for abortion representing less of an issue is that in recent decades, patients 
have usually been able to self-refer to abortion services without ever seeing a GP. Thus many 
women who seek a termination of pregnancy might never raise the issue with a GP. In areas 
that are well served by family planning clinics, this is perhaps an issue that might avoid the GP 
consultation entirely and become invisible as far as the ethics of practice are concerned. For Dr 
R, abortion was not an obvious ethical issue for practice. 
 
Dr R: ...that’s perhaps the most, the commonest one that’s not [an] obvious ethical issue... 
 
Importantly it may mean that education about abortion and its attendant ethical issues needs 
to be provided in order to prepare the new GP for practice in areas that are less well served, or 




Even when a woman does attend her GP to discuss having an abortion, it is not something that 
most GPs have to refer or be directly involved with unless they are comfortable to do so as Dr 
R illustrated: 
 
Dr R: I mean the structure is such that you don’t actually have to make, decide whether or not 
they’re going to have an abortion, because if you’re not happy about it, there are easy ways 
round it, and, in fact, all you need to do now where I’m in, is give them a piece of paper with a 
phone number on basically, a little referral slip and they do the rest.   
 
GPs with an ethical aversion to involvement in abortion may choose to use such redirection to 
avoid an ethically challenging encounter. Passing the patient a referral slip, however, is also a 
way of avoiding an uncomfortable and time consuming discussion regardless of whether a GP 
strongly objects to abortion. A key problem with this approach is that the GP may be in a 
better position to counsel the patient, may have access to their full healthcare record and have 
established a relationship of trust. The patient may be unwilling or unable to access family 
planning series directly, and the GP may be able to deal with related issues, such as whether 
the patient is at risk of sexually transmitted illness or in an abusive relationship. Dr U, for 
example mentioned that it might represent an issue of practical ethics where a teenager might 
present with a request for an abortion. In that case the issues might be more concerning issues 
such as unlawful sexual activity, and whether the teenager is competent to make the decision 
and have their confidentiality respected. Professor Y stated the necessity of discussing the 
request to make sure that it was the most appropriate decision. 
Prof Y: Well I mean in terms of abortion, I clearly discuss it with the person... 
 
Dr R also expressed the opinion that if a GP holds a fixed ethical view regarding abortion, then 




Dr R: I think it’s fairly easy, perhaps comparatively easy for those people who consider that 
abortion is wrong in all circumstances.  And it’s probably fairly... It’s pretty easy for those people 
who consider that a woman has a right to choose in all circumstances. 
 
For many who have ethical difficulty with abortion, this is because beliefs about the sanctity of 
life and personhood render the procedure as morally equivalent to murder. Whilst I cannot 
infer that abortion is a live issue only for doctors with strong religious convictions, the most in-
depth spontaneous discussion of issues around abortion came from Dr R and Dr E, two 
avowedly Christian GPs. Conversely, If a person does not regard the foetus as a person, or 
believes that only the pregnant woman has the right to decide whether to continue with her 
pregnancy, then the question of what to do will be more easily engaged with.  Professor Y was 
generally in favour of requests for abortion, so the issue became less problematic, illustrating 
Dr R’s point. 
 
Prof Y: … on the whole I [am] always for abortion, unless it really is an outrageous request, but I 
always discuss it.  So that would not be a problem for me. 
 
The limit to Prof Y’s favourable view is the outrageous request. Even where there is consensus 
about the permissibility of abortion based on women’s rights, there may be moral outrage for 
reason other than the rightness or wrongness of abortion itself. For example selective 
abortions for cultural reasons such as the preference for male heirs may provoke ethical 
disapproval from people who would otherwise regard themselves as pro-choice.  
A conscientious objection also does not necessarily render the issue easy to avoid. For example 
some Roman Catholic writers state that deferring to colleagues or to counselling services (who 
will facilitate abortions) makes a GP morally complicit. For example, two separate articles in 
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the Catholic Medical Quarterly suggest that a GP with conscientious objection to abortion 
ought to only refer to services and charities that will encourage and support a woman to go 
through with her pregnancy, and only to suggest colleagues who are opposed to abortion. 
Furthermore they suggest that the discussion is an opportunity to find those requests that do 
not comply with the abortion act, and to give advice about the risks of the procedure in the 
hope that they will dissuade the patient from seeking an abortion (Watt, 2008, Delaney, 2006). 
From the position of Watt and others, providing information or referring to a colleague (active 
avoidance of the issue) will often be morally wrong. Awareness of such advice makes 
conscientious objection much harder for GPs who hold a sincere belief in the sanctity of 
human life from the point of conception. Whilst UK law does not consider an embryo at any 
stage to be a person, someone who believes the embryo to be a person from the point of 
conception will consider abortion to be the same as murder. 
 
Maintaining a conscientious objection was also regarded as uncomfortable. Dr E illustrates the 
idea that just because a GP views abortion as morally wrong, is does not mean that he does 
not recognise the adverse situation that may lead to a request, or that may arise from an 
unwanted pregnancy. 
 
Dr E: … I still, and never have done during my entire clinical career, would encourage someone 
with an unplanned pregnancy to have an abortion. I think that my understanding of their plight 
and why they want to [have an abortion], has increased enormously over the years.   
 
Dr E also discussed the personal ramifications of conscientious objection. Unlike breaches of 
confidentiality, which are generally impermissible, referral for an abortion is in effect generally 
seen as legally permissible, and therefore a refusal to participate or to refer is seen as refusal 
to provide a service to which the patient is entitled (Savulescu, 2006). Savulescu argues that 
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doctors’ consciences have little place in the delivery of modern medical care. He proposes that 
people are not prepared to offer legally permitted, efficient, and beneficial care to a patient 
because it conflicts with their values, should not be doctors. He argues that a service which 
depends on the values of the treating doctor, results in patients shopping around doctors to 
receive services to which they are entitled. This introduces inefficiency and wastes resources. 
The less-informed patients may fail to receive a service to which they are entitled -this inequity 
is unjustifiable (Savulescu, 2006). Savulescu’s argument has rapidly found its way into 
preparation materials for GP-trainees contemplating Case-Based Discussion Exercises (Naidoo 
2007) as a view which GP-trainees are encouraged to heed. 
 
Dr E: I would say it’s reprehensible for somebody like Julian Savulescu to take the line that they 
did in the BMJ famously, about six year ago, to say that, you know, doctors with conscience 
should not be allowed to practice.  It seems to me his argument that you do what the state says 
or otherwise you’re not an ethical doctor, is an extremely flawed one.  So you’ve got to face that 
brutalising pressure.  You’ve got to face the pressure of having to deal with the very real 
emotional strains and conflicts that are going to arise in consultation with patients that, you 
know, you wouldn’t otherwise have if you towed the party line. 
 
Whilst participants discussed the potential avoidance of involvement none claimed to have 
actively persuaded any patient to seek an abortion, or confessed to a tick-box approach to 
requests in their own practice. 
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Engaging with the ethics of abortion 
 
The engagement with ethics in practice begins with beliefs and values of the GP and the 
patient and the discussion will often concern potential points of agreement. Realistically GP 
and patient are unlikely to change each other’s view on the moral status of the embryo. Dr G 
went so far as to suggest an ethical consensus might not even be possible. 
Dr G: …ethical thinking won’t resolve ‘is abortion right or wrong?’ because clearly if there was an 
answer, we’d have discovered what it is by now.  The fact that there is on-going difference of 
opinion must suggest that ethics can’t resolve it.  
 
Some GPs may not regard the foetus as having full human rights and therefore may view a 
termination of pregnancy as an extension of contraception or as a gynaecological treatment. 
The woman’s right to choose whether to continue to be pregnant until delivery may be viewed 
as a value that trumps any notional rights of the foetus.  Other GPs may consider that the 
foetus has full human status from the moment of conception (a view often associated with 
sincerely held religious beliefs) or that the foetus increasingly acquires moral status from 
conception to birth. Gillon suggests that these views are not ethical at all but epistemological. 
According to Gillon, two people may agree that killing people is wrong (the ethical question) 
but disagree over what counts as a person (the epistemological question)(Gillon, 2001). This 
makes any kind of ethical discussion very difficult. 
 
Despite an epistemological belief that the foetus does have moral status, some GPs may be 




Dr R: …But I mean it’s this thing about, which I have a continuing discomfort, because I don’t have 
a black and white view ... If you have a Hursthousian view, which is what I have, that, you know, 
there are times when, with regret, one will decide that abortion is the least bad course. 
 
Others who did not ascribe personhood to the foetus early in pregnancy might also consider 
that there are times when abortion is right and others when it is wrong, such as the 
outrageous request to which Prof Y referred. The discussions I had with participants around 
the ethics of abortion did not generally revolve around the moral status of the embryo in the 
eyes of the doctor, but the impact of abortion on the life-story of the mother. Dr M described 
the nature of a ‘right’ decision in terms of the patient narrative. 
 
Dr M: ...it’s always the one thats most appropriate at that time for that person... 
Dr E gave the most thorough description of the immediate and longer term benefits and harms 
of having an abortion with reference to a specific case Whilst I cannot comment on the validity 
of the scientific studies that Dr E quotes (itself a source of fierce debate), there is an 
unavoidable element of what facts a GP chooses to believe in weighing the risks and benefits 
in order to counsel a patient. 
 
Dr E: And, you know, the measurement of happiness, I think is something that also needs to at 
least be debated rather than, rather than assumed.  And sometimes of course, what makes a 
patient immediately happy in the long term may not do so.  And in general practice, one sees 
patients throughout the course of a long period of time.  And certainly I’ve taken a longstanding 
interest, right from the time of being a medical student, over the whole issue of abortion, and the 
early studies that were done justifying the mantra that abortion does not harm women, I think 
were – now generally acknowledged to be very short-sighted that, of course, in the immediate 
aftermath, if you’re faced with the awful dilemma of, you know, having conceived and not feeling 
that you can look after that child, you’re going to feel, in 99% of cases, I would have thought, 
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immediate relief once the problem has been dispensed with.  Most of those early studies only 
looked at a six month time interval. But now we have more studies looking at longer term 
sequelae, the psychological consequences I think are becoming more evident.  And again one’s 
clinical experience I think informs that.  And when, like me, you’ve had not one, but several 
women who when they have lost a child in a road traffic accident or a cot death, a subsequent 
child – I had one patient who rang me up saying, ‘What should I do, this is a judgement on me for 
having a termination.’  Now I didn’t even know that this woman had had a termination.  And that 
was the first thing she uttered when she picked up the phone.  So, you know, one’s experience 
obviously does colour your reading of – and in fact I looked in that patient’s notes and saw that 
the gynaecologist who had referred her at least 15 years before, at the age of 19, was quite 
convinced that this would do her no harm, and she was a thoroughly modern woman, in 
quotation marks, for whom this would have no effect at all.  Clearly, with hindsight, he was 
wrong. And I’m sure that this happens with my decisions too.  But utilitarian arguments are very 
short-sighted sometimes. 
 
Dr E conceded that his decisions to intervene in someone’s life could also have adverse effects 
that became apparent at a later point in their life-story. He ostensibly argued that it was 
important not just to consider immediate but also future happiness in such interventions.  
 
Dr G reflects on whether a GP has a right or duty to determine the outcome of the 
consultation. 
 
Dr G: …the ethical issue for abortion for a doctor is not, is not just ‘is abortion right or wrong?’ 
but the ethical decision is given that I hold a view either way, have I the right to insist upon it?  




Roger Neighbour comments on the morality of influencing patients’ decisions in ‘The Inner 
Consultation,’ a manual of consultation skills that is widely taught and often referenced 
(Neighbour, 2007). He voiced the concern below himself at a training course that I attended 
and conveniently articulates it in his key text as well. 
 
What do you do if you have sound reasons for thinking one option is far better than the others, 
but the patient chooses the ‘wrong’ one? I never promised you an end to moral dilemmas. You 
could accept the patient’s choice for the moment, and let time be the teacher; or you could use 
some of the more covert influencing techniques we shall be discussing shortly. Or you could ask 
your medical protection society. Or your priest. (Neighbour, 2007) 
 
Neighbour answers his own question. If a GP can influence a patient in that same patient’s 
best interests, then there are times when it is right to do so. 
 
 The doctor is credited with expertise, charisma and respect amounting to what Michael Balint 
called ‘his apostolic function’. This lends ‘doctor’s orders’ and authority which, while we may 
secretly consider it underserved, we should be foolish not to use in the patient’s interests. 
(Neighbour, 2007) 
 
For Neighbour, medical ‘authority’ is one of many skills or attributes which can be used to the 
patient’s good. His reference to the medical protection society and the priest illustrates the 
idea that whether, and the degree to which, a doctor ‘influences’ the patient may rightly or 




Substantive issues and ethics Education  
 
Intricate rules and complex reality  
 
Confidentiality arguably sits at a convergence of professional, philosophical and legal 
principle: a theoretical basis for confidentiality can be justified in terms of deontology (we 
have a duty to respect autonomy and therefore privacy), consequentialism (if doctors keep 
confidences, patients trust doctors and disclose more relevant details), virtue ethics 
(virtuous doctors are discrete and therefore keep their patients private details confidential) 
as well as other ethical theories. 
Confidentiality is an excellent example of ethics as a language of deference – enquiries about 
confidentiality are about which rules should be followed and when exceptions should occur. 
Some of the younger participants voice the feeling that they did not have sufficient knowledge, 
skills or experience to comfortably negotiate confidentiality issues when they arose. The 
perceived educational need as regards confidentiality manifested in two different ways: Firstly 
a desire to know what procedure to follow in order to be practising well, and secondly to know 
when it was appropriate to deviate from the duty to maintain confidentiality. Insofar that rules 
and guidelines aim to generate morally right or even praiseworthy practice, following them 
properly was understandably perceived to be important. 
However, the general practice literature openly acknowledges the anxiety that can arise where 
idealistic rules meet complex reality. Members of the RCGP ethics committee recently 
published a discussion piece in the RCGP newspaper about the challenges of maintaining 
confidentiality and handling patient data provocatively entitled, ‘Is confidentiality a 
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con?’(Marshall and Pattison, 2010). Marshall and Pattison asked whether current professional 
ideas relating to confidentiality are conceptually ‘leaky’ and even paternalistic.  
The article generated a direct response in the British Journal of General Practice (BJGP) by a 
very eminent retired general practitioner, Sir Denis Pereira Gray. He re-asserted the ethical 
promise of confidentiality that instils confidence in general practice:  
This doctor-centred article, published in the medical press from two prestigious authors may 
mislead and worry patients, especially those who read it via one of the approximately 2000 
patient groups now associated with British general practices ... Patients often come to GPs in 
distress, and unburdening themselves can be, and often is, therapeutic. This response seeks to 
support such patients and to assure them that their legal, ethical, and ministerial safeguards 
remain in place (Pereira-Gray, 2010). 
Perreira-Gray appears to argue that legislation and professional guidance is sufficient to 
produce ethical behaviour in GPs. He argues that the ethics on display is a good representation 
of how GPs ought to and generally do behave. An extension of the argument might be that 
that if GPs have problems maintaining confidentiality, then they must be poorly-educated or 
unethical.  
By contrast, the participant data from this study suggest that ethics education (with particular 
reference to confidentiality) could be improved, and that issues arising in practice may 
necessitate disclosure of confidential information rather more than idealistic statements might 
suggest. I have suggested that there are three key ways in which confidentiality appears 
problematic.  
1. The first problem is that GPs, especially the younger participants perceived 
confidentiality as the key issue repeatedly arising in practice, but were unsure about 
how to respond to it. The solution may be part of the problem as trainers describe a 
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clamour by trainees for concrete facts about the current law and what to do in specific 
instances, in preference to the skills with which to arrive at a judgement on the correct 
course of action. This problem may manifest in the discomfort that arises when 
confidentiality should be breached (sometimes quite urgently) but the GP is not 
confident that the profession will (with hindsight) support the decision.   
2. The second problem is that confidentiality issues often involve conflicting duties, 
complex demands and uncertainty of both factual premises and predicted outcome. 
This second problem is more about the difficulties generated by the system in which 
GPs practice, and, wrongly, a possible perception by some GPs that they should 
maintain confidentiality at all costs rather than respect confidentiality wherever 
possible. An absolutist approach to confidentiality potentially spares the GP the moral 
work (and discomfort) of having to balance rights, benefits and harms. A decision that 
involves moral work, however may be the best one, and avoidance of such decisions 
may not be possible. 
3. A third problem may be evident in the way that assumptions can be made (usually but 
not exclusively) by trainees and less experienced GPs that certain people may receive 
confidential information (and others not). There may be good reasons why 
information is shared with other healthcare professionals and patients’ relatives. The 
good reasons should be a part of the conscious decision-making rather than just 
assumed, however, given the store that the profession set by this principle. 
 
The healer’s duties, beliefs, and power 
  
Abortion as an ethical issue in practice has the potential to be missed or avoided. There is an 
argument that issues connected with abortion need to form part of the ethics education of 
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GPs. This is because, when a GP is presented with a request for an abortion, there is a legal 
requirement for him/her to make a judgement as to whether the procedure is necessary.  This 
judgement can be avoided, by passing the request to a colleague or to a self-referral service. 
However neither may be available, and complete avoidance may sometimes be neglectful of 
other duties. Deferral may still place some doctors with sincere conscientious objections in 
difficulty as they may see this as a form of facilitation – this is something that requires further 
discussion from the point of ethics education. 
 
It is helpful to distinguish values from beliefs. Debates about the moral status of the embryo 
have formed much of the previous moral discourse, but these are only starting points for a 
conversation in the practice setting.  GPs need to be aware of their own religious and scientific 
beliefs and to reflect on how these influence the advice that they give to patients.  Beliefs in 
this instance may include beliefs about the moral status of the embryo or about the potential 
harm to the mother of continuing with or terminating a pregnancy. Participants’ discussions 
centred very much on belief about the mother. The idea that an abortion is a tragic necessity is 
one which some GPs with a belief in the moral worth of the embryo may use to justify 
facilitating a termination of pregnancy. Similarly a GP with no such beliefs may still consider an 
abortion request to be outrageous. 
 
All doctors in the UK are under a professional obligation not to allow their own values and 
beliefs to prejudice their work. However, given that GPs are expected to influence patient’s 
decisions, can they operate in a state of moral neutrality? The ethically sensitive GP must 
decide how far they will allow their values to influence the patient, and how far they will allow 
their patients’ values and choices to influence their actions. There is an argument that where a 
GP believes that s/he will do some good for a patient s/he should attempt to influence and 
persuade them. GP must decide to what degree they should display their espoused values and 
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beliefs, and acknowledge any particular source of moral values that the patient would consider 
to represent a conflict of interests. A declaration of beliefs may undermine that ability to 
persuade. The ability and duty of the GP to influence patients is remarked upon by GP 
educators (Neighbour, 2007) and in the ethics more generally (Brody, 1992) and perhaps this is 




Chapter 9: Substantive ethical issues 




This chapter continues the exploration and analysis of substantive issues in general practice 
ethics. Although there is no clear-cut separation of the ‘personal’ and ‘social’ dimensions of 
ethics (as well illustrated in the discussion of confidentiality for example) it is important to 
recognise that the ethical work of GPs takes place under financial (and other social) constraints 
which, by necessity, help shape their deliberations. GPs are certainly not free-floating agents 
who can simply and purely choose to do what they see as the best for the person in front of 
them. The issues discussed in this chapter – financial incentives and rationing – are chosen 
both because they featured in the data and because they help to illuminate this additional ‘real 
world’ dimension. As in the previous chapter most of the discussion will be given over to 
understanding the nature and complexity of the ethical substance but I will conclude with 





Financial incentives in primary healthcare 
 
Recognising financial incentives as an ethical issue 
 
Financial incentives are not an issue that dominates medical ethics education in the same way 
that euthanasia or confidentiality has generated a vast academic and educational literature. 
However the issues generated by financial incentives in medicine are to an extent represented 
in both mainstream medical and general practice literature. 
 
The QOF is not the only way in which the decisions to collect data, provide certain 
interventions and to restrict others is incentivised. However it serves as the main illustration of 
participants’ awareness that payment linked to performance could be ethically problematic.  It 
is also a pervasive element in English general practice. 
 
The QOF contains four main components (domains). The four domains are: Clinical Domain, 
Organisational Domain, Patient Experience Domain and Additional Services Domain. Each 
domain consists of a set of achievement measures, known as indicators, against which 
practices score points according to their level of achievement. The 2010/11 QOF measured 
achievement against 134 indicators; practices scored points on the basis of achievement 
against each indicator, up to a maximum of 1,000 points. 
 clinical care: the domain consists of 86 indicators across 20 clinical areas (e.g. coronary 
heart disease, heart failure, hypertension) worth up to a maximum of 697 points. 
 organisational: the domain consists of 36 indicators (worth up to 167.5 points) across 
five organisational areas – records and information; information for patients; 
education and training; practice management and medicines management. 
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 patient experience: the domain consists of three indicators (worth up to 91.5 points) 
that relate to length of consultations and to patient experience of access to GPs. 
 additional services: the domain consists of nine indicators across four service areas –
cervical screening, child health surveillance, maternity service and contraceptive 
services. 
The QOF gives an indication of the overall achievement of a surgery through this points 
system. Practices aim to deliver specified services across a range of areas for which they score 
points. Put simply, the higher the score, the higher the financial reward for the practice 
(Papanikitas, 2013). The final payment is adjusted to take account of surgery workload and the 
prevalence of chronic conditions in the practice's local area.   
 
Though it is a pervasive and, some might argue, unavoidable aspect of practice, the QOF 
should in theory be invisible as an ethical issue. Misselbrook, for example, illustrates this 
presupposition that the values of the profession, patients and the state should be in alignment 
(Misselbrook, 2010).  
 
Misselbrook: Surely then QOF must represent a win-win situation? GPs are happy that hard work 
is rewarded. The [Department of Health] is happy that perverse disincentives are reduced and the 
[statistical] ‘tail’ of poor general practice has finally been addressed. And patients should be 
happy that they can be confident of receiving the best quality of care. [Italics added to quotation] 
If all stakeholders were happy as in Misselbrook’s clearly rhetorical suggestion there would be 
no ethical controversy. By its very nature QOF itemises clinical activity and links the items to 
reimbursement, and so it is no surprise that the places the discussion of such items high on 
GPs’ agendas. However, references to the ethical aspects of financial incentives do appear in 
medical journals. Those which I found concentrated on the QOF and tended to be critical of 
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incentives as a means to better healthcare (Kramer, 2012, Misselbrook, 2010). Discussion of 
the QOF in terms of ethics also finds its way into the correspondence pages of the trade press. 
QOF has also begun to be discussed in medical undergraduate text books though it might be 
discussed under a heading of promoting population health (Booton et al., 2013b) rather than 
ethics. On this basis, there is the potential for financial incentives to be pre-identified issue. 
Financial incentives and ethical discomfort 
 
As well as being recognised in the literature as ethically problematic, financial incentives 
(especially QOF) were recognised by participants as a source of ethical discomfort. 
Dr G: I do genuinely believe that the effect of QOF has been to put a lot of doctors under quite 
serious ethical dilemmas, as to their priorities with patients in the consultation. I think that’s a 
very real issue. 
The tasks generated by QOF competed with other clinical activities aimed at service 
improvement and patient welfare. Occasionally adherence to targets was inappropriate and 
this risked harm to individual patients. Another area of discomfort was where a GP perceived 
that an incentivised task conflicted with advice from the latest in evidence-based medicine. 
Regardless of whether QOF targets were based on good clinical evidence, they were perceived 
to conflict with a professional ethic of holistic, person-centred care. All of the participants who 
discussed financial incentives had been in practice prior to the introduction of the QOF in 
2004. None of the younger participants raised this as an issue, begging the question of 
whether this had become an issue that was invisible as a topic for ethical discussion and 
consequent ethics education. None of the participants discussed a need to explain financial 
incentives to patients. By contrast participants did raise the issue of discussing confidentiality, 
healthcare rationing and abortion with patients. 
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Incentives in conflict with other patient needs 
 
A significant proportion of income for a practice comes from the achievement of incentivised 
performance targets. Consequently, a significant amount of time and effort is put by members 
of the practice into planning how they can best be achieved.  
Dr B illustrated how the achievement of QOF targets can dominate discussion at the practice 
management level. This was at a cost to the discussion of individual cases. 
Dr B: ...we were reflecting as a practice the other day, that ten years ago, when we met over 
coffee in a sort of haphazard way, every day, and in our weekly team meeting, we spent most of 
our time, well most, certainly a very large chunk of our time, discussing individual cases.  
Whereas now we spend most of the time on practice administration and QOF. 
It is intuitive to suppose that GPs with managerial responsibilities for and a financial stake in 
the services that they provide (partners) might have greater awareness of financial incentives 
in practice. 
 
Prof Y: I don’t do them ... The QOF things.   But I’m not a partner... I mean I have some 
responsibility to the practice, because they pay me, but it’s not the driving force. And I don’t 
think it is, to be fair, the driving force by the partners, but because they know more about it, how 
far we are from our targets and all the rest of it, they are bound to be more aware of it. 
 
None of my participants suggested that GP-partners were disproportionately influenced by 
financial incentives. Prof Y suggests that salaried GPs might also feel a duty to their employers, 
whether this was out of a desire keep one’s job or to make sure that the service received 
sufficient funds to run. Dr G suggested that this was a powerful issue for young GPs as well, 




Dr G: ...one [issue] that’s clearly very, very powerful at the moment, which I think lots,  
particularly young doctors, are very confused by, is, is the tension that exists between the 
doctor’s agenda and partly QOF driven for instance, and the patient’s.   
 
In the consultation itself, all English GPs are reminded to perform QOF-related tasks by 
messages that appear on the computer when they open any given patient’s healthcare record.  
Prof Y: I think in principle it [raises ethical issues], because when these little things pop up on my 
screen, ‘Ask them about this, that and the other,’ and they’ve come with other, particularly their 
intimate problems 
Dr R: You’re making a moral decision every time you decide whether you’re going to do the QOF 
things or forget them... 
 
There are two potential GP’s agendas implicit in meeting QOF targets: In so far that the targets 
are supposed to be evidence-based activities which benefit the public good, and even benefit 
the individual patient, the doctor’s agenda may be one of beneficent paternalism. However in 
so far that the QOF targets are associated with a significant proportion of practice income, the 
doctor’s agenda may be ensuring income for the practice. Whatever the rationale behind the 
doctor’s agenda, the patient’s agenda may differ and conflict, for example because the patient 
has different values and beliefs.  
Incentivising bad medicine 
 
The QOF is ostensibly evidence-based in that the targets are in theory based on gathering data 
that will be meaningful to plan services and on providing chronic disease management that will 
benefit and not harm patients. Both data gathering and chronic disease treatment aspects 




Whilst I did not have participant data questioning the evidence base for data gathering linked 
to the QOF, this found its way into the correspondence pages of trade publications such as the 
following ‘Prize letter’ from BMA News. 
 
Most doctors in the NHS work to targets, but are they all ethical? And if doctors receive 
payments as a result, what then? An editorial about health checks in the BMJ on November 20 
(2012: 345; e7775) says they are not effective, yet GPs have been asked to meet them and get 
Quality and Outcomes Framework points. Depressed patients have to complete two hospital and 
anxiety and depression questionnaires for new diagnoses in primary care; the National Institute 
for Health and Clinical Excellence advises that this is not an effective tool, so why are GPs and 
patients doing this?  ... We have to practice evidence-based medicine, but who makes health 
secretary Jeremy Hunt pursue ethically and evidence-based policies? (Neaves, 2012) 
 
The QOF incentivises prescription of numerous medications for chronic illness which are 
targeted at measurable endpoints such as the lowering of blood pressure results or blood 
sugar measurements. Misselbrook describes the resultant increased prescribing as a ‘two-
edged sword.’ He cites evidence that iatrogenic illness relating to poly-pharmacy accounts for 
many admissions of older people to hospital (Misselbrook, 2010). Professor P described a 
circumstance where following guidance incentivised by the QOF will potentially harm a 
patient.  
 
Prof P: [I have come across queries] about the evidence underpinning blood glucose control in 
diabetics, particularly  elderly diabetics and how people feel that the –actually interestingly, the 
words [GPs] use are, ‘We’re being made to do certain things that we think are dangerous for 
patients.’  To which my response would probably be, ‘Actually you’re not being made, you’re 
being incentivised.’  So we see the difference between being incentivised and being made to do 
something.  But, you know, that is an interesting issue, there’s probably sufficient evidence now 
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to, to suggest that we shouldn’t be controlling blood glucose as tightly in the elderly as QOF 
would encourage us to do so.  And that might be possibly dangerous.  So what are the 
consequences of GPs recognising that factor and what should they do about it? 
  
In the above quotation Professor P makes an important distinction regarding the influence of 
financial incentives. The measurable physiological or laboratory result is what is incentivised 
rather than a positive outcome that is more immediately meaningful to individual patients.  
 
Incentives are not unbreakable rules, and GPs are at liberty to potentially earn less, if gathering 
data from and treating patients to achieve statistical targets are not relevant. Furthermore, 
patients who refuse to cooperate with the QOF, and patients for whom the targets are 
inappropriate can be exempted without financial loss. Although, exempting large numbers of 
patients without good reason and without a reasonable attempt to meet the QOF targets is 
considered to be a kind of fraud.  Accordingly, GP practices with high levels of exemptions are 
more likely to be investigated. Official scrutiny carries an attendant threat of discovering some 
form of inadequacy and an additional administrative burden on the practice being 
investigated. 
 
Conflict between financial incentives and the general practice ethic 
 
In previous chapters I have already alluded to the idea that as a profession in the UK, general 
practice espouses an ethic of holistic patient-centred care. This ethic is embedded in both GP-
training and in the contribution of general practice to undergraduate medicine. Working with a 
system of financial incentives that is predominantly disease-orientated and predominantly 
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focuses on quantitative measures irrespective of patient well-being can be a source of ethical 
discomfort. Kramer described this as a worry in the British Journal of General Practice. 
I had worried that, by being paid to implement evidence-based guidelines, my work would 
become a restricted, target-driven exercise that shifted the balance of my consultations to a 
doctor and disease-centred agenda (Kramer, 2012). 
 
Professor P and Dr G, two very senior GPs within the profession suggest that the tension 
between the ethic of patient-centred care and disease-focussed incentives can occur at a 
corporate level in general practice.   
 
Prof P: ...sometimes it’s a high level. If you’re incentivising certain biomedical practices, which are 
easily measurable, what happens to the less measurable aspect of general practice, and there’s 
concern amongst, there’s concern amongst certain member[s of the RCGP] that we stop thinking, 
that we’re practicing good evidence based medicine, but we’re not behaving like generalists any 
more. So sometimes it’s a kind of a high level concern about the direction of travel of medicine 
and biomedicine and general practice in particular. 
 
Dr G:  I think there’s a greater tension between corporate professional ethics and political 
expectation at the moment. 
 
Misselbrook (Misselbrook, 2010) argues that the QOF hijacks the patient’s agenda and replaces 
it with a biomedical target that is driven by the agenda of doctors and politicians to agree on 
measurable targets linked to payment.  Dr G gave a dramatic example of how the ethic of 
patient-centredness might be challenged by the QOF. 
 
Dr G: Now the big principles don’t help with that at all.  I mean you can make a case for – let, let’s 
say, let’s say that you’re 'Minute nine' in the [ten minute] consultation and the patient looks 
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about to burst into tears, but you’ve got a reminder that says you haven’t checked his blood 
pressure, how are you going to use that last minute?  That’s an ethical issue.  You can’t resolve it 
by reference to any of the broad principles, because you can make a case for doing either in 
terms of its justice to the community at large, that the hypertension is properly documented, it’s 
right for the individual patient, for their agenda to, you know, to predominate ... So in the 
example that I’ve just given you, if in the last minute, the pressure of being under time 
constraints, if you could follow the QOF points or follow the patient’s tears - what you actually 
decide is an expression of your values. And if you actually got the QOF points, I won’t believe you 
when you say you’re patient centred, because your actions, not you personally, your actions 
confound that. 
 
For Dr G this was a circumstance where an espoused value of patient-centredness meant 
letting the patient’s needs predominate. Ethical arguments could be made using the four 
principles that the QOF target should be achieved, but this does not stop adherence to the 
QOF from conflicting with the espoused value. The example that Dr G uses seems extreme, 
and it appears intuitive to attend to the patient’s distress rather than to measure their blood 
pressure. 
 
Avoidance of financial incentives 
 
It is possible to avoid thinking about the QOF, especially for GPs who do not have a direct duty 
to balance practice finances. Professor Y, for example was able to abdicate responsibility for 
gathering sufficient QOF-data to others, and did not have any great knowledge about which 




Prof Y: ... I don’t know what the QOF payments are in the practice, and I don’t concern myself 
with the administration about it ... So I feel much more for the person in front of me, i.e. the 
patient. 
She compared herself to the practice partners, who might be more aware if the practice was 
not meeting its targets. Exemption of patients for whom QOF is inappropriate is not a form of 
avoidance and does not in theory cost the practice any money. Avoidance of the issue by 
simply not attempting to engage with the QOF can have significant financial ramifications for 
the practice. It also ignores the public health benefits of gathering data and treating chronic 
disease proactively.  
 
Professor Y, however, qualified her position on the QOF. She was prepared to gather data 
ostensibly for the QOF so long this did not interfere with the consultation. 
 
Prof Y: Now if it seems appropriate within the consultation to ask about smoking, alcohol and all 
the rest of it, then I will do that for QOF, okay.  But my primary responsibility is the person 
coming to see me, and that’s how I see it.  
 
Professor Y’s qualification was that that her primary duty was to the patient. Patient-
centeredness was the key value that prevented patients being disadvantaged or even harmed 
by financial incentives. However, awareness of the incentives and the rationale for them 
means that GPs can be opportunistic about gathering data and can be reminded of best 






Rationing and resource allocation have been an issue in the GP consciousness for some time. 
Recent historical developments have made the concept of rationing an issue for practice both 
at strategic and the consultation level. Participants used the terms, rationing, resource 
allocation and commissioning but all these terms are employed in a context of finite resources. 
Consequently I have discussed them under a main heading of rationing. 
Rationing identified 
 
An approach to rationing has been certainly taught on undergraduate medical ethics courses 
for decades under the subheading of ‘justice’. Justice, the concept of treating equals equally 
and unequals unequally according to the morally relevant inequality is one of the ‘four 
principles’ of bioethics that is widely promulgated by Gillon and others in the UK (Gillon, 2003, 
Booton et al., 2013a). Dr R explicitly connected justice to resource allocation.  
AP: What would you say are the top four issues of an ethical nature that might impinge on... 
Dr R: Justice and resource allocation, which is everything from referral decisions to how long you 
spend with the patient, whether you prescribe a cheaper or more expensive drug, that must, 
that’s got to be the biggest one, because that happens most, that involves most consultations. 
And do you feel that you have to make decisions of that nature as a GP? 
Dr R: Of course, every day 
Dr O referred to equity, but used the term synonymously with justice -he listed equity in the 
place of justice when reciting the four principles he had learned in medical school.   
Dr O: I find that equity is absolutely fundamental through all my work as a GP [...] I find, and I find 
it of paramount importance ….  Again I don’t know if I’m blurring the boundaries, but for me 
being a general practitioner is about, you know, fundamentally about managing resources, being 
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a gatekeeper of resources and directing resources parsimoniously to those who need it.  So 
equity is of fundamental  
importance, I consider, in my work. 
 
Dr O identified a role of the GP as being a gate-keeper, someone who will refer some and deter 
others from accessing specialist healthcare depending on each person’s clinical need. In this 
sense a GP acts as an agent for National Health Service, which offers healthcare that is funded 
by taxation, equal and free at the point of need. Dr O’ commitment to fairness was not unique.  
At the time I conducted my fieldwork, there was an imminent change in the legislation of 
healthcare provision, with more explicit roles for GPs in the allocation of health resources. This 
change came in the wake of a major economic recession, which was accompanied by much 
public rhetoric about cost-cutting in the public sector. As Dr M (below) suggested when I asked 
her about big ethical issues, rationing is a visible contemporary issue. 
Dr M: …actually much more now rationing, resource allocation… 
Participants reflected on idea of finite resources that are inadequate to cater completely for 
clinical need. Prof P felt that this was an area of ethical complexity that would become more 
prominent in ensuing years. 
Prof P: I mean the credit crunch of course didn’t really have any impact on the health service. It’s 
going to have an impact over the next three or four years. I think most people don’t realise quite 
how significant that impact will be.  And I guess that’s what I was alluding to around 
commissioning, how our decisions are going to have to be made … So I think it’s going to very 
tough and a lot of ethical issues will come to the fore as a consequence. 




Dr U: …eighty billion sounds a lot of money until you realise that, in reality, taking over now – 
homecare which has previously been means tested and funded and no longer, allegedly, will be 
the case.  The government are attempting to drop about £180 billion worth of problems on 
primary care. 
 
Dr U’s simple point was that there is a budget of £80 billion for problems worth £180 billion. 
Therefore some people’s needs will not be catered for. His figure of £80 billion is the stated 
budget for primary care trusts in 2009/10 (King's Fund, 2011). 
 
Rationing as a source of ethical discomfort 
 
Particular concepts allied to rationing emerged as sources of ethical discomfort. The first was 
awareness that resources given to one patient or group of patients might result in resources 
being denied elsewhere. If resources are perceived to be limited, then any perception that 
their allocation occurred in a manner that was unjust resulted in disquiet. This was especially if 
that injustice originated in a preference or belief held by the person doing the allocating. 
Whilst participants were quiet on the issue of discussing financial incentives with patients, 
discussing resource allocation with patients was an unavoidable source of conflict and 
difficulty. 
 
Awareness of opportunity costs 
 
If resources are limited, then the economic concept of opportunity costs gains relevance. This 
dictates that resources expended in one area of health care are unavailable for expenditure 
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elsewhere (Bradley, 1999). Participants were aware of opportunity costs and that giving to one 
person could deny another. Opportunity costs were described in terms of two resources, 
finance and time.  
 
Dr R had alluded to whether to prescribe any given patient a more or less expensive 
medication. The implication was that the more expensive one might be better.  
 
As we have seen elsewhere in this section resource was often seen in terms of finance. Drs U 
and W illustrate this. 
 
Dr U: Every decision we make has a financial implication. 
Dr W: …around commissioning decisions we already make are, in practice, there’s not a surgery 
I’ve done where I haven’t prescribed something, I haven’t sent a patient off for an investigation 
or referred them on.  All of those cost money to the taxpayer...  But I do that day to day. So 
therefore as a GP I’m a commissioner every day … most GPs are commissioners, we just don’t 
label them as commissioners.  
 
Dr R brought home the point about opportunity costs in terms of time spent with each patient. 
For Dr R as with all other who discussed resource allocation, this was an ethical issue. 
Dr R You’re making a moral decision every time you decide whether you’re going… to, when the 
patient raises a cue that you know could reveal a whole lot of stuff which you could take ten 
minutes, take ten minutes over, whether you actually respond to it or whether you say, ‘Well 
here’s the prescription,’ and terminate the consultation, because – and, because you’re giving, 




The involvement of GPs in resource allocation sits at odds with the espoused duty to act as 
advocate for the patient, whether it is the patient who consults, a patient who is registered 
with a GP or a population for whom the GP has a responsibility. 
Conflicts of interest 
 
A source of discomfort around the ethical allocation of healthcare resources may stem from 
conflicts of interest, where the person doing the allocating is perceived, rightly or wrongly to 
be doing this unjustly. Commitment to a specific group of patients, preserving the financial 
viability of local services, and the less altruistic desire to maximise personal income were also 
presented as sources of conflict of interest. Some might also argue that beliefs about the 
effectiveness of particular treatments might constitute a conflict of interests. I have discussed 
such beliefs under a separate heading below. 
 
Professor Z described his awareness that, by obtaining funding for his practice, he was denying 
it to others who might potentially benefit. In effect he presented the idea that a pre-existing 
commitment to a patient or group of patient might represent a conflict of interests.  
 
Prof Z: [A case] that I remember quite vividly was, was a distributive justice issue, about our 
practice’s application to [primary care funding body] to have funding for psychotherapists to 
come to the practice, and we fought hard for that [...] But all the time I personally was worried, 
though I didn’t  - only in a theoretical way, worried, because I didn’t do anything about it – that 
other practices that weren’t fighting so hard and didn’t play the game of getting funding for their 
practices, quite so effectively, weren’t getting that sort of help for their practices, and therefore, 
for their patients.  And you know, the balance between a concern for our own practice 
population and between, I don’t know, all the patients in the local area, and then of course in a 
theoretical way, how to balance the needs of all sick people, you know, across the country as a 
whole, or regions of the country, or indeed internationally.  You know, that’s the sort of dilemma 
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that, in the end I think one simply has to choose [...] who you give your benefits to and who you 
don’t give your benefits to.  [...] And I suppose, you know, the reason I didn’t pull back from 
applying for our own psychotherapists was that I feel it’s actually proper to give priority to the 
people to whom you are specifically committed, and that, of course, is another tension in the 
area of distributive justice. 
 
Professor Z’s rationale does not need re-explaining. However, his example illustrated the idea 
that we may tend to look after local interests first and do not necessarily live our lives in a 
manner that helps those in most need. Indeed Professor Z’s patients might have been relieved 
to know that their GP was looking out for their interests in preference to those of the region, 
the country or the world! If Professor Z had telephoned around his colleagues regionally to see 
which GP had the most patients in psychological distress, and then helped that GP to apply for 
the service, he might have been failing in his duty to ‘his’ patients. 
 
Another source of anxiety is connected to decisions to prefer certain local services in the 
allocation of resources because they are better in some way. This can be subject to accusations 
of unjust preference. 
 
Dr W:  There will be services I’d be commissioning to a colleague who I’ve known as a GP 
as working with [GPs with a special interest], so the community services. I don’t 
necessarily refer to him because I think he’s getting money from it, I refer to him 
because I think that’s what’s clinically appropriate.   
 
Dr W’s answer to allegations of unjust bias was that the superiority of the chosen service 




When conflicts of interest are discussed it is often less altruistic conflicts that are discussed. Dr 
U felt that selfishness in terms of resource allocation decisions was to be expected as a facet of 
human nature. Unless run directly by the state (not the norm) GP surgeries are set up as small 
businesses. 
 
Dr U:  GPs are human beings, there are going to be practice issues, there are going to be their 
families saying, ‘Well what’s in it for us as a business?’  I mean no doctor in my view, who is 
locked in to a practice, who has had to invest half a million quid in the business, who’s looking 
forward to getting a million and a half or three million quid out when they retire, can be entirely 
objective on medicine, because they are always going to want and prefer their business, that’s 
human nature.  ... But the argument is, if they’re all in it together, they can all fight amongst 
themselves, divide and conquer.  That’s supposed to be management?  Ha, ha.   
 
Dr U was disparaging of the idea that enlightened self-interest would lead those with a 
financial interest to give the highest quality service for the least cost on the basis of 
competition. He suggested that the only way to avoid any perception that a commissioner of 
services is unaffected by financial bias would be to remove any financial stake other than the 
incentive to do the job well. He gave the example of a locum GP as someone without a 
financial stake or contractual tie to any one GP practice or group of patients. 
 
Dr U: So you need somebody who’s got no financial interest whatsoever to deal with that.  You 
know, above it ...Certainly I would argue that locums, because they are not locked into practices, 
are probably the people to lead commissioning groups … because they can look objectively at 
medicine and dilemmas and they are not running a business … if you’ve got a senior locum, with 
running the commissioning group, and they are being paid, I don’t know, 100 quid an hour, 
whatever it is, simply to work as a salary, and can be sacked if they’re no good, then as far as the 
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others are concerned, they are not favouring one particular business over another business, 
because they’ve got no interest in any of the businesses. 
 
The potential difficulty with stripping away all aspects of a GP that might give rise to the 
smallest suspicion that there is a conflict of interest, is that this also strips away some of the 
value of decisions made by a medically and locally knowledgeable person who has the local 
population’s interests at heart. 
Discussing rationing with patients 
 
Conversations with patients where a desired service is being denied, delayed or restricted are 
perhaps inevitable – In my own GP-training a conversation about how to tell someone that 
they should accept the cheapest effective version of a drug rather than the newest and most 
expensive is was used as an archetypal scenario.  
When discussing a decision that is influenced by awareness of the need to preserve resources, 
there is a discomfort in being perceived as denying something that could be beneficial to a 
person’s health. Similarly there is potential conflict in denying patient requests, as Dr O 
illustrates. 
Dr O: And I fear that many of my patients might object that I consider it too much in relation to 
their needs for patient autonomy. I don’t find the two mutually exclusive. 
 
The suggestion that Dr O makes, that patient autonomy and justice are not mutually exclusive, 
relies on persuading a patient (without deception) either to accept the phenomenon of 
rationing or to accept a reasonable alternative to their request. Where patients had 
unrestricted means to access services, there was less of an onus to prove that the treatment 




Dr E: But now, with 27 years of experience behind me, I’ve certainly come across anecdotal cases 
of my patients seeing homoeopathic practitioners and particularly with conditions like eczema 
and asthma, getting much better…  And if they have a condition like eczema which either the 
treatments may  not work very well, or if  they do, it’s at a cost, and patients are aware of the 
problems with steroids and so on, I  now think to myself, ‘Well I may [not] believe in it, but I 
certainly don’t believe that it does any harm, because that’s why it doesn’t work, it’s a neutral 
treatment, and if the interaction between the homoeopathic practitioner and the client can lead 
to an improvement in their or their child’s eczema,  in a way that I cannot, then who am I to, you 
know, denounce it? And though I would still say there was a principle about paying for it, I am not 
happy that the PCT pays for it, but now I will happily refer if the patient is paying for it. 
 
Dr E illustrated the double standard with respect to complementary and alternative medicine. 
Given that there was doubt about the efficacy of a treatment, the treatment should not be 
funded by the NHS. However, given that a treatment would cause no harm (for example by 
causing side effects or leading to avoidance of conventional therapy) he was happier to 
facilitate a private referral for alternatives to mainstream western medicine. 
 
Given that Dr E would have to explain why he could not in good conscience advocate NHS 
resources for homeopathy, his reasoning might ultimately be less about ethics and more about 
belief.  
 
Dr E: And again it comes back to this thing about, you know, what are you doing, are you 
educating the patients about, you know, evidence based medicine?  
 
There is no guarantee that educating someone about what treatment will be efficacious will 




Dr E: I have seen the hostility that that’s induced in patients…  And sometimes they don’t come 
back to see me.  And I don’t think that’s usually, you know, an outcome that I want to aim for too 
often. 
 
Dr E reflected that some of the patients whose preference for complementary medicine he 
had challenged simply chose not to consult with him again. Iliffe suggests that age, 
socioeconomic status and ethnicity all conspire with different understandings of science to 
establish distinct explanatory models, and distinct experiences of illness and medical care 
(Iliffe, 2001). 
 
The epistemology of resource allocation 
 
My fieldwork for this study revealed two potent sources of controversy around rationing and 
resource allocation. They were not about ethics but about beliefs relevant to ethics. In the first 
instance there was the belief that if waste were eliminated from healthcare, rationing would 
be unnecessary. In the second instance there were beliefs about what constituted effective 
use of healthcare resources. Beliefs about effective healthcare were closely tied thematically 
to beliefs about evidence based medicine.  
Beliefs about minimization of waste 
 
Government officials may publically deny that rationing is necessary and even use threatening 
language when the word is invoked. For example Conservative Health Minister Earl Howe, 
quoted here in a GP newspaper (Moberly, 2012) condemns rationing based on cost. 
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Howe: We have been clear that it is completely unacceptable to impose blanket bans on 
treatments, or to restrict access to treatments on the basis of cost alone. We have made it clear 
that we will take action against any organization found to be arbitrarily restricting treatment 
without clinical justification… 
I watched Earl Howe make an almost identical comment at the 2012 RCGP Annual Conference, 
to over a thousand members of the RCGP, including trainees and newly qualified practitioners. 
His comments were met with some disbelief. Implicit in Earl Howe’s statement is the idea that 
it is wrong to restrict access to treatments that work, especially when there are treatments 
that do not.  
According to Brody, ethicists arguing for fair rationing have had to contend with claims that the 
cost problem would be solved if waste were eliminated (Brody, 2012). They have replied 
suggesting that eliminating all waste would result in one-time savings; the primary drivers of 
cost escalation — technological advances and the aging of the population — would proceed 
unchecked. Brody argues that if waste is defined broadly as spending on interventions that do 
not benefit patients, this actually amounts to a much larger sum and is a major driver of cost 
increases 
The two principal ethical arguments for waste avoidance are first, that we should not deprive any 
patient of useful medical services, even if they're expensive, so long as money is being wasted on 
useless interventions, and second, that useless tests and treatments cause harm. Treatments that 
won't help patients can cause complications. Diagnostic tests that won't help patients produce 
false positive results that in turn lead to more tests and complications (Brody, 2012).  
Brody’s approach is implicit in Dr O’s parsimonious approach to resource allocation which I 
referred to at the beginning of the section on rationing. It may have been a reason why he did 
not consider that his approach was inconsistent with other ethical values. The belief that 
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controlling waste in the system will avoid rationing is a convenient one, whether held by 
politicians of doctors, because it avoids taking full responsibility for restricting beneficial care. 
 
Beliefs about the effectiveness of treatment  
 
Beliefs about the morality of restricting treatment in the presence of waste were further 
epistemological questions about what constitutes a beneficial treatment and what constitutes 
a waste. Dr E used the example of complementary medicine as an example of something he 
felt was a waste of money. 
 
Dr E: So if I can return to my sort of hobby horse about waste of money and so on, I practice in a 
very fashionable area, where I get lots of requests for… I’m asked to get a referral to the Royal 
Homoeopathic Hospital, my heart absolutely sinks because I personally think that homoeopathy 
is bunk and has no proven value at all and a total waste of money. 
  
General practice (and healthcare more generally) in the UK claims to be scientific and 
evidence-based. This does not allow room for alternatives, especially with respect to the 
allocation of state funds. Dr W, a GP and healthcare commissioner compared the UK to his 
experience of healthcare in China. 
 
Dr W: …I was in China, and in China their medical model is definitely not a biomedical model the 
way we think of it.  And they have a very inclusive approach.  … they have  a very justifiable 
argument to say, well Chinese medicine existed long before Western medicine did.  And there’s 
something cultural around how in the West the doctors have approach, which has meant we’ve 
excluded many other things. And whereas their approach in China at the moment is, if you go to 
a, a Chinese hospital, actually they’re dual trained or they’re open to complementary – I wouldn’t 
use the word ‘complementary’ there, open to what I describe as their mainstream medicine … 
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And things like acupuncture are about as standard as writing a prescription. And they do, if you 
speak to anybody about Chinese medicine, actually their formulations are not too different to 
how we formulate a diagnosis. So it’s, it’s an interesting one from that perspective. It’s made me 
rethink actually my very rigid hard-nosed Western view.   
 
If the UK medical profession do not believe in the basis of Chinese medicine, and the evidence 
for its effectiveness is also lacking, it seems unlikely that they will advocate its funding by 
limited state resources. Both Dr W and Dr E’s personal views on alternatives to western 
medicine had softened with experience. However, both conscientiously would only use public 
funding for treatments that were endorsed by evidence-based medicine. 
 
Dr W: [It has not] changed what I have to do because I have to justify public finance, when it 
comes to making decisions here, but there is something around acknowledging that we have a 
very restrictive practice rather than an inclusive practice. … as a commissioner, I wouldn’t go with 
the commissioning of a non-numerical, unquantifiable service with very little evidence base, 
because I just wouldn’t be able to stand up and justify that as we cut other services where is 
there a lot more evidence to it. 
 
Western medicine by definition excludes alternative systems – if science is truth then 
alternatives are delusions and lies. Edzard Earnst, the UK’s first professor of complementary 
and alternative medicine argues that complementary and alternative practitioners can be 
unethical in three key ways: their methods cannot be explained by western science, their 
results cannot be substantiated, and they have no robust professional oversight to regulate 
their behaviour (Ernst, 1996, Ernst, 2009). Practitioners are accordingly acting outside of an 




An ethical issue arising out of diversity within society as regards culture and belief is the public 
support for treatments that are not recognised by western evidence-based medicine. This has 
in many ways taken the debate over whether to prioritise patient preference or clinical 
effectiveness to a strategic and even political level. It echoes the conversations between GPs 
and patients at the consultation level. 
 
Dr W: About five years ago we had a whole debate around homoeopathy when we went through 
last cuts … And across [the city] we’d agreed to pull the contracts on [a homeopathic hospital].  
And when we did that, you know, there was a, ‘why could we do that, because it was a very 
target of saying well I guess everyone sort of likes it, but we’re not quite sure what it’s meant to 
be doing.’   So on a numbered scale, you know, they could show a very high satisfaction rate, 
everyone liked staying there.  But actually what benefits it could bring to that individual … it’s 
actually quite hard from a commissioning perspective to try and justify why you would ever take 
it up. 
 
Clearly there may be a spectrum of belief regarding the effectiveness of both western 
medicine and its alternatives. In a context of unrestricted resources the main limiting factor at 
a consultation and a commission level might be avoiding harm whilst maximising choice. 
Participants illustrated this by the willingness to privately refer for things that they would not 
endorse on the NHS. One might expect that the spectrum of belief is wider outside the medical 
profession, because adoption of certain beliefs and values are necessary if one is to 
successfully qualify and practice without censure. 
Avoidance of responsibility for rationing and resource allocation 
 
Whilst GPs may claim to ‘husband’ resources to eliminate waste and make those resources as 
effective as possible, they are keen not to identify themselves as deniers of essential 
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healthcare. Misselbrook flippantly refers to GPs as the ‘good guys’ who don’t switch off 
children’s ventilators in an editorial welcoming ethics discussion in the BJGP (MIsselbrook, 
2012). This dissociation from or avoidance of involvement in rationing decisions was evident in 
discussions with participants.   
 
Professor P suggested that some members of the RCGP were concerned about the idea of a 
visible role in managing healthcare resources at a regional level. 
 
Prof P: The [RCGP] has been overall supportive of the direction of travel of the White Paper, but 
there are members who are concerned.  [There have been  a lot of discussions]  from people who 
feel very strongly that the White Paper is heading in the wrong direction, asking GPs to do things 
that are unacceptable, particularly around the commissioning role and holding budgets and 
making rationing decisions. 
 
Dr W, a GP with a senior commissioning role reflected on the idea that GPs felt some distaste 
for being seen to be in control of healthcare resources. 
 
Dr W: …suddenly now we’re described as commissioners, suddenly we feel this may not be the 
right thing for us …I think we’re brought up with the idea that we distance ourselves from, we’ve 
not handled money, because I think money itself is something that we’ve been taught is a dirty 
thing to talk about and is morally wrong.  And so we’ve learnt to dissociate ourselves from it. And 
nobody ever talks to me or anybody else [to say], “You commissioned a thousand pounds’ worth 
of activity in the local community.” And I find that quite hard. As a GP I find it quite hard to take 
on board. 
 
In their recent qualitative study of resource allocation decisions by 24 inner-city GPs, Berney et 
al found that none of their participants questioned the moral premise that there should be 
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equal access to healthcare based on equal need, free at the point of delivery (Berney et al., 
2005). However GPs often complained of having to explain or justify decisions made by others 
but which patients believed had been made by their GP her/himself (Berney et al., 2005). This 
is evident in Professor P’s description of ‘blaming someone else’ for the unpopular decisions. 
 
Prof P: …whereas in the, you know, when I was practising as a fund holding GP or even prior to 
fund holding in the late eighties, early nineties, and hard decisions had to be made around 
prioritisation, I could always blame somebody else.  You know, our health authority is telling me I 
can’t fund X.  As an active commissioning GP, I wouldn’t be able to do that. 
 
The public identification of GPs as people who make decisions to restrict resources is new and 
sudden. The dissociation from decisions made at a higher level allowed GPs such as Dr E to 
take the side of the patient and denounce those decisions that appeared poorly made.  
 
Dr E: I think that issues of being open with the patients about the conflicts between an 
increasingly centralised controlled practice and why we’re doing things as we are, and these 
dilemmas seem to me to be becoming more and more frequent and an everyday affair.  And the 
example that comes to mind is that our primary care trust has installed Scriptswitch, a generic 
switching software into our computers. We weren’t asked our consent about that.  It was just 
done.   And even though the last time they did it, about two or three years ago, my 
understanding is that it cost them more to buy the software than they saved in terms of 
reduction of GPs’ prescribing costs.  They’re doing it again, probably because they’ve been told to 
do it.  And when this message flashes up on the screen that, you know, if you prescribe X instead 
of Y, you’ll save 24p, and the patient sees that, they are not stupid.  And to me, it’s incumbent to 
explain to them that the PCT have done this, why it’s there, and also to explain to them that I 
think it is entirely unethical myself. 
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Two solutions were presented in the data to the problem of being blamed for poorly-made or 
simply unpopular rationing decisions. In the first instance, GPs might husband resources 
covertly or implicitly – perform rationing without publically admitting to it. The other would be 
for GPs to abdicate all responsibility for resource allocation. Dr U raised the idea of covert 
rationing: 
 
Dr U: ...We are expected to ration without it being obvious...  
 
Dr U’s somewhat sceptical suggestion was that GPs might ration covertly. Covert rationing is 
not a widespread concept in the general practice literature. Where it occurs it is attributed to 
governments rather than individual clinicians (Fears et al., 2000). but one that nonetheless 
some GPs are aware of, as Peter Toon outlined in a public debate at the Royal Society of 
Medicine (Toon, 2012). 
 
The RCGP guidance used the valued word ‘justify’, which is a recognition that it’s not just an 
empirical but an ethical judgement we make in our consulting rooms.  And much of the time it’s 
impossible to separate the two elements because they involved unconscious processes as well as 
conscious deliberation.  Because these are decisions that are often small, ‘should we do this test, 
should we arrange this referral?’ and their evaluative element is often less than the factual 
uncertainty that we’re facing.  We can pretend this isn’t rationing. That this is self deception.  
Unless we deliberately disregard the costs of our actions, which can’t be just or prudent, we must 
ration. And the benefits of GP involvement in commissioning, which I’ve begun to see already is 
an end to this fooling ourselves.  People are beginning to assess the costs and benefits of their 
judgements, more consciously and explicitly that they did formerly (Toon, 2012). 
 
Toon, unlike Dr U, suggests that covert rationing is more a process of self-deception that a 
conscious attempt to covertly restrict services in order to preserve healthcare resources. There 
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are few arguments that implicit or covert rationing is a good idea. Hall (1994) outlines the key 
argument:  
 
Internalizing cost constraints is a more socially and professionally acceptable means of rationing 
and, in any event, it is inevitable since even a preponderance of rule-based rationing will leave 
considerable areas of discretion for physician judgment in the implementation and interpretation 
of the rules (Hall, 1994). 
 
The problem with abdication of all responsibility for resource allocation is implicit in the above 
complaints that GPs make about others’ rationing decisions. In the quotation below Dr U 
implies that managers may lack a sense of context when making such decisions.  
 
Dr U: Except we know that managers, can manage, but they don’t understand medicine … of 
course you brought to the practice administrator to function and manage the administration of 
the staff, but the actual policy and strategy was done by the partners, not the manager.   That’s 
where we’ve been for the past thirty years. 
 
I did encounter from participants the idea that GPs should be involved in the allocation of 
healthcare resources. The implication is that managers, without this influence, will make 
decisions based on economic and other considerations that are somehow divorced from 





Substantive issues and ethics education 
 
Caught between the task and the vocation 
  
The idea of GPs having to prioritise between carrying out tasks generated by the QOF and 
responding to individual patient’s ideas concerns and expectations echoes an issue which I 
often encounter in medical students. Medical students learn about disease by obtaining data 
from patients (taking a history) and then presenting the data back to their teachers. However, 
as they progress towards independent practice, taking a history should become more shaped 
by the patient’s values and agenda, on the basis that that the doctor is there to help the 
patient. When medical students forget this and prioritise the task (history taking) over the 
broader aims of talking to the patient, this hinders a humane discourse between the student 
and the patient. I have thus far refrained from including data in chapter conclusions but there 
was a relevant piece of data that fits with this observation. Dr E, who supervised both medical 
students and GP-trainees, illustrated how tasks can override ethical practice.  
 
Dr E: ...in ethics obviously you do get to know quite a lot about how medical students and 
registrars think, from looking at ...by their behaviour in a very general way sometimes. I had a 
particularly high proportion of patients with psychological illness, and always make a point of 
saying, particularly to younger medical students, but also sometimes with registrars – ‘that if 
you’ve got an exercise to do for an assessment in taking a history from a psychiatric patient, then 
from my point of view, I want you to be very sensitive to that patient’s needs. And I don’t want,’ 
and I usually say, ‘I don’t want you to go like a bull at a gate just to get the data that’s on the 
proforma that you need for the teaching exercise. You know... respond to the patient.’  And on 
several occasions I’ve had students who have, in spite of being told not to do it, have given their 
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priority to the exercise and made certain patients very upset, and some occasions, cry.  And on 
one occasion complained about the way the student handled them. 
 
There are morally relevant parallels between the data gathered by medical students in a 
‘medical history’ and the data gathering for the QOF. ‘Taking a history’ can become an end in 
itself rather than a means to finding out what is ailing the patient. Students that are too 
focussed on obtaining the pieces of information that the doctor considers to be important can 
fail to elicit what patient’s relevant ideas, concerns and expectations are. Like the history 
taking exercise the QOF is only a means to an end. Should the QOF result in a patient’s needs 
not being met, a patient’s distress being increased, or an old and frail patient being put at 
undue risk of side-effects, then it represents an ethical failure of the GP. The GP’s belief in 
whether the incentivised task is worthwhile or even harmful is an ethically relevant factor, and 
I will discuss this further in the concluding chapter. Even without the element of financial 
incentives, there is still an ethical balance to be struck between tasks for the benefit of 
population health, tasks that are measurable and have measurable outcomes, and patient 
need as expressed by patients and witnessed by GPs.  
Ethics education has a potential role in the prevention of financial incentives becoming ends in 
themselves. Rules for conduct have since pre-Hippocratic times, protected patients from 
healers’ self interest. Authors such as Iliffe call for ‘Rules for action’ in preference to theory 
(Iliffe, 2001). Some simple rules on financial incentives that could be extracted from the 
‘commonsense’ insights of my participants might look like the list below:  
1. Not allowing incentivised services to compromise duties that are not incentivised; 
2. Conscientiously objecting to incentives that are contrary to sound medical evidence (if 
medical evidence is applicable); 
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3. If patient-centeredness really is a core feature of general practice then GPs who claim 
to be patient centred-ought to prioritise this above financial incentives.  
The discussion around payment for performance incentives (incentivised tasks) should not be 
separated from the general discussion of GP’s interests as employers, employees and citizens 
who themselves need to make a living from their vocation. Without professional ethics, any 
system of payment for GP services can result in maximisation of income in preference to 





What doctors would do if they did 
not behave in line with their 
professional principles 
 
Salary Pay independent of workload 
or quality 
As little as possible for as few people 
as possible  
 
Capitation Pay according to the number of 
people on a doctor’s list 
As little as possible for as many 
people as possible 
 
Fee for service  Pay for individual items of care As much as possible, whether or not 
it helped the patient 
 
Pay for performance 
  
Pay for meeting quality targets A limited range of commendable 





The element of finance may well add pressure to complete the incentivised task, however. The 
income that practices receive is expected to provide for staff premises and equipment. GP 
partners do not earn a fixed salary by have to pay themselves out of the surplus. Toon notes 
the dissonance between the plethora of literature on making a success of general practice as a 
business and the literature emerging from journals and the RCGP (Toon, 1994a). He suggests 
that academic scholarship predominantly treats doctors as platonic gentlemen of independent 
means, whose sole concern is to decide morally and empirically how best to occupy their time. 
Clearly this view is a caricature, but the social study of ethics in general practice can offer a 
bridge between abstract ideals and reality. The ethic of patient-centeredness is a core feature 
of GP training – but preparation for how this ethic will be tested in practice seems far less core. 
Ethics must serve patients but must also acknowledge the interests of GPs as employees and 
owners of small businesses. 
 
Which patient shall I make my first concern? Competing ethical 
principles in the general practice context 
 
Justice and the fair allocation of healthcare resources are a key element in the academic 
bioethics that is has for many decades been taught to medical students. However GPs train in 
different contexts over time – at a time where resources are plentiful the skills needed to 
prioritise resources may wither. Consequently resource allocation may represent an area 
where periodic ethical reorientation is required. Efforts to give GPs ethical tools have been 
made by professional bodies, for example the ethics toolkit for GP-commissioners produced by 
the RCGP ethics committee (Oswald and Cox, 2011). However, I had to know it existed in order 
to look for it, and there is a commitment of time and effort in reading it –as I discussed in 
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chapter 5, GPs have far less time for reading than medical students. Moreover, there is debate 
ongoing over how much rationing takes place in the consulting room and at the bedside, with 
contrasting views that GPs should act in the patients best interests and that availability should 
be the only constraint and that GPs do and have the discretion to preserve limited healthcare 
resources. 
Ethics education should recognize the beliefs on which resource allocation may be founded. 
The reduction of waste has been offered as a way to avoid the need for rationing. The term 
efficiency-saving implies better use of money whereas rationing implies denying patients that 
which they want or need. Waste reduction offers a partial solution only. At worst belief in 
waste reduction may be empirically flawed (I do not propose to settle this question here) or 
may represent an attempt at avoidance of involvement in rationing decisions. Complementary 
and alternative medicine raises the issue of what GPs are prepared to endorse as effective 
treatment or waste of resource. Beliefs about the rationale and effectiveness of medicine are 
important because they are a core element of being a doctor and a GP. My study is certainly 
not the only one to raise complementary and alternative medicine in the context of resource 
allocation. Berney et al also found that some GPs were placed in a position where they 
believed that such treatments were useless, and a drain on resources, but (in this instance) the 
primary care trust had decided that patient were entitled to be referred for them. In this 
situation, the ethics talk revolved around conscientious objection, on the basis of a belief that 
complementary and alternative medicines were harmful or ineffective (Berney et al., 2005). 
Even evidence-based medicine, however, may be criticised as either inappropriate for, or as 
improperly applied to, patient-centred care. Based on what a GP believes, they may 
conscientiously endorse or object to certain kinds of practice – the literature on conscientious 
objection revolves in a somewhat limited way around religious belief and reproductive 
medicine (Savulescu, 2006).  
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In an era of openness and respect for patient autonomy, some way of involving patients in the 
dialogue over what GPs will and will not provide seems essential. This already surfaces when 
trainees and MRCGP candidates are assessed on their ability to negotiate patient expectations. 
There are two elements to discussions around resource. The first is providing reasons why the 
cheaper effective treatment will be offered first. The other is explaining which treatments are 
considered effective and why. Both elements can result in disagreement and even the failure 
of the GP-patient relationship. This failure may involve disagreements about facts or values. 
If we accept that rationing of time and resources takes place, whether at the level of the 
commissioners or the consultation (and this is implicit in the choice of terms like rationing and 
resource allocation), then GPs need to be prepared to make rationing decisions that are 
coherent, consistent and just. The strains of practicing patient-centred medicine in a resource-
limited environment is well documented, and Iliffe uses the analogy of GPs being between the 
hammer of utilitarian, population-based medicine and the anvil of deontological, patient-
centred medicine (Iliffe, 2001). Given the ethical agony of being in this situation, it is perhaps 
to be expected that some GPs would like to abdicate from rationing decisions, or to make 
those decisions covertly.  Avoiding rationing decisions can mean that resources are poorly 
allocated, or that the people who do take on such responsibilities are less familiar with the 
particular context of local primary care. Covert and implicit decisions avoid external scrutiny 
and as a result may be both incoherent and inconsistent and therefore unjust. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions 
Introduction 
 
In this thesis I have attempted to map how ethics education is constructed in, and for, general 
practice. I have engaged with people who generated academic, educational and trade 
literature, as well as those who had access to educational materials both for the purposes of 
teaching and learning in general practice. I used  three linked concepts from the sociology of 
education (curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation) in order to organise my data (Bernstein, 
1971). In order to study ethics education in action, I treated ethics as a kind of knowledge with 
regulatory implications. I began from the initial premise that everyone engaged in the ethics 
education of GPs, whether as an academic, an educator or a learner is affected by social forces.  
An understanding of these social forces can, I suggest, not only help identify processes of, or 
problems with, the production and enactment of ethical knowledge but may help us adjust for 
these processes and problems as well. In a manner analogous to how science translates 
between the laboratory and the bedside I have tried to capture a sense of how ethics 
translates back and forth between the classroom and the clinic. Such a concept of translational 
ethics is akin to that coined by Cribb (Cribb, 2010). This concluding chapter explores the 
question, “What insights can be drawn from this thesis that may usefully influence someone 
who is connected to ethics education in general practice?” I do this in two ways. Firstly, I draw 
out some key ideas from each of the main headings under which I grouped data. Secondly, in 
the final section, I pull the threads together into an overarching conclusion. I argue that 
general practice ethics can be seen as a form of boundary work, and that ethics education is 
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illuminated by seeing it in the context of the sociology of knowledge. This thesis may help to 
provide a more nuanced and reflexive account of ethics education; one with the prospect of 




In this thesis I have argued that a nuanced understanding of how a curriculum develops as well 
as what it contains can be useful for teachers and learners. This type of educational reflexivity 
is endorsed in core GP education materials (Riley et al., 2007c). 
Postgraduate education of GPs is built on a foundation of undergraduate education, as well as 
previous postgraduate experience for those whose career paths do not take them directly to 
general practice. I noted that an (albeit diminishing) proportion of the GPs in practice may 
have qualified prior to the embedding of ethics education in the undergraduate curricula. I also 
noted that GPs who qualified in countries with very different cultural values and 
undergraduate ethics teaching may struggle without some form of ethical reorientation.  As 
such, there is a real danger that a curriculum that relies on a UK-style experience may be 
inadequate for all GPs. Moreover, the undergraduate curriculum has been heavily influenced 
by the dilemmas of specialized hospital medicine. This thematic imbalance is something that 
has been redressed in consensus statements on the undergraduate teaching of medical ethics 
and law (Stirrat et al., 2010). However, both the inclusion, and the broadening, of 
undergraduate ethics education may not yet have had a full impact on the majority of the UK 
general practice workforce. 
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The RCGP curriculum contained a discrete statement on ethics for the entire time that I was 
conducting interviews with participants (Slowther et al., 2006b). The statement attempted to 
introduce a systematic way of understanding values. However, ‘Values based practice’ 
appeared to be ignored by both by the RCGP’s own curriculum guide (Riley et al., 2007d) and 
by independent learning materials in comparison to the four principles of biomedical ethics 
(Naidoo, 2008a). This observation points to the need to review the relationship between 
curriculum and pedagogy. Putting a new approach onto a curriculum does not automatically 
imply that educators will understand or be able to teach it. If all other resources offer a 
competing framework (the four principles), GP trainees can be forgiven for choosing what they 
know and what they think they will be examined on rather than what is in the curriculum 
document.   
Discrete curriculum statements can have qualities akin to what Bernstein described as 
collections – highly controlled sets of knowledge with defined content (Bernstein, 1971). The 
advantage of collections is that it is relatively easy for learners to identify what they need to 
know in order to pass examinations. However this only works if teachers and learners read the 
curriculum document. Only a small minority of my participants were familiar with the MRCGP 
curriculum statement on ethics and values based practice. 
I have argued that it is relevant to consider what the criteria of academic success are when 
thinking about who may legitimately contribute to the ideas that find their way into teaching. 
My participants suggested that academic rigour in bioethics may render it paradoxically less 
intelligible to both educators and practitioners. Publication in specialist journals, partly for this 
reason, was identified with a decreased likelihood that the publication would be read by 
ordinary GPs. According to Bernstein,  to make a subject distinct is to reduce its immediate 
relevance, rending it dry and jargon heavy (Bernstein, 1971). An analogy might be that it 
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should be more like engineering and less like physics, though an understanding of key 
principles may be common to both. 
Both participants and the literature also suggest that the resources, and therefore the interest, 
in ethics academia largely lie in the discussion of new biomedical technologies and their 
introduction largely into a hospital setting (Papanikitas and Toon, 2011). This does not prevent 
academic ethicists being geographically housed in departments of primary care but may deter 
them from asking theoretical and empirical questions of direct relevance to the primary care 
workforce and patients.  Similarly resources and interest in primary care academia are 
perceived to focus less on philosophical study and more on research with quantifiable impact 
on disease and patient welfare. 
 
One major problem is that there are a number of key factors that mitigate against available 
and accessible curricular and pedagogic resources for postgraduate trainees in general 
practice. In particular I have highlighted the following factors: the dominance of a limited 
model of academic success in ethics, namely philosophical and academic rigour;  the nature of 
resource-allocation in academia which means that ethics resources are often in ‘silos’; and the 
loss of ethics as an identified undergraduate educational role of the academic department of 
primary care. These are just some of the examples of the ways in which deeper social forces 
shape ethics education and also determine such things as which topics will be funded, and 





Just as education should be more broadly viewed than classroom-activities which focus on a 
specific subject or qualification (Gewirtz and Cribb, 2009a), I have considered the ethics 
education of GPs in a way that is purposefully broad. Ethics education may begin with the 
values inculcated in childhood, and this was hinted at in the trainee focus group. However my 
remit was to specifically look at ethics education of GPs as GPs, with a consequent emphasis 
on medical ethics. The span of education that I considered began with a consideration of ethics 
education in preparation for medical school interviews and included experiences of ethics 
education at medical school and as a junior doctor as well as the specific ethics education of 
GP trainees. I also considered education beyond qualification as a GP. 
Although participants who were recent UK graduates made halting references to the four 
principles, those who had qualified outside Europe discussed the difference that they 
perceived between the local culture and values and those in the contexts in which they 
qualified. The local graduates appeared to both understand concepts such as patient 
autonomy and confidentiality and to reflect it subconsciously in discussion and practice. 
Whether or not local graduates are encultured with the these values or get them from ethics 
teaching, additional help may be required by international medical graduates who are entering 
general practice in the UK – as the knowledge differences may be more prominent as regards 
ethics, especially in general practice.  
Participant accounts of ethics education between medical qualification and GP-training were 
few and brief, either stating that there was none, or that what there was focussed on 
procedural aspects such as keeping patient record confidential. This chimes with ethicists such 
as Sokol being invited to give an hour’s teaching to first-year doctors (Sokol, 2010b). This may 
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mean that newly-qualified doctors are reliant on their undergraduate education in ethics to 
make sense of the morally challenging aspects of practice. Undergraduate medical ethics might 
thus be seen as some degree of immunization against the more harmful aspects of the hidden 
curriculum both inside and outside of medical school (Cribb and Bignold, 1999). 
The formalised provision of ethics education for GP trainees in a classroom setting clearly 
predates the new MRCGP and the curriculum statement on ethics and values based practice. 
Where GP training schemes provide a class on ethics this is usually one half-day session 
comprising a presentation and some discussion. Otherwise, trainees can cover this with their 
trainer, in discussion with colleagues and through self directed learning. Learning, however, 
was focussed towards examinations, and participants were not very forthcoming about what 
they learned, except to refer to the four principles. Participants reflected how easy it was to 
miss the session on ethics, and how unprepared they were for the ethical aspects of practice. 
The participants that were not ethics enthusiasts confessed that they did not read books on 
ethics or look at online guidance, but only got as far as the GMC’s duties of a doctor and the 
four principles.  
Regardless of participants complaints about ethics in their formal educational settings, there 
were two aspects that were described in a universally positive way. Firstly, however little, 
there was some time that was allocated to reflecting on or finding out about ethics. Secondly 
the classroom environment or trainee group was described as safe. In the formal educational 
setting, mistakes and misunderstandings about ethics did not have the same perceived 
repercussions as they did in the work-place. Moreover, trainees had the safety-net of being 
supervised by a more experienced trainer who could be approached for advice, and indeed 
expected to be in a position to give it. This relied on participants having functional training–
relationships (none of my participants discussed having had a dysfunctional relationship with 
their trainer). It also relies on GP-trainers being able to help trainees with the ethical aspects of 
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practice, or to be able to direct them to resources. The relatively intensive supervision of 
trainees that can take place in general practice may allow trainers to help trainees to spot 
ethical issues of which they might have otherwise been unaware.  Trainers are more likely to 
be in the old guard who missed undergraduate ethics education, and may be in a position to 
compensate for trainees missing the solitary half-day on ethics. Much of the formative course 
work that I discussed in chapter 6 is also assessed by trainers and may never be seen by an 
independent assessor. Ethics education for GP-trainers may be therefore more if not as 
important as for trainees. Role modelling has traditionally been one way in which ethics have 
been taught, and is an element of GP training. Where trainer and/or trainee have the skills to 
reflect on ethical aspects of practice, this means that the trainer can openly reflect on her 
habits and, for example, what makes them good or bad habits, and the trainee can be 
encouraged to come to an independent conclusion. This avoids ethics being simply, ‘Doing as 
others do,’ an approach that plays to the hidden curriculum, especially if others do as they 
ought not to.   
Whilst considering ethics education I asked participants about the education of educators. 
Reading a book, or attendance on a day’s course, was considered sufficient by some GP-
trainers. Those who had a broader role such as teaching on Masters level course or directing 
undergraduate ethics education described a variety of ways in which they developed their 
knowledge, and this involved obtaining diplomas or degrees in philosophy, ethics and/or law. 
This is in line with longstanding recommendations that undergraduate and postgraduate ethics 
should have appropriate training (Gillon, 1987). 
Informal formative encounters with ethics did occur outside GP-training and post-qualification. 
These were described in a haphazard way – ethics ‘cropped up’ in Balint groups and significant 
event meetings, conversations over a coffee and ‘banter’ between salaried GP and the senior 
partner. The only consistent reason for ethics education other than haphazardly was if it 
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happened to be a special interest for the GP or if it was mandated by an assessment – the only 
such assessment for all GPs post qualification is the annual appraisal. Outside the educational 
environment, time is much more precious. 
In line with a broad concept of education, I considered reading as a type of pedagogy. Some 
participants described reading very high level philosophical treatises and others confessed to 
not reading anything about ethics. Reading reflected the variety of learning styles that GPs 
may have. Scholarly literature generally was viewed as being jargon-heavy and dry, and if 
ethics is to be accessed reliably by GPs as a topic, then it needs to be delivered in a variety of 
styles. This might for example include embedding ethical ideas in dramatic narratives or 
offering guidance that is focussed on a common aspect of practice. Potentially it might be 
offered in a variety of media. The problematic aspect of this is that peer-reviewed specialist 
journals are considered to be markers of academic success but, paradoxically, they can also be 
seen as the least helpful to front-line educators or ordinary practitioners. 
Evaluation 
 
I considered evaluation in two ways in this thesis. The traditional way in which it is considered 
is in the context of assessments, and I examined formal assessments that occur along the 
entire span of a GP’s medical career, beginning with entry to medical school, and including 
assessments that might take place after full qualification. I also considered the enactment of 





Ethics is a knowledge set that many of my participants vividly connected with some kind of 
formal assessment during their careers. It is assessed at entry into medical school, in medical 
school examinations, and is an element of selection to becoming Formal assessment of 
educational knowledge is a phenomenon that Bernstein categorised as a form of ‘evaluation.’ 
In essence it is one way in which ethics is enacted, albeit an artificial one. I explored key 
evaluative encounters represented by formal assessment processes. Just as with ‘Pedagogy’ 
(above) participants’ accounts included more than just the qualification to become a GP. In a 
similar fashion to my discussion of pedagogy, I expanded the gaze of the chapter beyond 
participants’ accounts to include selection for medical school and selection for general practice 
as well as medical and general practice examinations. Participants also connected ethics with 
formal assessments in practice that were unconnected to career advancement, such as 
appraisal for revalidation and external scrutiny connected to allegations of malpractice. 
Ethics in formal assessments that were connected to career advancement was experienced in 
two broad ways. It was either:  a minor component of a curriculum that would count very little 
to the total overall mark or it was a small but critical component that might make the 
difference between success and failure. 
Where ethics is a small component of an examination whose absence may be compensated for 
by different kinds of knowledge in order to qualify, then candidates may view it as something 
that is negotiable – something that may be deferred, or muddled through. This message comes 
across from about ‘just having to touch’ on ethics in the context of preparation for the new 
MRCGP. Both medical school and the new MRCGP written examinations rely on questions with 
right and best answers. Ethics may be omitted entirely by the learner at very little risk to 
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examination success. Where ethics is included in exam revision, its scope may be restricted to 
learning about questions with definite answers.  Essay and short answer questions, where they 
occur, can be subject to the same kinds of thinking by examinees.  The various ways in which 
ethics as an educational topic is transmitted may be inextricably connected with the way in 
which it is assessed. Evidence of this among participants was that trainees not only wanted to 
know things that could be tested but specifically the kinds of things (e.g. facts about current 
legal opinions) that could be tested by certain kinds of exam (e.g. multiple-choice questions).  
Similarly participants referred to studying the GMC guidance booklets as this represented the 
most authoritative set of rules for professional behaviour. 
Ethics is potentially unavoidable in assessments, and could make the difference between 
passing and failing. This is evident in three key ways: Ethics as encountered in interviews and 
oral examinations, ethics as a compulsory element in coursework, and ethics as a pervasive 
element in clinical examinations.  
The advantage of interviews and oral examinations is that ideas can be explored and tested. 
However, this can be interpreted as a request to reproduce a model answer. This is evident in 
discussions about ‘The four principles,’ in the context of the old MRCGP oral examination. It 
seems intuitive that if an examiner asks candidates what ethical framework they use, 
candidates will offer the framework that they think is most widely approved of. They may do 
so at a very abstract and superficial level because they have not considered how the four 
principles (or any other ethical framework) work in practice or in what circumstances they may 
not do so.    
Ethics as a compulsory element of coursework has the advantages of putting time for 
reflection on the leaner’s agenda, and allows for GP trainees’ ideas to be examined by GP-
trainers in a way that allows the process to be educational. This process is put at risk when 
learners prioritise the task above its purpose, for example by striving to get the right number 
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of ethical cases into an e-portfolio rather than using reading and clinical experience to 
demonstrate learning in this area. This phenomenon also begs the question of what is an 
ethical case and how it ought to be analysed. A narrow reading of what counts as ethics may 
restrict entries to a small number of clinical topics such as abortion or assisted suicide, or to 
dilemmas rather than everyday practice. As with other types of assessment, candidates may 
prefer a widely available ethical framework that is on the face of it easy to apply. The worked 
example for iMAP reflection uses the four principles (RCGP, 2010, RCGP, 2012) and I saw no 
alternative frameworks offered. Worked examples could demonstrate how to see the ethics in 
the ordinary as well as the extraordinary consultation. They could demonstrate a range of 
possible approaches to analysis. Perhaps then examiners might see a more diverse and robust 
set of answers and candidates might feel less afraid to offer a realistic critique of how the 
ethics of the classroom meet those of the clinic. 
The third way in which ethics can be critical in formal assessments is as a pervasive element in 
practice. This can be explicitly tested in clinical examinations, whether in medical school or in 
the new MRCGP. It may also be a way in which a candidate shows repeated deficiency. For 
example, repeatedly failing to give patients any explanations or options for treatment could be 
both recognised and remediated by an understanding of respect for patient autonomy. This is 
illustrated by the plight of many international medical graduates who do less well at the CSA in 
the new MRCGP. Ethics education, if successful may help such candidates understand the 
diverse values of the society in which they expect to practice. It may not be enough to assume 
that such ideas are absorbed over the course of training through role-modelling. 
Formal assessment of ethics can also take place outside the examination setting, and two 
examples of this were in my data: appraisal for revalidation and professional scrutiny over 
allegations of malpractice. Appraisal for revalidation has the potential to place ethical 
reflection on GPs lifelong educational agenda. However, truly reflective conversations about 
332 
 
clinical practice may be inhibited by the idea that appraisers have an explicit summative duty. 
As I encountered among both potential participants in the trade literature, this inhibition may 
be linked to a fear of sanctions. Where there is a threat of being deemed to be unprofessional, 
academic notions of ethics give way to a mixture of ordinary language, the law and the GMC 
duties as outlined in ‘Good Medical Practice’. The one potential participant who had been 
suspended by the GMC declined to offer any explanation (as was his/her right). The potential 
damage to GPs reputations may inhibit their sharing of lessons learned from such encounters. 
Indemnity organisations and the GMC get around this problem by publishing paradigm cases 
that are anonymous. Naturally GPs strive to avoid being subject to fitness to practice 
proceedings by their regulator. 
Practice 
Recognition of ethical issues 
An idea that emerges clearly from my participant data is that certain clinical scenarios come 
pre-identified as problematic, needing more careful attention, with the possibility of doing the 
wrong thing.  This pre-labelling of ethics comes largely from medical education. As ethics 
education appears largely to be an undergraduate phenomenon for GPs then such issues may 
reflect undergraduate teaching emphases. Issues such as abortion and euthanasia are raised as 
ethical, as well as a range of situations that might be classed as dilemmas and conflicts. 
Identification by pre-labelled scenario is useful in flagging certain situations as worthy of more 
careful consideration. However it may also blinker GPs concerning situations that do not come 
pre-labelled, or have yet to find their way from the academic and trade literature into formal 
education. 
Another key way in which the ethical content of practice may be identified is through the 
emotional discomfort that it engenders in the GP. Ethical discomfort is well recognised in 
educational literature.  Despite this, it is not obvious as to what a GP should do about such 
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discomfort, or that the discomfort is easily identifiable as an ethical problem. This may be one 
reason why ethical issues are sometimes raised in Balint Groups, one of the safer situations in 
which GP discuss the interpersonal aspects of practice.  
The identification of any aspect of practice as ethical allows the use of analytical tools, and 
permits access to ethical support and resources. Problematic or distressing issues that are not 
identified by the person experiencing them as ethical can only be identified as such if they are 
able to seek non-specific help such as from a GP-trainer or a Balint group. Accordingly GP-
trainers, Balint-group leaders, mentors, appraisers and other types of supervisor ought to be 
able to recognise when a disclosed problem is ethical in nature and at the least to signpost 
their trainees and colleagues to appropriate support and of resources. 
 
Ethical strategies 
The ability to identify an ethical problem, and even to frame and classify it without the 
knowledge of how to deal with it may be a source of distress for GPs. In discussion, 
participants identified a number of strategies for dealing with ethical issues.  
I was surprised by the honesty with which avoidance was identified as an ethical strategy.  
There are many reasons for GPs to avoid becoming involved in ethical decision-making. The GP 
may not feel that they have sufficient knowledge or experience to deal with an ethically 
complex case. Ethical decision-making also takes time when time is a precious resource. 
Spending the time to deal with an issue can result in increased work for other GPs.  Ethical 
decision-making can produce results that are unpopular or result in criticism of a GP. 
Consultations which involve ethical content can be emotionally charged, difficult to deal with 
and tiring. Accordingly, participants discussed a number of ways of avoiding having to do 
ethical work. One such systematic avoidance is represented by the delegation of discussions 
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around abortion to services outside the GP surgery. However a more subtle kind of avoidance 
is to restrict conversations to the biomedical aspects of practice – measuring physiological 
values and offering medications whilst disengaging from the holistic approach that is 
supposedly characteristic of the profession. Avoidance of ethical issues was seen as a morally 
inferior approach by my participants. Consultations informed by ethical awareness were seen 
as harder, but better. 
The key ethical strategy described by participants appears to be deferral, particularly to rules. 
Ethical rules, guidelines and policies are all examples of preventative ethics. Based on the idea 
that people with authority and expertise have produced rules with which to navigate 
problematic issues, GPs might defer to those rules rather than agonise over every case.  
Moreover, following rules is a percieved method of exculpation from wrongdoing. Participants 
also deferred to senior colleagues and to experts, whether they sought advice on what to do or 
validation of a proposed course of action. Even so some participants qualified their deferral  
and expressed a reluctance to defer blindly to rules and people. 
Conscious engagement with the ethics of practice by reference to ethical theory was described 
as a minority sport. This begs the question of what is the purpose of ethics education and what 
are the ethical competencies that ought to be expected of GPs. Participants offered the 
possible, albeit relatively minimal, answers that ethics might assist with the understanding of 
the professional boundaries of practice, and might allow GPs to explain their professional 
obligations to patients. Conscious engagement can be contrasted with a more intuitive, 
embedded approaches to ethics. The problem with embedded ethics, which I discussed as a 
form of unsconscious competence, is that unreflective practice may either be eroded by the 
pressures of daily life or fail to change with societal norms – in either case this may entail 
ethical unconscious competence developing into unconscious incompetence.  
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The variety of approaches to engagement with ethics both in education and practice may 
reflect the variety of GP’s learning styles. Ethics education needs to be presented in a variety of 
ways to accomodate this.  
 
Substantive ethical issues 
In the two chapters on substantive ethical issues I focussed on key ethical issues that 
participants discussed, and here I draw together some theoretical threads that might feed back 
into ethics education. 
More than anything else, the participants wanted to discuss confidentiality. The point that 
comes across very clearly is that GPs are most comfortable staying within the boundaries of 
their professional rules. Confidentiality represents more than a rule, however. It is a 
professional ethic that permeates the history of the profession and one which the profession is 
constantly promising to uphold. The closeness of clinical and professional relationships and the 
very geographical proximity of practice staff to patients (and their communities) warrants 
many learning materials having a chapter on ethics and a chapter on confidentiality. Justified 
breaches of confidentiality were still uncomfortable experiences, and the reason for this was 
that GPs were aware that even when justified, breaching confidentiality carried a risk of harm 
to the patient or criticism of the GP. Conversely participants described how in confidentiality 
scenarios, rules could not always be relied upon to give clear answers and required 
interpretation. Even if there was guidance for a situation there was no guarantee that GPs 
would know that it existed or how to access it, or, in the heat of a situation, that there would 
be time to do so. This was a potent source of anxiety. A richer understanding of ethics allows 
GPs to weigh competing duties, and to understand the basis of confidentiality sufficiently to 
know when they were in keeping with sprit of the ethic and to recognise when they were not. 
Of course understanding ethical principles, and their complexities, may not be enough to enact 
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them; especially where this is connected to a fear of reprisals that overwhelms the courage to 
do what is ethically right.  
One of the sources of ethical tension that arose in my discussions about the key substantive 
themes was not so much ethical as epistemological. Belief and conscientious objection is 
something that GP-education materials tend to ascribe to the rights of GPs with conservative 
religious beliefs to exempt themselves from involvement in abortions. However the ethical 
education of any GP ought if possible to encompass an approach to dealing with a wide variety 
of differences in both cultural and scientific belief. These differences may be manifest between 
the GP and the patient, between different GPs, or even between GPs and the government of 
the day. Recognising the nature of these differences might sometimes involve making a 
decision to compromise one’s own beliefs in the interest of patient satisfaction or democracy. 
However it may also involve a sincere conscientious objection, for example, to performing a 
financially incentivised task, or to making a referral for a treatment that the GP believes is 
useless or harmful but that the patient has some entitlement to. 
As well as conscientious objection, the ethics of conscientious persuasion could be further 
explored in ethics education and research. The degree to which GPs using their authority and 
knowledge to influence patients can represent a challenge to the respect for patient autonomy 
(Doyal, 1999, Neighbour, 2005a). Part of the ethical complexity lies in the acknowledgement 
and declaration of conflicts of interest. Should the GP who recommends a treatment also state 
that they have a financial interest in prescribing it, and should the GP who does not believe 
that a request for abortion meets the criteria set down by law also declare that they are 
opposed to the procedure on religious grounds? Such disclosures may have a bearing on the 
outcome of the conversation in themselves, and how to bring ethics into discussion with 
patients was raised several times in my data. 
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The discussions surrounding incentivised medicine and around resource allocation illustrate a 
tension between practicing personalised medicine and population medicine. The strains of 
practicing patient-centred medicine in a resource-limited environment is well documented, 
and Iliffe uses the analogy of GPs being between the hammer of utilitarian, population-based 
medicine and the anvil of deontological, patient-centred medicine (Iliffe, 2001). The 
educational implication is that ethics education often focuses on the ‘individual’ account, 
whether this is informed by a Hippocratic approach, the individualistic aspect of the four 
principles (where autonomy is first among equals), of the RCGP-espoused ethic of holistic 
patient-centred medicine. Consequently other accounts may be seen less as ethical and more 
as the inconvenient facts of life. An awareness of the ethics and philosophy, however basic, of 
utilitarian aspects of public health, evidence based medicine and concepts of community and 
solidarity may help GPs to understand their wider duties and the challenge of reconciling these 
with person-centred practice. 
338 
 
General practice ethics as boundary-work 
 
In this final section I will attempt to draw some overarching conclusions about the production, 
transmission and enactment of ethics education. In brief I want to argue that general practice 
ethics can usefully be understood as a complex form of ‘boundary work’. It arises at the 
conjunction of, and from interactions between, many academic and professional currents and 
debates that determine the boundary of what counts as ethics for different purposes. General 
practice ethics draws upon, and generates, ideas about both academic ethics and professional 
ethics. Unsurprisingly given the many different conceptions of, and perspectives in, ethics the 
various boundaries in question are strongly contested. But these contests are also practically 
very important because they coincide with crucial concerns about the professional status and 
legitimacy of general practice as a field and GPs as individual professionals. 
Ethics education in any professional setting represents a unique site to study the connections 
between the production, transmission and enactment of knowledge.  This is because ethics is 
recognised as an overtly contested kind of knowledge, where multiple stakeholders make 
claims on what a curriculum should contain and who should legitimately contribute to it. 
Others have raised the possibility that the production and enactment of ethics is significantly 
shaped by social factors (Cribb, 2010), and I have extended this argument by shining a light on 
these processes of production in general practice.  
In several places in this thesis I have used ‘boundary work’ (Gieryn, 1983, Gieryn, 1999) as a 
sensitising concept. Boundary work has been used in the sociology of scientific knowledge and 
in the sociology of professions to understand how academics and professionals defend their 
professional autonomy (Wainwright et al., 2006). If curriculum is defined as what counts as 
valid knowledge for the purpose of general practice ethics, then this is clearly also founded on 
the ways in which general practice attempts to justify itself among a variety of medical 
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specialities – chief among these is the claim to be both biomedical and psychosocial. This latter 
claim contains an important tension which acts on practitioners and can generate broader 
tensions both within the medical profession and with the demands for clear disciplinary 
boundaries and constructions of rigour emerging from academia. The tensions between 
biomedical and psychosocial orientations, as well as those between academic and practical 
perspectives, need to be systematically borne in mind in the delivery of ethics education to 
GPs at every stage of their educational journey. 
Linked to the contested nature of the ethics curriculum are the questions, “who should own 
and do GP ethics?” and “what are the implications of different ways of answering this 
question?” Ethics can be taught differently depending on the learner’s need. There is, of 
course, a basic need to act rightly, and in a manner that is thereby shielded from criticism. 
There is an allied need to be able to explain one’s actions, whether to a regulator, a peer or a 
patient. A key idea that surfaces both in reading and in discussions with participants is whether 
there should be some deliberate limitations on the ethics education of GPs. Should, for 
example, the ethical education of GPs (and doctors in general) be limited to the key legislation 
and professional guidelines? Should all tough decisions be deferred to a GP with special 
interest in ethics and law or an ‘ethics consultant’? One of the answers suggested by this thesis 
is that all GPs need to engage with ethics in some greater way (than the above minimum) in 
order properly to belong in the professional group. In part this is because having a set of 
ethical standards and, importantly, being able to interpret and balance them in practice is a 
key demand within, and element of, professional identity. It is, for example, a demand that is 
potentially present in formal assessments at every key point in a GPs career. In this regard 
engagement with ethics is part of becoming a GP. 
In addition ethics is an unavoidable element of practice. The predicament for practising GPs is 
that there is often a reality gap between what is expected of them and what the constraints of 
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practice allow them to do. This too makes some basic engagement with ethics unavoidable. 
Educators need a better understanding of the GP’s predicament as a moral agent. Ethics, by 
definition, involves answering questions about what is good and bad, right and wrong, 
professional and unprofessional. Becoming a GP is easier than being a GP in this regard, 
because it is easier to give the idealistic answer in an examination setting or to talk in 
abstractions. Admitting to grey areas is difficult for professions and professionals. At first 
glance, the deliberate removal of ‘too much’ discussion of ethics from public contexts (from 
display) avoids revealing weaknesses and inconsistencies in broadly accepted ethical ideas, 
legistation and local policies. However, preaching what is impossible to practice, and preaching 
what is not commonly practiced creates un-resolvable ethical tensions for those who have to 
enact that practice.  
Just as a goal for learners is to pass formal assessments and become accredited with the social 
benefits of the education, there is a sense that practicing ethically means practicing what is 
either mandated by rule or guideline, or in some way praiseworthy or ‘good’. The absence of 
uniformly uncomplicated decisions in practice means that practitioners run the risk of being 
considered not good or praiseworthy every time a difficult decision has to be made.  
Consequently the demand for ethical knowledge in work may mirror that demanded for 
exams, in that there is a preference for situational rules rather than an understanding of 
theory and debate. If a rule is followed correctly it exculpates. However, the same people who 
demand rules for action will sometimes express dissatisfaction that the smorgasbord of topics 
and guidelines is not comprehensive or clear enough. Learning a set of rules is not enough – as 
we have seen in the examples above, rules have exceptions, and rules change over time. 
Moreover rules are not exhaustive, they require interpretation at some point, and they 
depend upon sufficient understanding to know when they ought not to apply. Confidentiality is 
just one clear example of the way that guidelines are not exhaustive or consistent, and GPs 
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may need to rely on balancing pragmatic judgements and principles when authoritative advice 
is unavailable. Because an ethic of confidentiality is held in such high regard, even justified 
breaches of it are associated with discomfort. Acknowledging the existence and the sources of 
such discomfort may reassure GPs that they are right in thinking that doing the right thing is 
necessary but also sometimes very difficult. 
Hence, as this thesis has revealed, it is important to recognise that because ethics represents 
professional boundaries, the reflective study of ethics is a dangerous hobby. To be considered 
unethical is tantamount to being considered unprofessional.  GPs will be reluctant to discuss 
issues that might lead to their own censure. Discussion of such issues also creates dilemmas 
for colleagues and educators as to whether to interfere or disclose the content of sensitive 
discussions to a regulator. Whilst no one confided any criminal activities to me, two 
prospective participants withdrew their consent to participate out of concerns about their 
privacy and ethical exposure. They highlight a concern that ethical reflection on one’s own 
practice occurs at one’s own risk. A genuine amnesty in appraisals may allow GPs to air their 
ethical difficulties as a first step to solving them. Even a call for a less rhetorical and a more 
conciliatory tone in response to those dilemmas that are publically aired may encourage more 
public discussions.  
A potentially dangerous implication of understanding ethics as professional boundary work is 
what I have previously alluded to as an inverse-care issue in ethics education (Papanikitas, 
2011a). Professional isolation is not just a matter of geographical isolation. Other empirical 
work has suggested both that general practitioners and clinicians in primary care access ethics 
support less, and that better ethics education results in better ability to access such support 
(Slowther, 2009, Hurst et al., 2007). This may partly be because GPs rightly or wrongly fear 
professional repercussions by exposing their ethical inadequacies to scrutiny. Factors that 
affect the approachability of colleagues include elements of safety such (at its most basic) 
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whether the colleague will be friendly or stern. The failure to access education and support 
may also be because GPs have developed an unconscious incompetence as regards an ethical 
matter and are just unaware of the need to reflect on this or to seek advice. Forums and 
colleagues that have a specified role in looking at broad areas of interpersonal practice or 
emotional difficulty are uniquely placed to identify ethics (as an educational subject) and 
signpost GPs to appropriate resources.  The simple provision of ethics education resources and 
ethics support may not be enough – GPs also need an enhanced ability to access both.  
Much has been written about academic inter-disciplinarity in the context of ethics research 
(Dunn et al., 2008). This thesis offers a tentative bridge between the social studies of 
education and work on general practice ethics. It rests on the premise that, in this translational 
context, the two fields benefit from being considered side by side. The sociology of knowledge, 
in particular, has informed my mapping of the phenomenon that is ethics education in general 
practice. It has helped me understand how ethics as a subject studied is shaped by the 
sometimes conflicting interests and demands of academia, education and practice. Ethics 
education needs to draw upon a range of theoretical perspectives but it should also be 
sensitive to the realities of practice, offering practitioners the tools with which to understand 
their professional boundaries, and to retain sight of what is good general practice in the grind 
of daily life with its attendant risk of moral erosion. 
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Summary of key findings linked to initial research questions 
 
1. What kinds of issues and questions do general practitioners consider are ethical and how 
are these recognised? 
 
Participants recognised ethical aspects of practice in three overlapping ways: 
1. When an issue mapped onto topics that had been pre-identified as ethical, such as 
confidentiality or abortion. 
2. When they identified conflicts between rules or between the needs and perspectives 
of individuals - including some that were identifiable as ‘dilemmas’. E.g. confidentiality 
dilemmas were illustrated by well described rules that appeared to conflict at times. 
3. When emotional discomfort arose that might not be readily explored, classified and 
resolved without assistance. This could apply to any situation  where a GP did not have  
the skills to identify the source of the discomfort. It could as easily relate to well-
rehearsed issues such as confidentiality, or less tangible issues such as power-
relationships and professional boundaries.  Issues that were not readily identifiable to 
those experiencing them might be exposed in formal educational settings such as 
trainee discussions, appraisals and mentoring, or in forums specially aiming to 
understand areas of difficulty such as significant event audits and Balint groups. 
 
2. How do GPs manage ethical issues in their professional lives? 
 
Participants described three main approaches to ethical encounters in practice: 
1. Avoidance was one approach to ethics in practice. Difficulty and lack of time were 
described as predisposing factors to avoidance. This was seen by participants as un-
praiseworthy. This was because whilst exploring the ethical aspects of practice might 
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make decisions harder, avoiding them also involved missing opportunities to improve 
patient care in a more holistic manner. 
2. Deferral was perceived to be a common approach to ethical issues; this included 
deferral to rules and guidelines, a specialist opinion or a senior GP in the workplace. 
Deferral can involve some abdication of responsibility but it can also increase 
confidence that a decision (endorsed by guidelines or colleagues) would be either 
good or less open to criticism. 
3. Engagement with ethical issues by drawing upon ethical learning and by thinking 
through the issues and taking responsibility for actions was also reported; but this was 
not seen as a common approach. 
3.  How is ethics-education produced for and delivered in General Practice? 
 
The production of ethics as a subject and topic 
 
 Ethics as an educational topic has multiple sources and these include both academic 
and professional publications. 
 Academic rigour in ethics is valued in some publication contexts but may render work 
less intelligible to both educators and practitioners. Publication in specialist journals, 
partly for this reason, was identified in the study with a decreased likelihood that the 
publication would be read by ordinary GPs. 
 Professional publications on ethics also face some difficulties of ‘translation’. For 
instance, they tend to emphasise professional ideals and duties, e.g. the professional 
ethic that celebrates ‘Patient-centredness.’ This ethic can clash with other sources of 




 The building of a strong and cohesive research base in GP ethics faces significant 
challenges: 
 The emphasis on hospital and experimental medicine in academic forums (e.g. 
conferences and journals) may also deter researchers from asking theoretical and 
empirical questions of direct relevance to the primary care workforce and patients. 
 Ethics research in may be harder to justify compared to research that has obvious or 
quantifiable impact on disease and patient care.  
 In departments of academic general practice/primary care that previously were 
involved in undergraduate and postgraduate ethics teaching, the loss of this role to 
other perhaps more specialized departments may contribute to ethics being seen as a 
low priority field of study. 
 Consequently, scholars contributing to this field may find themselves in a diverse array 
of departments, fields and academic disciplines without easy ways of communicating 
ideas. 
 
Modes of teaching and learning 
 
 The majority of formal ethics education is perceived to occur at undergraduate level. 
Formal ethics education is reported to a smaller degree in postgraduate and GP 
training. Some GPs had sought out additional education but among my participants 
this was based on personal interest and as part of developing teaching skills and not on 
clinical need. Some older GPs and international medical graduates may therefore 
require additional educational input on ethics.  
 Participants described classroom-based ethics education in GP training, when it did 
occur, as brief and potentially easy to miss. They also described discussion, whether in 
groups, or between trainee and trainer. This may imply an expanded role for GP-
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trainers in ethics education, whether as a facilitator of ethical discussion, or as an 
ethical role model. Consequently, trainers ought to have some training in ethics and an 
awareness of ethics resources. 
 Participants described formal educational settings as safe, with protected time for 
discussion. This contrasts with descriptions of professional life presenting little time for 
discussion and isolation from supportive colleagues. 
 Participants were aware that ethics education in general practice was guided by a 
formal curriculum, but for the most part did not know the curriculum’s content. 
Undergraduate ethics education was seen as rooted in academic ethics frameworks 
such as the four principles, whereas postgraduate ethics education was identified with 
the GMC’s document, ‘Good Medical Practice.’ For these participants both the ‘Four 
Principles’ and ‘Good Medical Practice’ were learned and taught in preference to 
‘Value-based practice.’ This implies a need to better understand what influences the 
use of, or ignorance of, key curricular components and models in education.  
The testing of ethics 
 
 Participants described preparing for assessment of their ethics education in a limited 
number of ways, which involved either the ‘Four Principles’ or ‘Good Medical Practice.’ 
Examiners and educators describe these often being used in ways that were 
abstracted, superficial or rigid. 
 Guidance on how to address ethics in coursework or examinations may sometimes 
appear open to a variety of approaches to ethical analysis. Worked examples, 
however, generally used the ‘Four principles’.  
 Formal testing of ethical competence outside of education and training can take place 
in the contexts of malpractice allegations, significant event audits (e.g. after a 
complaint), or discussion in a professional appraisal  
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 The most pervasive test of ethical knowledge is practice itself. Because this is largely 
unobserved, GPs arguably require skills to appraise their own performance and to find 
relevant education and support. 
 
4. How do the recognition and management of ethical aspects of practice inter-relate with 
ethics education in general practice? 
 
 Issues that arise in practice (e.g. through the experience of emotional discomfort or 
conflicts of needs and perspectives) are not necessarily those that come ‘pre-
identified’ as ethical issues in education. 
 Very common approaches taken in practice, including ‘avoidance’ or ‘deferral’ 
approaches, do not all involve the kind of conscious engagement in ethical deliberation 
often envisaged in ethics education. 
 Ethics education is seen as relatively brief and as largely clustering around 
undergraduate education rather than the contexts in which GPs train and practise. 
 The kinds of assessment that occur in ethics education are different in kind from and 
much less high stakes than the ‘assessment’ of ethics in practice. 
 The genres adopted in ethics texts (especially academic texts) can be alienating to 
those interested in practical relevance. 
 An awareness of the ethical traditions and frameworks that underlie evidence-based 
medicine, public health, and concepts of community and solidarity, may help GPs to 
understand their wider duties and the challenge of reconciling these with person-
centred practice. 
 An awareness of the social forces that shape academic and professional thinking in 
ethics education may be useful in making arguments for adequate resources for the 
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study of practice-relevant questions and improved communication between 
academics, educators, and front-line practitioners.   
 This study takes a broad view of ethics education in general practice, pulling together 
how ethics as a subject for education is conceived, taught and learned, tested in 
educational and professional settings, and enacted in practice. This represents the 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
Interviews: Stakeholders 
Bioethics scholarship and moral 
deliberation in UK General Practice 
Introduction 
I would like to invite you to participate in a PhD 
research project which looks at the combined 
ethical, social and legal understandings, 
regulations and practices that inform how UK 
GPs identify and reconcile ethical conflict in the 
context of primary care. This information sheet 
is designed to give you more information on the 
purpose of the study, and to outline what you 
would be invited to do if you took part in the 
research.  Before you decide to take part it is 
important for you to understand why the 
research is being done and what it will involve.  
Please take time to read the following 
information and discuss it with others if you 
wish.  If anything is not clear, or if you would 
like more information, then please contact the 
researcher at any time.  Please remember that 
you should only participate if you want to and 
choosing not to take part will not disadvantage 
you in any way. 
 
What is the purpose of the research project? 
 
This project will address the questions: What 
issues generate ethical conflict for GPs? How 
are these ethical conflicts resolved or 
reconciled? How does this affect and how is it 
affected by curricula, guidelines and academic 
research into law and ethics?  
 
The study (towards a PhD in the Sociology of 
Biomedical Ethics) aims: 
 
1. To discover, using qualitative methods, the 
explicit and implicit ethical decision-making 
strategies used by UK GPs as well as those 
suggested by stakeholders involved with UK 
Primary Care Ethics. 
2. To use this data to further understand how 
such decisions are made, why different 
strategies are used and how moral principles, 
professional guidelines and laws are applied and 
reconciled when they conflict. 
3. To contrast the approaches used by a sample 
of UK GPs and relevant stakeholders with 
ethical frameworks identified in the literature on 
General Practice ethics. 
4. It is anticipated that this research will 
illustrate different perceptions and 
strategies of ethical decision-making by UK 
GPs, and that this will help lawyers and 
policymakers shape future laws, codes of 
practice and guidelines for situations 
associated with ethical dispute, 
conscientious objection and moral 
ambiguity. 
 
Who is conducting the research? 
 
The project team consists of Dr Andrew 
Papanikitas (Centre for Biomedicine & Society, 
King’s College London) who is supervised by 
Professor Clare Williams (Centre for 
Biomedicine & Society, King’s College 
London); Professor Steven Wainwright (Centre 
for Biomedicine & Society, King’s College 
London); with advice from Professor Rosamund 
Scott (Centre for Medical Law and Ethics, 
King’s College London). The Chief Investigator 
is Andrew Papanikitas. The research will be 
carried out by Andrew, who is a part-time 
practising GP and has had training in Medical 
Law and Ethics as well as qualitative research 
methods.   
 
Who is funding the research? 
This study is currently self-funded.  
 
What would I be invited to do? 
 
We wish to conduct interviews with GP and 
non-GP stakeholders in primary care ethics.  
The interviews will be conducted by Andrew 
Papanikitas, a practising GP with training in 
clinical ethics and qualitative research methods, 
and will last approximately ninety minutes. 
With permission, interviews will be audio 
recorded and transcribed. 
 
What are the aims of the interviews? 
Discussion about ethical decision-making in 
Primary Care, which we hope will be useful to 
everyone participating  
 To produce examples of dilemmas 
and insights into their resolution 
362 
 
 To help frame interview and focus 
group research which is taking 
place in parallel to these 
stakeholder interviews 
 
Possible risks of participation 
Some participants may feel anxiety about some 
of the topics raised, or discomfort with the 
implications of expressing their views. Topics 
may be raised, or ways of thinking about them, 
that you did not anticipate, or would rather not 
discuss openly.  The dilemmas raised may not 
be resolved in the discussion. You may hold 
religious, political or cultural beliefs that you do 
not wish to reveal, or to have to explain. 
 
Possible benefits of participation 
GPs at all stages of training are encouraged as 
part of appraisal and revalidation to reflect upon 
the ethical problems which may arise in the 
context of primary care. It is also hoped that all 
participant stakeholders will have the 
opportunity to contribute to and influence 
research findings that may lead to policy 
recommendations and academic contributions to 
GP-education and primary care ethics. 
Will the information I provide be kept 
confidential? 
In accordance with the 1998 Data Protection 
Act, all information collected during the 
research will be kept confidential. Transcripts of 
the interviews will be anonymised and any 
identifying details removed. Some broad 
demographic questions may be asked (e.g. 
practice setting, qualifications in medical ethics) 
to aid interpretation. Recordings and transcripts 
will be stored securely in a research office.  At 
project completion, audio recordings will be 
destroyed; transcripts will be stored for 7 years 
from project completion. Consent forms will be 
kept securely for the same period. If anyone 
feels, at the time or afterwards, that they do not 
want specific statements to be used in reports 
we will omit these from the transcript. 
However, we cannot withdraw data after it has 
been included in a submission, presentation or 
publication (which will take place a minimum 
60 days after participation). Please feel free to 
emphasise while you are talking if you want 
particular points to be omitted from all reports. 
The only exception to this would be the 
disclosure of unacceptable practice. 
What will happen to the results of the 
research study? 
We will publish papers in academic 
journals and give conference 
presentations. The results will be 
presented as a PhD Thesis, which in turn 
may be published as a book. Verbatim 
quotes may be used, but participants will 
not be identifiable in any report, 
publication or presentation. Participants 
may elect to receive a summary of findings 
toward the end of the study, which will be 
placed on the project website. Further 
details of the project can be found on the 




Who has reviewed the study? 
This Study has been approved by the Royal Free 
Hospital NHS Research Ethics Committee (ref. 
no: 09/H0720/126) 
 
What do I do now? 
If you are interested in hearing more about the 
study then please contact Andrew and he will be 
happy to answer any questions you may have.  If 
you agree to participate then an interview will be 
scheduled at a time and place convenient for you.  
If you do decide to take part you will be asked to 
sign a consent form and be given a copy of this and 
the information sheet to keep. 
 
E-mail:  andrew.papanikitas@kcl.ac.uk      
Telephone: 07872383688   
What if I decide not to take part? 
You are free to decide not to take part.  Even if you 
do agree to take part you are free to withdraw from 
the study at any time without explanation.  
Withdrawal will not be possible once data has been 
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used in publications (a minimum of 60 days after 
your participation). 
What if I have any concerns? 
If you have any concerns or other questions about 
this study or the way it has been carried out, then 
please contact Andrew Papanikitas in the first 
instance.   
Alternatively, you can contact Professor Clare 
Williams, main academic supervisor and Director of 
the Centre for Biomedicine and Society, King’s 
College London. 
E-mail:  clare.2.williams@kcl.ac.uk  
Telephone: 07850 093522 
What if something goes wrong? 
If you are harmed by taking part in this project, 
there are no special compensation arrangements. If 
you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then 
you may have grounds for a legal action but you 
may have to pay for it. Regardless of this, if you 
wish to complain, or have any concerns about any 
aspect of the way you have been approached or 
treated during the course of this study, the normal 
NHS complaints mechanisms should also be 
available to you. Information about Independent 





Thank you for reading this
Appendix D: Interview consent form 
CONSENT FORM 
Interviews 
Bioethics scholarship and moral deliberation in UK General Practice 
 
Name of Chief Investigator: Dr Andrew Papanikitas  
Names of Supervisors: Professor Clare Williams and Professor Steven Wainwright 
Name of Interviewer: Dr Andrew Papanikitas 
          
 Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated  
  (insert date) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw  
 specific statements made in the interview or the entire interview, prior to the inclusion of 
data in a presentation, publication or submission (which will take place a minimum of 60 days 
after my participation), without giving any reason, and without my legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I agree to my interview being recorded on tape/cd/digital recording on the  
 Understanding that the audio recording will be destroyed/erased once the   
 project is ended  (July 2011). 
 
4. I understand that my interview will inform the study and that data from   
 this interview may be used anonymously in reports and publications. 
 






________________________ ________________ __________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
I confirm that I have explained the proposed study to the participant: 
 
 
________________________ ________________ __________________ 
Researcher Date  Signature 
 






Appendix E: Focus group consent form 
 
CONSENT FORM Discussion Groups 
 
Bioethics scholarship and moral deliberation in UK General Practice 
 
Name of Chief Investigator: Dr Andrew Papanikitas 
Names of Supervisors: Professor Clare Williams, Professor Steven Wainwright 
Name of Ethics Discussion Group Facilitator: Dr Andrew Papanikitas    
Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated (insert date) 
  for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw specific 
 statements made in the discussion, prior to the inclusion of data in a presentation,  
 publication or submission (this will take place a minimum of 60 days after my participation), 
 without giving any reason, and without my legal rights being affected. 
 
4. I agree to my contribution being audio-recorded on tape/cd/digital recording   
 on the understanding that the audio recording will be destroyed/erased once the project  
 is ended (July 2011).    
 
5. I understand that my discussion group will inform the study and that data from  
 this discussion group may be used anonymously in reports and publications. 
 




I agree to take part in this discussion group subject to the conditions agreed above: 
 
 
________________________ ________________ __________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
I confirm that I have explained the proposed study to the participant: 
 
 
________________________ ______________  __________________ 
Researcher Date  Signature 
 







Appendix F: Interview topic guide 
 
Topic Guide: Stakeholder Interviews 
Bioethics scholarship and moral deliberation in UK General Practice 
 
Name of Chief Investigator: Dr Andrew Papanikitas  
Names of Supervisors: Professor Clare Williams and Professor Steven Wainwright 
Name of Interviewer: Dr Andrew Papanikitas 
 
It is not anticipated that the interview will match these questions exactly or that all of them will 
be covered, however these are a guide to the core issues relating to the research questions. This 
topic guide may be modified, based on the stakeholder’s background and involvement in 
primary care ethics. 
 
This research looks at how UK GPs identify, categorise and attempt to reconcile ethical issues which arise in 
the context of primary care. This study also asks similar questions of certain stakeholders such as your self. I 
would like to begin by asking some broad background questions: 
 
 How would you describe the setting in which you currently practice? (if not a GP –how would you 
describe your involvement with General Practice or Medical Ethics?) 
 Would you be happy to describe your background in terms of religion or world-view? 
 Do you have any expertise or qualifications with regard to medical ethics and law? 
 What broad involvement do you have in teaching/designing professional curricula or setting 
standards which will be used by UK GPs? 
 What experience of teaching or learning have you had w.r.t. the RCGP statement on ethics and 
values based medicine, Good Medical Practice or Medical Ethics and Law more broadly? 
 
I am now going to ask you about how you approach ethical problems in general practice. There are no 
wrong answers. You may decline to answer any question, withdraw any statement, take a break or stop the 
interview at any time. At times it may seem as though I am pressing you, but this is only because I am 




 What kinds of situations do you think of when you hear the phrase, ‘Ethical issues in general 
practice’? How would you distinguish GP ethics from Primary Care ethics? 
 Do you think that GP or Primary Care ethics is sufficiently different from hospital ethics to warrant 
its own subdicipline of medical ethics? If so why? If not why not? 
 How do you feel that the styles and approaches used in bioethics scholarship relate to moral 
deliberation for UK general practitioners? 
 In what ways might ethics curricula, codes of practice and ethical/legal guidelines relate to moral 
deliberation? 
 What do you think makes a problem an ethical problem in General Practice? 
 Can you think of an example in your practice or which you are aware of? Would you be happy to 
discuss this? How did you/would you go about resolving this problem? 
 In broad terms how do you/would you approach resolving an ethical problem? Do you use any 
particular ethical frameworks in practice? Can you give me an example? 
 Have you ever had to make a choice between two unacceptable outcomes? Could you tell me 
more about this and how you resolved the issue? 
 Are there any peer support networks you use for such problems? Would you use a clinical ethics 
committee if one was available? Do you ever use medical defence organisations to aid ethical 





Appendix G: Focus group topic guide 
 
Topic Guide: Trainers Focus Groups/Trainee Focus Groups 
 
How do UK general practitioners identify and reconcile ethical conflict? 
Name of Chief Investigator: Dr Andrew Papanikitas  
Names of Supervisors: Professor Clare Williams and Professor Steven Wainwright 
Name of Interviewer: Dr Andrew Papanikitas 
How do UK general practitioners identify and reconcile ethical conflict?   
 
It is not anticipated that the discussion will match these questions exactly or that all of them 
will be covered, however these are a guide to the core issues relating to the research questions.  
This research looks at how UK GPs identify, categorise and attempt to reconcile ethical dilemmas 
which arise in the context of primary care. 
I would like to begin by asking each participant to write down an answer to these broad 
background questions which have been shown to be relevant to ethical decision-making in 
previous research. All answers are optional and will be kept confidential from the group so as 
not to bias discussion in any way. (presented to each participant as a form prior to the 
discussion -attached): 
 How would you describe the setting in which you currently practice? (e.g. rural, urban, 
suburban) 
 If you are happy to do so, would you describe your background in terms of religion or 
world-view? 
 Do you have any expertise or qualifications with regard to medical ethics and law? 
 What broad involvement do you have (if any) in teaching/designing professional curricula 
or setting standards which will be used by UK GPs? 
 What experience of teaching or learning have you had w.r.t. the RCGP statement on 
ethics and values based medicine, Good Medical Practice or Medical Ethics and Law more 
broadly? 
I am now going to ask you to discuss how you approach ethical problems in general practice. 
There are no wrong answers. You may decline to answer any question or withdraw any 
statement, take a break or leave the group at any time in discussion. I will do my best to stay quiet 
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and leave the discussion to you. This exercise is expected to take roughly ninety minutes, and I 
will move the group on a certain intervals. 
 What kinds of situations do you think of when you hear the phrase, ‘Ethical issues in 
general practice’? What do you think makes a problem an ethical problem in General 
Practice? 
 In broad terms how do you/would you approach resolving an ethical problem? Do you use 
any particular ethical frameworks in practice? Can you give me an example? 
 Can you think of situations where a GP might make a choice between two unacceptable 
outcomes? Could you tell me how you resolved the issue? 
 Can you think of an example of ethical dilemmas in your practice or which you are aware 
of? Would you be happy to discuss this? How did you/would you go about resolving this 
problem? 
 Are there any peer support networks you might use for such problems? Would you use a 
clinical ethics committee if one was available? Do you ever use medical defence 
organisations to aid ethical decision-making?  
 How would you describe professional ethics? How is this different from the law? Who 
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